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Abstract 
 
In the last decade the endogenous growth theory has been said to have found into the 
difference of endowment of knowledge that different regions possess both an explanation of 
semi permanent differences in prosperity levels and, consequently, a recipe for eliminating 
the gaps.  
The theory had significant policy consequences and the impact was particularly large on the 
European Commission when it was decided to drastically increase the share of structural 
funds – the money meant to produce economic convergence of regions –   into R&D.  
However, statistical data show a weak correlation between R&D expenditure and economic 
growth acceleration, and more specifically, the correlation becomes even weaker if applied 
to EU poorer regions. 
More precisely, the evidence suggests that R&D programmes can display different returns. 
This work wants to be contribution to better understand the reasons that lie behind these 
differences. 
The research tests an hypothesis described through a framework that we called innovation 
value chain.  
The result is that better performing innovation strategies are associated to: a more 
concentrated allocation of available resources and a higher capability of the initial public 
investments to stimulate further private investments; a clearer distribution of responsibilities 
for decision making over structural funds programmes and independence from policy 
making of the implementation processes of the programmes; a presence of partnerships 
amongst business, universities, government and public opinions that pre exist the 
implementation of the programmes and are based on specific per projects objectives. 
The analysis is carried out through case studies that compare similar OB 1 programmes in 
regions that were similarly endowed as far as R&D assets at the beginning of the 2000 – 
2006 programming period and that, yet, showed opposite results and patterns of economic 
growth.  
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You have learnt something. That always feels at first as if you had lost something. 
 
George Bernard Shaw
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Public investments in R&D as a tool for regional economic development 
Under which circumstances do the European Union’s Structural Funds investments on 
research achieve their objective to contribute to economic convergence of regions? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Innovation has become in the last fifteen years the priority that is shared by the political economy 
strategies of countries at different stage of development and by virtually all political sides. However, 
statistics appear to sometimes contradict such a wide consensus: the propensity of economies and 
societies to invest in innovation has not always increased as much as promised and technology driven 
changes have not always been capable to significantly impact economic data. 
More specifically as far as the regional development policies, the endogenous growth theory has been 
said to have found both an explanation of semi permanent differences in prosperity levels amongst 
different countries and regions and, consequently, a recipe for eliminating the gaps. Knowledge was 
theorized to be not freely transferrable across geographical areas and the spontaneous concentration 
of it in some places was identified as the determinant of lasting differences in productivity levels. The 
consequence of such a position was that convergence cannot happen spontaneously and, therefore, 
there is a need for the state to invest into knowledge related assets in less advanced regions.  
The theory had significant policy consequences in many countries. The impact, however, was 
particularly big in the European Union (EU): a new emphasis was placed on knowledge by the EU 
Lisbon Strategy and by its policy targets in both the 2000 – 2010 period and the 2010 – 2020 one; the 
European Commission (EC)’s investments into research and development (R&D) was increased; 
even sharper was the shift towards this typology of expenditures of the structural funds’ budget that 
finances the EU cohesion policies whose aim is to reduce differences in prosperity amongst EU 
regions.  
Currently 140 billion euro are being spent by the EC - through structural funds and framework 
programs - in R&D and, more broadly, in innovation. Of this amount, 70 billion are specifically 
allocated to projects to be carried out in less developed European regions with the objective to 
achieve the full use of their economic potential. This sum doubles when we take in account the co-
financing that beneficiaries - national public administrations and private - are required to provide. 
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However, notwithstanding the expectations, no systematic account of the results is available to the 
Commission or member states, nor there is any timeframe for reaching the policy targets.  
However, both in Europe and elsewhere, the validity of the expectations that the endogenous growth 
theory raises, is rarely questioned. 
The ability of knowledge creation to increase the wealth of nations is taken for granted by most 
policy makers and most of public opinions, and there is seldom accountability for results either 
before, during or after the programs. The very academic literature tends to focus on the conditions 
that affect the propensity of states to invest in research or at the most on the overall impact of 
national or regional innovation policies (Hall et al, 1999, Grilisches, 2000, Levy, 1990) and more 
specifically on the effects of government funded investments on the propensity to invest of firms. 
Little has instead been done in terms of acknowledging that R&D investments can have dramatically 
different returns according to the tipology of industry, the kind of investments, the actors that have 
the responsibility to implement. Additionally, little is discussed as to what can generate differences in 
efficiency of public investments in research, whereas the evidence suggests that one euro spent on 
research can yield dramatically different results.  
 
This research aims to respond to the aforementioned gap. 
 
The puzzle from which the investigation is originated is, in fact, that statistical data do not confirm 
expectations inspired by the endogenous growth theory of most of the international organisations and 
especially of the EC: there is not a strong correlation between European countries and regions 
increasing R&D expenditure and economic growth acceleration, and more specifically, the 
correlation becomes even weaker if one considers the capability of poorer regions to converge 
towards EU averages. More precisely, spending on R&D appears to be a condition which is 
necessary but not sufficient for less developed regions to converge towards European averages. The 
evidence suggests that R&D programmes can display different levels of efficiencies and this work 
intends to investigate the reasons behind these differences. 
 
This thesis, therefore, stands at the crossroads of two questions that have dominated European 
regional and national development agendas for some time. First, is it worthwhile to spend taxpayers’ 
money on R&D programmes as a regional development tool and, if so, when? Secondly, is the 
sizeable increase in funds that the EC allocates to R&D programmes in less developed regions 
justified, and under which conditions do structural funds investments on research contribute to the 
reduction of differences in economic prosperity amongst European regions?  
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In order to find answers to the above main questions, the thesis explores three hypotheses that are to 
be interpreted as dependent, independent and pre existing variables along a process through – as for 
the “innovation value chain” that we are introducing in this thesis as our main methodological 
framework   - which innovation strategies are developed and realized.  
 
Firstly, we want, then, to test whether the higher capability of public R&D programmes to generate 
economic growth in less developed regions is associated with a more concentrated allocation of 
available resources in industry sectors, academic domains, geographical areas and segments of 
recipients. This can in turn foster a higher propensity of the initial public investments to stimulate 
further private investments.  
Secondly, it is hypothesised that a more concentrated resources allocation and a higher ability to 
increase private investments are associated respectively with a clearer distribution of responsibilities 
for decision making over structural funds programmes, as well as with the presence of partnerships 
amongst business, universities, government and public.  
Thirdly, the thesis also explores the pre existing conditions – in terms of the independence from 
policy making of the implementation processes of the programmes, as well as  of the existence of 
explicit strategies meant to develop and maintain the above mentioned partnerships – that are 
supposed to be associated to the above hypothesized success factors. 
 
The above mentioned factors are hypothesized to be decisive vis a vis other factors – human capital 
limiting spill overs of public investments in R&D (as in Rordiguez Pose and Crescenzi, 2006), 
specialization (as in Porter, 1990, and Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman, 2002), institutions (as in the 
tradition of the “new institutions economics” as  in North 1993)  - that are considered by other 
authors as far as the success of innovation policies.  
 
This hypothesis is tested using as case studies structural funds spending on R&D, and the outcomes 
of such spending in two regions in the United Kingdom, and two in Spain.  
The 2000 – 2006 programming period was chosen because it is the last that was completed and for 
which we can evaluate even the impacts on economy which are likely take few years to unfold after 
completion of the programmes.   
The cases were selected – as explained at a greater extent in the methodological part of the work – 
because for each pair, the injection of public investments in R&D during the 2000 - 2006 period were 
similar in that they represented equal percentages of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) spent on R&D. 
Moreover the productivity and income per person before this period were also similar in both regions, 
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as well as their propensity to spend in research. Regions within each pair also appeared to be 
endowed similarly of the other factors (human and social capital, specialization, institutions) that we 
just mentioned as alternative explanations to the hypotheis we are testing as determinants of success 
of innovation strategies. 
Yet the outcomes of the expenditures in R&D were markedly different: in the UK, the two regions 
differed significantly in terms of indicators like effects on private investments, speed by which the 
funds were utilized by firms and universities and, ultimately, productivity growth rate; in Spain, the 
two regions differed a lot in terms of the rate of private investments in R&D that structural funds 
expenditure attracted, as well as effects in terms of employment and productivity. 
 
**** 
 
The results produced through this analysis are expected to be of interest for scholars, practitioners 
and mangers of regional innovation programmes both in Europe and beyond the domain of the 
cohesion policies and outside Europe. Likewise some of the results may be relevant for those 
studying, evaluating, designing or implementing innovation strategies at national levels. The 
structural funds must, in fact, be considered as a context which is interesting for testing hypotheses 
whereas some of the conclusions are meant to be generalizable to other similar policies.  
 
The work is articulated according to the following structure: 
Chapter one describes the background to the problem. Firstly, the research is positioned within wider 
debates concerning the factors underlying economic growth of less developed regions, the recent 
success of the innovation based explanations of differences in economic progress of regions and the 
impact of such theories on European Union’s and European Commission’s choices. We will, then, 
show that notwithstanding this enthusiasm with R&D as a priority, a higher expenditure in 
knowledge does not automatically translate into an acceleration of growth. The last section of the 
review of relevant literature considers the strands of research upon which the thesis and its 
methodology is constructed with the better identification of the factors that according to this author 
may explain different performances of similar public investments in R&D and of different regional 
innovation strategies persued in less developed regions.  
 
Chapter two addresses various issues relevant to the methodology of the work. It first introduces the 
causal chain – we will call it the “innovation value chain” - that is supposed to account for how an 
investment in R&D turns into a sustainable gain in productivity or economic growth. Next,  the 
criteria for selection of case studies are introduced and applied in order to identify the countries and 
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regions  ultimately selected for study. We will, then, go through a survey of additional factors that 
may influence outcomes of R&D investment and explain how the research strategy was crafted with 
the aim of minimizing their impact. The chapter continues with the a review of some of the 
definitional probems associated to operationalization of the key variables - research, economic 
growth and regional competitiveness – whose relationships will be investigated. The section also 
clarifies that the focus of the thesis will be on R&D related investments, although we also explain 
why the thesis will have also to consider the wider notion of innovation. The section is concluded 
with a survey of the main research instruments.  
 
Chapter three gives an account of the analysis undertaken in preparation for the field work conducted 
in the UK and Spain. The role of R&D as a lever of regional development in each country, and the 
pre-existing economic conditions - in terms of development, research assets, and institutional setting 
- are described. 
 
Chapter four and five describe the case studies, according to the following structure. First, the main 
choices of the development programmes and the structure of the measures dedicated to innovation are 
described. Secondly, results are assessed, on the basis of macroeconomic data, programmes, official 
documents and interviews with both the beneficiaries and the individuals in charge of the 
programmes. This provides the basis for testing the hypotheses that: i) better performing programmes 
are associated with more concentrated resource allocation patterns and mobilization of private 
investments in R&D; ii) that more concentrated resource allocation patterns are in turn explained by 
clearer decision making procedures and independence of implementation from policy-making 
process; and, eventually, iii) that a higher capability to mobilize private investment in R&D depends 
on the presence  of partnerships between certain categories of actors relevant to regional innovation 
strategies and agents that create, maintain and facilitate such alliances. 
 
Chapter six then summarises the investigation’s main findings, while also drawing out advice for 
policy makers and finally identifying areas for further research.  
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CHAPTER ONE – MERITS AND LIMITS OF INNOVATION 
AS A REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
 
 
The initial chapter will frame the problem we are investigating, present the puzzle from which the 
study was originated and account for the literature in order to better define the contribution that this 
research is going to provide.  
The first part of the chapter will position the research within a wider review of relevant literature and 
background data. More specifically we will review the arguments for considering regional 
development policies as a provider of a public good – convergence amongst regions in terms of 
prosperity levels - which otherwise would not be spontaneously offered by markets and, more 
specifically, we will frame public  investments in innovation as a tool of regional development and 
try to explain the impact of endogenous growth theory on policies meant to generate economic 
growth.  We will then review, in the second part of the chapter, how European cohesion policies 
reflect an higher priority being attached to innovation in terms of resources allocation, we will also 
show the consistency between the strategic choices upon which these EU policies were constructed 
and the basic beliefs of innovation based theories of economic growth.  In the third part we will, 
however, see how numbers falsify the idea that always higher investments in knowledge translate 
themselves in acceleration of economic growth and introduce the explanations that have been given 
to explain different performances of different innovation strategies. In the last section we will, thus, 
review the literature on regional innovation strategies to whose broad domain this thesis is going to 
contribute and, more specifically, we will account for the main academic works done on how the 
quality and the quantity of cooperation within the region and  different organisations of the decision 
making process may have an impact on outcomes: these last pages will provide the theoretical 
background that will serve as foundation of the thesis and of the methodological framework – the 
innovation value chain – that we will describe in the second chapter. 
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1.1 THE LITERATURE ON INNOVATION WITHIN 
THEORIES OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
The question of the effectiveness of public investments in R&D and innovation as a tool of regional 
development must be positioned within a number of wider debates, concerning questions:  should 
government do anything in order to accelerate economic growth and, more specifically, economic 
growth in less developed regions? Is otherwise a better option simply not to hinder a convergence 
that should take place spontaneously, as an effect of market forces? Is there a market failure to which 
public investments in R&D is asked to respond? Alternatively if we believe that convergence will not 
take place without intervention, which is the best mix of possible public investment and what should 
the role of R&D be within the policies aiming to produce it? And lastly even when these policies are 
effective on aided regions which is the effect on developed regional economies that did not get the 
funds? 
It is, therefore, preliminary to a research like ours on the effectiveness of various instruments of 
regional development to try to address the very issue of the justification of the regional development 
policy and, more specifically, of a policy meant to generate regional development through 
innovation. The question is, at the end, about establishing if there is a particular market failure such 
that faster than average economic growth of the poorer does not spontaneously happen and if in 
particular there is a lasting underinvestment in the knowledge assets of less developed regions that, in 
turn, produces lasting differences in terms of prosperity.  
The question we are referring to, reflects the dialectics between the main theories of growth: it is a 
vast academic domain dominated by the conflict between the neoclassical approach, on one hand, by 
which convergence does ultimately take place, and the new economic geography, on the other, that 
maintains that differences are here to stay. We will shortly see that as far as Europe is concerned, the 
first theory of market driven “convergence” seems to apply to the states which are increasingly 
similar as far as level of prosperity, and the second seems to, instead, explain why gaps amongst 
regions stay the same or become bigger. We will see later that the latter theory finds the reason why 
divergence does not go away spontaneously, in the presence of tacit, not tradable, not transferrable 
knowledge. 
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1.1.1 The justification for regional development policies and the hypothesis of 
market driven convergence. 
 
The supremacy of markets and, thus, the idea that no role should be played by the State to directly 
foster economic growth finds its origin back to the standard neoclassical growth theory that explains 
economic growth through the argument of decreasing return on capital. Such a factor is considered 
a  driver of convergence and it is expected to generate in the long run a decrease in the difference in 
terms of GDP per capita1. If this theory is to be believed, regional income per inhabitant should 
tend to converge and there should be no need for public money to be spent on achieving such 
an objective.  
On the basis of a number of time series2, Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) were amongst the first to 
argue that the rate of profit on capital may be generally falling in time and thus – transferring the 
argument to a macro level - that it may increasingly fall the more capital a nation accumulates. In the 
argument that Solow developed, countries reach – through a path of decreasing return on capital – a 
steady rate where capital and labour are employed at their equilibrium with the best possible 
efficiency (meant as in Pareto). Further increase can only come from technology improvements 
which are seen as exogenous to the system and perfectly transferrable from one country to others3.  
A decreasing return to capital may thus explain why poorer countries tend to grow more than richer 
ones and why such a trend continues until they reach a regime that the theory describes as a “steady 
rate”. This is, after all, the explanation employed for three decades (sixties, seventies and eighties) to 
explain why relatively less-developed countries (Germany, Italy, Japan) tended to outperform in 
terms of growth rates the countries  (USA, UK and up to some extent France) that inherited wealthier 
and larger industrial bases after World War II4. 
                                                 
1 It must be said that the micro economic concept of “economies of scale” says exactly the opposite. Smaller industry 
bases may be doomed by their size, not to have same return of investment of bigger ones and thus not to attract same 
amount of capital. If we now assume – in order to go from the micro to the macro case – that more advanced regions tend 
to have not only more capital, but also larger, more capitalized firms, the distance may become bigger. A transposition of 
the economies of scale argument to the plane of macro economic performance is at the heart of the “new economic 
geography” theory that we will analyse later. 
2 The classical study of Denison (1967), for instance, that provides evidence through cross-country data. The study run 
comparisons in a relatively limited period of time (1950 – 1962) for UK, Germay, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, 
Italy, the Netherlands and the US. Similar results are reached by other studies by Kendrick and Sato or by the US bureau. 
 
3 Neo classical growth theories appear to be, in fact, a theoretical development of the idea of convergence towards 
equilibrium that comes from microeconomics and from Leon Walras’ classical work. In a sense, the European cohesion 
policies that wil be investigated by this thesis, appear to reflect the main critique to the general equilibrium theory as in 
the very Keynes when he points out to the fact that these models can only be valid in the “long run” and overlooks the 
“suffering” that will happen in the adjustment process. 
4 Wars, however, can also be the real explanation for the GDP to more fastly grow in countries that were more hardly hit. 
The  reconstruction – which in the case of world war II was even financed from other countries - might have, in fact, 
provided extra fuel to the economy of countries like Italy, Germany and Japan. However, these countries outpaced the 
others for longer than the period needed for the reconstruction, hence other explanations appear justified. 
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The policy implications for such an interpretation of development are that the best option for 
accelerating growth in less developed regions is to increase the free movement  of capital as much as 
possible. Capital will tend to be allocated to where marginal returns are bigger and thus, accumulated 
investments are smaller. In fact, in a world of perfect capital mobility, perfect information and 
decreasing return, convergence would take place instantaneously and no differences among countries 
would ever occur. 
Although the neoclassical growth model seemed to hold true – as far as the comparison amongst 
developed countries - for the three decades after the Second World War, the advantage of Japan, 
Germany and Italy – that were pointed for a long time as the examples of the validity of the theory - 
started to be eroded since the eighties wih USA, UK and - up to less of an extent – France that found 
an apparently new way to gain a competitive edge. Data (as in Jorgenson and Khuong, 2005) have, in 
fact, continued to undermine the very theoretical premise of decreasing return of scale of the elegant 
model developed by Solow.  
However, a new even more powerful tipology of market driven convergence was about to happen 
with reference to the differences between developed and developing areas.  
A new, export driven convergence has been, in fact, taking place since the early nineties at a global 
scale, with the rise of economies like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and more recently giants like 
China, India, Brazil. Similar process was, at the same time, happening in Europe with Spain, Ireland 
and more recently a number of eastern European countries rapidly catching up.  
The reason for this trend is, however, slightly different from the neoclassical model.  
The neoclassical model considered, in fact, economic systems that were substantially closed and 
although significant exchanges amongst the group of most developed countries were an important 
factor for development, the world economy (Maddison, 2001) was much more fragmented.  
The new wave of convergence between more and less industrialized states was, instead, characterized 
by much deeper and wider fall of trade barriers and to comparative advantages that poorer countries 
hold at the beginning of the process in terms of costs. The theory that comparative advantages may 
trigger economic convergence is, in fact, not at all recent and it can be traced back to Ricardo (in The 
Principles, 1821 but also amongst others Grossman and Helpman, 1991).  
Although different, the neoclassical and the comparative advantage theories shared two common 
traits.  
Firstly, in both it is industrialization that triggers rapid economic growth: under the neo classical 
hypothesis, convergence is generated mostly by movement of capital in search of better remuneration 
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in the less developed regions; under the world of comparative advantages it is mainly the increase of 
exports and, thus, turn-over of the (local and foreign) industrial sites that are located in developing 
countries  that erode the market share of the ones that are based at the centre. 
Secondly, in both contexts the only possible development policies are the ones that aim to  minimize 
the interference of the State in the economy (Olson, 1982, Hirsch, 1976, Kraus, 1968, Tsoukalis, 
20055);  in both, convergence is an unavoidable result and no need seems to exist, within this 
account, for specific development policies (like the cohesion one).  
Even less space is left for allowing public money to be spent on R&D endowments in less developed 
regions given that spontaneous development appears to trigger endogenous investment in knowledge 
and research. This last assumption appears to be confirmed by the behaviour of many catching up 
countries: after a first phase of cheap labor driven development, they tend to increase their 
expenditure in R&D even more than developed countries in order to compete on technologies and 
skills (see Zhou
 
and Leydesdorff on China, 2006, and  Dahlman and Utz of  World Bank, 2004). 
However, notwithstanding the fact that neoclassical theories have appeared to be often successful, 
few fundamental critiques have not gone away and have, in fact, been strengthened by the very 
financial and economic crisis erupted in year 2009. 
In certain contexts, in fact, markets have failed to produce convergence: if we, for instance, look to 
European regions gaps amongst them appear to endure any attempt to significantly reduce them. Not 
less importantly, notwithstanding the accusation of the dominance of liberal theories, practically all 
countries of the world, including the ones that are traditionally more used to trust markets, have felt 
the need to develop an increasingly richer and more diversified menu of regional development 
policies.  
The persistence of gaps amongst regions appear to have found one of its most interesting explanation 
in the “new economic geography” which also has got far reaching consequences for the idea to invest 
into the R&D basis of less developed areas. 
Whereas “growth theory” theoretically applies to cases where only exchange of capital and no 
exchange of goods takes place among economic systems that present different return on capital, the 
“new economic geography” (Krugman and Venables, 1995, Puga, 1999, Midelfart-Knarvik and 
Overman, 2002, Boldrin and Canova, 2001) literature focuses on the effect of growing market 
integration on inequalities amongst regions. 
                                                 
5 As far as the EU’ case, Lucas Tsoukalis (2005) even theorized that the growth of countries like Spain, Portugal and 
Greece in the last tow decades, is to be more  associated to the liberalization process that began due to their joining the 
EU (he, in fact, even asked himself – in “what kind of europe?, page 55, 2005, if “economic integration is a validation of 
liberal theories” after having noticed that EU “seems to have acted as a convergence machine” and having reasoned on 
the causal relationship between increase of trade due to liberalisation and growth) than to the investments of structural 
funds on thos countries. 
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An increase in international trade and, more precisely, a reduction of barriers to exchange is seen – 
in a way which turns on its head the neo classical argument - the cause of higher inequalities.  
When trade costs decrease, agglomeration, meant as concentration of industrial activity in certain 
places, increases for two reasons (Puga, 1999 and 2002, Forslid et al., 2002): 
a) Competition among firms is less restrained by trade costs and the initial outcome should be the 
elimination of less efficient producers and a concentration within industries (and consequently among 
suppliers and buyers); this means that more profitable firms are likely to concentrate in regions that 
can provide better access to suppliers and work supply; consequently, these regions tend to grow 
more in terms of industrial base, and, eventually, GDP per capita; 
b) Firms whose factories were located in different regions have a smaller incentive to be closer to 
final customers (as in a model where two regions are separated by high “trade” costs) and the 
incentive for them is to concentrate their assets in the same (most likely home) location.  
As a result, the regions with better “endowments” 6 (education, infrastructure, legal system and 
security, natural resources, etc.) capture shares of other regions’ markets so that they increase their 
share of the total production base7. 
It is, as we mentioned before, the very European Union to provide some of the most interesting 
statistical back up of new economic geography: regions are converging only slowly (like in Spain 
which is one of the two country that we selected for our research) or are, in fact, deverging (like in 
UK the other chosen country). This is seen as a consequence of the large redution of trade costs 
created by not only the single market but also the wider policy called “integration” 8.  
                                                 
6 Some argue that such an agglomeration takes place even if the endowments of the regions are equivalent (i.e. their 
“comparative” positions are equal). In fact, the agglomerated industries tend to enjoy increasing returns to scale even if 
the geographical contexts are equivalent at the start (Allen et al., 1998, again Krugman, 1999, Porter, 2000). Competitive 
pressures tend to increase the average productivity, and proximity to suppliers tends to reduce prices of the initial 
production factors. So even if it is just by chance, the movement of a firm from one region to another is expected to 
produce – in a low trade cost model - a self-accumulation process that can significantly concentrate the industry base. 
 
7 The entire forecast of the “new economic geography” is, however,  further complicated by the implication of the wide 
diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). This discontinuity makes it in theory (Cairncross, 
1997, Quah, 2000, Maignan and others, 2003) less valuable for a firm to be geographically closer to its competitors, 
partners and suppliers, while it makes feasible the creation of “clusters” which happen to be geographically dispersed but 
“logically” very compact. This point will be the basis of one of the hypotheses that we will test when we investigate the 
importance and the nature of partnerships within regional innovation strategies.  
 
8 An application of economic geographic reasoning to the EU case requires, however, clarifications on both the 
dependent and independent variables whose relationship we are trying to assess. More specifically as far as a) the 
definition of the economic shock against which policies are to be drafted, b) the definition of the outcome expected and, 
thus, the policy’s objective pursued.   
First, as far as the shock, there is a difference between a reduction of trade costs – modelised by th new economic 
geographers – and  the concept of integration. Reduction of trade costs and, as an expected consequence, increase in trade 
between regions, appear at a global level as a result of deliberate policy choices as well as technological novelties 
allowing for transaction costs to fall.  Integration, by contrast, is a more sophisticated set of policy tools, because it also 
includes increasing coordination of policies. It thus also considers the elimination of a number of “invisible” barriers that 
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Looking reality from the “new economic geography”’s proint of view, the argument of the market 
failure leads to the idea of convergence being a public good requiring a dedicated policy. 
One consequence of an approach of this kind has been, in fact, the push on the creation of an 
industrial basis (Hoffman, 1958 but also Perroux, 1955) as a platform to respond to economic 
backwardness and to promote further agglomeration9. Once a basis exits, comparative advantages 
will be produced from the expansion of that basis and will allow that region to catch up. Greece, 
Spain, the Italian Mezzogiorno were sort of laboratories to test the validity of this approach even 
before the structural funds interventions could take off (Leonardi, 2005).  
However, new economic geography models do not necessarily imply a constant relationship between 
a reduction in trade costs and accumulation and thus inequality.  The paper of Krugman and Venables 
(“Globalization and the inequality of nations”, 1995) shows that the effect of higher international 
integration is a “U shaped pattern of economic change, of divergence followed by convergence”.  If, 
at an initial stage, the fall of trading costs will mean that producers of intermediate goods, as well as 
the users of them, will find it convenient to locate near to each other, at a later stage, when trading 
costs fall further, the importance of being close to suppliers will diminish.  Cheaper labour costs in 
the periphery as well as a surge of costs due to congestion in the centre will reverse the 
agglomeration pattern.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
prevent goods and services, people and capital from moving and the creation of a number of positive actions aiming to 
favour trade. 
Secondly, the final outcomes are different. There is, in fact, a difference between “agglomeration” – to which the new 
economy geography refers - and “convergence” – the final outcome pursued by the cohesion policies. The former refers 
to the distribution of industrial activities amongst different areas and the latter concerns the reduction of difference in 
GDP per capita. We can obviously have one without the other, although we may have expected (more in the past than 
now) some correlation to exist between the two. 
Moreover, within the idea of “agglomeration”, we need to further distinguish between “clustering” which is the 
concentration of sectors in certain areas (it can be measured by the “specialisation” of certain geographical entity), and 
concentration of the manufacturing base (Porter, 2000). Again, we can have the former without the latter (when regions 
relocate productions sites so that the loss of the region’s production in one industry are exactly compensated by gains in 
another sector), and vice versa. Whereas the overall manufacturing base concentration normally implies inequality in 
employment rates, specialization has more immediate consequences on productivity. 
The evidence suggests that, for instance, Europe is experiencing different evolution patterns on concentration and 
specialization (“clustering”) and that such patterns are differentiated according to whether we are referring to regions or 
countries (Knarvik and Overman, 2002): a) member states are specializing but at a slow pace; b) even slower is the pace 
by which regions become more specialized; c) the overall manufacturing sector does not get concentrated when we 
consider states and there is instead a significant concentration amongst regions in the same state. 
 
9 New economic geography’s analyses were, in fact, not completely new in their foundations and implications. A few 
decades before, Myrdal (1957) had proposed a theory of “circular cumulative causation” by which the development of 
richer regions will subtract potential of development from the poorer ones which prevents economic systems from  
converging and forces the economy to be in a permanent situation of non equilibrium created by  increasing gaps. In fact, 
even in Myrdal (according to the Economic Theory and underdeveloped regions, 1957) there is – like in the new 
economic geography some spill-over from developed to less developed areas, although the effects of these were supposed 
to be low as far a Europe is concerned. 
Even more radical than Myrdal are the economists of Marxian tradition: to them development is a zero sum game and 
unless the cost of the industrialization is paid by the centre, no development can happen (Frank, 1974, Holland, 1976, but 
also the Rosenthal report, 1974). 
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A U-shaped pattern of economic change does, however, has got two further qualifications. 
The first is that adjustment and convergence would imply (and this may be the case that applies to the 
USA that does, in fact, display – according to Puga, 1999 – lower differences amongst states that is 
the case amongst European regions) costs in terms of differences of wage and workers relocation. 
The second is that the models do not provide a clear answer to what is going to happen in a given 
time to convergence amongst different geographic areas. According to Krugman and Venables, 
immediately following the shock agglomeration occurs and proceeds for some time afterwards, and at 
a later stage a reversal will unfold, equalizing incomes. It is evident that nobody can tell beforehand 
what stage the economic system is going through: nobody knows the length of time of each leg of the 
agglomeration–decongestion cycle. Such a forecast becomes even more difficult when reductions in 
trade barriers are not one-off events, but are rather a sum of a number of sometimes contradictory 
small steps towards liberalization. The answer depends, in fact, on where the economic system lies at 
a certain time with reference to the process of adaptation to a certain shock (the reduction of trade 
barriers) and the long term may last long enough to create consequences for social cohesion and 
political consensus (Forsild et al., 2002). 
 
The second point may offer a justification for policies – like the EU cohesion policy– meant to 
reduce differences. It is – as we will see in the next section – the rather peculiar meaning that the EU 
attributes to the concept of convergence - the idea of pursuing reduction of prosperity levels without 
bearing the human costs associated with workers relocation and the costs to cohesion produced by 
differences in salary - that is needed to understand why cohesion has become not only an idea widely 
accepted by European policy makers but also one of the feature that qualifies a so called “European 
social model” that the EU has been pursuing for decades.  
Here is where the “endogenous growth theory” comes into play as the theoretical backing and the 
idea that European cohesion policies were looking for: the investments in the innovation assets of the 
less advanced areas must have been perceived as the only way to make prosperity levels to 
convergence without going through competition on costs amongst European regions. 
 
1.1.2 The justification for innovation policies and their role within regional 
development 
 
The link between knowledge and economic growth has long been recognized. As Howells (2005) 
reminds “from Marshall (1890) through to Kuznets (1971) there has been a recognition that, directly 
or indirectly, knowledge changes economic activity and economic activity changes knowledge in 
constant round of changes”.  
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However, as mentioned before, in the neo classical word (from Solow, 1956 through Mankwin et al., 
1992) knowledge and technology10 – being this latter the ultimate product of knowledge – is totally 
exogenous, available to everybody and everywhere (and in this sense it is “public good”) and in the 
long run the rate of technological progress is equal for every place. 
The “endogenous growth theory” turns this approach on its head: knowledge decomes endogenous to 
a given system (country or region) and cannot be transferred without significant transaction costs11. 
Endogenous (and neo shumpeterian) growth models, thus, integrate the endogenous component of 
technological progress as one of the independent variable generating economic growth as technology 
progress is seen as the product of the actions of speficic economic actors (Romer, 1990) that decide 
to invest in human capital and R&D.  
Moreover two further qualifications contribute to render innovation “a disequilibrating factor in the 
process of economic growth between geographical areas” (Howells, 2005): the neo shumpetrian 
interpretation of growth that introduce the notion of monopolistic competition on generation and 
exploitation of knowledge and intellectual property rights that make knowledge even less 
transferrable (Temple, 1999); and the idea that investments in knowledge may have increasing 
returns (Verspagen, 1997) that make likely the rise of strong cumulativeness effects in the impact of a 
region’s research assets. 
In this context, it is the difference in endowment of endogenous, not tradable (Rodrigeuz - Pose 
and Crescenzi, 2008, call it “tacit” to differentiate it from knowledge that is formalized and protected 
in patents) knowledge that explain a divergence in long term growth rates that can last over 
extended periods of time and the political consequence that has been derived is that if you want these 
gaps to disappear you need to invest into the R&D base of the less developed region. 
The endogenous or new growth theories represent a rather differentiated body of analyses that stem 
from the same basic assumption of the contingent transferability of technological progress. Therefore 
under the same theoretical umbrella different readings of economic reality and very different policy 
recommendations co-exist (Watson, 2004). 
The origins of the theory can be traced back to Arrow and Romer whereas Lucas also provides some 
important contributions. 
Starting from the basic belief that it is knowledge that makes economic performance of countries and 
regions to differ, Arrow and Romer focus their research on investigating the networks, the places 
                                                 
10 There are important differences between a number of terms – knowledge, innovation, technology, research and 
development – that can change in a significant way both the premises and the conclusions to many of the arguments that 
we and many authors develop. We will come back to these differences in chapter two of this thesis. 
11 Technologies is not the only factor that has been considered as not easily transferrable. Social capital (Putnam, Nanetti 
and Leonardi, 1993) and more broadly production factors (Cappellin 1993, Stoehr, 1990, Suarez – Villa, 1898; Wadly, 
1986) tend also to stay. 
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where knowledge and production meet. This is, in fact, will also be one of the focus of this thesis 
when we will concentrate on partnerships and hubs where innovators come together.  
 
The difference between the two is that the former focuses on the effectiveness of the mechanism by 
which ideas and goods meet and leverage each other (Arrow, 1962), the latter on the meeting of 
proper technologies and again goods (Romer, 1986). Points of view like Arrow’s one highlight the 
importance of investments and reforms of the education system; whereas Romer seems to theorize an 
entire school of thought which underlines the importance of public investments aimed to embed R&D 
into the industrial and research base of a nation. It is Romer, therefore, that can be seen as the 
beginner of the theory that produced later the literature on regional innovation systems which is 
particularly relevant to this thesis. 
The question that is not less important to qualify the endogenous growth theory and the role of 
knowledge in regional development is, however and once again, the one about the role of the state. Is 
innovation something that needs to be triggered by public intervention? 
An other important contributor to the theory, Lucas (Lucas, 2001) stresses the importance of free 
markets and lessening constraints for entrepreneurs to freely pursue innovative modes of production 
or original products. According to him, innovation, like in a destruction – creation Schumpeterian 
cycle, is the production of entrepreneurial greed and ingenuity and, therefore, he gives priority to the 
creation of the ideal conditions for entrepreneurs to deploy their energy and potential (Lucas, 2001). 
According to some others, however, the role of the state is essential for two reasons.  
The first is that private firms may underinvest as opposed to what would be optimal to the general 
welfare and this underinvestment may be particularly large and damaging in some domains. This 
outcome may be because of “incomplete private appropriability” problems: markets would not invest 
as much as it would be necessary to maximize welfare because the benefits of innovation is too 
uncertain, too wide in geographical terms and too long to materialize when compared with the criteria 
with which private investors tend to assess the attractiveness of different possible investments 
(amongst others, Arrow, 1962, and Nelson, 1959). 
The second is that in less developed regions this suboptimality may be even bigger because of the 
costs that firms and universities may pay for a disadvantage in terms of distances from markets and 
researchers, whereas R&D investments may tend to concentrate in specific areas even more than the 
manufacturing base (Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman, 2002). 
The role of the State within R&D accumulation processes can be, then.  reconducted to a market 
failure. This market failure and thus underinvestment tend to differ greatly according to the typology 
of research we are talking about (basic research is supposed to have harder time to attract private 
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investors funds), the industry (the defence depends almost entirely on public decisions) and the area 
(R&D tend to be heavily concentrated so a goal – like the cohesion policies’ one – to over invest in 
less developing areas may be necessary to compensate private investors’ investment decisions to 
focus on developed ones). 
Therefore it is widely acknowledged that there is a role for the State and that it is theoretically 
convenient for purpose of welfare maximization to spend taxpayers’ money in R&D, although the 
decisions about the optimal size of this investment and the area where to spend pose – as we will see 
in the third section of this chapter - important choices to policy makers and civil servants that may be 
charged with the responsibility to choose. 
The theoretical backing of innovation oriented policies is, however, challenged by both, as we will 
see, statistical evidence and qualifications of the validity of the arguments on a theoretical plane. 
As far as the latter, it is worthwhile at this stage to mention two problems that have been raised. 
The first is about the real endogeneity of knowledge. Nordhaus (1969) does, for instance, notice that 
although we admit that technology is privately owned, the very nature of the intellectual property 
right (acquired via patents or publications) require a formalization of the innovation that makes by 
definition knowledge less tacit and thus, theoretically, on the contrary, more tradable and thus 
exogenous.  Moreover, empirical studies have demonstrated that these transfers of knowledge are 
indeed very large and that for a country like the United States half of technology progress can spilled 
over to the rest of the world (Eaton and Kortum, 2002). 
Secondly, it must, also, be said that all the considerations that we synthesized, refer mostly to 
countries and that their application to regions – to which this thesis is interested - imply few 
problems. Vavakova (1999), for instance, raises an issue of coordination and minimum scale with 
reference to the French case of regionalization of  research strategies. Legislation and regulations that 
may have an effect on propensity to invest in risky projects are normally outside regions’ institutional 
competences. Wehereas, spillovers tend to be higher and thus knowledge is a less endogenous asset 
(Gumbau-Albert and Maudos, 2009) especially when we are talking about small regions. 
Notwithstanding these doubts even when we acknowledge that many things may go wrong with 
innovation based regional innovation strategies, we still need to admit , as Rodrigeuz-Pose (2001) 
recognizes, that “R&D investment in lagging areas may prove in the long run to be a better and 
cheaper alternative to social transfers and to the investments linked to traditional development 
strategies”. 
This must have also been the view of the policy and strategy makers that have recently adopted 
innovation as main priority of cohesion policies. 
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1.2 EVOLUTION OF COHESION POLICIES AND THE 
SHIFT TOWARDS INNOVATION 
 
With the rise of new growth theories innovation becomes, therefore, the main factor driving 
economic growth and ultimately prosperity at both national and regional levels. In this section we 
will start from a broader contextualization of the growing importance that has been attributed to 
knowledge by the European Union as a lever of competiteveness and defence of its social model; we 
will then follow up with a review of the reasons why innovation may have appeared to have a fit with 
the ideological premises of the particular kind of cohesion that European Union pursues, and we will 
conclude with the numbers showing how this new priority has changed the resources allocation 
within the budget of the Union and of cohesion policies. 
 
1.2.1 The Lisbon strategy  
 
The priority on research is recognized nearly everywhere in the world and this has recently produced 
an increase in the percentage of GDP dedicated to R&D: both in the most advanced economies (in 
Japan between 2000 and 2008 the percentage went from the already high 3,04 to 3,44%, whereas in 
the USA it increased less from 2,7 to 2,8) and in the most recently industrialized ones (in China it 
went from 0,9 to 1,44%, in South Korea from 2,3 to 3,2%, whereas the rise was lower in India) that 
are deliberately trying to develop new competitive advantages in technology as opposed to cheaper 
labor costs (OECD, 2010).  
Altough the rise in the propensity of EU to invest in R&D has not been equally large and the 
percentage of GDP spent on R&D has stayed around a relatively low 1,2% in the last decade, the 
European Union launched - at the beginning of the period we are considering (2000) – an ambitious 
pla, the so called “Lisbon Strategy” as a new political priority of the EU. 
In fact, the strategy was not only the result of the influence of the endogenous growth theory on an 
academic plane.  It was a wide literature and media discourse on the rise of a brand new “information 
society” that attracted lot of policy makers’ attention (Watson, 2004). The idea that dominated some 
of the European councils  in the last years of the nineties (and more remarkably the Luxembourg 
Council in 1997) was that in order to revitalize or, even more drastically, save the “European social 
model” which was felt to be faced by the competition of the rest of the world and, particularly at that 
time, of the USA, it would have been necessary to incorporate in the EU policies some of the 
elements of the new paradigm which was based on information – intensive production systems that 
were believed to have made the United States (as well as other Asian economies like South Korea, 
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Taiwan and Singapore) to enter into a “new economy” characterized by superior economic growth 
with no inflation, no business cycle and a frictional unemployment (Freeman and Soete 1994).  
Some of these considerations were clearly underestimating certain economic processes as the stock 
market crash and tech downturn showed in 2001. And yet in Lisbon, the European leaders felt the 
urgency to respond with a grand strategy meant to increasingly become a vital goal of the Union. The 
Lisbon strategy’ objective was to make the EU “the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based 
economy in the world by 2010” and one of its two qualifier targets (being the other an employment 
rate of 70% by 2010)  was, in fact, to reach by 2010 a percentage of GDP spent in R&D of 3%. 
Moreover, this transformation was to achieved by preserving at the same time public and private 
financial stability. 
As a matter of fact, a more complete reading of the Lisbon Strategy’s objectives is for the EU “to 
become  capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
socialcohesion and respect for the environment" (European Council, 2000). The idea was, thus, to 
preserve (and “sustain”)  EU’s unique social model by increasing productivity and competitiveness in 
the face of global competition12.  
Not less important  was the recognition that such an ambitious strategy “could not be pursued at EU 
level alone but through the co-operation between the EU and Member States” (European 
Commission, 2010). This method of cooperation – that was, then, called Open Method of 
Coordination – was not a novelty (Hodson and Maher, 2001) for the Union governance and, yet, 
some of the mechanisms – benchmarking, peer review, target setting – were explicitly adopted for the 
first time as a tool for influencing and coordinating national agenda. 
The limits of the strategy were, however, apparent almost since the start: first of all the OMC 
appeared to be not enough to provide the European Union the power to really enforce the agenda. 
Moreover EC’s own financial capabilities to promote the strategy were also relatively small 
(European Council, 2000, European Commission, 2001). 
These problems were made even more evident by the partial incapability of the Strategy (see the 
evaluation of the strategy issued by the EC in February 2010) to achieve its targets and, more 
specifically, on the small impact that the strategy (including here the choice to use structural funds) 
had had on the percentage of GDP spent on R&D. 
A major factor in the failure to reach the initial targets was, certainly, the crisis that took a toll on  
employment rates and public deficit. However, even before the crisis the initial objectives appeared 
difficult to reach. 
                                                 
12 A very similar agenda has been reproposed for the renewed strategy covering the 2010 – 2020 period, called Europe 
2020.  
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Over time concerns about the ability of the EU to achieve the targets of the strategy had, in fact,  
considerably grown even after the first half of th Lisbon Strategy deployment period (2000 – 2005) 
(Pisani – Ferry, 2006).  
Reports like the one produced by the Independent High – Level study group established in 2003 by 
the President of the Commission (at that time Romano Prodi) and led by Andre Sapir (Sapir et al, An 
Agenda for a Growing Europe, 2003) reminded in its very introduction that one the major concern 
underlying the Lisbon decisions - the gap in competitiveness of the EU vis a vis the USA – had 
stayed the same. One possible political response (according to a number of EC and EC commissioned 
reports like the Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Employment 
commissioned by the EC to a High Level Group coordinated in 2004 by the previous Dutch Prime 
Minister Wim Kok) has been seen to dedicate to the objective of “competitiveness” a bigger portion 
of the EU budget and more specifically a much larger share of the structural funds (Kok et al, 2004).  
The structural funds that support the implementation of cohesion policies did, thus, provide a much 
needed financial back up. Altough there were other more profound reasons for cohesion policies and 
Lisbon strategy to become instrumental to each other, as we will see in the rest of this section. 
 
 
1.2.2 The reasons for the “lisbonization” of cohesion policies 
 
The alliance between the argument of the innovation as driver of economic growth and equalizer of 
prosperity levels between poor and rich areas and the argument of cohesion was, therefore, based not 
only on financial considerations. In fact, there are at least three fundamental reasons why the 
European Commission and the community of policy makers and experts dedicated to cohesion must 
have considered with increasing interest the possibility to put innovation at the centre of their agenda 
(EC, fifth, 2008, sixth, 2009, cohesion reports). The first has to do with the peculiar kind of cohesion 
that Europe has been looking for; the second with the idea that convergence is not, as we will see, a 
zero sum game; and the third a certain dissatisfaction with the results achieved with structural funds 
until the period (2000 – 2006) that this thesis studies. We will, however, start from a overview of the 
nature and evolution of cohesion policies. 
 
Cohesion policies as distinctive feature of the European model 
 
The acknowledgment of the reduction of regional imbalances as one of the missions of the Union can 
be traced back (Leonardi, 2005) to the founding Rome Treaty Preamble of the 1957 where the initial 
six members express – firstly - their  “[anxiety] to strengthen the unity of their economies and to 
ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various 
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regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions” and immediately after they stated their 
“[desire] to contribute, by means of a common commercial policy, to the progressive abolition of 
restrictions on international trade” (EU, 1957). 
 
However, notwithstanding the principle that the treaty put forward, an autonomous Community 
regional policy was not established for more than a decade: the reasons for this delay have been said 
to be basically two: the idea that integration of markets would contribute to reduce regional 
disparities (Vanhove and Klassen, 1987 page 258); but also the fact that France, Germany and Italy 
had recently started their experience with regional policies and that an European one was felt to be a 
possible duplication producing confusion (Wallace, 1977, page 140).  
 
During the 60s, however, a number of papers showed that some of the optimism that convergence 
was a spontaneous process was misplaced (Van Campen 1959, p. 167, Motte 1960, p. 827 , 
Birkelbach 1964 , p. 114).  
 
However, the report that signals a significant advancement of the Union’s position towards the 
approach that we observe today was the report issued by the commissioner for regional policies 
George Thompson in 1973 (European Commission, 1973). The Thompson report is, in fact, 
significantly modern in most of its major statements. Firstly the report acknowledges the definitive 
failure of the idea of spontaneous convergence, when it recognizes that the Community, which at the 
time had six members, had experienced an economic expansion that had been “continuous – with 
GDP growing at a rate of more than 5% - but not balanced  – with  richest areas having an income per 
head five times that of the poorest”. Secondly the report underlined the case for regional policy from 
the  points of views that were “moral, economic and environmental”. By moral need, the report 
meant that cohesion was indispensable in preserving the very meaning and motivation of citizens 
towards the commission and, thus, here there is the political side of the cohesion policy perceived as 
indispensable for the survival and the development of the European project. The environmental 
dimension is mentioned because the new policy was meant to reduce the cost of congestion in areas 
where aggregation was exceeding its optimal level and it is interesting to notice here both the fact 
that the report anticipates the concern for the environment and that it puts forward the idea that the 
development of the periphery of Europe is necessary to the centre as well. This approach is 
confirmed when the report outlines the economic side of cohesion and explicitly says that its aim is 
to increase the use of untapped potential and thus the wealth that overall the European community is 
able to produce. In the report, which is considered the ideological foundation of the cohesion policies, 
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it is, thus, underlined that the entire argument for launching a proper regional policy (and a 
specifically dedicated European Regional Development Fund) was to, simultaneously, make 
economic growth not only more balanced but also higher. 
 
Not less interestingly, the report also clearly mentions that the regional policy objective was then to 
“move capital towards underutilized human resources” and to avoid  the opposite situation. It is a 
precise qualification of the idea of convergence that Europe decide to promote whereas – unlike the 
United States – gaps are closed, as we will see shortly, not by large migration of workers, but by 
creating the conditions for capital to move towards the less developed areas. 
 
Nowadays the European cohesion policies has become  been the best endowed, best known and most 
sophisticated of all regional development policies and it is certainly the most significant regional 
development policy being designed and deployed on an international scale and whose coordination is 
carried out by an international organisation (Leonardi, 2005). In fact, the cohesion policies budget 
amounted to 71,4 BN Euro in the first 1989 – 1993 programming period, rising to 184BN Euro for 
the 2000–2006 cycle that we are analyzing in this thesis, and rising further to 344 BN Euro for the 
current expenditure cycle (2007-2013). This amount equals to more than one third of the EC’s total 
budget and approximately 0.3% of member states’ total GDP. 
Cohesion policies are, thus, enacted through the realization of a number of operating programmes 
funded by the so called “structural funds” 13 whose reform was mandated to the EC by the article 130 
(d) of the Single European Act (1986) 14 and reviewed by three successive wave of regulations15 each 
starting a new five years programming period (thus we so far had a 1988 – 1993, 1994 – 1999, 2000 
– 2006 and 2007 – 2013 programming periods). The structural funds target different objectives16  that 
mostly correspond to different areas facing different problems, wheras the biggest is the Objective 1 
dedicated to support regions whose GDP per habitant was below 75% of the European Community 
average17. As said before, these programmes operate mostly on a national or regional18 basis and are 
                                                 
13 European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF), European Agriculture Guidance 
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) plus since 1993 the Cohesion Fund for the member states whose GDP pro capita was less than 
90% of European average (Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Greece). 
14 Regulations 2052/ 1988; 4243/ 1988; 4244/ 1988; 4245/ 1988; 4246/ 1988 
15 In 1993, 1999, 2006. 
16 Objective 1, 2, 3 & 4, 5a, 5b to which one wants to add the so cllaed Community Initiatives that were managed directly 
by the European Commission and the Integrated Mediterranean programme whose introduction in 1985 anticipated some 
of the principles of the reform in Italy, France and Greece where they were spent. From 2007 there has been a reduction 
of the objectives to three. 
17 Objective 1 became “convergence regions” under the 2007 – 2013 regulation. 
18 By region here we mean the definition that EU has identified to distinguish regional entity (called Nuts II in the 
Eurostat terminology) from the sub regional/ provincial ones (the Eurostat Nuts III). 
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therefore administered by regional and national administrations, coordinated by the European 
Commission (mostly the Direction for Regional policies and the one for Employment). 
The outcomes of a policy constituting such a substantial investment financially and politically are 
thus crucial for the continuing viability of the European project. Additionally, the policy represents a 
key “case study” for other “macro regions” experiencing growing regional inequalities.  
Some of the distinctive features of the cohesion policies also serve as theoretical justifications of the 
recent introduction of innovation as the concept around which to reconceptualise cohesion policies 
and regional development strategies. 
 
Investment in knowledge as a response to the integration versus cohesion dilemma 
 
The first reason of looking to innovation with interest is that it must have appeared as a way for 
Europe to solve the contradiction between integration and cohesion – Europe’s two main missions – 
that has characterized most of its history.   
The success of the former (integration) has, in fact, always been believed to augment the reasons for 
raising the (financial and political) commitment to the latter (cohesion).  
It is, in fact, not a coincidence that the  entire regional development strategy with the reform of 
structural funds of 1988 with which the first programming period was launched, almost coincide with 
the creation of the “single market” that according to the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987 was to 
be completed by 1992. In the SEA the notion of single market was meant a goal that, more 
ambitiously than for the “common market” envisaged by the founding treaty of 1957, had to be 
parallelled by policies meant to reduce regional imbalances that may become gretaer because of 
increased competition (Leonardi, 2005).  
As Boldrin and Canova (2001) notice, the EU buys a “divergence” vision of integration that reflects 
at least partially the forecast that the “new economic geography” would do in terms of impact of a 
reduction of trade costs on regional imbalances. Lower barriers and more competition are expected to 
expose the weaknesses of backward regions and to attract – when proximity to final clients become 
less of an issue – capital in the more developed ones (Graziano, 2003, Widgren, 2001).  
However, this effect does not – in the case of the “model” that European Union pursues – gets 
compensated at a later stage by the relocation of workers and competition on salaries that according 
to  the economic geographers would bring the system to a new equilibrium with lower differences 
amongst areas when agglomeration costs become higher than agglomeration benefits.  
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In Europe a mix of deliberate policies and social characteristics has, in fact, limited both the labour 
mobility (Janssen and Gijsel, 2000) amongst states19, whereas much mobility has happened amongst 
regions within countries and the wage differentials, whereas salary levels differ at a large extent 
amongst countries but not amongst regions within countries (Molle and Van Mourik, 1989, Andersen 
et al, 2000, Boeri et al, 2002). The combination of the two effects make European region to differ in 
terms of income level more than other areas of the world (Puga, 2002) where salaries move more 
freely and workers relocate themselves looking for better opportunities20. 
This situation of a mobility that de facto limited to capital and goods, thus, resulted into a situation 
where 
1. countries tend to converge thanks to the comparative advantages of new comers and the 
mobility of capital that moves to countries with cheaper labour (Puga, 2002); 
2. regions within countries tend to diverge because of low differences in wages within countries 
given that wage bargaining systems are largely national21 so that within countries poorer 
regions can not make for their gap in productivity by providing chaper labor (Boldin and 
Canova, 2001). 
This is demonstrated by looking to the numbers of the evolution of differences in income per capita – 
as a proxy of convergence - amongst regions and member states in Europe that the author 
reconstructed for the 1995 to 2007 period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Surprisingly, in fact, the number of EU’s employees being born in a European country and working in an other was 
much higher (up to 6%) in the seventies before the SEA than today (Janssen, 1999). 
20 As some authors (Puga, 1999, 2000 and 2003) have put forward, numbers appear to even say that higher mobility and 
wages flexibility make regional gaps in income smaller in more market driven economies like USA than Europe. 
In fact, the ten best-off (NUTS 2) regions in Europe have GDP per person equal to 3.5 times that of the ten worst-off 
regions, whereas in the USA, the ten  best-off states  have a GDP per person equal to 1.5 times that of the ten worst-off 
states; moreover whereas nearly 25% of EU citizens live in Regions whose GDP is below the 75% of the average 
threshold and thus qualify for Objective 1; in the USA the similar percentage, applying the same mechanism, would be 
only 2% and only two states, Mississipi and West Virginia, would be considered “less developed”.  However, the 
weakness of this analysis is that it compares (American) states with (European) regions, where there are large differences 
between the two - both in terms of institutional  and size – that makes the comparison questionable. Moreover, America’s 
industry base seems more concentrated, given that to account for half of the European industrial production we have to 
sum the 27 more industrial European regions with 45% of the population (and 17% of the land), to get to half of it in the 
USA is sufficient to consider 14 states which have 21% of the inhabitants (and 13% of the surface).  
 
21  With the partial exception of Germany (Hancke, 2002). 
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Graph 1.1 – Coefficient of variation in income per capita amongst regions and amongst countries, EU 15, 1995 – 2007 
 
Source: Eurostat, access November 2011 
 
The chart does clearly indicate that if we focus on old (EU 15) member states which were beneficiary 
of structural funds in the period we are studying, whereas countries are converging fast, differences 
amongst regions are being reduced more slowly. If we then try to measure convergence not amonst 
all regions but as average of the coefficient of variation amongst regions within countries (so that 
we neutralize the measurement of the intra countries effect), the curve becomes practically flat with 
no gain of less vis a vis more developed regions (notwithstanding the expenditure of structural 
funds).  
In this situation, the expenditure in R&D in less developed regions may have appeared as the tool to 
make regions to converge on a curve of economic development characterized by higher added value 
without competition on cheap labor amongst them (as, for instance, for the second “cohesion report” 
released at the beginning of the programming period we are considering, European Commission, 
2001). This reasoning becomes even stronger when regions become “vulnerable” due to the increase 
in global trade (see, for instance, the study of Affuso, Capello and Fratesi, 2010, on strategies 
adopted by different regions to respond to the so called globalization).  
 
Cohesion as a lever to pursue efficiency and innovation as an enhancer of economic growth 
 
There is, however, a second reason that makes the case to invest in R&D particularly interesting for 
European policy makers. Since the start, cohesion policies have been, as we mentioned, explicitly 
said not to be a form of subsidy or of compensation. The objective has been in fact said to use 
cohesion instruments to increase the wealth of the entire community by tapping into the most evident 
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unused potential which was supposed to be hidden in the less developed regions. This point has been 
even more highlighted recently by the EC’s documents (European Commission, Second, 2003, Third, 
2005, Fourth, 2006, Fifth, 2008, and Sixth, 2009, Cohesion Reports).  
Since the 1986, the view of cohesion as a lever to use a particularly large and underutilized potential 
for growth was associated to cohesion instruments. This was the view that was, for instance, endorsed 
and theorized by a study group appointed by the President of the Commission Jacques Delors and 
chaired by Tommaso Padoa Schioppa (Padoa Schioppa et al, 1987). In that report efficiency, stability 
and equity were conveyed as the three overarching aims of the Community. The idea was to put at 
work factors that were underused and, in this context, an investment in knowledge was perceived as 
pivotal not only to reduce inequality but also to increase the capability of lagging regions to 
contribute to general wealth and, thus, to maximize the economic growth of EU as a whole. 
The clarification that the objective of efficiency is to be perceived as distint and to be persued with 
different instrument as opposed to the aim of equity did further contribute to legitimate the 
investments in the innovation capacacity of backward regions as one of the pillar of the new cohesion 
policy.  
The independent report released in April 2009 by Fabrizio Barca at the request of Danuta Hubner, 
Commissioner for Regional Policy (Barca, 2009)22 can be, in fact, seen as the outcome of a debate 
that has taken place especially during the programming period that this thesis considers.  
The Barca report  argues that both considering the latest choice and the history of the policy, 
Structural Funds are, in fact, serving not one but two objectives.  One of equity23 whereas the EU 
wants to make sure that European citizens or European places are not excluded and that thus 
cohesion of the Union is not reduced, and one of efficiency where overall levels of prosperity can be 
increased by making full use of the potential of people and areas that may be underutilized.  
In Barca’s view efficiency can be further specified (adapting Bourguignon and other, 2007) as the 
full achievement of economic potential. Such a definition envisages an increase of output through 
                                                 
22 The rationalization that Barca proposes leaves open questions on the very identification of the policy’s objectives (see, 
for instance, the recent 'Cohesion or Confusion: A Policy Searching for Objectives by Iain Begg, 2010). However, the 
acknowledgement that two objectives co-exist under the same umbrella raises an even more important issue which has to 
do with the structure of the programmes and the organisation of the implementation processes. Is it efficient to pursue the 
competitiveness of more and less developed regions under the same umbrella of the structural funds, or would it not be 
better to separate the two areas and thus policies (Tewdwr-Jones, 2005, Wishlade, 2008)?  
The idea that the instruments pursuing efficiency and equity should be separated is probably the most interesting 
innovation that the Barca report (2009) suggests. This is, in fact, one of the most far reaching indications that the report 
provided which also appears to be consistent with the thesis that we proposed. The weakness of the report is, however, 
that the consequences of such a separation are not fully elaborated. 
 
23 The concept of equity is clarified by the report by associating it to the idea of social inclusion and referring to a 
multidimensional approach which is richer than income per person (the report refers for justifying its theorization to 
Amartya Sen’s capability approach, but also to recent works of both the EC – the First European Quality of Life Survey – 
and the OECD, Giovannini and others 2007). 
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two typology of actions: a static one that is meant to increase the utilisation of a certain economy at a 
given time (essentially through the increase of the employment rate of people and the deployment 
rate of investments), and through a dynamic one whose objective is to increase wealth in time by 
increasing the output per factor. This latter, in turn, means to increase the productivity of workers and 
of industrial assets by improving skills and technologies.  
The report provides some further interesting input into the debate and into this thesis when it defines  
the rationale for the intervention (Barca, 2009, pages 20 -21 and page 31): “it is the failure of 
institutions and of the motivation within a society which calls for an external intervention that can 
break the path towards underdevelopment and that is, both, capable of delivering results and creating 
the conditions for the development process not to be reversed”. The report, accordingly, suggests to 
focus on both the pursuit of efficiency and on the achievement of equity by providing “integrated 
bundles of public goods and services” because they increase the visibility of the intervention, produce 
early wins and create the accountability between program managers and population.  
The “public goods and services” that are needed for achieving efficiency are, then, associated with 
the infrastructure necessary for investing innovation, the education and the volume of expenditures in 
research which all represent assets upon which the market would underinvest because of a lack of 
convenience and, thus, of the above mentioned appropriation problems. 
 
Cohesion partial failure and innovation as a possible change  
 
The third and final reason why innovation has become so important in the structural funds experience 
is that the experience of cohesion policies falls short of a definitive confirmation of achievement of  
its own objectives: inversitments in R&D appeared to have the potential to make possible a change in 
direction. 
In fact, the few analyses24 of the overall performance of cohesion policy are available (Leonardi, 
2005, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1996), Armstrong and Taylor, 2003) “leave us with the question of 
whether the Cohesion policy has been fully able to achieve its objectives” (Leonardi, 2006).  
Data, in fact, do not provide any definitive answer25. Even the evolution employment rates mentioned 
by some of the papers that support cohesion policies (Leonardi, 2006) do not support any strong, 
                                                 
24 These studies show that convergence is taking place in Europe but at a slower pace than in other large economies like 
the USA (where states are taken – with a lot of institutional approximation – as proxies of regions) and Japan. Leonardi 
(2006) distinguished convergence for Objective 1 as opposed to not Objective 1 regions in Europe and found that the 
former were growing faster than the latter (and the same was said by the Third Cohesion Report, EC, 2004). 
The researches do use as tools of measurement both Beta and Sigma convergence, whereas Beta convergence happens 
when we find a negative correlation between the growth rate of income per capita and the initial level of income and  
Sigma convergence takes place when the dispersion of real income per capita among group of regions tends to fall over 
time. They both show that notwithstanding larger regional development policies, convergence is proceeding at a slower 
rate in Europe than in other continents. 
 27
generalized conclusion (even when we limit to the comparison between cohesion countries and the 
rest). Moreover, the data of even our previous graph 1.1 showed that the cohesion policies’ results 
have at least mixed: convergence within countries amongst regions is practically not happening 
notwithstanding the structural funds, whereas, even the mere fact that only eleven of the fifty seven 
regions that were elected as objective 1 regions in 1994 did succeed abandon their status of less 
developed region by 2000 – being this the overall objective of a public intervention of this kind – 
says that it is plausible that cohesion policies did, at least partially, miss their target. 
More likely, performances of structural funds programs do vary a great deal according to the decision 
that are taken at national and regional levels and no unique answer to the question of performance 
exist, with some examples of outright success (Ireland as for the account given by O’Hearn, 2001, 
and Barry and Crafts, 1999) and other of quasi permanent failures (as in the independent evaluation 
that involved your author and that assessed the effectiveness of structural funds programmes in South 
Italy, Vision&Value and LSE, 2007). These differentiations and the impossibility to give one answer 
to the question of the impact is, after all, a natural consequence of the empowerment of regions: 
different regions take different decisions, develop different institutional capabilities and achieve 
different results and a research like the one that we are developing is meant to understand what does 
explain these gaps in performances26. 
Moreover, however, even more doubts exist when it comes to assess the capability of cohesion 
policies to not only support less developed regions, but also to promote EU wide economic growth 
through the use of underutilized resources.  
Reports like the one produced by the Independent High – Level study group established in 2003 by 
the President of the Commission (at that time Romano Prodi) and led by Andre Sapir (Sapir et al, An 
Agenda for a Growing Europe, 2003) urged the EU to consider growth (both in terms of productivity 
and employment base) as its overarching priority. A trade off between cohesion and growth was, 
once again, exposed and the concern of opinion leaders and policy makers appeared to shift again 
towards the need of efficiency27.  
Investing in innovation and, more precisely, in making through innovation each region leading edge 
in its specialization (as the Barca report, 2009, suggests when it encourages the European 
                                                                                                                                                                    
25 There is, in fact, a problem of both data at region and programme level - Leonardi, 2006, notice, in fact, that 
“measuring whether change has taken place should be easy” and instead  it is not so due to lack of data and dis 
homogeneity in the methods to collect them which is per se an issue of accountability and institutional capability – and of 
models capable to isolate from other factors the impact on GDP levels and employment of the programme. 
26 In fact, the argument of differentiation of outcomes can be applied to both cohesion policies and single market with 
(authors and) regions being dispersed in each of the four quadrant resulting from the combination of the positive –
negative outcome of both structural funds and fall in the trade barriers. 
27 The Sapir report also proposed a number of radical reforms of cohesion policies with a re nationalization of the 
structural funds programs. These proposals appeared, in fact, in contradiction with the above mentioned aim of “multi 
level governance” being an aim (and not only a method) of cohesion and with the priority that the same report appeared to 
attach to the idea of improving institutional capabilities. 
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Commission to adopt a wider interpretation of what innovation may mean so that each region may 
find its way – even in traditional sectors and portion of value chain of not innovative industry – to be 
innovative in its own way) has, therefore, a strong appeal and certainly may have appeared to 
promote a change in programmes that displayed, at very least, the possible problem to be too similar 
amongst them. 
The next section will discuss how the decision to invest structural funds in research and innovation 
must have, therefore, appeared as the compromise to bridge between the need to facilitate the 
transformation of Europe into a knowledge – based economy and the idea to keep the cohesion effort 
going. 
 
 
1.2.3 The shift on the allocation of structural funds 
 
The impact of the evolution of the theories of growth on cohesion policies has been constant. We 
already saw how the rejection of the idea of convergence as a natural process assumed by the 
neoclassical theory of growth, found an important back up in the economic geography forecast of the 
single market producing divergence.  
Priorities also changed over time both in terms of the weight of the structural funds in the EU budget 
(and thus in terms of the role of cohesion policies within the EU strategies) and of the composition of 
the portfolio of structural funds funded investments (again European Commission, Second, 2003, 
Third, 2005, Fourth, 2006, Fifth, 2008, and Sixth, 2009, Cohesion Reports) and this again can see as 
being influenced by the evolution of theories of growth. 
Although there is no systematic account for the evolution of the structural funds portfolio in terms of 
change of weight of different typologies of investments, one can recognize a general shift in 
instruments mix through the five programming periods that can be accounted for in the following 
way:   
 
1. an approach to development that was initially neo-Keynesian; investments in transportation 
infrastructures tended to be seen as crucial to avoid isolation but also to produce an increase 
in the production function (through investments and the consumption variable); 
2. a shift at a later stage towards the concept of regional competitiveness meant as strengthening 
of the competitiveness of firms and “districts” of firms (as for Michael Porter, 2003) through 
the provisions of financial and real (consulting, information, ..) support, although this was 
tempered by the need not to violate the concurrent principles of competition and of restriction 
of state aids; 
 29
3. an increasing concern towards training as a way to improve the employability of individuals 
and the human capital assets that the firms can leverage where this approach was encouraged 
by a number of studies that underlined human capital and education as success factor of the 
recent rise of some economies like South Korea, Singapore and, also, Ireland (see, for 
instance, the estimation of impact of educational achievement on economic performances in 
Aghion et al, 2003, and OECD, 1996, 1999, 2003); 
4. a growing emphasis of the EU on environmental and lately climate change policies; 
environment was, in fact, one of the three “pillars” of the very Lisbon strategy (where the 
need to “decouple growth from the use of natural resources” was put forward) as it was 
confirmed by the Goteborg Strategy in 2001 (EC, 2001, but also the report on the role of 
environment within cohesion policies of the Regional Environmental Center under the 
auspices of the European Network of Environmental Authorities, 2008, and the case for 
electing “adaptation to cilimate change as one of the cohesion priorities in the above 
mentioned Barca report, 2009) 
and ultimately  
5. a strong increase of the importance of R&D and Information Communication Technologies 
(ICT) in the current programming period (for the theoretical and political reasons that we just 
described). 
 
Throughout this evolution, cohesion policy has progressively increased its distinctiveness as an 
intervention aiming to reduce inequalities, not through redistributive measures, but through the 
creation of “conditions” under which the potential of the less developed areas within the Union and 
their resources can be untapped. In the EU’s vision such a policy should not only impact positively 
on the economic performance of less economically able regions, but also deliver a net gain for the 
growth of Europe’s economy as a whole (European Commission, Second and Third Cohesion Report, 
2002, 2004). Investments in R&D have been perceived the instrument that more immediately can tap 
into underutilized potential of economic growth. 
 
The effects of the new priority on R&D can be found already for the 2000 – 2006 programming 
period and can be seen in the graph 1.2 that shows the evolution of R&D investments: 
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Graph 1.2 – Total R&D expenditure in EU 15 and EU 15 Objective 1 Regions (1999=100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, accessed March, 2008 
 
In the latest programming period investments in R&D have accelerated much more in less developed 
than in advanced regions and such a redistribution appears to be mostly the effect of structural funds. 
It must be, in fact, said that the increase of funds spent on R&D only partially happened for the 
period that we are studying. In fact, the Lisbon strategy was officially launched after or at the same 
time that the 2000 – 2006 structural funds programmes were drafted. And yet the numbers appear to 
say that the debate that was taking place at the end of the nineties, did impact on the choices of 
structural funds programme managers.  
The shift has been even larger for the programmes that started in 2007 and will last until 2013 as it is  
summarized by graph 1.3: 
1. Out of the 344 bn Euro one quarter is to be spent on “innovation”; this amount is roughly 
three times  that planned for the 2000 – 2006 period and the growth is such that innovation becomes 
the first type (field) of intervention, and, in fact, becomes even greater than transportation that used to 
be the largest area of investment in previous periods. 
2. Of the four categories of innovation related investments, the largest is R&D taking more than 
half (almost 60%) of the resources28; the other types of investments in innovation being investments 
in human capital (mostly tertiary education), ICT (within ICT structural funds are focused on 
applications meant to improve public services), and measures to promote entrepreneurship. 
                                                 
28 ; This adds up to 50 billion euro of structural funds to be spent on R&D that transforms the cohesion policies in a 
source of EU money to research that is even larger than the VII Framework programme. 
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3. In terms of geographical distribution, 80% go to less developed regions (more or less evenly 
distributed between new member states and less developed regions across EU 15 countries). 
 
Graph 1.3 –Structural allocation, 2007 - 2013 
 
 
Source: EC DG Regio 
 
If we, then, add to 40 bio spent in research in the less developed regions, the money spent on not 
R&D innovative projects we reach about 60 bio of structural funds spent on innovation in 
convergence regions to which we can add, further, approximately 10 bio of R&D financed by the 
commission through framework programs. This makes 70 bio euro of EC money to which one should 
add further 70 bio euro  of funds coming from private firms and public administrations as co finance: 
the total of 140 billion euro in seven year represents  the possibility to double the expenditures in 
research in less developed regions. 
 
The priority on innovation is most likely a priority to be strengthened in the next programming period 
(Barca, 2009) and yet a number of fundamental problems in terms of efficiency of the strategy and 
the factors explaining higher performances are still to be solved.  
 
1.3  THE PUZZLE AND ITS POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
 
Investing in knowledge must, thus, have appeared as the tool to square more than one of the 
dilemmas that European policy makers have tried to tackle for decades. But does it effectively work? 
How effective is the use of structural funds as a lever to achieve both convergence (of less developed 
regions) and higher competitiveness of the EU as a whole? Do numbers and empirical studies 
confirm expectations? 
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The question can be, in fact, broken down into two parts: 
 
1. First, we want to ask ourselves how well are structural funds spent on R&D in less developed 
regions in terms of serving the aim of fostering economic growth in those regions. 
2. Secondly, we should try to understand the effect on the rest of Europe (regions that are not 
qualifying for the status of “convergence” or of “objective 1”) of spending structural funds on 
R&D in less developed regions (whereas we also have a smaller portion of funds that are in 
fact allocated to be spent on R&D of non-convergence regions). 
We will now present few empirical data that appear to cast few doubts on the validity of some of the 
assumptions that we have mentioned. 
 
1.3.1 The empirical data 
 
One methodological caveat to any of these analyses is that it is impossible to isolate the so called 
impact of a certain independent variable (being it the overall expenditures in innovation or the use of 
structural funds) whose effect we want measure on a certain dependent variable (productivity, 
employment or GDP pro capita) from the impact of other levers. We will introduce in this research 
some results that are proxies of effects directly due to structural funds programmes. However, it is 
enough at this stage to consider the statistics that indicate how much economic growth tends to be 
associated with R&D expenditures. 
 
Let us then start from the very general question of how effective is R&D expenditure as an 
instrument of economic growth.  
As we saw in section 1.1.2, the link between innovation and growth has long been acknowledged by 
authors like Marshall, Kuznets, Schumpeter and yet a definitive answer on the capability of R&D to 
accelerate economic growth is still missing. 
The numbers seem to present a reality that is different from the one we would expect taking the 
forecasts of the new growth theory at face value. The graph below maps EU countries by comparing 
expenditures on R&D as a percentage of GDP and economic growth. The results are precisely 
opposite to those we would expect.   
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Graph 1.4 – EU 27 countries by average annual R&D expenditure in % of GDP (differenge vs. average) and GDP 
compound annual growth rate (difference vs. average) 1999-2005 
 
Source: Eurostat , accessed March, 2008 
 
The correlation is significant and strongly negative. Countries that have recently grown more rapidly, 
can still spend less in R&D.  
One obvious objection to these results is that they can be by the simple fact that new member states 
have outperformed generally older ones on a cheap labour and taxation that have determined the 
former to outperform the latter in terms of attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Altough 
rather obviously that the former spend less on R&D than the latter.  
 
However, if we neutralize this fact and divide the analysis in two – with one part focused on older 
and the other on newer member states – the situation does not change and the correlation between 
propensity to spend in R&D and economic growth stays negative (-0,42% for EU15 only and - 0,19 
for EU 12). 
 
A more precise operationalization of the endogenous growth theory expectations may, however, be 
that we expect that a quicker acceleration (and not the absolute level) of R&D expenditures is 
associated more frequently with quicker economic growth. This redefinition of expectations yields 
the results shown in the following graph 1.5: correlation is positive and significant with countries 
such as  Estonia, but also Ireland and Spain, seeming to find a competitive advantage from an 
acceleration of R&D investments over the norm.   
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Graph 1.5 - EU 27 countries by R&D expenditure compound annual growth rate (difference vs. average) and GDP 
compound annual growth rate (difference vs. average) 1999-2005 
 
Source: Eurostat, , accessed March, 2008 
 
The correlation becomes in this case positive and significant but again the magnitude of both the 
coefficient and the significance fall short to avoid a great variance of outcomes for each level of 
R&D growth rate with, for instance, Slovakia or Sweden decelerating more than similar Slovenia or 
Denmark their investments in R&D and yet growing more. 
The results appear confirmed by the analysis performed on the same period by Crescenzi (Crescenzi, 
2005) who interestingly deployed an econometric analysis on EU 25 regions (and not countries like 
for the previous graph). Crescenzi tried to check how much is GDP per capita growth rate explained 
by three different indicators of innovation – R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP, R&D 
personnel as a percentage of the labor force and High Tech patent as a percentage of the labor force – 
plus one overall indicator that compose the above three. The results are moderately positive 
(obscillating from a positive 0,33 to a much lower 0,14 for patents), moderately significant (with the 
exception of patents which is not a surprise consideting that patents may, in fact, reduce, as we will 
see later, the quantity of endogenous, tacit knowledge that is the asset whose effect this thesis is 
studying) and with a very large variance.   
These results appear even clearer if we transpose the theory from a national level to a regional level 
and, moreover, if we focus on the subset of the less developed European regions.  
As the following graph 1.6 shows, R&D and GDP growth are practically uncorrelated, and regions 
seem scattered in each of the four quadrants that couple R&D and economic growth as over or under-
average.  
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Graph 1.6 - EU 15 objective 1 Regions by R&D expenditure compound annual growth rate (difference vs. average) and 
GDP compound annual growth rate (difference vs.EU 15 average) 1999-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, , accessed March, 2008 
 
It appears that if we consider a long enough period (justified with reference to the supposedly long 
term nature of the effects of the R&D) R&D expenditure growth rates are not associated with GDP 
growth rates at all.  
 
Moreover, variability of outcomes tend to be larger at the extreme of R&D growth rates: when you 
spend more or less than average, you tend to have either an above or below normal outcome in terms 
of capability to converge. 
 
A number of other correlations were run and calculations made of how different levels of prosperity – 
that can be proxied by absolute level of GDP – are associated with  R&D expenditures, whereas we 
separated public from private investments and we compared this correlation with other parameters 
like productivity, patents and employment in R&D (all indicators, as we will later elaborate, that are 
considered targets of the so Lisbon strategy).  
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Graph 1.7 – Correlation between GDP per inhabitant (T) and indicators of R&D intensity, innovation activity and 
competitiveness in Objective 1 Regions (1999-2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, accessed March, 2008 
 
Once again the results indicate that public expenditure on R&D is the variable which is – amongst the 
variables that we are considering (public and private expenditures in research, patents, employment 
in R&D and productivity) – the one that is less associated to GDP per inhabitant. Moreover, we ran 
the regression with time lags  (calling T-1 for the year previous to the one when GDP per person was 
recorded and T-2 for two years before) and obtained the interesting result that the introduction of lags 
does not change the correlation in any significant way.  
 
It is, of course, possible that investments in R&D take more than three years to materialize29. 
Nevertheless, the fact  that the correlations do not change in time may – as we will elaborate in the 
second chapter – hint to the fact that the lag argument that has been voiced many times as one of the 
complications of evaluations of R&D, may be somehow less important than it is normally thought to 
be.  
 
                                                 
29 In fact, it is impossible to understand how long will be necessary for an investment in R&D to fully impact 
macroeconomic results and, in addition, the response would be different for different typology of innovation (radical 
versus incremental), different phases of the value chain being impacted (product versus process innovation), different 
industry and academic domain. 
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Not less interesting is the result that says that private investments may, in fact, matter much more 
than public ones. This result (confirmed by other analyses see for instance Hall et al, 1999) will, as 
we will elaborate in the second chapter, support the idea that we are going to develop in chapter two 
that private investments in R&D are a good proxy of success.  
The data investigated so far, are, however, data that describe correlations amongst different features 
of an economic system. What, more specifically, is the impact of the expenditures of structural funds 
in R&D?  
The last numerical exercise of this paragraph shows – in Table 1.1 – the results of a regression (that 
unlike correlations try to measure how one independent variable explains variation in the value of the 
dependent one) of convergence (increase of GDP per capita of less developed regions) on structural 
funds spent in R&D measures30. 
 
Table 1.1 – Main results of a regression of GDP growth rates on structural funds expenditures in R&D (OB1 regions, 
2000 – 2006, p-values in parenthesis) 
 
Dependent  Variable
 
Independent variable 
GDP per capita average compounded growth 
rate 
Structural Funds Expenditures in R&D as 
a percentage of GDP 
1,77 
(0.075) 
GDP (1999) -0.00000066 
(0.583) 
Percentage of population with tertiary 
education (1999) 
0,372 
(0.153) 
Constant 
-0,014 
(0,83) 
N 39 
R2 0.6726 
 Source: EC, DG Regio, Eurostat, accessed November, 2009 
 
The regression applied a linear equation where the percentage of growth in GDP per capita was to be 
explained by three independent variables: structural funds expenditures in R&D, initial level of GDP 
                                                 
30 Data with the actual allocation and expenditures are available for only 39 of the 59 objective 1 regions. 
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per capita before the beginning of the OB 1 expenditure period (1999) (this is to control for an 
internal convergence within OB 1 regions), and differences in education attainment (plus a set of 
country indicators variables that capture country specific differences in factors that affect regional 
economis growth – e.g. national economic policies).  
The p value of the t-test on the coefficient of the structural funds is under 0,1 which indicates that the 
result is statistically different from zero at the 10% significance level. The R2 shows that the 
regression is able to explain a substantial amount of the variation in GDP growth rates. The 
expenditure of an additional 1 per cent of the GDP in R&D is, on average, expected to yield an 
increase of the GDP per capita of 1.77% which is good value for money. However, even this analysis 
(the details are in the annex in the annex table a.1) confirms that the variation can be very large given 
that the 95% confidence interval for the point estimate oscillate from a maximum increase of the 
GDP per capita of 3.73% to a minimum of – 0,2% (where GDP would actually shrink because of the 
injection of public money in R&D). 
The validity of the results is somehow limited by the relative lack of data on structural funds 
expenditures. Yet, the statistical significance of the data say that normally structural funds spent on 
R&D are likely to impact positively on GDP growth rates, whereas this was also found by others (for 
instance, Rodrigeuz-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008) who also demonstrated that such an impact is likely 
to be higher  than the one of other typology of expenditures (like infrastructure or aids to SMES).  
Even less specific analyses have been deployed as far as the impact on other regions and EU’s 
economy of the expenditures of structural funds in R&D in less developed regions. 
One of the most interesting - Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman (2002) -  focused on effect of EU aids 
to R&D on the specific issue of specialization of EU industry and on the impact that more or less 
specialization may have on overall EU’s wealth. It was found that  
 
a) specialization is taking place slowly at country level and even more slowly at regions level; b) 
EU aid – as opposed to what they found for state aid – is effectively distorting the polarization which 
would have taken place without them; thus the policy is in fact having some counter-market effect as 
one would expect, especially by attracting R&D investments in less developed regions, and c) this is, 
nevertheless, a result which may be negative from the EU’s point of view (crowding out potential 
High Tech expenses in other parts of Europe), and ineffective in terms of increasing the growth rates 
of less developed regions because they appear to have low endowments of high skilled labour and 
thus are not able to leverage on the increase of their R&D capabilities. 
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Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman’s point is very interesting because of their analysis of the 
composition – per industry – of the manufacturing base. Overall scepticism on a possible 
geographically redestribution of R&D expenditures is supported. 
Other systematic assessments of the validity of the choice to use structural funds to finance R&D 
provide very little and the few, mostly qualitative, evidence (Technopolis, 2006) showed concern for 
the adoption as far as investments in innovation of “the  sprinkler principle (a little for everybody) 
without prioritization and without proper evaluation”. One of the main hypothesis of this research is, 
in fact, that concentration of investments in one specific industry or portion of the value chain of an 
industry is, in fact, important for success. 
Overall the statistical evidence that we presented in this section does, however,  indicate that: 
a) spending structural funds in R&D seems to have a significant and positive impact on GDP 
growth rates; b) however, there is no guarantee that this will happen because the variability of the 
outcomes seems very high; further c) if we want to more correctly associate R&D expenditures and 
economic performance, we should consider private investments in research as more strongly 
associated to GDP growth rates; d) the impact of public investments in the R&D of less developed 
regions seem to have a negative impact on the rest of Europe that may overcompensate the benefit in 
aided regions. 
It is therefore worthwhile to identify the reasons that can explain this variability of results. This is 
also because the fact that EU has just decided to confirm its strategic choice to become a “knowledge 
based economy” by 2020 notwithstanding the partial failure of 2000 – 2010 strategy, says that 
innovation is a choice that is here to stay and for the long term. It is, thus, important to understand 
how can we maximize its results. 
Whereas however the very few analyses that have been made systematically (Crescenzi, 2005, 
Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2006), tested the possibility that pre existing region’s conditions 
(geographical accessibility, percentage of population with higher education achievement)  may 
explain the differences, this research will attempt to test instead the explanatory power of   the 
independence of the decision maker from politics and her accountability, as well as of the capability 
to develop partnerships amongst business, universities, civil society and government with the specific 
purpose to incorporate information (as, once again, Barca, 2009, recommends) in the innovation 
strategy and solve specific problems. 
This set of evidence do carry us on the following question which is on the reasons why performances 
may differ so greatly. 
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1.3.2 Reasons for differences in the performance of innovation strategies 
 
We, therefore, need to understand which are the most mentioned reasons why regional innovation 
strategies may fail. They can be categozied in four distinct possible problems: the possibility of 
public investments having the effect to reduce the private ones; the difficulty for bureaucrats and 
innovators to interact, the issue of adding expenditures in context that do not have the minimum scale 
to compete; the spill overs that may disperse to other regions the knowledge that has been 
accumulated in the region. Their combination may generate, as we will see, a fifth problem which is 
specific to less developed areas and that academia uses to call “the regional innovation paradox”. 
 
The question of the crowding out of private investments  
 
Public investments in research may be complementary to private investments and thus encourage 
further expenditures in knowledge, but may, also, on the contrary, substitute private undertakings and 
this may turn out only in no increase in the overall volume of R&D expenditures but even in a net 
dmininution of social welfare if private undertakings present a lower return than public ones.  
The study of Hall, David and Toole (Hall et al, 1999) is one of the most useful in order to have an 
overall view of the problem. The paper, in fact, presents both an aggregation of many different 
studies on this matter and a methodological framework to analyze the issue. 
The paper suggests, then, that the results must be assessed by measuring  separately the impact of 
public investments on “marginal rate of return” and the “marginal cost of capital” of investments on 
R&D to be conducted by private firms.  
The reasons why public investments may improve the prospective profitability of private investments 
in research appear to operate on a more macro level through the mechanisms of spillovers and 
expectations. The outcomes of publicly funded projects may, in fact, provide to all potential investors 
the initial knowledge or the infrastructure whose lack would have, otherwise, raised the costs of the 
investments and may, even, raise the expected profitability because they could increase the number of 
expected clients by enabling individuals that may demand a certain product.  
The mechanisms by which public investments may, instead, substitute private funds seem to be more 
associated to both a reduction of the expected return on investments due to the competition that 
public investments may create to private investors and the increase of the inputs necessary to conduct 
research due to the expansion of the demand that public investments will produce. 
More interestingly it is the conclusion of the study where “the usefulness of searching of the right, 
unifying answer” is doubted and the impact of differences amongst industries and typologies of 
research is acknowledged. More specifically it is recognized that substitution may be minimized by 
the extent to which public investments are targeted to sectors with large “appropriation problem” and 
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thus with little private investments and large positive consequences for welfare. Similar 
considerations should hold true when public investments target less developed regions where private 
investments would be scarce without any public intervention.  
 
The problem of the dialogue between innovators and administrations and the role of institutional 
arrangements 
An obstacle that the design and deployment of programmes of public investments in R&D is believed 
to encounter is about a possible clash between two different social and corporate culture. 
As a number of authors recognized (Head, 2011, Potts, 2009)) despite the enthusiasm for the use of 
innovation in order to modernize policies, public services and public investments’ menu, the public 
sector entrepreneurship is not “generally the hallmark of public sector behaviour” and managing 
innovation requires at leat what we may call entrepreneurial approach.  
The conflict between innovators and bureacrats is, indeed cultural: civil servants tend to be - even 
because of the legal definition of their job position - risk adverse and keen on predictability, whereas 
innovation means by definition risking failure.  
Moreover allocating public investments amongst different possible industries or even phases of 
industries’ value chains require a internationally wide knowledge - of different industries’ main 
trends and different academic domains’ characteristics - that can not be expected from public 
administrations. 
Not less acute, however, the potential conflict is between innovators and policy makers: political 
cycles tend to be shorter than the time span that innovation requires to unfold its potential and 
politicians tend to please their constituencies by splitting evenly resources whereas R&D requires 
critical mass and concentration (as we will see in the “worse” cases that the thesis investigated).  
 
The intensity of the spill over and the issue of the human capital 
The third limit of public investments in knowledge is that even assuming that the investments do 
succeed to support local innovative firms and universities or to attract innovative firms from outside, 
the benefits  may spill over to other regions (Shearmur and Bonnet, 2011). As mentioned, studies 
have demonstrated that even for a country like the United States half of technology progress can spill 
over to the rest of the world (Eaton and Kortum, 2002), that this percentage becomes higher the 
smaller is the area (region) to which a certain innovation strategy applies (Gumbau-Albert et al., 
2009), and Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi (2006) found that the percentage of population having a 
higher education degree may be a good indicator of how knowledge can become embedded to the 
region.  
 42
 
 
The question of scale and specialization 
A problem that especially any investment in less developed region needs to address is the issue of the 
minimum scale that is necessary to develop through innovation a competitive advantage that can be 
sustained on a global scale. 
As we mentioned before investments in knowledge  may be characterized by  return to scale that 
show an exponential pattern which may be the opposite of what we expect from manufacturing  
(Solow, 1987a) and, thus, of a cumulativeness that make different areas to increasingly diverge. 
This feature becomes even greater if we consider the very characteristic of the mobility of the high 
end of most educated workers that tend to constitute a large part of the workers employed in research 
and high technology sectors. Their mobility – meant not as true emigration but as constant flows 
form one country to an other – has increased a lot (OECD, 2008) unlike the mobility of other workers 
(as we saw in section 1.2).  
They move amongst countries, end up to live in few capital cities, London, Paris, Frankfurt, 
Barcelona, Milan and, thus, they tend to drive a concentration process at the European level.  
The resulting concentration of the research assets in Europe is paralleled, after all by a  similar trend 
in the US where Seattle, Boston, DC and the Silicon Valley account for two thirds of the US R&D 
expenditures.   
It has, however, to be mentioned that recently two possibilities to circumvent the problem seem to 
emerge. 
The first is the idea that we need to widen a lot the definition of what innovation is (as for the Barca, 
2009) going beyond the conformism that led hundreds of regions of Europe to declare in their 
innovation strategies similar choices – using often buzz words like High Tech, ICT and even 
biotechnology - in terms of industry where they may find their “specialization”, whereas one may 
even specialize itself by becoming particularly innovative in mature sectors like agriculture (as our 
case of Castilla Y Leon will show) or steel (like we will see in Yorkshire) or in not obviously 
technology intensive service industry like tourism or education. 
The second is to use ICT as a lever to overcome the problem of geographical proximity. IN the last 
decade studies have shown that Information Communication technologies have made phisical 
clustering and expecially of innovation activities is not anylonger a condition necessary for success 
(Cairncorss, 1997, Quah, 1997a, Maignan et al, 2003).  
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The regional innovation paradox 
We just saw the four explanations for regional innovation strategies to go wrong. The first two – the 
problem of public investments being additional to private ones, and the differences in the semantics 
of administrations and innovators – has to with most of regions. The second two – the question of the 
spillover and the scale – mostly apply to less developed regions that are the object of this study. 
The basis for the complex relationship between economic growth and R&D investments in less 
advanced regions is often referred to as the Regional Innovation Paradox (as in Oughton C., 
Landabaso M. and Morgan K., 2002), according to which, in essence: 
 
1. Investments in innovation and knowledge are, in fact, key to economic growth that may be 
sustainable in the long term;  
2. Yet, less developed regions display both a lower absorption capability (whereas by absorption 
is meant here capability to spend public investments that may be allocated to them for R&D 
projects) and 
3. Lower efficiency in terms of economic outcomes of the investments that they succeed to 
finance;  
4. This lower performance results from a disadvantage in terms of scale, because R&D 
investments tend – as for the arguments of some new economy geographers (Krugman and 
Venables, 1995) – to require high critical mass before they can achieve results that can yield 
returns in terms of productivity that may be robust enough to last in  time (Boldrin and 
Canova , 2001); and 
5. A further disadvantage in terms of institutional capabilities, because public administrations of 
less advanced areas tend to display a gap in terms of skills (Milio, 2007) as opposed to 
bureaucracies of more advanced regions and the effects of this gap may be larger when it 
comes to managing complex, innovative programmes like the ones dedicated to investing in 
research.  
It is the question of the institutional capabilities the one upon which even, more recently, the Barca 
report (2009) focuses when it comes to describe the problems that structural funds funded programs 
aimed to produce innovation and regional innovation strategies may encounter. The report identifies 
three risks of using R&D within the framework of the cohesion policies: policy imitation with an 
excessive tendency of regions to follow exogenous models (the report refers to imitation of models 
emerged in other contexts to which we would add the tendency of the EU frameworks to require too 
often consistencies amongst innovation strategies designed at different levels); local capture which 
happens when the strategy is controlled by local stakeholders that want to use it for their own 
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interests that do not coincide of tapping into unused potential; financial redistribution which is the 
danger that is produced by the point of view by which the objective of the innovation policy is the 
mere re alignment of the percentage of GDP spent in research by all regions and that may make 
worse the problem of scale that we just mentioned.  
The presence of such distortions will be controlled for in our empirical work and the investigation of 
the reasons that may explain why even innovation strategies sometimes fail will be futher focuse and 
operationalized by looking to three strands of literature to which this thesis is nearer: the research on 
the role of management in the performance of policies, the literature on the real value of partnerships, 
both to be considered a part on the wider work on regional innovation strategies. 
 
 
 
1.4 REGIONAL INNOVATION SYSTEMS AND OUR 
HYPOTHESIS ON THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS 
 
The notion of regional innovation system (RIS) has been very popular in both academia and policy 
making circles, for purposes of both economic and innovation developmenent for at least the last 
couple of decades. 
The basic idea underneath the conceptualization of RIS is that 
1. innovation or more appropriately - considering the semantic of the endogenous growth theory 
– the tacit knowledge that is essential component of innovation cannot be understood or even 
created “purely in terms of independent decision making at the level of a firm” (Dilling-
Hansen M., 2000) or of a single inventor and that thus it can be viewed as an “interactive, 
collective, entrepreneurial learning process” (Lundvall, 1992) across different organisations 
and domains (public and private, research and business)  
and that 
2. the more adequate level to observe such a learning system to operate is subnational31, indeed 
local where the reduced spatial distance makes easier for the complex interactions that 
innovation may require to happen (Lundvall et al, 2007) and for the trust32 - which is also 
necessary for this form of strategic collaboration – to consolidate (Freel, 2001);  
this local level has been commonly interpreted as regional (although there are a number of 
inconsistency between the institutional definition of “region” and the natural boundary of a 
                                                 
31 Altough the first systems of innovation to be conceptualized were the national ones by Lundvall (Lundvall, 1992) and 
Nelson (Nelson, 1993) 
32 Putman (Putman et al., 1993)would have called it social capital, although here we are talking about a more committing 
and pervasive form of it. 
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proper local system of innovation – see for instance Martin, 2003 and Yu and Jackson, 2011), 
even if the same concept has also been applied to city (Cooke, Davies and Wilson, 2002). 
 
An interesting description of regional innovation systems is the one that we found in the work of the 
American management guru Michael Porter (The competitive advantage of nations, 1990). Porter’s 
work leverages on the seminal research done investigating the industrial districts of the so called 
Third Italy (Beccattini, 2003 and 1998; Brusco, 1992; Camagni, 1995, but also Bianchi, 1994, for a 
critique to this model) to describe a system where competitive advantage of firms are constructed on 
the basis of mutually reinforcing interactions amongst firms and other players competing and 
cooperating with each other: strong suppliers, demanding consumers, universities providing high 
level workforce, foreword looking regulators and, of course, competitors (Porter 1985, 1990). 
The model that according to some had emerged in some parts of Italy as well as in Germany and 
elsewhere was also associated to a much wider process of transition to an organisation model that “in 
contrast with the pre-eminence of Fordist and Taylorist practises during the postwar period postulates 
that efficient production, and even more succesfull innovation processes are increasingly associated 
with vertical disintegration and flexibility” (Freel 2001, but also Hansen, 2011 and Lawson, 1999). 
The necessity of a distributed model of production and innovation is due to two major reasons: the 
need to be more flexible and responsive to increasingly diversified and changing market needs; the 
acknowledgment that new ideas will increasingly come from outside. 
In fact, the systematization that Porter proposed was, more precisely, named by the same Porter as 
“cluster” meaning by that an area that beyond the above mentioned specifications is also 
characterized by being geographical concentration of firms operating in the same industry, whereas 
the similar concept of “regional innovation clusters” (Yu and Jackson, 2011) applies to regional 
clusters of innovative firms and as such have been recently identified as a “driver of the national 
economy” by the Obama Administration (National Economic Council, Strategy for American 
Innovation, 2009). 
Despite the announcement by some of the theorizers of regional innovation strategies (Sallet et al, 
2009) that the economic advantages of innovation oriented clusters have been demonstrated, there is 
a lack of solid empirical demonstrations capable to support the argument of a positive effect of 
clustering of firms on propensity to invest in R&D, leaving alone the most complex issue of the 
impact economic growth: there are researches that found that in some highly innovative industries 
firms in non cluster areas may fare better in terms of employment growth of firms in cluster palces 
(Feser et al, 2008) whereas others even claim to have demonstrated the opposite and so that diverse 
economies tend to outperform economies concentrated in few sectors (Partridge and Rickman, 2003).   
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More over there are authors that questioned the assumptions of a higher likelihood to invest in R&D 
of firms operating in clusters  vis a vis other firms that do not belong to these agglomerations (Lee, 
2009) and others that have demonstrated how uncertain is the impact of specialization of a certain 
region (and thus the need to concentrate public investments in sectors that represent a share of 
regional GDP that is higher that the share of that sector on national or European GDP) on the 
efficiency as well as the volumes of R&D (Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2009). 
As a possible key to explain the cases of relative failure of clusters to achieve superior economic 
performance, it is worthwhile to mention a number of studies that investigated the relationship 
between cooperation and efficiency (Fritsch, 2004 and, especially, Katz, 1986). 
The results of such empirical studies appear to, not only, falsify the expectation that collaboration is 
always good, but also to provide some indications of when collaborations may work. As a study 
which is not even recent of the Rand Corporation (coordinated by Michael Katz of Princeton) 
demonstrated real cooperation (to be strongly distinguished by “free riding” of one the two cooperant 
on the other) is more likely too happen when there is not much product competition (like it happens 
in vertical integration along the supply chain), when the risk of spill over would be great even if one 
attempts to protect intellectual rights (like generated knowledge is largely tacit) and the cooperation 
concerns basic research more than development activity.  
We will see in our field work that these are the characteristics, in fact, that distinguish the interactions 
amongst the firms and the research centres based around the technology parks in South Yorkshire and 
Castilla Y Leon.  
In a sense this result have the merit to sort of turn the argument of regional innovation system on its 
head: it is not that RSI have a higher capability to generate successful innovation because people in 
an RSI cooperate but it is that people in an RSI are more likely to cooperate - because of the 
prevalence of interaction between actors positioned differently across the value chain and of higher 
risk of spillover - and such a cooperation creates opportunity of innovating that do not exist 
elsewhere. 
However, in order for this statement to be true, we need to recognize that not all forms of cooperation 
are good or feasible and not all clusters work equally well to achieve better performance on the plane 
of productivity or efficient innovation. 
The question that has worried the most the literature on agglomeration economies is, more precisely, 
about the right level of diversification in economic structure of the clusters.  
Here, the dispute has been between one school of thought that appears convinced (as Glaesler et al., 
put forward already in 1992) that specialization is key to better innovation and economic 
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performance (in order to overcome the so called MAR externalities33) and an other who has 
emphasized the virtue of diversified economic structures and the so called Jacobs’ (Jacobs, as early as 
1969) externalities. 
This entire discussion has led to a profound rethinking of the modelization of the regional innovation 
systems which has found recently a systematization produced by one of the first to propose a 
definition of RIS (Cooke, 1998 and 2007). Philip Cooke (2007 and together with Asheim and 
Boschma, 2011) does, in fact, qualify the very idea of regional innovation system by introducing the 
idea of  
1. “related variety” where it is theorized that between full diversification and strong 
specialization, the best clusters may be situated in the middle where not one but more than 
one industry are represented although they are “related” because they may add value to each 
other and they operate in activities that do have a link; 
2. “knowledge base” where a distincition is put forward between “analytic” (typically new drug 
development and, more broadly, natural science where research’s results tend to be codified 
and patented and where break through in product innovation are more frequent), “synthetic” 
(also called engineering research where innovation tend to proceed per marginal 
improvements and most of knowledge is incorporated in the individual employes’ experience 
and skills) and “symbolic” (like in production of culture and art where changes happens 
through interactions with an even wider set of actors and the personal relationship, the “know 
who” other is engaged in the creativity process is key). 
 
The implication of the discourse is that the application of a similar framework to various regional 
economies appear to say that more successfully innovative clusters tend to be the ones where 
exchanges amongst different knowledge bases are maximized. 
The most important implication of this line of reasoning is, however, on the plane of the role that the 
state may play in this revised version of a regional innovation system. Cooke and his colleagues do, 
in fact, maintain that in this newly understood environment the policy maker and the public 
administration should refrain from being too much directive (as Cooke had already contested both in 
general, 2000, and in the specific case of the Welsh Assembly Government, 2005, for reasons that we 
will see examine later in this work) and should, instead, “construct regional advantage by building a 
policy platform” (Cooke et al, 2011). 
The idea is that leaving to the state the role of selecting sectors where to invest in R&D may produce 
two problems. 
                                                 
33 Based on Marshall (1890), Arrow (1962), and Romer (1986). 
 48
The first is about the impossibility to predict (even more from the point of view of an administration 
that is not – as we mentioned before in section 1.4 – in the business to make such previsions) which 
is going to be the winng sector.  
The second is that such a “picking-the-winner” policy tends to result in the same choices made 
everywhere as demonstrated by the reading of few regional innovation strategies developed by 
different European regions where almost unavoidably all tend to say that they want to imitate “silicon 
valley” and invest in biotechnology and information communication technology. The consequence of 
this would be the likely denial of the growth potential that almost all regions would have if one does 
not limit herself to a mainstream definition of R&D and does invest in making local knowledge to 
become part of the strategy for innovation. 
Policy platform is, therefore, a communication platform where the state (the programme manager in 
the case of structural funds funded investments in innovation) only plays the role of a) promoting this 
exchange of knowledge (and interactive, collective learning exercise as Lundvall, 1992), of b) 
identifying (as Cooke, 2007, clarifies) the actors that are capable to add value (and knowledge) and of 
c) avoiding that this exercise becomes captured (as Barca, 2009, reminds) by either too few (as in the 
case where a firm or a university plays a monopolistic game and exploits the public intervention in its 
favour) or too many (which would produce a dilution of the investments like the one that this author 
witnessed in Murcia and West Wales). 
As such this transformation of the role of the state does not imply a reduction of the concentration of 
resources being allocated (which in fact is, as we will see a pre condition to success) but an 
involvement in the choice of local partners which have the experience and the skills to add 
information. 
The concept of technology platform – where the state plays a strategic role and yet it is relatively 
hands off when it comes to a priori choose where to allocate resources – will be, as we will see 
shortly, one of the theoretical foundation of our hypothesis about the characteristics of the 
management of an innovation strategy which is more likely to achieve its own objectives. 
Last but not least, it is necessary to remind an even bigger modification that the RIS literature will 
need to dal with in the next years: the validity of the idea of regional innovation system can not, in 
fact, avoid to be confronted against the reality of the Information Communication Techonology (ICT) 
which has reduced of hundred of times the cost of communication with far away partners. As we 
mentioned and will elaborate further ICT, has not34 meant the end of the “tyranny of distance”. Yet 
technologies are also changing dramatically the boundaries of RIS – one can, in fact, imagine the 
                                                 
34 So far. Here a word of caution is necessary because of the continuous evolution of technologies and the largely 
unpredictable impact on human relationships (Grasso and Grillo, 2004). 
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emergence of virtual RIS which are not bounded to an area – and the typology of exchanges that do, 
instead , require face to face interaction.  
The idea that we elaborated in this section of partnership which are centred on specific problems and, 
thus, only involve who can contribute to their solution – rather differently from the formalistic 
interpretation of “partnership” given by the European Commission – is the basis of the second 
hypotheis that we want test. 
However, the ICT argument is also key to a second substantial critique of the way partnership and 
regional innovation strategy have been interpreted so far: regional innovation strategies, in fact, almot 
invariably present RIS as a closed system, where partnerships can only involve local actors. We 
maintain that partnerships are capable to integrate local knowledge with a global one and to involve 
actors that can bring this added value. 
 
1.4.1 The role of the organisation of the implementation processes  
 
The literature on the importance of the so called institutional (Bukowski et al, 1997) or administrative 
(Milio 2007) capacities as a success factor in the implementation of structural funds funded 
programmes include a number of mainly country specific accounts of how they may explain different 
performances. 
The emphasis on measuring and strengthening the capacities of public administrations as a 
precondition to enjoy structural funds programmes, grew during the negotiations with Central Europe 
candidates for the accession in 2004 (Bollen, 2001) when it clearly emerged that “states with weak 
administrative capacity at the regional and local levels were more likely to have serious problems 
with the mismanagement of funds or even accessing them” (Hughes et al, 2004). In fact, would be 
members of the European Union could use a programme – Phare – whose first priority was to 
promote institution building so that candidate countries could develop “the structures, strategies, 
human resources and management skills needed to strengthen economic, social, regulatory and 
administrative capacity” meant to be necessary for managing – amongt other things – the complex 
procedures of structural funds expenditures (Milio, 2007, but also applied to a broder notion of 
“institutional capacities” beyond cohesion policies Barman and MacIndoe, 2012). 
In this author’s opinion existing research presents three problems. 
First of all only few (Milio, 2007, is one of these exceptions) attempt an operationalization of the 
concept with some obvious consequence. The definitional problem makes impossible (as Hughes et 
al, 2004, points out) the development of a strong, controllable asssment model. Even the exercise that 
Milio (2007) proposes, is based on a rather subjectively developed model articulated in four macro 
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capacities being them managing, programming, monitoring and evaluating and, thus, on a qualitative 
assessment for each of this capacity (whereas the study compares two different Italian regions that 
are distinguished by consistently scoring the highest and lowest capability to spend structural funds 
although other conditions appear to be the same in the two cases). 
The second problem is that these analyses assume that there can be a single administration - a region 
in Milio’s work, for instance (Milio, 2007) – to whose  “administrative capacity” differences in 
performance may be due(). This is not the case almost per definition. In fact, it is the very regulation 
of the structural funds – as it has been established in 1988 and confirmed by each successive new 
regulation at the beginning of each programming period - that established that although each 
programme does have a a “managing authority”, they are implemented – as for the principle of 
“partnership” to which we will return in the next section - through a distributed decision making and 
management process – supposed to last from the start to the end of each programming period – that 
involve in addition to regions (and national and supernatonal authorities), local public 
administrations, economic and social partners (representative of employers and trade unions), civil 
society (amongst other NGOs), member of the research community. Such an involvement can display 
at least three different levels of intensity: at the lowest possible level it only requires the region to get 
an opinion or to inform other stakeholders; at the highest possible degree of involvement we may 
have the responsibility to manage entire portions of the programmes to one of this stakeholder (and 
this is the case, as we will see, of some of the measures meant to promote innovation); whereas in the 
middle we have the instances where it is required the agreement of the other administration or 
institution to go ahead. In this situation the ultimate result will depend no longer on one 
administration and its administrative capacity but on the joint capabilities of a network of different 
actors.  
The third issue is that both above arguments appear even more important when we consider the 
implementation of regional innovation strategies. The very definition of administrative capacity (as 
Farazmand, 2009, but see also the argument in previous section 1.3.2 on the possible reasons for 
failure of many RIS and on the structural disalligment between bureaucrats – as well as policy 
makers – and innovators on the plane of the objectives and the semantics) appears, in fact, to be 
almost born obsolete when confronted with the world of instability, risk, unknowability, speed that is 
associated to innovation.  
These limits do lead us to consider a narrower and more pragmatic definition of the organisation 
features whose impact of the return to public investments on R&D will be investigated. 
We, in fact, maintain that as per Cooke’s (2010, 2007) what is going to matter is that programme 
manager refrain from making choices for which they do not possess the specific skills and that they 
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should rather “develop the platform” through which informed actors will join the problem solving 
exercise that is required by the design and the implementation of a regional innovation strategy and 
take the responsibility to choose these actors on the basis of their likelihood to contribute. 
Even such choice will, however, need autonomy of the programme manager so that her decision does 
not get captured (as Barca, 2009, would fear) by the interest of too few (so that they can exploit the 
funds at their advantage without scrutiny) or too many (so that the resources are given proportionally 
to everybody with a loss of concentration).  
In this sense our hypothesis does not even point to any certain organisation layout and any ideal 
degree of publicness of the decision maker and rather will try to access the autonomy of decision 
making as such. This is, in fact, consistent with few researches that have demonstrated (Andrews et 
al, 2011; Rainey and Kline, 1979; Bozeman, 1987) that the choice between the implementer of a 
policy being public, private or a quasi public body (like for the regional development agency – RDA 
– that we will encounter in this research in all regions that we studied). 
What is, therefore, really important for the hypothesis that we will test is the recognition that the 
programme manager is granted by the relevant partners as networker standing amongst different 
“knowledge bases” and interests.  
This authority must be, then, tempered by a strong accountability (again like in Farazmand, 2009) on 
results that, however, must be assessed, given the nature of investments in innovation, at least with 
the time horizon of a structural funds programming period (seven years). 
 
 
1.4.2 The impact of partnerships on drafting and realizing innovation strategies 
 
Partenership is one of the principle upon which the functioning of the entire cohesion policy is based 
since the reform of 1988 that launched the first programming period. However at the beginning 
partnership basically meant collaboration between the Commission and the member states. More 
recently the concept has been enlarged both in terms of the scope of the collaboration – now it is not 
only the initial design of the strategy and its verification - and the stakeholder to involve, as we 
mentined in the previous section. 
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2009 and 2008) distinguish at this purpose Type 1 multilevel 
governance which largely coincide with a form of flexible federalism where the power to run a 
programme is allocated in a changeable way to the most efficient level, and Type 2 multilevel 
governance which is even more flexible and can involve innumerable (both private and public) 
jurisdictions that get together around specific policies and issues. 
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The partnership that we are referring here is mostly of second type (whereas we were mostly 
referring to institutional partnership of the first kind in the previous section when we described the 
distributed decision making and management process which is typical of structural funds 
implementation).  
Partnership become, however, even a “sine qua non condition for undertaking regional innovation 
strategies” (Pellegrin, 2008). Pellegrin clearly says why: innovation programmes require more than 
others competence and information coming from different domains to come together and “in a conext 
in which they are scattered between different agents, effective coordination mechanisms are 
necessary to help determine clear strategic objectives while avoiding replications and competing 
effects”. 
The results of partnership appear – in the broader case of structural funds - to have been oscillating 
between failure and success both in terms of the effects on democracy and on effectiveness and 
efficiency of the programmes. 
In fact, whereas some cases (like West wales, as we will see in the empirical work, but Royles, 2006 
propose the same assessment) appear to fare not satisfactorily on both accounts, others (like South 
Yorkshire that we wil examine further, but Bache and Chapman, 2008, confirm) do seem to do well 
on both fronts. 
The argument of a unavoidable Faustian Bargain – whereas partnership add value in terms of 
efficiency at the cost of transparency and, even more, of decreased centrality of elected officials – 
appear not to be an unavoidable outcome of partnerships (Peters et al, 2004). In fact there are others 
that advocate that the mere fact to include a diversified and numerous set of constituencies in the 
decision making is an antidote for the agenda of policy making not to be captured by the interests of a 
single organisation (it is the formula of “safety in numbers” proposed by J. Rosenau, 2004). 
The mixed results do, in the author’s opinion, point to the rather obvious point of diversified 
approaches, different pre existing condition and thus different capability and motivation to use the 
partnership lever. 
To this thesis the concept whose importance will be tested is the one of “problem solving 
partnerships” whereas the formalistic approach to partnership (emobodied in, for instance, the formal 
composition of the not very effective monitoring committees of the structural funded operation 
programmes, as noticed by Bristow et al., 2009 in West Wales which is going to be one of our four 
case studies) is surpassed by the existence of partnership, or more precisely, the empowerement of 
pre existing partnerships whose membership, enlargement and function is based on specific 
objectives and the capability of partners to jointly solve them.  
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One additional feature of the sort of partnership that we will look for is their capability to be not only 
local but open to contributions from outside the region and the country. Such a simple evidence (as 
Morgan, 2004, puts it “endogenous” does not mean “indigenous”) appears almost entirely ignored by 
the representation of Regional Innovation System that most of regional innovation strategies make. 
The two independent variables that we are proposing – organisation and partnership – do, of course, 
influence each other (a good public manager will be essential for partnerships to emerge and the 
existence of these coalitions will make life of the programme manager easier). We will try to 
operationalize the two concepts and highlight the differences in the next chapter. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The chapter confronts main theories for growth and main arguments that could support the hypothesis 
of neoclassical growth models that envisage spontaneous convergence amongst different 
geographical areas against the ones that expect the persistence of the gaps in economic prosperity 
amongst them. The experience in the last decades shows clearly that convergence is happening 
amongst countries – recently this has been the case with the rise of Asian and south American 
countries at a global level and of new member states within Europe, whereas differences within 
countries and amongst regions tend to stay large. This is especially true for the EU where the market 
driven process that may produce - according to the new economic geography - a reduction of 
differences between core and periphery can not happen: this is because of the existence of a 
European social model that tends to avoid both the migration between regions and the flexibility on 
salary that are seen by the economic geographers as necessary to convergence.  
 
In this scenario there seems to be a rationale and, thus, a legitimacy for a cohesion policy that is 
meant to provide the “social good” of territorial cohesion that market alone would not deliver. This 
policy is, in fact, drafted as not a mere redistribution of funds, but as the creation of the conditions for 
untapping the potential of less developed regions and, thus, as a way to increase EU’s overall wealth 
and competitiveness.  
 
More specifically, the endogenous growth theory appears to provide a tool to reach convergence in a 
way which is compatible with the European values: it is the size and the productivity of the research 
assets that a region possesses that can improve competitiveness and medium term prospective for 
economic prosperity; thus investments into R&D (and in innovation as it has been specified by the 
above mentioned definitions of the European Commission) quickly has become the priority of the 
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structural funds programmes, where 40 billion euro are supposed to be spent on less developed 
regions. 
 
The puzzle, however, is that the analysis of growth rates of GDP and of absolute levels of 
expenditures on R&D (or of their growth rates), show that the correlation between the two parameters 
is low and that, more importantly, the returns of public investments in R&D are very differentiated. 
The thesis is an attempt to understand which are the factors that may change the efficiency of the 
different regions. The research will more specifically test factors like the independence of the 
decision maker from politics and her accountability, as well the capability to develop partnerships 
amongst business, universities, civil society and government with the specific purpose to incorporate 
information (as, once again, Barca, 2009, recommends) in the innovation strategy as key to the 
success of regional innovation strategies. 
Three strands of literature appear, in fact, linked: both the research on the role of management in the 
performance of policies and the literature on the real value of partnerships can be considered a part 
on the wider work on regional innovation strategies. 
The next chapter will describe the methodology by which we want to test our hypotheses on which 
those factors can be. 
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CHAPTER TWO - THE HYPOTHESIS AND THE 
METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN 
 
 
After having put forward the puzzle and the thesis that we are proposing to solve it and having 
positioned this work within the relevant literature, this chapter describes the structure of the research 
undertaken.  
As said the hypothesis that we are about to test is that certain organisation and social features - the 
programme manager acts like a “communication platform” (like in Cooke et al, 2010) amongst 
partners that are capable to provide to the implementation of the programs added value information 
(as recommended by Barca, 2009) – are key to the success of regional innovation strategies.  
However, the assessment of the capability of R&D programmes to achieve economic growth and the 
identification of the determinants of such performance face two problems.  
The first concerns the nature of the innovation process and the fact that, according to some authors, 
this process is intrinsically with a long time lag and with many different factors impacting the same 
variables that this study is investigating. The second is about definitions and, more specifically, the 
operationalization of the concepts of innovation, economic growth and regional competitiveness, 
whose relationships we are investigating. 
These two main issues have limited the number of studies that try to provide policy relevant 
indications on how to draft and execute regional innovation strategies based on an assessment of the 
return to investments in regions approaching the policy with different organisation lay out. This is the 
gap that researches like the one we conducted is trying to fill with a methodology that is articultated 
by this chapter in the following way. 
First, the thesis is put forward. We formalize the idea of the causal chain that transforms an additional 
investment in R&D into a sustainable gain in productivity or economic growth is identified, and the 
analyses to be performed are explained. More specifically, the dependent variable (the characteristics 
of the R&D investments portfolio that are more likely to produce long term productivity gains) and 
the independent variable (the decision making procedures and the partnership mechanisms) are 
identified, as well as the pre-existing conditions (the independence from politics of the 
implementation process, and the existence of agents specialized in developing and maintain the above 
mentioned partnerships). Second, we will identify case studies and explain the research strategy. 
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Thirdly, we will more specifically categorize the competing explanations of the outcomes that we are 
investigating and the reasons by which the research design minimizes their impact are described. 
Fourthly, we will describe some of the definitional problems that the operationalization of the 
dependent and independent variables imply. Fiftly we detail the method through which the field work 
and the desk analysis has been conducted and the reliability of the information has been checked. 
 
2.1 THE HYPOTHESIS TO BE TESTED 
 
The question of measuring the return of public investments in R&D and, more importantly, of 
identifying the reasons for failure so that policy making relevant suggestions can be generated is still 
to be adequately addressed. The reasons for this lack of clear answers to the question of the impact of 
R&D and other structural funds supported policies may be, partially, explained by the fact that the 
literature generally comprises: 
 
1. Evaluations undertaken by a number of practitioners and consulting firms for each programme 
that tend a) to be concentrated on implementation mechanisms, in part because they are “interim 
evaluations” or due to lack of data that could allow more concrete evaluations of results of the 
programmes; and b) to lack the possibility to compare regions, because their scope is set at the 
programme level. 
or  
2. Academic works that either  a) seek to evaluate effectiveness of the programmes at EU level 
but fail to appreciate  differences amongst the regions, or b) offer comparisons amongst regions but 
miss the information on different programming choices that appear to be important to understanding 
the reasons for the differences in performances amongst regions. 
 
In other words, either a) studies are too narrow in scope and qualitative, or b) and too wide and too 
concentrated on quantitative models. In both cases they appear to fail to produce enough 
generalizable indications to be useful to regional managers. 
The relative lack of studies that try to respond to research questions similar to the one that we asked 
ourselves is explained by a number of problems that we will review later in this chapter.  
However, the overall idea of this research is to combine the two above mentioned typologies of 
approach and available knowledge to add some insights into the relationship between performances 
and choices. We will likewise combine macro and micro, industry or firm-wide considerations (as in 
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similar studies conducted, for instance, by Hancke - 2002) to understand dynamics that imply causal 
chains that are rather long for the very nature of the phenomena we are studying. 
The hyopothesis to be tested and the methodology devised are grounded on the review of the factors 
that can influence performance of public investments in R&D and that we reviewed in the third and 
fourth section of the first chapter, whereas our focus will be the organisation of the strategy 
implementation process and the quality of the partnerships that support the realization of the 
programmes. 
 
2.1.2 Our framework: the innovation value chain 
 
The innovation value chain is a systematization of the phases through which a regional innovation 
strategy is implemented and, at the same time, of the conditions for a successful strategy of 
investment in research, and it is the methodological framework whose explanatory power is going to 
be tested in this study. Its logic is visualized by the chart 2.1. The framework is based on the selection 
of most relevant literature contribution reviewed in chapter one and especially in the third and fourth 
section. It is worth noting at this point that the public administration are normally not aware of such a 
flow, even if the civil servants that we interviewed in this thesis’ field work recognized that this could 
be an effective way to reconstruct the process by which strategies are realized. 
 
Chart 2.1 – The innovation value chain 
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The chain is such that observing it from right to left we have a sequence of associations so that we 
expect that: 
 
1. results which we will measure with reference to  a number of different data of which we will 
attempt triangulation and more specifically  
a. the evolution of the macro data at regional level; 
b. the programme indicators that signal the achievement of the objectives of the 
various measures; 
c. the growth of the the propensity of firms to invest in innovation, whereas altought 
this is not technically an outcome of the programme we can safely assume (see section 
1.3 and the exercise by which we compared the correlation between GDP per capita’s 
growth and the growth of private investments in R&D with the one between again 
change in GDP per capita and increase in public investments in R&D) that this is a 
rather strong signal of the capability of public expenditures programmes to have  
improved the endowments that make the region more innovative (as Hall, David and 
Toole, 1999, argument as far as the importance of complementarity between public 
and private investments in research); 
d. the concentration of the funds on the areas (industries, academic domains, locations) 
where the region seems to have competitive advantages, which is again not exactly a 
result of the programme but a condition which – in a less developed region (whereas 
it may be different the case for an already developed one) is necessary (as Midelfart-
Knarvik and Overman, 2002, but also see the argument of cumulativeness of the R&D 
expenditures and of increasing return to scale, Krugman and Venables, 1995, Solow, 
1987) although not sufficient to success (as some authors questioning the effectiveness 
of concentration – Feser et al, 2008, Lee, 2009 – have demonstrated); 
we, thus, decided to consider a range of indicators of performance which is wider than 
mere macro economic evidence to avoid to rely exclusively on trying to explain a 
relationship between variables whose influence may go through a chain which is too long and 
this is expected us to be able to better test the capability to explain of the following 
2. success factors and thus  
a. the degree of autonomy of the individuals responsible for implementation processes 
and, more specifically, their capability to be independent by either (as in Barca, 2009) 
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too many  for political or bureaucratic reasons - actors that result into dilution of the 
strategy or  
too few actors which may yield the capture of the policy maker by a private interest 
 
and, thus to choose the partners that are capable to join and improve the collective 
learning experience (Lundvall, 1992) that the implementation of a regional innovation 
strategy represents; 
b. the accountability of the programme managers that is the check against the above 
autonomy must be balanced (Head, 2011); such accountability must be drafted so that 
decision makers respond of results that neither too short term nor linked to one single 
project (Frolich, 2011);  
c. the above mentioned partnerships are expected to be facilitated by communication 
platforms  (as in Cooke et al, 2011) meant to host or promote collaborations amongst 
the stakeholders to be involved (like in Leysedsdorff, 2000 and Landabaso et al, 
2002); 
d. capability of programs to increase the propensity of private actors to also invest in 
innovation requires the presence of project based partnerships amongst the various 
actors – government, business, universities, public opinions – whose knowledge is 
necessary for the implementation of innovation strategies (for instance, Morgan, 
1997a) and that, thus, may be also external to the region (Pellegrin, 2008). 
 
The various phases of the innovation value chain can be considered, as in the chart 2.1, as dependent 
and independent variables and pre existing conditions of a causal process.  
The method of decomposing an implementation process in phases with the intention to make each 
phase to correspond to a specific assessment reflects an approach that is applied both in micro 
economy (the “value chain” that Porter, 1990, 1985, proposes to uncover the “competitive 
advantage” of firms and countries) and in the evaluation practice (Mairate, 2002, 1999). 
 
On this basis, the research will now detail the three characteristics that we expect in successful 
regional innovation systems. We will, therefore, first of all enumerate the features that we expect to 
find in successful R&D programmes in terms of resource allocation; secondly, the main 
characteristics in terms of programmes’ strategy design, implementation and institutional context; 
thirdly, we will describe the nature of the partnerships amongst research, firms, government and civil 
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society that we expect to be functional to success and we will elaborate on the actors and the 
mechanisms that can facilitate the development and maintenance of such partnerships.   
 
The methodology will, then, articulate the three steps through which our theory (and connected 
assumptions) will be tested and the impact of competing explanations will be verified.   
 
2.1.2 The resources allocation in successful innovation strategiess  
 
As a consequence of the framework - the innovation value chain - that we just presented, we expect 
that successful programmes display : 
 
1) A high concentration in terms of the allocation of resources amongst different industries and 
phases of the value chain whose improvement can allow for a quicker achievement of competitive 
advantages, as well as academic domains where the region’s research community has a current or 
potential leadership, and geographical areas that host a disproportionate high percentage of 
innovative firms or research centres, 
 
2) A high capability of public money to mobilize further private funds to be invested in R&D.  
 
The latter factor is to be considered both as one of the conditions for the programmes to be more 
efficient (as for the reasons elaborated from the literature in section 1.3.2), but also a sign of success 
in itself (as we saw in graph 1.6 where we compared the correlation of private investments in R&D 
with public ones). If private funds are, in fact, spent on the same projects financed by public money 
this is a symptom of economic viability of that project (EC, 2007). A similar argument holds if, 
instead businesses increase their propensity to fund other non publicly funded projects that are still in 
the same region because this means that R&D program is  credible enough to improve expectations 
and attract private investors willing to risk their own money. 
 
The two parameters are expected to be correlated, given the importance of economies of scale and, 
thus, specialization (Boldrin and Canova, 2001, Porter, 2000, Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman – 
2002 -, Krugman and Venables  – 1995 -, amongst others).  
We will, however, see that for the argument of few authors (Cooke, 2007, but also for Mark 
Harrison’s paper on the dangers of concentration in the JRC report, 2010), it is also important that 
concentration and, thus, choices are achieved not as an imposition from the top, but as a shared 
objective of the actors involved into the innovation strategy. 
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The first assessment about the resources allocation focus will be conducted, wherever possible, by 
comparing a) the break down by industry and/ or geographic areas and/ or academic domain of  
structural funds spent on R&D and b) the  breakdown of the regional economy by sector and/ or of 
the population and/ or or the academic faculty as a whole. Significant differences between the two 
distributions say of an allocation of resources that do not simply replicate the structure of the 
economy or its demography or its research.  
 
The second analysis will be carried out considering  
a) monies that cofinance with public funds the same projects that the administration has selected, 
or  
b) investments  (attracted from outside or generated by local entrepreneurs) that are undertaken 
because of a positive modification of the expected return to investments into R&D due to 
public programmes increasing the demand for research. 
 
There is, then, a further level of analysis that we will, only partially, try to address: in fact, we can 
ask ourselves not only whether there were clear choices in the innovation strategies, but also how 
good these choices were.  
It is entirely possible, in fact, that  choices within the wrong sectors may achieve a return which is 
worse than the one realized by a more diversified projects portfolio. 
  
The analysis will be implemented – when feasible - by assessing the potential of the industries and of 
the areas that were the priorities of the innovation strategies (that can be proxied by the growth rates 
of the industry in terms of added value) and the position of the region in that industry (and this can be 
measured by referring to the market share of the region on national or international production).  
 
Within our  field work, we will observe how in  South Yorkshire (SY), for instance, an entire 
regional innovation strategy has posed the issue of moving local firms towards the high end niche of 
the metal industry or how in Murcia natural resources related industries are trying to add value to 
their production. 
 
In addition, an assessment of the quality of the innovation programs may also try to evaluate the 
capability of specific projects to target specific needs within the business models of the firms in those 
prioritized industries. This, however, will be difficult in a research like the one that the author is 
carrying out and we will try to assess indirectly by assessing the capability of the programme as a 
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whole to involve actors that are relevant to success: their commitment may signal better quality of the 
investments; but it is also a condition for a positive outcome. 
 
Public investments which are highly leveraged by private ones, show a strong capability to make 
choices so that investments are concentrated in sectors with the highest potential. We believe that 
these data can account for a test of the likelihood of a programme to achieve a high efficiency in 
terms of R&D investments to produce gains in productivity (and convergence) which are sustainable 
in the long term. 
However, a more focused resources allocation pattern requires also a number of organisation 
conditions that we are going to consider in the next paragraph.  
 
2.1.3 The organisational conditions to success 
 
Which then are the organisational features that seem to be a pre requisite of a well drafted portfolio of 
innovative projects?  These features appear to be somehow a logical consequence of the two main 
features that we just identified in terms of concentrations and attractiveness to firms. 
 
We will first need clear decision making procedures (Bollen 2002, but also Cooke and Morgan, 
1992, Jones – Evans, 2002, De la Fuente, 2002, Bristol and Blewitt, 2001 on the specific experience 
on structural funds in UK and Spain, as we will elaborate in chapter three where we will revise the 
literature specific on regional development in these two countries) so that high level choices on 
which are the region’s  preferences in terms of sectors and academic domains do not get diluted along 
the implementation process. 
Skills will, then, be necessary to select the right sectors and to design bidding procedures capable to 
select projects which can address specific needs along the beneficiaries’ value chain (Feiok and 
Strema, 1998, but also Coe and Helpman, 1995, Rodriguez-Pose, 2001, Lundvall, 1992 on the 
challenges of managing regional innovation strategies). 
It will, then, required the existence of clear targets and incentives attached to these targets, as well as 
evaluation arrangements to measure achievements, so that to any allocation of decision making 
power corresponds a responsibility (Bachtler and Michie, 1995, Mairate, 2000, Eser, 2001, Grillo and 
Iannacci, 2009 on the merits and limits of evaluation and monitoring in the structural funds 
experience, but also, more in general Dunleavy, 2006) against which programme managers are held 
accountable.   
Last, a “knowledge management system” which applies in particular to implementation of 
innovation strategies, whose nature is intrinsically experimental and whose return is, also, in terms of 
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knowledge that a system - a region, an organisation - accumulates through successes and failures of 
experimentations (as for Davenport and Prusak, 1998). 
 
These organisation factors, however, point to – as we have seen in the “innovation vale chain” – a pre 
existing institutional condition. 
 
We, in fact, argue that choices require a certain degree of – formally recognized or informally 
achieved - strength of the program managers – especially in the project selection phase – and their  
capability to resist to political pressures that may determine a redistribution of resources amongst 
different local consistuencies (see, for instance, as we elaborated in chapter one Lundequist and 
Power, 2002, Rodriguez-Pose, 2001, Puga, 2002, but also Midelfart–Knarvik and Overman, 2002, on 
the risks of using R&D as redistributive tools at European level and similar reflections by Jones-
Evans, 2002, Armstrong et al, 2001, Raymond and Garcia, 1994, Serrano and Cabrer, 2004 on the 
specific cases of Spain and UK). 
 
The entire question of the independence of the technical decision maker will, however, invole the 
investigation of the usefulness of agencies and, more specifically, the Regional Development 
Agencies (see, for instance, Bull, 2009, for a theorization of main trends, but also, for instance, 
Morgan, 1997, on the case of the continuation of the Welsh Development Agency (WDA))  that 
constitute a form of semi privatization of certain parts of the policy implementation (see, however, 
also also, Geva-May, 2004 on the problems of the so called “termination” of public policy).   
 
2.1.4 The features of effective partnerships 
 
Programmes that are organisationally developed so that accountability is ensured and knowledge 
management systems are made available are,  according to our overall theory,  strongly associated 
with certain specific social, institutional and economic characteristics. 
 
Notwithstanding the difficulty of defining and measuring innovation (see section 1.1 above), most 
people by now acknowledge that innovation cannot happen in isolation. The idea that meaningful 
research can be produced by lone researchers or single laboratories located in a desert is seen as no 
longer adequate, with the rise of the so called network society. Not only is accumulation of firms in a 
certain area or of talents in a certain organisation indispensable for sufficient knowledge to be shared 
and competitive pressures to be felt, but also innovation projects are increasingly projects that entail 
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not only efforts on product renewal or invention, but also marketing, political support, and societies 
that are friendly enough towards the change that is associated with many innovations. 
 
In a sense the importance of partnerships depends, in turn, on the importance that information is 
incorporated in the decision that programme managers take. Better informed decisions produce 
projects that are more feasible and capable to find less obstacles and more motivation. It is a classical  
argument (see, for instance, Von Hajek, 1945) that applies both to the issue of local knowledge (that 
the Barca report, 2009, underlines), to the question of international knowledge (like in Rodriguez-
Pose, 2001)  and to the very idea that the drafting of strategies need to consider and include experts 
knowledge. 
 
The idea of networks and partnerships is not new, and yet the argument that the thesis will explore is 
that the nature of these alliances is changing. Various authors have stressed the importance of the 
relationship between firms and universities (Salet and Gualini, 2007 as far as projects of development 
at city level). Others (for instance, Cassia et al , 2008, and their comparative analysis of world class 
regional innovation systems in UK, Sweden, Germany and USA) have, instead, introduced 
government as a third actor and from this strand of research emerges  “the model of the triple helix” 
(Leydesdorff, 2000, and Landabaso et al, 2002) meant as local partnerships between government, 
business and research. It is submitted that even this last model needs further qualification because it 
omits at least two elements whose importance has grown recently: the role of civil society (as for 
Wilson, 2004) and the importance of long range relationships with firms, researchers and 
governments of other regions and countries (Pellegrin, 2008, on structural funds R&D programs, 
Niosi and Zhegu, 2005, Ernst, 2005, on the globalization of the very concenpt of cluster, but also 
Quah – 1997b – as we just elaborated in chapter 1, on the impact of ICT on distances). 
 
Regarding civil society, its importance has increased because of the increased demand for 
participation at local level. Civil society, in fact, can be seen as essential for at least three reasons: 
Firstly, endogenous growth theory itself is – as we saw in the first chapter – mostly about 
accumulating knowledge of  the tacit type (Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2006), as opposed to the 
one that is formalized in patents and scientific articles and can be more easily traded. To develop the 
former requires cooperation amongst a number of actors within the region so that it becomes a 
common asset to be shared by them; in turn this demands trust within the region of the kind 
associated with the presence of social capital (as for Putnam et al, 1993).  
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Secondly, some of the most interesting innovation practices address the production and delivery of 
public goods (e.g. internet based transformations of the way health, security, transportation is 
organized) and thus a strong citizens’ demand for such modifications can be an asset (Grillo, 2001 
and 2004). on the contrary, civil society appears in practice still often expresses resistance towards 
change and the minimization of such resistance is crucial for innovation to happen. 
 
Thirdly and more broadly, the value that society attaches to personal investments in knowledge (and 
thus in education and scientific research) and in innovation (and thus the cultural attitude towards the 
natural greed and failures that innovation processes imply) is essential to attract and maintain talent 
and innovative firms/ research groups (as in Florida, 2005, or “The war for talent” - 2001 - of the 
McKinsey partners Michaels et al). 
 
The combination of these reasons combined with the idea that regions possess actors that are crucial 
to innovation and flows of knowledge amongst them has produced the idea that regions (and, thus, 
their stakeholders and civil society) are a “learning” entity (Lundvall, 1992, Dunford, 1996) and that 
they can be “innovation prone” or “innovation averse”. Some specific social features, such as the 
relative rigidity of the labour market, skills shortages, and an ageing workforce (Konstadakopulos, 
2000) thus become decisive in any innovation policy effort. 
 
The issue of long-range relationships (Pellegrin, 2008) is similar to the question of civil society. If  
tacit, shared and, thus, endogenously embedded knowledge produces durable productivity gains, the 
possibility to draw skills and expertise with international exposure into the design and 
implementation of innovation strategies is also essential (Rodriguez-Pose, 2001).  This is because of 
the very nature of the innovation market that is intrinsically global, but also because of the reduction 
in the cost of such relationships, due to ICT. Not all elements must be present in the same geographic 
area: actually, one may argue that it is crucial that regions or pieces of a regional innovation system 
(its government, business, research or civil society) outsource talent and knowhow from other eco 
systems (either from other countries or other regions within the country).  
 
The idea is thus that the propensity towards innovation of a region is, in fact, a function of a number 
of elements that can be theoretically measured and acted upon (Wilson, 2004, in Information 
Revolution in Developing Countries): 
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1. The comparative size of the four worlds (Wilson, 2004, call them quads meaning by them 
government, business, research or civil society and their numerous possible sub 
segmentations) because imbalances in size and, thus, in power may impair credible, useful 
partnerships amongst the four; 
2.  the number of links and their thickness; the relationships should not be only formal (as for 
some applications of the partnership principle within EU financed programmes) but become 
working relationships; 
3. The capability to link eco systems amongst themselves, according to specific needs, so as to 
establish virtual districts that may achieve performances superior to geographic concentration 
of firms (clusters) that were seen a decade ago as instrumental to regional competitiveness. 
 
These would appear, then, to be the elements both in terms of actors and interactions amongst them 
that can make a society more or less “prone” (Rodriguez-Pose, 2001) to innovation.  There is, 
however, still one question that remains open. What can a policy maker or an administration do if a 
region finds itself in the unfortunate position of lacking a critical mass of research expenditures, clear 
political endorsement to make choices on how to allocate research funds, or a preexisting practice of 
partnerships amongst the various “worlds” whose interactions are crucial to produce sustainable 
innovation and high return R&D programmes (this was the reflection of the empirical study that, for 
instance, Tödtling, and Kaufmann  - 2001 – conducted with reference to an European project35  meant 
to study patterns of SME to innovation and more specifically to develop partnerships for innovation)?  
 
The response (as suggested by guidelines from international organisations like the OECD, the EC) by 
many less developed regions has been  the creation of a web of actors whose presence is deemed 
necessary for an innovation strategy to happen: technology parks, incubators, science parks, and 
offices within universities meant to sell knowledge and raise funds.  These can be grouped into three 
main types: 
 
(1) Innovation brokers: these act as an intermediary between the four types of actors transferring 
or facilitating the transfer of technologies, funds, information, consulting. Institutions that 
have these tasks as their core activity include the office for the transfer of knowledge that 
many universities have set up (as we will see with OTRI in Spain); agencies that are 
supposed to help innovative firms to get funds from the government for supporting their 
research activities; public or private consulting firms that identify firms’ innovation needs; 
                                                 
35 SMEPOL financed by the EU Commission's TSER programme 
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and bodies that some regions have created to realize seminars, workshops, and courses that 
bring students and local communities closer to regional R&D capacities (as for the NAMTEC 
in SY that we interviewed during the field work).  
(2) Innovation hubs: these provide the sites and the services that make firms, universities, and 
governments work in the same environment, and the networking services that establish, 
maintain and develop the relationships amongst them. This category will include, for 
example, technology parks that are dedicated to hosting innovative firms and universities 
departments and the science parks that are normally born at the initiative of universities.  
(3) Hybrids that mix the characteristics of the first and the second actors above, like the 
incubators that are dedicated to the creation and development of new innovative firms by 
providing logistics, services and sometimes funds. 
 
The case studies will investigate how these actors have promoted partnerships and, thus, innovation 
and we will see to what extent they have been a reflection of a deliberate strategy meant to increase 
the efficiency of research and innovation oriented public investment programmes. Further, the 
empirical Chapters 4 and 5 will follow the same structure as just described: we will test whether 
concentration and high leverage on business’ investments are associated with better results. We will, 
then investigate the quality of the implementation processes and the impact that institutional contexts 
may have on them. Finally, partnerships and actors specialized in developing them will be analysed. 
 
 
2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND CASE SELECTION 
 
The hypotheses that we just put forward will be tested through case studies.  
Case studies will be, first of all, selected by referring to the effects of structural funds programmes 
within the programming period 2000 – 2006.  
The choice of structural funds is due to the need to observe regions employing similar regional 
development instruments which are similarly large relatively to the size of their economy and public 
investments. We will shorty see that this weight is indeed rather high so that we can confortably 
assume that other smaller development policies could not make much of the difference. The 
programming period 2000 – 2006 was chosen because is the last one for which we have concluded 
programmes (the current 2007 – 2013 is still under way) for which we have data and for which we 
can assume that we can also observe impacts that may take some time before materializing (normally 
evaluators consider that at least two years after the conclusion of expenditures are necessary for 
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impacts to unfold). It also has to be considered that notwithstanding that the programmes we are 
observing are called as 2000 – 2006, some of the investments lasted until December 2008 (as last 
moment for programmes’ expenditures to take place). 
Our observation will be focused on the differences between pairs of regions and, thus, we will not be 
concerned by differences between countries. This should minimize the impact of differing national 
policy contexts on outcomes (see also the next section on “the control of competing explanatory 
theories”) so that differences in performances can be expected to depend on differences in regional 
structural funds strategies.  
 
Such a methodology (Verba et al, 1994, George, 1982) will allow us to understand which are the 
factors along the innovation value chain that can explain how similarly endowed regions perform 
differently.  Moreover, we also identified cases that had a greater difference: within countries we 
selected regions that, beginning from a similar situation, exhibit significant differences in the 
behaviour of macro indicators associated with performance that investments in R&D are supposed to 
explain albeit the expenditures in R&D were not higher in the better performing regions. 
 
2.2.1 Country selection 
 
The case studies were selected in two steps. First of all, two countries36 were selected, within which a  
further selection of regions was then made. The criteria used were the following: 
  
1. Large countries were preferred because they present more regions and thus a higher 
possibility of choosing a better pair of regions37.  They also provide more opportunity for 
generalization. Although the analyses we will perform are expected to generate results that 
may be relevant at European level, generalization is still more immediate at country level, 
which  should thus account for a larger portion of total structural funds spending. Italy (with 7 
OB 1 Regions), UK (6) , Germany (5) and Spain (8) seem to respond to this first criterion, 
whereas French Objective 1 Regions are too few (4) and more importantly not comparable to 
other European regions (they are all islands or overseas territories). 
                                                 
36 The author has, in fact, also been involved  – beyond the scope of this research – into a similar inter regions comparison 
amongst Objective 1 Regions in Italy and Greece. However, the results of the analysis are not completed and are not 
expected – for the reasons that we are exposing – to be as significant as the ones that are presented in this research. 
37 Greece is also characterized by many – 13 – Objective 1 regions. However, as a consequence of the size of the country, 
these regions are too small and thus they are expected to be characterized by much spill overs of knowledge amongst 
them and thus not ideal for a regional innovation strategy. 
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2. Amongst large countries, those where deviations in R&D and GDP growth rates in the 2000 – 
2006 period were highest were given a further priority which appeared to exclude Italy where 
the behaviours of Objective 1 regions seemed more similar according to main macroeconomic 
trends; 
3. Finally, we also considered as interesting the case of countries where regionalization and 
structural funds reforms have taken place at the same time. This will allow, as we will 
elaborate in chapter three, to capture situations where changes in institutional setting may 
affect results and thus provide an interesting test case for our initial hypothesis; this condition 
make Spain and UK the countries to focus on.  
 
Thus, Spain and UK were, eventually, selected. As per our criteria they represent a large enough 
share of structural funds (42,4 Bio Euro in the 2000 – 2006 period that makes one third of the total - 
EC, 1999). In addition they present – amongst the big countries - the highest differentiation in terms 
of their Objective 1 regions and, thus, the highest potential for a method of comparison between 
outliers as ours to generate useful recommendations.  
 
The choice of Spain and the UK was also confirmed by four additional factors 
 
1. both countries are accelerating their investments in R&D and both have been concentrating a 
higher share of these investments in less developed regions – unlike France and Germany, 
whose R&D spending is above the European average and Italy, which spends less and is not 
catching up; 
2. they are the countries where effects of structural funds and, specifically, of regional 
innovation policies have been most investigated, allowing this study to leverage upon and 
develop previous research; 
3. they are countries where the author had (together with Italy) better access to programme 
managers and data; 
4. last but not least, in Spain and the UK – more than in any other large European countries – the 
regionalization process has been, as mentioned, in parallel to the structural funds 
implementation periods: this will provide the research with an interesting viewpoint from 
which to see how the institutional setting may become an explanatory factor in terms of  
performance and vice versa, how the institutions and their concrete functioning are influenced 
by the necessity to spend EU funds and get the best possible results from them. 
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2.2.2 The selection of regions 
 
The regions within the two countries were selected in parallel manner. Firstly, we selected regions 
with different performances that are not explained by the quantity of public investments into R&D, 
and secondly regions with similar starting conditions except for some specific differences whose 
influence we want to test.  
The regions in both cases will, thus, have in common at least the following characteristics: initial 
level of income per person is similar;  structural funds spending represents (as we will see in section 
2.4.2) a high share of the public investments meant to generate development, of total GDP and of 
public and total expenditures in R&D; these percentages are also  equivalent across each of the two 
couples of regions; the initial expenditures on R&D and the number of researchers and graduates are 
also similarly low in all cases. This criterion is important in order to minimize the impacts of other 
public (and, in fact, private and, more precisely, private that were not stimulated by public 
intervention) investments programmes, as we will elaborate in the next section on the “control of 
competing explanatory theories”. 
Within these two Objective 1 groups we selected SY and West Wales (WW) in the UK and Castilla 
Y Leon (CYL) and Murcia in Spain. 
The first of these pairs will let us investigate an apparent paradox: the region that is more rapidly 
increasing its expenditures in R&D is one of the worst performers in terms of the overall OB 1 
programmes objective of achieving long term GDP and productivity gain. In this situation, the only 
way to prove the assumption that differences in endogenous knowledge assets explain differences in 
economic growth still holds true is to find in the two regions different capability of investments in 
R&D to generate economically relevant knowledge that becomes an asset of the region (Rodriguez-
Pose, 2001).  
On the other hand, the Spanish case allows us to investigate the situation where productivity gains 
appear proportional to the increase in R&D expenditure and, where, in fact, the difference in 
performance turns to yield a radically different capability of the public investments to attract further 
private funds to be spent on research and thus an overall different increase in the ratio between R&D 
and GDP. 
 
The two UK regions, thus, start from similar situations in terms of income per person and propensity 
to spend in R&D but diverge in terms of evolution of the basic data that we will consider as 
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indicators of performance and, in fact, they can be considered outliers within the Objective 1 as 
shown by the table below38. 
Table 2.1 indicates in bold GDP per capita, propensity to spend in R&D, growth rates for GDP 
procapite, productivity and R&D in the 2000 – 2006 period. The numbers in bold represent the 
Objective 1 Programmes. However we also indicate the data for the regions (Wales for WW, 
Yorkshire for SY, North West England for Mersey Side and South West England for Conwall & 
Scilly) because the R&D numbers are not available for some of the OB 1 sub regions but only for the 
“region” (as for the UK laws and the definitions of the Office for National Statistics) to which they 
belong. We are, then, assuming that R&D evolution in the OB 1 sub regions can be proxied by the 
one of the region they belong to. 
On the basis of this assumption, the data point to an interesting inverse correlation between R&D 
expenditure and GDP growth rates. This appears to contradict the expectation of the EC and, even, 
the endogenous growth theory, unless – and this will be the real core of our field work – we find that 
in different regions R&D investments have a very different return. 
Table 2.1  – Selected macro indicators, Objective 1 Regions UK, euro, percentage  
 
GDP procapite 
1998 
R&D/ GDP 
1998 
 GR GDP (2006 - 
1998)  
 GR productivity (2006 - 
1998)   GR R&D (2006 - 1998) 
Northern 
Ireland 16.000 0,75% 0,44 0,32 0,66
Wales 15.600 0,83% 0,37 0,27 0,80
West Wales 13.400 0,23% 0,37 0,24 n.a.
Yorkshire  17.600 0,86% 0,38 0,29 0,27
South 
Yorkshire 15.200 n.a. 0,44 0,41 n.a.
North West 
England 17.600 1,69% 0,40 0,30 0,51
Mersey Side 14.400 n.a. 0,42 0,23 n.a.
South West 
England 18.500 2,01% 0,41 0,38 0,40
Cornwall & 
Scilly 11.800 n.a. 0,55 0,48 n.a.
Highlands & 
Islands 19.200 n.a. 0,11 n.a. n.a.
Source: Eurostat, ONS, accessed May, 2008 
 
                                                 
38Higlands & Islands is a special case of OB1 Programme. Infact, the programme  is called the Highlands and Islands 
Special Transitional Programme (HISTP) granted to H&I because of their geographical remoteness, whereas the GDP 
per person ins much higer than in other OB1 areas in UK. 
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The two UK regions appear to be rather polarized, with SY being one of the regions that is growing 
the most in terms of GDP per person and, more so, in productivity, and the least as far as expenditure 
in research; WW on the other hand is doing exactly the opposite.  The comparison between the two is 
thus expected to unveil reasons underlying the difference in the return of public investments in R&D. 
 
In Spain, by contrast, the two regions were at the beginning of the period average amongst the OB1 
Regions in terms of overall R&D expenditures and percentage of these expenses coming from 
business. In addition they both faced the same problem of insufficient scale of spending on R&D and, 
yet, they achieved different results: CYLhas increased more than other regions the ratio between 
R&D and GDP and the percentage of expenses coming from business and the opposite is true for 
Murcia. The comparison was thus envisaged to provide some insights on the conditions that may 
make a certain portfolio of public investments more attractive for business funders. 
 
Table 2.2  – Selected macro indicators, Objective 1 Regions Spain, euro, percentage  
 
 
GDP 
procapite 
1998 
R&D/ GDP 
1998 
business on 
R&D  1998 
 GR R&D (2006 - 
1998)  
business on 
R&D 2006 
GR 
public 
R&D 
Galicia 12.800 0,53% 30,4 85,0% 37,6 68,7%
Principado de Asturias 13.800 0,55% 42 65,0% 43,7 62,5%
Castilla y León 14.800 0,51% 42,2 93,0% 57,3 68,5%
Castilla-La Mancha 13.100 0,48% 51,6 41,0% 44,5 47,5%
Extremadura 10.200 0,42% 20,4 41,0% 32,1 26,1%
Comunidad Valenciana 15.700 0,60% 35 89,0% 34,6 90,0%
Andalucía 11.900 0,65% 29,3 76,0% 35,4 62,9%
Región de Murcia 13.500 0,55% 41,8 65,0% 37,8 71,9%
Canarias 15.500 0,51% 15,3 58,0% 21,5 41,3%
Average OB 1 Regions 13.478 0,53% 34,22 68,1% 38,28 59,9%
Source: Eurostat, INE, accessed May, 2008 
 
Table 2.2 shows, firstly, how the conditions in terms of propensity to spend in R&D, growth rates 
and percentage of R&D expenditures coming from firms were very similar between Murcia and CYL 
at the beginning of the period we will observe. Secondly, however, it shows how large the difference 
in the quantitative growth of investments in research and the contribution to this growth from 
business have been in the programming period we are considering, although the injection of public 
funds has been similar. The polarization in results can unveil in a very effective way the reasons why 
similar amounts of public investments in two regions that appear very similar in terms of research 
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assets, can yield two very different results in terms of stimulating business to also invest in 
innovation. 
 
Moreover, similarities emerge even from an account of more qualitative parameters that the field 
work allowed: the cohesion of the regions we selected – meant as social capital (like in Putnam,  
Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993) or as connectivity (like in Monastiriotis and Petrakos (2009) studying 
the reasons for different regional inequalities in the Balkans, or Wilson (2003) analysing the factors 
that make more or less a country innovative) – appear to be similar. It was, in fact, a different 
decision in terms of leveraging on the relationships existing amongst government, business, 
universities and civil society, that made the difference. 
 
In fact, the selection of the two regions in the UK is crafted so that most pre existing conditions 
appear similar but for one that may be relevant as an explanatory factor: the level of autonomy of the 
region. In both cases the development programmes are being applied to sub regions to which no 
proper institutional level correspond. Yet in one case – SY - the development programme is 
substantially managed by a Government Office formally part of the central government while in the 
other – WW – the similar OB 1 programme is managed by a regional administration that is elected 
and to which powers have been devolved. Different levels of efficiency that – according to the macro 
data that we mentioned – exist between the two UK regions may be explained by differing 
institutional capabilities and this in turn by different institutional settings. 
 
In Spain although income, relative size of R&D expenses, and geographical position towards the 
centre of the country are similar, the main difference in the preexisting conditions is the presence – in 
CYL- of big actors (prestigious universities and big multinationals) capable of playing a leadership 
role in the implementation of innovation strategies, whereas in the other case – Murcia – we mostly 
have small firms and smaller research institutions.  
 
It was also indicated above that the selection of these regions allow us to focus on regions and 
policies that have already been investigated and evaluated more than others. This is certainly the case 
of SY and Wales, that tend not only to be the two cases of regional development most studied within 
the UK but are also home to some of the most influential regional policy analysts in Britain (working 
from the Universities of Sheffield and Cardiff). CYL has likewise been frequently investigated and 
presented as a benchmark by the EC. 
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2.3 THE CONTROL OF COMPETING EXPLANATORY 
THEORIES  
 
As discussed before, other theories clearly need to be considered as offering alternative possible 
explanations for the phenomena under inquiry: differences in initial endowments and independent 
variables other than quality of regional programme managers’ strategies certainly may impact 
differences in regional performance. Therefore, we distinguished two groups of explanations for 
different results of similarly endowed innovation policies other than the ones – organisation of the 
implementation processes and partnership - whose impact on performances we are assessing: 
differences in pre existing conditions and differences in changes intervening after the start of the 
programmes.  
The objective of this section is to specify how we will control control methodology, so that the 
measurements performed isolate the effect of the factors under investigation from the effects of other 
variables which also impact the above defined performances (on limits of the case methodology and 
the complexities on “designing social inquiry” this author referred especially to King, Keohane and 
Verba et al., 1994). We will, thus, distinguish: 
 
1. Differences in pre existing conditions that may determine different patterms of development 
that may pertain to differences that other authors have controlled for, whereas the ones that 
have been more frequently explored where it comes to differences amongst less developed 
regions, regard (as mentioned in section 1.3.2): 
a. human capital; 
b. propensity to spend in R&D and differences in the size of pre existing research assets 
of the regions; 
c. institutions; 
d. other less specific to innovation strategies (accessibility to core markets, development 
levels, social capital). 
As we anticipated in the previous section the cases have been selected with the specific 
intention to minimize such differences so that the explanation for different performances is 
likely to be found in other factors. 
 
2. Changes exogenous to the region or at regional level but outside the structural funds 
programs and the innovation strategies  being triggered by either  
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a. Policies meant as change in regulations or  
b. Public investment programmes meant to foster – directly or indirectly - economic 
growth and which are neither financed by structural funds nor belong to the domain of 
the innovation strategies; 
c. Other changes in overall economic and financial conditions, in technologies and in 
industry trends or within industries competition. 
 
Although the influence of any of the above can not be excluded, this  section will thus provide an 
explanation of 
1. why these other factors may be not as relevant as the independent variable which is the focus 
of this study; 
2. and how research’s methodology design has been designed so that their impact is minimized. 
 
2.3.1 Differences in pre existing condition 
 
We will now recapitulate how the research is going to minimize the impact of assests - human 
capital, propensity to spend R&D and pre-existing research assests, institutional arrangements - other 
than the quality of programme management and partnership, whereas we will control in the next 
chapters that the regions that we are going to study are similarly endowed of them. 
 
Firstly, human capital is an important differentiator because when investments do succeed to support 
local innovative firms and universities or to attract innovative firms from outside, the spill over of the 
benefits to other regions (Shearmur and Bonnet, 2011) is believed to become higher, the smaller the 
percentage of population having a higher education degree (Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2005, 
Gumbau-Albert et al., 2009). 
However, as we will see, the education qualifications  is similar in the two regions. And similar is the 
emigration of the most qualified portion of their population – especially amongst people attending or 
having completed higher education- to the core areas of the two countries (London in UK, Madrid 
and Barcelona in Spain) suffered by all four regions that we are going to observe.  
 
The second factor whose differences within regions also mut be controlled is the size of research 
assets and thus the distance from the minimum scale that is necessary in order to develop through 
innovation a competitive advantage that can be sustained on a global scale. 
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Altough not all authors agree with the argument of the return to scale of investments in research 
(Cooke, 2007, Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2009), size and concentration are widely believed create a 
cumulativeness (Forsild et al, 2002) that make different areas to increasingly diverge and this does, in 
fact, work in two ways that reinforce each other: on one hand the return to investment, as we 
mentioned before, may, in fact, be characterized by return to scale that show an exponential pattern 
(Solow, 1987); on the other even the size of private investors’ investments tend to concentrate as well 
as the numbers of researchers that strongly tend to aggregate in the same locations (OECD, 2008 and 
2009, but also Guena, 1998).  
The regions that we observed, however, display, as we will see shortly in section 3.4, similar 
percentages of GDP spent on R&D and similar proportion of the population engaged into research.  
A more precise analysis should, of course, be by research assets (both in terms of expenditures, 
researchers and infrastructure) measured by academic domain and industry (because it is by sector 
that distance from minimum scale must be assessed). Even data on economic structure and 
distribution of faculty and students amongst studies fields do not appear to say that any of the regions 
we are considering is significantly more concentrated than others.  
Differences do, in fact, exist in terms of quality (and in the case of Spain tradition) of the universities 
hosted in the regions that we are investigating and this difference may, as we will see, potentially 
matter in terms of being a source of potential leadership for the innovation strategies. However, in 
terms of quantity not significant gap appears to exist at the beginning of the period that we are 
studying between the better and worse case considered by the research. 
 
The third explanation to policies performance that we need to consider as an alternative to the ones 
we are studying is probably the most mentioned: there is, in fact, a rather large literature that consider 
the consequence of different institutional settings on performances of economies, policies and even 
on innovation strategies. (the new institutional economics as for the account, amongst many others, 
of North, 1993). In section 1.3.2 we already elaborated on the reasons why there may be a structural 
problem in the relationship between public administrations and innovators (Head, 2011, Potts, 2009) 
but also of likelihood of imitation of other regions’ choices with little research of a smart 
specialization (Barca, 2009, but also McCann and Argiles, 2011) that may allow to reach minimum 
scale although with limited overall R&D investments. 
More specifically the former problem may advise - according to some (for instance Morgan, 1997) to 
delegate the core functions to entities that are outside the public sector (or that are quasi public bodies 
like the regional development agencies that we will observe in our selected regions), although not 
everybody (Diefenbach, 2009) would agree with the superiority of the choice to outsource public 
 77
administrations functions to the so called quangos; the latter issue may, instead, suggest according to 
others (for instance, Hooghe and Marks, 2003 and 2009) to make the decision making process as 
close as possible to the regions so that local needs may be identified, although there is also who 
advises that not always the more devolution, the better (as for the arguments made by Rodriguez-
Pose and Gill, 2004, with reference to statistical correlations in Europe between devolution and 
inequality and by Cooke and Clifton, 2005, with reference to the devolution in UK). 
We will see that none of these differences appear to be able to determine per se differences in 
performances: the presence of a regional development agency appears to be an advantage in the UK 
case, and yet in Spain a public administration led decision making process appears to still be able to 
achieve success; differences in autonomy from the central government is associated in the UK 
couples to differences in performance, and yet in Spain similar empowerement does not prevent to 
produce very different results. 
 
Finally accessibility to core markets are also similar with the regions being similarly distant from the 
economic and innovation centres of their country (again London, Oxford and Cambridge in UK and 
Madrid and Barcelona in Spain). And the same can be said for prosperity levels who are – by 
definition similar – for regions that are considered less developed. Lastly as far as social capital not 
only the regions that we are considering appear similarly endowed: it also appears that this factor is 
more relevant for the development of a broader notion of “prosperous community” (as in Putnam, 
1993) that for the effecteveness of innovation strategies that appear dependent on relationships 
amongst specific actors (Leysedesdorff, 2000, Andersson, 2009) who are relevant for the formation 
of the partnerships that we are studying. 
 
2.3.2 Shocks other than cohesion and innovation policies 
 
As stated above, such factors include new policies, public investment programmes and market 
shocks, which are decided or take place above the regional level or within regions but outside the 
structural funds domain.  
We will then separate between shocks happening outside or inside the regions, starting from the 
former. 
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Changes in policies at national and European level 
 
The influence of such discontinuities is undeniable, but minimized by the terms of definition of this 
study’s research question. It is useful to distinguish such changes with respect to the level at which 
they materialize, i.e. national or European (supranational): 
: 
 
1. Changes at European level affect all the regions under consideration. More specifically, they 
can be seen as lacking relevance when considering that it is sought to explain variation in 
differentials between particular regions’ performance and EU average. Political decisions that 
may affect performance on convergence (such as the decision to liberalize movement of 
capital, or to liberalize trade) do not therefore make a substantial difference to our analysis 
because they apply equally to all European regions.39 Consequently these policies which, 
according to neoclassical theories, explain the greater part of differential convergence 
between, for instance, the USA and the EU, are not relevant in understanding differences 
observed as between EU regions.   
 
2. Changes at national level, again, will be neutralized by the method of construction of case 
studies, selecting one pair for each member state, permitting concentration more specifically 
on differences between regions within nation states. 
Political decisions that may impact the ability of a whole nation, or of the whole group of 
Objective 1 regions belonging to a certain member state, to converge, will not be relevant for 
the differences between regions within a member state to be analysed40.Thus important 
factors, like the differences in national labour market regulation (which the “new economic 
geography” identifies as crucial), can explain why, in general, groups of Objective 1 regions 
belonging to various nations show differential ability to produce economic growth, yet they 
cannot account for gaps in performance between regions within the same member state. 
 
                                                 
39 In reality, same political decision applied equally to different regions may impact them differently because of 
differences in their productive and industrial basis. For instance, trade liberalisation may affect differently regions which 
have high propensity to export as opposed to others who are less used to international trade. Such a factor should, in any 
case, be of limited importance given that all the Objective 1 observed regions tend to display similar macroeconomic data 
and, often, similar composition of the productive basis at the beginning of the observation period (and this will be even 
more true if comparisons are carried out between regions belonging to the same member state).  
40 Again this may be not completely true because similar decisions (on labour market regulation) have a different impact 
according to different composition of the workforce of different regions. However, as we said before, regions belonging 
to the same Objective 1 status should – from this point of view - display similarities (at least between the Objective 1 
regions belonging to the same Member State).  
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This method does not deny the importance of factors external to the region, but targets and restricts 
the analysis to the component of differences in regional performance that results from regional level 
factors. 
 
Public investment programmes at national level others than structural funds 
 
The dependent variables that we are studying can, in theory, be impacted by decisions on public 
investment taken from outside the region, and which may also contribute to accelerating economic 
growth or facilitating achievement of productivity gains.   
 
In practice, though, this effect should be minimal in observed regions, because: 
1. In the regions (objective 1) subject to analysis, there is little public investment beyond 
structural funds (as shown by the table in the section on “public investments at regional  
level”); there is a very low probability that any intervention other than European aids can 
explain convergence behaviour. 
2. The relatively small amounts of funding dedicated to development are further divided 
according to an equitable mechanism (the amounts are determined on a GDP per capita basis); 
the fact that selected cases start from similar situations (in terms of macroeconomic 
indicators) therefore suggests that levels of other public money invested in the regions should 
be similar. 
 
Since we are focussing on testing the quality of public investment strategies as a determinant of 
differential regional performance, we also need to isolate this factor from impact of their quantity 
(amount per person, or percentage of GDP). Accordingly, we will control for this factor through 
selection of case studies showing similar amounts of public investment and, especially, structural 
funds dedicated to development. 
 
Market shocks 
 
Neither is it envisaged that factors external to the region or external to the public-led domain are 
important factors influencing regional performance. Principal shocks in this category would include: 
 
1. Dynamics in different economic sectors which may affect regional outcomes, because the 
weights of such sectors may be different amongst observed regions. As will be seen, by and 
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large, the composition of economic activity in selected regions is similar, so that any such 
effect should be minimal. Verification of this expectation will require a closer examination of 
the incidence in studied regions of industries displaying different performance, which will be 
undertaken in the course of this project. It should be noted that difference in industry structure 
able to produce differences in performance will require the presence, on one hand, of 
comparative advantages that the region has been “gifted with”, and, on the other, a structural 
funds spending strategy (whose quality is the independent variable under scrutiny) able to 
intentionally exploit them; 
 
2. Technological or economic changes having variable impact on different regions according to 
certain characteristics, for instance geography41 or composition of the population by age42. As 
before, similarities across Objective 1 regions belonging to the same member state allow us to 
envisage that such a factor should not play a major role. Once again, shocks improving 
regional performance without any deliberate political action and, by contrast, modifications 
resulting from specific choices exercised by the regional programme managers, in order to 
take advantage of these shocks, will need to be distinguished. 
 
To reiterate, it is not expected that these exogenous change possess significance in the  explanation of 
the differences under investigation. 
Changes in regional policy 
Policies decided at regional level do not appear as highly significant in determining regional 
differences. Principally this is because most decisions potentially relevant to convergence and 
competitiveness are decided either at national level (labour market regulation) or European level 
(trade liberalisation, liberalisation of capital movements). 
Nonetheless, the selection of cases was undertaken in order to minimize any impact of regional 
policies, by ensuring that: 
1. Member states (like the United Kingdom where the NUTS 2 regional notion had to be 
introduced for structural funds allocation) without significant regionalist tradition are 
privileged. And that 
                                                 
41 We are hereby referring to technological advancements which may be more or less important to a region according to 
its geography and, for instance, we may assume that diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies may 
make less important, in some industries, to be centrally located or, on the contrary, at the periphery of Europe. 
42 We are thus considering modifications like, for instance, shift towards a higher curve of the interest rates structure that 
may benefit some segment of population (for example, the elderly with substantial savings) at a disadvantage of others 
(younger people with higher financial leverage) and, therefore, affect differently different regions according to the 
composition by age of their population. 
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2. Within regionalist member states, regions with lower autonomy (like CYLand Murcia in 
Spain) are investigated. 
Public investments at regional and sub regional level others than structural funds 
Structural funds account for a significant portion of public investment in the Objective 1 regions 
regions, and “cohesion policy” can safely be considered to be a decisive part of policies impacting on 
the variables under analysis43. Table 2.3 calculates per each Objective 1 region which is the weight of 
the sum allocated to the structural funds programmes and to the specific R&D realted measures 
within the same programmes respectively on regional GDP and on the total (private and public) 
regional expenditures in research (each of the two allocations at the numerator was divided by seven 
– the years of the programming period - in order to have the yearly potential impact).  
 
Table 2.3 – Weight on GDP of structural funds expenditures (average for Objective 1 regional programmes with R&D 
dedicated measures)  
 
 
Source: EC DG Regio, Eurostat, accessed May 2008 
 
                                                 
43 Moreover the way the analysis we will perform is constructed, is such that all investments (including infrastructures) 
will be considered taking in account the impact on productivity (like Overmans, 2001, suggests). 
REGION 
Structural Funds 
total allocation 
(mio euro) 
Structural Funds 
on R&D (mio eruo)
Structural 
Funds total 
allocation on 
GDP (per year)
Structural Funds 
R&D on total R&D
expenditure (per 
year)
Brandenburg 5055 1067 1,7% 25,6%
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 3727 525 1,8% 29,1%
Galicia 5321 182 2,5% 10,5%
Principado de Asturias 2164 48 2,4% 5,1% 
Castilla y León 5032 133 2,2% 9,4% 
Castilla-La Mancha 3183 61 2,3% 6,2% 
Extremadura 3188 139 4,7% 29,6%
Comunidad Valenciana 4533 421 1,2% 11,8%
Andalucía 12115 358 2,3% 8,0% 
Región de Murcia 1917 65 2,0% 11,1%
Canarias 2932 122 1,8% 12,3%
Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki 1014 7 2,5% 3,0% 
Dytiki Makedonia 520 2 2,0% 9,2% 
Ipeiros 638 5 2,8% 2,3% 
Dytiki Ellada 675 6 1,4% 1,2% 
Sterea Ellada 744 5 1,1% 3,5% 
Notio Aigaio 521 9 1,8% 51,1%
Kriti 681 8 1,4% 1,5% 
Campania 7748 388 1,5% 6,9% 
Puglia 5281 74 1,4% 3,0% 
Basilicata 1696 21 2,8% 4,0% 
Calabria 4036 45 2,3% 8,3% 
Sicilia 8459 157 1,9% 3,7% 
Sardegna 4258 82 2,5% 6,4% 
South Yorkshire 3088 100 2,0% 13,3%
West Wales and The Valleys 4040 234 2,0% 15,0%
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The yearly total structural funds expenditure was running in 2005 between between 1.2 and 4.7% of 
GDP of aided regions.  
 
Much higher was the weight of structural funds on R&D expenditures, whereas those same numbers 
are even higher when we calculate the weight of structural funds on the public expenditures on R&D: 
in the regions that we selected as case studies, the structural funds were more than the yearly total 
public expenses in research (including salaries and other non investment expenses for universities).  
 
It is, thus, plausible to expect that structural funds are playing a pivotal role in building the 
knowledge base of Objective 1 Regions.   
 
In summary, this section enumerated various possible changes that may be seen as competing with 
this study’s target independent variable in terms of influencing achievement of the outcomes of 
convergence and competitiveness. It has been proposed that these competing forces can be resolved 
into three different categories: 
 
1. Factors whose importance appears low with respect to the variation sought to be explained i.e. 
differences between regions (such as non-structural funds public investment, as being of a 
scale insufficient to trigger significance). 
 
2. Factors (such as national- and European-level policies) which may explain overall 
performance at European level or at national level, but lack explanatory power in relation to 
differences between regions within the same national context, or lying within the same cluster 
(less developed regions, and regions whose starting point is similar at the beginning of the 
observation period). 
 
3. Factors (such as technological changes that different regions may have exploited with 
different levels of effectiveness) which may have an impact and whose importance must be 
verified through the case study phase, and that cannot be ruled out as insignificant at this 
point in the research project.  
 
 
The table below presents a list of competing explanatory factors and the responses that the research 
offers to minimize their impact. 
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Table 2.4 – Competing explanations and reasons why the impact is minimized 
 
 Public investments Policies Not government driven 
(likely business)  
Exogenous to the 
region 
The choice to focus on 
differences between 
regions should neutralize 
this impact under the 
assumption that national 
investments are 
distributed proportional 
to regions’ size  
The choice to focus on 
differences between 
regions should neutralize 
this impact under the 
assumption that national 
policies should impact 
regions having the same 
economic and research 
in a similar way 
The choice to focus on 
regions with similar 
economic structure 
should minimize the 
impact of different 
trends in different 
industries  
Endogenous to the 
region  
The choice to focus on 
structural funds should 
minimize the impact of 
other investments that are 
small relatively to 
structural funds 
Most of the research 
(and other relevant 
policies e.g. labor 
market)  policies are 
national so impact of 
different policies 
between different 
regions should be 
minimal 
The choice to focus on 
regions which are not 
core in their countries 
should minimize the 
number of big players 
and, thus, the impact of 
decisions and of the 
results of single firms 
 
This framework, together with the deliberate choice of regions displaying similar endowments of 
human capital, research assets and institutional arrangements, should then provide the mechanisms by 
which the research can control the minimization of the influence of factors others than the 
independent variables that we want to control.  
 
2.4  PROBLEMS WITH DEFINITIONS  
 
In this section we will deal with three main queries relevant to our research: a) We do not know what 
we should exactly mean by “innovation” and, thus, the exact parameter of the independent variable. 
Consequently, we do not know how to measure the input of our equation. b) There is no universal 
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consensus about what should be meant by economic performance leaving alone the notion of 
citizens’ wellbeing which after all should be the bottom line of any policy, including one having 
innovation as lever.  Accordingly, there are uncertainties about how should we operationalize the 
dependent variable. Lastly, and although a less central issue c)  even as far as the concept of 
regional competitiveness is concerned, there are a number of conflicting definitions and 
measurements demanding a choice preliminary to the research. These questions and their solutions 
are now considered. 
 
1. Innovation  
 
Research & Development in its various declinations44 is normally considered the proxy for 
innovation; the ratio between expenses on R&D and GDP is normally considered a measure of the 
“propensity of a certain region to innovate” and the Lisbon Strategy selects R&D/GDP as one of its 
most important quantitative targets.  
 
However, this definition has a number of problems (OECD’s Frascati Manuals – OECD, 1963 and 
2002 – are probably the most comprehensive and authoritative attempt to solve them). For instance, 
there is the fact that large and increasingly significant investments in innovation are not captured by 
R&D: a) innovation in Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) seems difficult to detect through R&D; b) 
process innovations are also underestimated whereas R&D is mostly centred around product 
development;  c) service (and, in fact, also agriculture) innovations tend to be neglected. 
 
An interesting definition of innovation is offered by the Green Paper on Innovation of the European 
Commission, where innovation is defined as “the successful production, assimilation and exploitation 
of novelty in the economic or social sphere”. Important here is the idea that innovation is considered 
in a broad sense: although the definition appears still to be mostly about new products that tend to be 
produced by quantum leaps changes. There is also a recognition that innovation can be produced by 
“assimilation” (imitation), “exploitation” and that can go beyond the “economic” domain. Innovation, 
however, remains distinct from mere speculation whose impact may extend beyond a reasonable time 
horizon. 
 
                                                 
44 The most recent EU documents talk about RTDI as Research Technologies Development and Innovation and from a 
statistical point of view we observe many mentions of GERD (Gross Expenditures on Research and Development) 
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Even this definition seems to overlook two important issues. The first is that innovation is necessarily 
linked to change (as the Commission acknowledges in other reports45) that tend to be disruptive (as 
in the classic Schumpeter’s classic, 1935) or, at the very least, cause old modes of production to fail 
and goods to disappear from the market.  
The EU’s definition of innovation seems to have difficulty in accepting the destructive part of the 
innovation process; innovation is not something that can be added to an economy’s infrastructure but 
which in fact requires profound changes to an economy’s dynamics.  
 
The second issue that EU documentation often fails to acknowledge is that innovation is not 
necessarily  successful. As many authors argue, “success” comes from “failure” (Peters, 1988; Zider, 
1998; Hardgadon and Sutter, 2000); and failure is valuable as long as it can provide the possibility to 
learn (Drucker, 1998). 
 
Lastly, the mainstream EU definition of innovation appears to be somehow too simplistic as far as the 
innovation process goes. “Innovation is not a linear, but an evolutionary, cumulative and feedback 
process, which can only be realized in the cooperation and in the economic and social interaction of 
different actors, and as a result produces technological, organisational and social innovations” 
(Koschatzky, 2001:62). As a consequence, innovation can be about localized (incremental and minor) 
or structural (radical, unpredictable) change (Boschma, 2006) 
 
It is, then, necessary to distinguish a number of overlapping concepts: innovation; knowledge; 
technology; (investments in) R&D; and (investments in) business competitiveness. It should also be 
noted that: 
1. Innovation (as well as R&D, in fact) is not entirely about technology; 
2. Not all R&D produces innovation; some of it will increase knowledge (like the funds spent on 
training or non research oriented higher education) but will not produce (at least not in the 
short – medium term) changes. 
3. Not all innovation is produced within a knowledge creation process; some of the change may 
occur by chance (for instance within companies) and not on the basis of an explicit codified, 
intellectual process. 
4. Some investments in business which are outside the proper R&D domain are still about 
producing innovation (for instance, in marketing, organisation, design). 
                                                 
45 “Innovation is about change and the ability to manage change over time”; European Innovation Progress Report – 
Trendchart; 2006; Commissioned by European Commission DG Entreprise and Industry) 
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5. Innovation can also be produced outside both the business and the R&D (universities and 
research centres) fields; public administrations and civil society, for example, are increasingly 
producing significant transformations. 
 
In addition to establishing the parameters of innovation and thus understanding how well R&D 
succeeds in capturing the extension of the area covered by innovation there are at least two other 
measurement problems (faced by Wang, for instance, when he attempts to measure R&D efficiency, 
2007): 
1. R&D expenditures put together investments (for instance in equipments) and current expenses 
(for instance, salaries of researchers); it would be important to distinguish them if we want to 
construct a production function; 
2. immediate outputs of R&D like academic publications or patents have been considered 
parameters of production; however these present significant problems of comparability.  
 
Notwithstanding these limits, the merit of R&D is that it is one of the measurements for which there 
are sufficiently long time series and adequate geographic disaggregation. It is also a dimension 
(although not the only one) of innovation that seems to be more immediately linked to industrial 
production cycles. Thus it is contended that taking R&D as the independent variable is an interesting 
proposition, as long as we do not seek to extrapolate conclusions to be deemed as relevant to the 
entire innovation domain.  
 
On the other hand, we will also try to include in our analysis elements that may indicate how other 
forms of innovation are proceeding in the particular region in question. We will also try to divide 
observed investments in innovation according to a number of main typologies.46 
 
2. Economic performance  
 
The evolution of regional prosperity - proxied by GDP per habitant as well as productivity that is still 
derived from GDP - will be the principal dependent variable. Yet there are, at least, two problems:  a) 
the limits of GDP and productivity as a measurement of the economic performance and the well 
being of a certain society on a macro level; b) the economic value added to firms on a micro level. 
Obviously both are questions of adequacy of the definitions and hence of the measurements of the 
                                                 
46 DG Regio, for instance, propose a codification that assigns to innovation a number of specific “measures” of the 
operation programmes 2007 – 2013 and distinguishes innovation amongst R&D, human capital (tertiary education), 
investments for e – government and entrepreneurship. 
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dependent variable directly impact the strength of the relationship between innovation and its 
economic effects. 
 
The first question is one of the most debated in economic theory. To cite just a few relevant 
contributions: Amartya Sen’s (in Choice, Welfare and Measurement - 1997) conceptualization of 
development;  Richard Layer’s (Happiness: lessons from a new science – 2005)  arguments on the 
merits of assessing other factors that may overcome the limits of GDP; the recent OECD project 
(Measuring Society’s Progress: A key issue for policy making and democratic governance at 
www.oecd.org/progress ) and the proposals to involve citizens and NGOs in the construction of the 
indicators; but also the very instruments (like the Human Development Index) that international 
bodies like the UN have been using for assessing the advancement of societies.   Further, Easterlin 
(1974 in Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? Some Empirical Evidence) has even 
identified a paradox that seems to contradict the relationship between GDP per capita and wellbeing 
that one would expect; solutions such as Gross National Happiness (in Tella, 2008) have been 
proposed and attempts have been made to apply it (see, for example, the Butan - Preisner (2004) 
ranking).  
 
The possibility, here, is that more innovation may produce (positive or, even, negative) effects that 
may not be detected by indicators like GDP per capita or productivity and effects. We will refer to 
other values that investments in R&D may produce, however, the main dependent variables that we 
will consider are still the traditional indicators of macro economic performance. This is also justified 
by the choice of the EC to consider GDP per capita  as the measurement of differences amongst 
regions and, thus, as the quantitative target of cohesion policies. This equates to say that we will 
assess performance defined as capability of  the programs to reach their self declared objective.  
 
The second similar issue – not at macro but at micro economy level – of the capability of firms’ 
economic value to reflect the impact of innovation is considered by various authors, a number of 
whom have demonstrated how quality (that can be enhanced by technology) or higher efficiency 
(lower costs that can be, once again, triggered by technologies) may fail to translate into higher 
productivity (see, for instance, Gordon on the innovation paradox, 2000). This is, again, a problem of 
definition that is also reflected in problems of causalities that we will elaborate in the next section. 
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3. Regional competitiveness  
 
Last but not least, there is the additional issue of clarifying what we mean by regional 
competitiveness. The last decades have witnessed a surge of academic, political and media attention 
dedicated to the notion of “competitiveness” meant as a feature of a certain “system” (Gardiner et al., 
2004 or Best, 1990, 1998). By “system” here we are referring to a geographically defined area and, 
thus, the concept seems applicable to cities, as well as regions, nation states and to entire continents 
(the EU for instance). In all instances, the notion that countries compete for “limited” resources 
within global markets and globalized societies is assumed to be increasingly important. As far as the 
present study is concerned, we are particularly interested in the more specific idea of “regional 
competitiveness”.  
 
In fact, it seems that definitions of “regional competitiveness” can be grouped into three main 
categories. A first definition makes competitiveness coincide with the very concept of economic 
performance (measured with macroeconomic indicators as GDP growth rate or absolute values or 
variation in employment rate).  The second assimilates competitiveness of a region to the volume or 
again the growth in exports and/ or the trade balance.  The third definition concentrates on the 
capability of a region to “attract” or “maintain” firms which are “competitive”, and therefore able to 
achieve a higher level of productivity and obtain high market shares in markets exposed to 
international competition. 
 
This thesis’ choice is to use the third concept, because of logical inconsistencies in the first two that 
we are now going to describe, but also not less importantly because the third definition is more 
consistent with the objectives that the EU has outlined for itself and which we are assessing: amongst 
other things – the consistency between policy objectives and instruments employed to achieve them.  
 
Firstly “regional competitiveness” cannot coincide with overall economic performance and thus 
cannot be measured by employment rates or GDP growth rate. If, in fact, “competitiveness” is a 
novel concept with autonomous predictive and narrative power, it cannot coincide with general 
economic performance. It is, instead, one of its components or of its determinants, as the Sapir report 
(2003) reminds us. 
 
Secondly, some authors assimilate regional “competitiveness” to a region’s export level, export 
growth, share of international trade, or even trade balance (Rowthorn, 1999, or Tyson, 1992). Such 
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association is, in fact, explained as the transposition of the “competitiveness” semantic from the 
context of private firms (to which the idea of being “competitive” is originally associated) to the 
world of macro economy and of the wealth of nations. In fact, the above measures resemble 
respectively turnover, turnover growth, market share and net income concepts typical of private 
enterprises.  
 
However, various authors find such analogies misleading. As Krugman (1999) recalls, international 
competitiveness cannot be regarded as coincident with the concept of large trade balance (or with 
rising or high shares of world exports) because many poor countries are in exactly that position and 
yet still do not experience the rising living standards that countries with chronic imbalances have 
experienced (such as Italy in the 1980s, and the USA in the 1990s). 
 
A more radical critique of this concept is however one that exposes the essential logical flaw of the 
transposition: to assume that the higher the exports/ the lower the imports and the better off is a given 
country overlooks the fundamental value that trade can generate through the acquisition of goods and 
services from other locations which are able to leverage comparative advantages.  
 
Country competitiveness cannot, then, be identified with GDP or other measurements of “bottom 
line” economic performance because it must be a component of it. Additionally it cannot be equated 
with exports because they are influenced by factors other than “ability to compete” and large 
advantages in trade are not necessarily associated to higher living standards. These arguments leave 
us with the third notion mentioned above. 
 
Thus, we have to look to another strand of indicators and economic phenomena, and more 
specifically to two characteristics:  
a) the increase (or the level) of “productivity” as one of the two legs (the other being 
employment rate) whose multiplication gives the per capita GDP: this is relevant in assessing 
the ability of the firms located in a certain area to command higher return for their products or 
to produce such goods and services in a more efficient way;  
b) the presence or “increase” of some endowment factors which make productive firms more 
likely to stay in a certain area where productivity has increased. Therefore “regional 
competitiveness” is a measure of the ability of a region to host a sufficiently high number of 
“competitive” firms (measurable with enough precision by “productivity”) and to maintain 
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them in the area (due to the presence of certain factors which make easier to persuade actors 
with a high productivity to localise or maintain their production in that region). 
 
This same line of reasoning is followed by Porter. For instance, in The Competitive Advantage of 
Nations, (1990) he suggested that the “correct” question for investigation of “regional 
competitiveness” should then be re-phrased as follows: “why does a region become the home-base 
for successful competitors in a given industry?” This question may in fact be viewed, according to 
Porter, as even more apt when posed at regional level because industry agglomeration tends to be 
concentrated in sub-national areas and is increasingly influenced by regional economic and 
development policies rather than national ones. 
 
Regarding measurement of how regional endowments affect competitiveness and the identification of 
factors which make one region more or less likely to attract or maintain competitive industries, an 
important source is the already mentioned Sapir report (An Agenda for a Growing Europe, July 
2003). The report emphasises the importance of the so called “intangible assets” that a Region 
possesses and underlines that higher education is crucial to growth. A study conducted across 80 
countries and run for data series covering the 1960 – 2000 period shows that for both total factor 
productivity and labour productivity the influence of skilled labour is positive and statistically 
significant (Aghion et al., 2003). 
 
Another relevant factor and indicator Sapir draws attention to is the pace of patents registration. This 
in Sapir’s view is in turn impacted by a number of factors: 
• R&D expenditure and manpower 
• regulations concerning intellectual property protection (which has to strike a balance between 
the interest of knowledge diffusion and innovation reward); 
• composition of the R&D expenditure between public, universities and private. 
 
These criteria generate indicators and composite indexes that are used to measure how competitive a 
certain area is. 
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2.5 RESEARCH TOOLS AND RESOURCES  
 
As mentioned, the data of the research will mostly come from the desk analysis – whereas on this 
basis we will mostly measure the “results” as for chart 2.1 – and from the fieldwork – upon which we 
will develop most of our investigation on the presence of the features that according to our thesis 
explain success or failure. 
 
 
2.5.1 Desk analysis and research  resources  
 
The research has been conducted with the objective to verify the presence of the conditions that for 
our theory – described in section 2.2.2 on the “innovation value chain” -  are supposed to be present 
in the successful case (and therefore absent in the less efficient region). The test of the hypothesis 
have been made by analyzing secondary and primary data that allowed to cross check the findings. 
Secondary data include the programming documents of the OB1 programmes to be implemented in 
the regions, their regional innovation strategies, the annual reports that tracked the results, the 
independent evaluations that the regions commissioned to consulting firms and research institutes, 
the European, national and regional statistics, the region and country specific literature (details are 
accessible in the annex 1), the economic reports produced by the selected regions and countries and 
by the European commission.  
 
2.5.2 The fieldwork: interview guides, selection of interviewees and interview 
methods  
 
Primary data are mostly interviews conducted with individuals belonging to the four below described 
categories: 
1. elected officials and civil servants at national and regional governments as well as regional 
development agencies;  
2. entrepreneurs and managers of firms; 
3. rectors and academics of universities hosted by the region;  
4. representatives of NGOS and opinion makers.  
For each of them a specific interview guide (see annex 4 for the guides) was drafted and sent to the 
interviewee before hand.  
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As far as firms, universities and NGOS the interview guide is articulated so that we first identify the 
category to which the interviewee belongs, secondly the quantity and typology of aid that she got and 
thirdly the likely effect of it. 
The meeting with programme managers and policy makers were mostly meant to unveil objectives 
and lay out of decision making processes. 
Primary and secondary data were continuously cross checked in order to spot inconsistencies and 
should these arise, further meetings and interactions through remote means (emails, conference calls) 
were used to clarify.  
Both recipients and not recipients of funds were consulted so that they could be compared in order to 
assess reliability.  
The names of the individuals and organisations that were interviewed and the interview guides are in 
the annex 3 and 4.47. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
What is innovation? And what do we mean by economic performance or, even, convergence? The 
misunderstandings of both we mean by investments into knowledge and by the objective of these 
programmes could hide a number of reasons why numbers may not yield the results that one would 
have expected.  
The definition of the independent variable that we are considering are many and even the official 
definition of institutions like the European Union leaves room for misinterpretation. In the reality of 
programming activities by innovation some of the regions we studied (like Wales) meant not only 
R&D, but also incremental change and realignment of firms towards some pre established standards 
of quality. These not innovative projects are normally financed by research dedicated measures and 
this dilutes the investments made in research and it is one of the reason why the net final effect is not 
as large as we would have expected. And yet it is perfectly reasonable that on the contrary the R&D 
definition does not capture innovations that are of the type that we are considering: radical, capable to 
potentially produce competitive advantage (and smart specialization – for instance McCann and 
Argiles, 2011, but also OECD (2010) - which is a concept that we will elaborate later with examples 
from the field work). 
The concept of economic growth as the dependent variable of the equation we are studying is not less 
tricky for reasons regarding the indicators, but also for the dynamics of a strategy meant to increase 
                                                 
47 All interviews were noted. Part of them were taped (but for the cases where the interviewee preferred not to). 
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the knowledge assests of a region. Innovation is about to promote change, and, thus, to make room 
for newer, more efficient business and research systems to replace older ones. Innovation can, 
therefore, have in the short term some not net positive results. 
 
The research strategy to consider innovation what appears to coincide with a competitive advantage 
and to observe the results in long enough time periods, should mitigate the two above problems. 
 
The main hypothesis to be tested is that higher effectiveness of public R&D programs tends to be 
associated to strategies whose higher efficiency can be measured along the phases of an 
implementation process that we called “innovation vale chain”.  
Better performance is expected to be associated to higher capability of these expenditures to multiply 
themselves into business investments. In order to achieve such a result public resources need to be 
concentrated in terms of industry, research domain, geographical areas, and beneficiaries so that 
critical mass is achieved.  The research will also try to understand what lies behind more focused 
choices. The idea is that innovation strategies depend on clearer allocation of responsibilities and 
higher independence from politics of programmes’ management, but also on the development of a 
number of working interactions between government, finance, business, universities and civil society 
alongside explicit strategies that can facilitate the creation and growth of these partnerships.  
 
The selection of the regions is deployed with the objective to maximize the potential of the outcomes 
to be extended to other situations by selecting areas that were similar at the beginning of the 
programmes, were exposed to similar national policies and that yet displayed very different results. 
The size of the financial aid package also similarly appeared to be enough to make of the structural 
funds the most important if not the only lever for generating economic growth.   
This reduces the importance of alternative explanations – both in terms of policies and shocks other 
than structural funds, and of differences in pre existing conditions and in terms of economic or social 
endowments - to convergence. 
UK and Spain as countries were, thus, selected and within them respectively the couples South 
Yorkshire – West Wales and Castilla Y Leon – Murcia  were chosen, so that the above criteria could 
be satisfied. Countries and regions seem to be an ideal setting for the analysis to be carried out for 
reasons that we will elaborate further in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE - REGIONAL POLICIES AND PUBLIC 
INVESTMENT PROGRAMMES IN RESEARCH IN UK AND 
SPAIN 
 
 
The cases were selected, as we detailed in the previous chapter, so that they could display – at the 
beginning of the programming cycle - similar economic structure, and similar endowments of assets 
like human capital, accessibility to core markets and propensity to invest in research: moreover 
structural funds programmes appeared to have similar and rather significant potential to impact 
economic growth and accumulation of expenditures in research in all four regions. And yet 
performances in terms of convergence and capability of public investments to attract private capital 
resulted very different at the end of the period we are observing: this maximizes the potential of an 
analysis like ours which is focused on the difference in performances that is due to organisation 
choices and quality of partnerships amongst firms, academia, governments and public opinions.  
This chapter allows –through secondary data and information collected in the fieldwork - for a further 
contextualization of the research within the political and economic situation of the two countries that 
we are going to investigate, as a well for an analysis of the similarities and the differences amongst 
the selected regions that provides the ground upon which the empirical work of chapter four and five 
is based.  
 
In fact, Spain and the UK are also interesting due to a number of additional features.  
First, in both countries the regionalization process has been parallel to the structural funds 
implementation periods, whereas in the other large EU countries regionalization preceded the 
structural funds programming cycles.  This difference will provide the research with an interesting 
viewpoint from which to evaluate how the institutional setting becomes an explaining factor with 
regard to structural funds concrete functioning. However, vice versa, we will also see how the 
institutions and their concrete functioning are influenced by the requirement to spend the EU money 
and get the best possible results from it (Bache and Jones, 2009; Burch and Gomez, 2002). This will 
be confirmed and articulated by the interviews on the field with decision makers at regional and 
central level. 
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Secondly, they are both accelerating their investments in R&D. Both have been concentrating a 
higher share of these investments in less developed regions and have increased the priority attached 
to investigating the question of what can make investments in R&D more or less effective (Howells, 
1997; Konstadakpoulos, 2000).  
The recent evaluation of the Lisbon strategy (EC, 2010) says that Spain has been one of the country 
that has accelerated R&D expenditures the most and that UK is one of those that, more intensely, 
employed expenditures in research as a tool of regional development. 
 
The above points are, in fact, reflected in a literature on regional development and innovation policies 
(for a literature review on the debates we will refer, amongst others, to Konstadakpoulos, 2000, and 
Cooke et al., 2011 and 2003) that is certainly larger than the one that we can find as far as France and 
Germany48 are concerned.  
The chapter is thus articulated as follows. The first section reconstructs how structural funds 
implementation processes have promoted changes in the institutional layout and, vice versa, how the 
organisation of the programming cycles appears to have been impacted by the existing institutional 
frameworks in the two countries. The second section shows how regional innovation strategies have 
expanded and changed their scope in UK and Spain and addresses debate in the two countries on 
innovation as a lever of economic growth.  In the third section we will show which main paths 
towards research seem to emerge for different groups of regions in the two countries. Finally, the 
fourth section presents in greater detail the two pairs of regions selected, explaining why they pose a 
puzzle in terms of differences in patterns of economic and research assets development 
notwithstanding the similarities that will be identified by comparing them against their peers in UK 
and Spain. These elements provide the framework for empirical testing of our hypotheses and of our 
framework of the “innovation value chain”. 
 
 
3.1 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REGIONALIZATION 
AND STRUCTURAL FUNDS   
 
The implications of EU cohesion policies on regionalization have been debated since the beginning 
of the 1990s. The milestone is seen to be the establishment of the so called “partnership principle” 
with the structural funds regulations of 1988, where partnerships are defined as “close consultation 
                                                 
48 As far as Italy is concerned, a broad literature exists although the focus is mostly on sub regional, local level of districts 
which display a strong specialization (see Capello, 1997, Camagni, 1991 and Porter, 1990 amongts others).  
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between the Commission, the member states .. and the competent authorities designated ..at national, 
regional local level.. with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal (Bache and 
Jones, 2009 and EC, 88). 
 
The partnership principle meant that (as noticed by Nanetti, 2007, Nanetti et al, 2004) regional policy 
became for the first time not just a policy for the regions but also by the regions. According to a 
number of studies (amongst which Marks and al, 1996, Hooghe, 1996, Bache, 2010) the effects of the 
introduction of the principle, however, appear to have been neither linear nor immediate.  
 
In fact, Hooge produced in 1996 a Europe-wide study trying to assess whether European cohesion 
policies had pushed regions towards a more central role in managing economic development 
strategies in any uniform way. The results were rather differentiated amongst countries: in some, like 
the UK, the government maintained a role of gatekeeper, whereas in others, like Spain, even direct 
negotiations between the regional administrations and the EC had been established.  
 
The differences amongst countries were, according to Bache and Jones, 2000, due to four factors.  
First, of course, very different institutional settings prevailed in different countries going from very 
decentralized situations (like in Germany) to others where regions were de facto created to satisfy a 
requirement of structural funds regulations (like more recently happened in new member states). 
However, even beyond institutions concrete technical capabilities and capacities to maintain and 
develop relationships with the EC, also, made a difference with some regions being formally 
empowered and yet informally delegating the representation of their interest to central governments. 
Political trends also changed the patterns: in the UK the election of the Labour government in 1997 
signalled an acceleration towards devolution and decentralization, and similarly in Spain narrow 
majorities made the support of nationalist parties from Catalonia and Basque Countries essential to 
the governing party and, thus, triggered a shift of the structural funds budget towards regions.  
Relevant, thirdly, was the different weight of structural funds on the public investments into a certain 
region or country: we, then, would expect cohesion policies’ decision making lay outs being more 
important in Spain than in UK and more to CYL than to the administration of the Community of 
Madrid, due to the different share of structural funds on total public investments available to 
development policies. 
 
As mentioned, however, the British and Spanish cases were those most extensively investigated.  One 
main difference between the UK and Spain and the rest of the largest EU15 countries is that regions 
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and regionalism were born in the UK and Spain in parallel with the programming periods of the 
cohesion policies, whereas in Italy, France and Germany regions came to existence before the start of 
the structural funds spending (in 1984) and its first significant reform in 198849. 
 
In the UK and Spain, some of the most important milestones of regionalization, such as the autonomy 
agreements in 1992 in Spain and the introduction of the integrated regional “government offices” in 
1994, were rather more recent than the above mentioned developments in France, Germany and Italy. 
 
Anther commonality is that both in the UK and Spain regionalization proceeded asymmetrically 
between a group of more autonomous regions (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in the UK and 
Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Andalusia in Spain) and the rest. This distinction was clearly 
recognized in 1978 in Spain with the constitution and in 1999 in UK with elections for both the 
Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly that had important and yet somehow unexpected 
consequences on structural funds as our interviews found50. In France and Germany, regionalization 
proceeded with less differentiation between regions whereas Italy similarly distinguishes two 
different degrees of regional autonomy.  
 
In addition, the relationship between structural funds and the evolution of the general institutional 
setting can be seen to be one of mutual influence (Bache and Jones, 2000). On one hand, the 
institutional setting, until the end of the 1990s, was very centralized, hindering any substantial 
application of subsidiarity and partnership principles. Bache (2010) find, for instance, that central 
government not only acted as a gatekeeper, but also chaired all the committees through which the 
structural funds programmes were implemented and selected the partners. In the UK, however, it was 
once again skills and motivation that were, sometimes, able to create exceptions to this layout. 
Scotland pioneered, for instance, the use of an “independent” secretariat which, though nominated by 
the central government, had a strong technical profile.  
 
                                                 
49 In fact, in France, regions drawn to current boundaries were recognized in the Constitution of the Fourth Republic in 
1946 although they were identified already in the Vichy years. In West Germany, the much more powerful Länder, first 
recognized in 1870 at the birth of the modern German state, were acknowledged by the Allies before becoming part of the 
new state under the constitution of 1949. In Italy, the regional form of the State was established in the Constitution of 
1946, although the regions were formally established only in 1970. Even if all these developments towards 
regionalization were encouraged by the parallel process of the progressive creation of European institutions, there was 
evidently no practical linkage between them  and any issue of the management of European regional funds. 
 
50 Interview with Professor Phil Cooke, Director, Centre for Advanced Studies, Cardiff School of City and Regional 
Planning 
Cardiff University, 14th May 2008 
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The Scottish secretariat was, in a sense, the anticipation of the independent Programme Directorate 
that, as we will see in Chapter Four, was one of the success factors of the OB 1 Programme in SY 
during the 2000 – 2006 period. More broadly, in 2000 – 2006, the overall institutional setting became 
more regionalized: in the UK structural funds are, in fact, understood to be one of the main reasons 
for the recent acceleration in regionalization (Burch and Gomez, 2002).  
 
It is remarkable that Yorkshire and Humber and Wales were, just before the start of the last 
programming period, considered as demonstrating worst practices as regards decentralization of 
decision making: in both cases, relationships between the main implementation bodies (the 
government office of Yorkshire and Humber  - GOYH -  and WDA) and other local partners were 
seen as largely unsatisfactory. However, as Bache and Jones, 2000, remind us, and as we will see in 
Chapter Four, it is not necessarily a case of “the more partnerships the better”. The involvement of 
local communities in the drafting and implementation of the strategies and, more specifically, of local 
councillors, was admitted by some of our interviewees as detrimental to effectiveness when these 
local authorities lacked the skills required by the program impllmentation processes51.  
 
The Spanish case was different both in terms of the significantly more regionalized institutional 
layout, and the much greater weight of structural funds within the Spanish economy: Spain has been 
the largest recipient of CF since the start of the policy. However, even in Spain the effective 
empowerment of regions has deviated from what we would have expected looking just at the formal 
legal provisions52.  
 
Before 1988, the choice of eligible regions and negotiation of regional plans were undertaken by the 
national governments with the EC (Lazaro, 1986). In the 1988 – 1993 period, although nine OB1 
regional Community Support Frameworks (CSF) were established, the overall amount allocated to 
each of them was decided by the government and the EC, excluding regions (Morata and Munoz - 
1996). Even in the 1994 – 1999 period, the overall amount of structural funds being directly managed 
by the regions did not increase (around 34% according to Conejos I Sancho, 1993). 
 
                                                 
51 Interview with Gill Browning, Strategy Manager, Yorkshire Forward, Leeds, 20th March 2007 
 
52 Interview with Aurelio Jiménez Romero, Independent Evaluator Murcia OB 1 Programme 2000 – 2006, Red2Red 
Consultores S.L., Madrid, 14th, April 2008 
 
 
 99
As in the UK case, as we were said during the fieldwork, it was a strong leadership of some but not 
all regions and, specifically, leadership substantiated in skills, relationships with the EC and 
motivation to acquire a higher role that made the differences in the effective level of each region’s 
autonomy53. In fact, the degree of autonomy exercise was not the same, with Catalonia and the 
Basque countries being highly critical of attempts by the national government to preserve control of 
the expenditure (as for the official documents of the debates at the Congress, 1993, 1995 mentioned 
by the Ministry of Economy, 1995) and successful achieving greater room to establish their own 
priorities. 
 
The 2000-2006 period witnessed a further shift towards greater regional responsibility as we were 
said during the fieldwork at the Ministry of Economy in Madrid54. Still, as we will describe in 
Chapter Four, decentralization has produced differentiated outcomes especially for those policies, 
such as R & D,  requiring skills and international relationships. 
 
 
3.2 THE EVOLUTION IN REGIONAL INNOVATION 
POLICIES  
 
If the criteria for claiming the existence of a regional innovation strategy include a specific policy and 
of government structures to support it (Konstadakopoulos, 2000; Capello, 1997; Camagni, 1991) then 
regional innovation strategies are a relatively novel concept, and came to existence much after the 
birth of the European Community: in Italy in the late 1970s, in France and Spain in the late 1980s.  
 
The UK became one of the most fertile terrain for differentiated approaches to regional innovation 
much later, in the 1990s with Wales being – unlike most recent periods - the most prominent case, 
and in the last decade with the devolution and the creation of regional development agencies. 
 
In the UK, in fact, although the Thatcher government launched the ambitious so-called “enterprise 
politics”, the innovation strategies almost coincided with the attraction of FDI. More sophisticated 
                                                 
53 Interview with Harvey Armstrong, Professor of Economic Geography at Sheffield University, Sheffield, 18th June 
2008 
 
54 Interview with Jose Luis Kaiser Moreiras, Subdirector General de Programación Territorial y Evaluación de Programas 
Comunitarios, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid,  21st April 2008 
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strategies meant to increase the transfer of technologies to indigenous firms were neglected until the 
mid-1980s (Howells, 1997). The result is that small firms in areas heavily impacted by FDI (which 
were sometimes driven by big government contracts, such as the defence contract that spurred the 
development of the aerospace industry along the M4 corridor in the South West Region and which 
for some time drew parallels with Silicon Valley) appeared to have no or very little internal R&D 
capacity (Konstadakpoulos, 2000). 
 
The most recent trends since the creation of regional development agencies (RDAs) have almost 
reversed this pattern. As Mikel Landabaso of the DG Regio at the European Commission told us 
during the interviews55, the drafting of regional innovation strategies has become one of the most 
important objectives of the RDAs, the budgets dedicated to innovation have been increased and, 
alongside the RDAs, a proliferation of actors engaged with promoting and realizing innovation has 
taken place. Paradoxically, recent surveys of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI, 1997) have 
shown that the public or quasi public bodies engaged in supporting small firms appeared to their very 
“clients” (the small and medium entrepreneurs) as too many in number and not well coordinated: this 
consideration will emerge in a particularly concrete way when we describe the case of Wales later on. 
 
The relationship between economic growth and, more specifically, regional inequalities and 
knowledge in UK has been, in fact, treated with a wider scope of the analysis by a number of authors. 
Amongst others, Duranton and Monastiriotis found (2002) that although the premium that different 
UK regional economies can afford to give to education is becoming similar, the increasing return  
that labour markets recognize to knowledge and a different composition of the workforce (with more 
educated people moving towards the centre) has produced an increase in the gap amongst regions in 
average regional earning with both Yorkshire and Wales lagging the others. Similar considerations 
were being heard during the field work of this research by the professors and rectors of the 
universities of both regions that we analysed in Spain:  knowledge is, in fact, transferred – in a way 
that the endogenous growth theory only partially envisages – with a brain drain from the periphery to 
the centre of the country. 
Within this context, regional innovation strategies can be understood – this was very much the case 
of some of the programme managers we heard in Murcia – as a programme whose main objective is 
to improve the number of knowledge workers that decide to stay and their percentage on the 
workforce. 
 
                                                 
55 Interview with Mikel Landabaso, DG Regio, European Commission, Bruxelles, 27th May 2010 
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Spain also saw regional innovation strategies unfold only at the end of the 1980s, with the regions 
representing the core of research and innovation activities (Catalonia, Madrid, Valencia and the 
Basque country) developing their first innovation plans at this time. It is interesting to remark that 
one of the typical features of Spanish regional innovation strategies has been fragmentation and, 
more specifically, the separation of innovation policies between ministries, with resulting conflicts 
between research, industry and economy competences (Konstadakpoulos, 2000): this, as we will see 
in the empirical chapters, has also been the case of Murcia for the programming period that we are 
studying. A further consequence was polarization of investments, with the expenditures managed by 
research ministries concentrating in basic research, and those by industry ministries in restructuring 
firms and new production processes (Buesa, 1996, Heijis, 1997) – a model  we will see as prevailing 
in Murcia and being overcome by the experiences of technology parks in other more advanced 
regions in Spain.   
 
Technology parks have, in fact, been one of the most important features of the approach of Spanish 
regional innovation strategies with an early significant success in Barcelona (the Valles Technology 
Park) and shortly after the Boecillo Park in CYL, whose far reaching impacts will be described in 
Chapter Five.  
 
Both the UK and Spain are following similar patterns as regards evolution of their R&D 
expenditures: they both demonstrate a below average propensity to spend in research; both are 
catching up; in both countries, the R&D expenditures result to be  geographically concentrated and in 
both there has been a recent acknowledgment of the importance of investments in research as a tool 
for regional development. Lastly, the two countries host a significant share of the most prestigious 
European universities and of the most innovative multinationals.  
 
In the UK, the propensity to invest in R&D is slightly lower than EU average (1,76% as R&D over 
GDP average in the 2000 – 2006 period that we are going to consider versus 1,92 at EU 15 level), 
although the UK seems to have been catching up in recent years (in the same period the yearly 
compound growth rate of R&D expenditures was 4,6% in the UK versus 3,63% in the EU) in a 
context of economic performance that has been strong relative to other EU countries (at least until the 
recent crisis which is beyond the time horizon of this research). 
 
Spain’s recent past has been characterized by convergence towards EU averages across all the main 
economic indicators (GDP per capita, employment rate and propensity to invest in R&D) although  
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differences with Union averages are still large as far as percentage of GDP spent on R&D (1,12% 
versus 1,9% in 2005). 
 
The other trend that emerges in both countries is that public investments in R&D are displaying a 
redistributive effect, with expenditures growing more in regions that used to spend less, albeit the 
gaps are still very large. Such redistributive effects are mostly due to structural funds-driven public 
investments. 
 
 
3.3 THE STATISTICAL EVIDENCE  
 
This section will, now, reiterate for each of the two selected countries the analysis that was performed 
at European level in graphs 1.3 and 1.4, after having surveyed the main literature on the effectiveness 
of public investments in research as a tool for economic development of less advanced regions. The 
question is, therefore, do the expectations of a strong association between economic growth and R&D 
expenditures hold true for the British and Spanish regions? 
 
As regards the comparison between regions within UK, we have measured how strongly differences 
in terms of size of R&D expenditures are associated with differences in economic growth over a 10 
year period (1996 – 2005) that includes the time frame we are investigating.  
 
Graph 3.1 – Comparison between R&D/GDP and DGP growth rate UK regions (1996-2005, average values, 
compounded growth rate) 
 
COMPARISON BETWEEN R&D/GDP AND GDP GROWTH RATE 
UK REGIONS 
(1996-2005, AVERAGE VALUES, 
COMPOUNDED GROWTH RATE)
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The differences between propensity to invest in R&D are large: the Region East of England invests 
more than 2,5% of  GDP in R&D and South East almost 2,0%. Scotland, North East, Wales, 
Yorkshire, and Northern Ireland invest just over one half percentage point, which is very small by 
European standards and related benchmarks.  
 
The main message is thus that correlation between R&D and economic growth appears to be positive 
enough. However, one remarkable exception is London, exhibiting a difference so large that it seems 
to cast a shadow over the entire theory of the importance of investing in research.  
 
London is one of the most striking examples of a context where a very low level of R&D 
expenditures (less than 0,5% of the GDP is spent in R&D) does not prevent a city - region to display 
both the highest growth rate of GDP in UK and the highest absolute level of GDP per capita in 
Europe. In the case of London, low R&D investment does not even signal a low propensity towards 
innovation. Additionally, London is a region where it is most evident that the notion of R&D only 
captures a fraction of investments in innovation. 
 
This is mostly due to London’s industry structure: here, the financial and high end service sectors 
have a greater weight than in any other UK or European region. Financial and service firms do not 
account for significant R&D expenditure, in the sense that although they may be heavy spenders in 
innovation, these expenditures do not qualify as within definitions of R&D applied for statistical 
purposes (as already elaborated in Section 2.1). Thus, economic growth may still be strongly 
explained by a typology of innovation which is beyond the domain of strictly defined Research & 
Development (OECD, Frascati Manual, 1963 and 2002).  
 
If we take, then, London, evidently an outlier, out of the group of UK regions, the correlation 
between GDP growth rate and the ratio between GDP and R&D becomes very high (+0,76) and 
sounds as a confirmation that the expectations of the endogenous growth theory hold rather well in 
the UK, with the exception of London: the more a region invests in R&D, the higher is its overall 
economic performance.  
 
As stated previously, however, this association cannot be considered a causal relationship: the 
correlation may even be simply a sign that richer regions  have more money to spend in R&D and 
therefore the relationship is not such that R&D is a cause of higher economic growth but rather that 
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the causality goes in the opposite direction, with faster increase of wealth explaining higher 
percentages of wealth spent in research (Perrin 2002). 
 
This picture tends to be almost reversed if, instead of looking to the percentage of GDP invested in 
R&D, we look to R&D growth rates and their correlation with economic growth. 
 
Graph 3.2 – Comparison between gerd and GDP growth rate UK regions (compounded growth rates 1996-2005) 
 
 
Once again, the differences are large: in the West Midlands and South East the nominal growth rates 
of expenditure on R&D has been around zero. In Wales and Scotland R&D spend has grown at 
annual rates higher than 5%. 
 
It is also interesting to note that regions with a higher propensity to invest in R&D have not increased 
their spending relative to GDP. The “laggards” are catching up (with the exception of West Midlands 
and London which, however, is, as we said before a rather peculiar case). The regions which have 
accelerated R&D investments, starting from low levels of R&D expenditures (Wales and Scotland) 
have failed to achieve superior patterns of economic growth.  
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The result of this analysis is the mirror image of the one observed previously: the correlation between 
growth rates of R&D and growth rates of GDP is negative (-0,57); whereas the one between the 
absolute level of R&D spending and GDP growth rates was highly positive (+0,76 if, as said, we 
remove London as an outlier). 
How can the apparent contradiction between the two results be explained? The finding that these 
numbers suggest is that R&D expenditure is, by and large, and with the exception of London, critical 
to achieving superior economic performance. However, a situation of disadvantage, in terms of lower 
growth associated with low investments in knowledge, cannot easily be overcome.  
 
One of the explanations for the relatively low response, in terms of economic growth, in UK regions 
to accelerating R&D expenditures is that investments in knowledge are effective only if they achieve 
a competitive advantage measured on a national, if not international, scale (Midelfart-Knarvik and 
Overman, 2002). Accordingly, we can assume that the relationship between the accumulation of 
R&D investments and economic growth is not linear, but exponential. The return of investments will 
be small, if not negative, at the beginning, and become gradually more positive as economies of scale 
and minimum critical mass are achieved by cumulatively investing for a long enough period of time 
(Krugman and Venables, 1995). This may well be the case in the UK, where the openness of the 
economy to global competition is particularly strong: nevertheless, this first hypothesis will need 
further confirmation within the field work conducted. 
 
This puzzle, however, is the evidence upon which the first half of the empirical research will be 
developed. We, in fact, selected two regions that – as for section 2.3 – that display opposite patterns 
in terms of R&D assets accumulation and productivity: the one – WW - that is growing the most – 
amongst UK regions - on the former indicator is, also, the slowest on the latter, and the other – SY – 
is doing the opposite. This contradiction makes the comparison a good case to test our hypotheses as 
attempt to explain drastically different levels of efficiency between R&D programs. 
 
As regards Spain, it must be said that, first of all, Spain has been one of the few country that 
increased the percentage of GDP spent on R&D as for the Lisbon strategy objectives (from 0,8 to 
1,4% between 2000 and 2008). The differences between regions in terms of the general picture 
certainly follow in line with a strong concentration of R&D expenditures: Serrano and Babrer (2004) 
remind us that more than half (55%) of R&D expenditure is concentrated in just two regions (Madrid 
and Catalonia) and the concentration  of firms’ expenditure on R&D is even higher.  
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Not less interesting is the study that has been conducted by Pilar Beneito (Beneito, 2002) with the 
support of a data set which was developed within a project (Encuesta sobre Estrategias 
Empresiarales , ESEE) conducted by the “Public Enterprise Foundation” on the relationship that 
firms have with research and innovation in different Spanish regions. 
  
However, the more recent years have witnessed a contradiction between a) growth rates of R&D 
which are higher in less developed regions and thus point to a “catching up” process and b) gaps in 
productivity and, more specifically, in TFP (total factor productivity) differentials that have, in fact, 
increased (as in Serrano again but also Cuadraro–Roura – 1999 – and De La Fuente – 2002). 
  
The following chart describes the situation as far as the comparison amongst regions. 
 
Graph 3.3 – GDP and R&D expenditures growth rates, 1995 – 2004, Percentages 
 
 
Source: Eurostat, INE; accessed May, 2008 
 
The propensity to invest in R&D is, however, below 1% of GDP in all Spanish Regions except 
Madrid, Pais Vasco and Cataluna.  
We will see later the above the average growth of Murcia (one of our two case) is wiped out once we 
discount it for the population growth and the below average growth of CYL (the other region we 
selected) corresponds, in fact, to an above average increase of productivity. 
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The correlation between propensity to invest in R&D and GDP growth rate is not significant, and the 
situation does not change when one considers the correlation between R&D and GDP growth rates in  
the following chart. 
 
 
Graph 3.4 – GDP and R&D expenditures growth rates, 1995 – 2005, Percentages 
 
Source: Eurostat, INE; accessed May, 2008 
 
It is also interesting to notice that, like in the UK, the regions that are growing the most, are the ones 
that have the lowest starting level of expenditures in R&D (with the exception of Navarra) and this 
partially contradicts the results of other research on the difficulty to change attitudes towards 
innovation in the less advanced regions in Spain (see, for instance, Coronado et al, 2008). 
 
The same trends are confirmed if we consider a larger measurement of expenditures in innovation56. 
The correlation of GDP growth rate to the level of innovation expenditure is moderately positive 
(0,13%), the one to the growth rates of this category of expenditures is moderately negative (-0,19%) 
and neither is statistically significant. 
                                                 
56 This is a different typology of investments that is calculated by the Spanish Institute for Statistics (INE) on the basis of 
questionnaires collected by firms. 
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However, the picture changes if we disaggregate the data for the eight Objective 1 regions57 as 
opposed to the seven regions that are considered developed58. 
 
 
Table 3.1 – Correlations between some main indicators of economic performance and research assets growth, 
percentages, 1995 - 2005 
 
  all regions only ob 1 only not ob 1 
average growth rates r&d 49,31% 55,55% 42,18% 
corr. gdp c.g.r. and r&d/ gdp 0,016 0,265 0,695 
corr. r&d c.g.r. and r&d initial level -0,309 -0,228 -0,118 
corr. innovation c.g.r. and innovation initial  level -0,602 -0,911 -0,299 
 
Source: Eurostat, INE; accessed October, 2009 
 
The picture that emerges from this table directs us to evidence that will be relevant for analysis of the 
selected cases. 
 
The growth rates of R&D are higher in less advanced regions than in more advanced regions; in fact, 
the correlation between initial level of expenditure on R&D and its growth rate are negative for Spain 
as a whole (-0,31) and this correlation becomes even greater (-0,6) if we consider the expenditure in 
innovation (as defined and measured by the Instituto National Estatistica – INE).  This process of 
catching up is, in fact, mostly driven by the very structural funds that are displaying a rather strong 
redistribution effect.  
 
However, the numbers become more interesting if we disaggregate the analysis by typology of 
regions: the tendency to increase faster R&D expenditures is confirmed even when we confront 
amongst them all structural funds aided Objective 1 regions, on one hand, and regions who were not. 
In other words it is plausible that even if we control for structural funds there is a tendency to close 
the gap amongst regions in terms of propensity to spend in research.  
Innovation strategies do, then, appear to be perceived as crucial to development, although the country 
also appears to acknowledge that a redistribution of researches may imply a cost – as recognized 
                                                 
57 In the 2000 – 2006 period, they were Galicia, Asturias, Castilla Y Leon, Castilla – La Mancha, Extremadura. Valencia, 
Andalucia, Murcia (not considering the islands).  
58 Aragaon, Cantabria, Pais Vasco, Navarra, La Rioja, Comunidad de Madrid, Cataluna: these were assigned the funds 
under Objective 3 for more developed regions. 
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during the meetings in Madrid59 - in the overall efficiency of the country’s R&D public investments 
(as per the argument of Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman, 2002 and Krugman and Venables, 1995, 
amongst others). 
 
The four regions that we are, more specifically, analyzing confirm, however, that they represent two 
polarized situations. First, in the UK, we will investigate the region that displays the slowest growth 
in R&D and the highest capability to converge, with one demonstrating the opposite characteristics. 
Thus, assuming that investments in research are still one of the best explanations (as per endogenous 
growth theory) of above-average economic growth, we will be comparing the most efficient  region 
with the least efficient. Second, in the Spanish case, we will contrast two regions which, against a 
similar injection of public investment in research show respectively the highest and lowest capability 
to multiply public expenditures by attracting additional private funds related to the policy. 
 
Accordingly, we should expect a comparison between a situation that ought to provide insights into 
differences in terms of institutional capabilities and another that ought to suggest how, more 
specifically, the administrations of less advanced regions attempt to overcome the problem of 
minimum scale that investments in research pose. 
 
 
3.4 THE PRE EXISTING CONDITIONS OF THE SELECTED 
REGIONS  
 
For each of the two countries, the main similarities and differences between the two regions will be 
described, in terms firstly, of institutional setting and organisation of the development and innovation 
policies before the start of the last programming period; and secondly, the main macroeconomic data, 
economic structure and research base before the programming period as well as demography and 
historical legacy. 
 
                                                 
59 Interiew with Jose Luis Kaiser Moreiras, Subdirector General de Programación Territorial y Evaluación de Programas 
Comunitarios, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid,  21st April 2008 
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3.4.1 South Yorkshire and West Wales: similar economic characteristics within 
diverging institutional  profiles 
 
In the UK the two selected regions were SY and WW. In this work we will also refer to the wider 
regions to which they belong: Yorkshire & Humber and Wales.   As it will be elaborated shortly, SY 
and WW do not fit into the common definition of regions: they are statistically recognized as such by 
EUROSTAT (in Eurostat terminology so called “Nuts 2”), however, they do not correspond to any 
administrative or policy unit. WW and SY were, at least partially, created with the specific purpose 
of making a sizeable allocation of structural funds possible and manageable.  
 
WW and SY correspond, thus, to the sum of a number (fifteen for WW and four for SY) of local 
communities (in SY they are called boroughs). WW accounts for 63% of Wales’ total population. 
However the area is mostly rural: Rhondda Cynon Taff (232,000 people) and Swansea (226,000) are 
the largest cities. SY, by contrast, has a smaller share (25%) of the total population of the Region to 
which it belongs, but it is formed by communities that tend to be larger than those of WW: Sheffield 
has 531,000 inhabitants and the other three (Doncaster, Bransley and Rotherham) host more than 
200,000 people amongst them. 
 
Regionalization and devolution 
 
The institutional setting is an important pre existing condition as regards the decision making 
processes that are applied to regional development policies.   The UK’s political and administrative 
framework incorporates two diverse models: England, which represents a large share of the UK (84% 
of total GDP and 80% of population), is internally centralized with a level of delegation significantly 
lower than in states of comparable size like Spain, Italy, Germany or France. On the contrary, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland demonstrate high levels of political autonomy which are even larger 
than those enjoyed by most autonomous regions in the above mentioned larger European Member 
States.  
 
The two cases under consideration are therefore different and yet, surprisingly, as we will see, they 
do not exhibit great differences in terms of degrees of autonomy in Research & Development and 
competitiveness related choices, although they do show different degrees of politicization of 
structural funds choices (as already hinted by Cooke and Clifton, 2005). 
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In order to understand the nature of the institutional framework affecting the two regions, we need 
briefly to consider the processes by which they were established.  Regional autonomy in the UK has 
been an important issue for some time, with strong cultural and political feelings surrounding the 
transfer of power from London to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland; on the other hand, regional 
devolution has not yet become a politically strong trend in England60.  As a result, with the exception 
of London, assemblies in England are not directly elected by the people, rather representatives to 
regional assemblies are nominated by the councils within each region. In addition, 30% of members 
represent regional stakeholders. The nine English regions have limited competences61 even if they are 
rather important in training activities related to and management of European Funds. Yorkshire & 
Humber is one of the nine English regions created within this framework. 
 
During 1997 and 1998, referenda were held in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland on how those 
countries and regions should be governed. In Wales the results fell far short of indicating a firm 
popular commitment towards autonomy: at the referendum held on 18 September 1997, 50.3 per cent 
voted in favour of a Welsh Assembly with a turnout of 50 per cent. As a result, elections for a new 
National Assembly for Wales were held on 6 May 1999 and devolved powers were formally 
transferred from the UK Government to the devolved administration on 1 July 1999. Low support for 
devolution and the under overwhelming turnout are important, however, in explaining some of the 
differences between outcomes of devolution in Wales and Scotland which, in turn, seem to have 
impacted on the effectiveness of the management of development policies in the two contexts. 
  
The Government of Wales Act provides that the National Assembly of Wales, located in Cardiff, 
assume almost all the power previously vested in the Secretary of State, including those relating to 
                                                 
60 The creation of the regional governments in England is due to the Major government that created ten Regional 
government offices in London, South East, South West, North East, North West, East Midlands, West Midlands, 
Yorkshire and the Humber, East, Merseyside. In 1998 Merseyside was merged with North West and since then the 
Regions and Regional Government Offices have been nine. 
In 1998, regional assemblies were created in each English region. The powers of the assemblies are essentially devolved 
to them from Government departments or have been taken over from pre-existing regional bodies, such as regional 
planning conferences and regional employers' organisations. Each region has, as mentioned before, a Government Office 
and each of them has got a Regional Development Agency. 
In fact referenda were planned to establish elected regional assemblies in some of the regions with the objective to 
legitimize further empowerment. The first referendum was held in London in 1998 and was successfully passed. The 
London Assembly and the Mayor of the Greater London Authority were created in 2000.  
However after that the referendum in North East England on 4 November 2004 was rejected, plans to hold further 
referendums were cancelled. 
 
61 Since 1999, the nine regions have also become England's European Parliament constituencies and statistical NUTS 
level 1 regions for the prupose of the Eurostat statistics. In addition Regions have, as this research has witnessed, the 
responsibility to manage European Union Structural Funds funded  programmes. 
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the Welsh language, water, arts and heritage, industry, education and training, economic 
development, social services, agriculture and fisheries, environment, housing, health, highways, local 
government, town and country planning, and tourism. The Assembly does not, however, have tax-
varying powers In addition, the UK Government retains responsibility for non-devolved areas of 
overall economic policy, such as defence and the armed forces, foreign policy (including EU 
matters), the justice system and police. Research is not explicitly mentioned and it is in fact not 
straightforward to understand whether it is or it is not devolved. What is certainly not devolved is 
funding and the decision making mechanism through which funds are allocated by the Research 
Councils62. However, the way Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland approach research and the 
drafting of their innovation strategies is such that it is considered de facto a policy where regional 
decisions matter because the impact on regions themselves can be decisive63.  
 
As we will see in greater detail, one paradoxical consequence of devolution in Wales has been the 
progressive de-legitimization of technocratic bodies such as the WDA, which was central in the 
regional development strategy until 1999. The parallel politicization of the implementation processes 
of the development strategies partially explains the suboptimal allocation of resources dedicated to 
innovation; this contention will also be developed further in this research. 
 
As mentioned previously, neither SY nor WW are politically-constituted Regions and both are 
products of the need to implement structural funds funded programmes. However, whereas SY is an 
administrative unit within a larger administrative body, WW is an administrative unit in a elected 
entity that is in principle more autonomous and important than a Region.  
 
This scenario has two main consequences. The first is that whereas SY OB 1 Programme Directorate 
was on an equal institutional footing with Yorkshire regional government (they were both technical, 
non-political bodies), the WW management of OB 1 programme was hierarchically subordinate to 
the Welsh Government Assembly. Moreover, this lower level of independence, institutionally, of 
WW OB 1 programme was symbolized and accentuated by the circumstance that whereas the SY OB 
                                                 
62 There are seven of these councils and they are specialized by academic domain. 
63 It is worthwhile to mention the First Minister and Minister of Science, Rhordi Morgan’s  forward to A Science Policy 
for Wales, 2006 “Our future lies in a knowledge economy, enriched by scientific, technological.. know how. Although 
science policy and funding is not devolved, a science policy tailored to Wales’ needs will help to accelerate the 
development.., education system, health service, environment, agriculture and evidence – based government in general.”  
 113
1 programme is managed in SY, and more precisely Sheffield, where the Programme Directorate has 
been based, in WW it was run in Cardiff, outside the beneficiary area64. 
The second effect is that, paradoxically, SY OB 1 programme decision makers appeared to be 
stronger vis a vis local communities than WW ones, because in the former case the decisions were 
made on a technical level by unelected administrators, whereas in the latter elected officials at 
regional level had to negotiate decisions with elected administrators with responsibilities local 
communities. Both of these factors appear to have contributed to the results described in Chapter 
Four. 
 
The economic structure and research expenditure similarities and differences in terms of 
university systems’ capabilities 
 
In terms of economic structure, the two regions appear similar. The table below considers the 
distribution of GDP by the EUROSTAT Nace definition of sectors.  
 
Graph 3.5 – Sector weight in terms of added value over GDP, 2000, % 
 
Source: Eurostat; accessed October, 2009 
                                                 
64 It must be said that more recently the operations of the WEFO have been moved to OB1 area. In fact WEFO for the 
2007 – 2013 period has been decentralized to four locations in the convergence region: Carmarthen, Colwyn Bay, 
Machynlleth and Merthyr Tydfil. The opposite has happened in Yorkshire: the “competitiveness” programme for 2007 – 
2013 will, as we will see shortly, be managed by Yorkshire Forward in Leeds, also because the interventions for South 
Yorkshire will be merged in the same programming document where there will be provisions for investments in the other 
parts of the Region. 
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The reconstruction of the most relevant deviations between the two sub-regions and the national 
average indicate that SY and WW share common traits that differentiate them from the rest of the 
country. In both sub-regions, the financial sector is much smaller than in the rest of the country. This 
is however accompanied by a more substantial public administration (being 10 percentage points 
larger than the national average in WW and five in SY), and a larger manufacturing sector. These 
differences increase if we consider the breakdown not of added value but of employment, with WW 
and SY having again a much stronger base in manufacturing by comparison with UK averages.   
However, two opposing trends have prevailed in recent decades. In the 1990s Wales found a way 
(that we will describe shortly) to leverage on its traditions and save its manufacturing base by adding 
value to it. The contrary took place in the last decade and, more specifically, in the programming 
period that we are observing (as described in Chapter Four), where Yorkshire managed to move its 
traditional industry base to a high level of innovation and competitiveness, whereas Wales has 
struggled to further improve its competitiveness. 
These trends are confirmed if we look at the evolution prevailing in the decade before the start of the 
last programming period. 
Table 3.2 – UK regions Manufacturing employment, yearly growth rates, percentage of total, 1991 – 1998 
Regions Change % 1991 – 98 Percentage of total 
employment in 
manufacturing 1998 
Average size of 
manufacturing firms 
(number of employees) 
East Midlands - 1,2% 21,5% 29,38 
Eastern - 2,6% 17,1% 23,30 
London  - 2,2% 7,8% 17,36 
North East - 0,5% 21,1% 41,51 
North West - 1,9% 20,2% 30,71 
South East - 1,6% 13,9% 23,13 
South West - 0,7% 13,9% 26,70 
West Midlands - 2,3% 25,7% 32,27 
Scotland - 2,2% 15,4% 34,16 
Yorkshire & Humber - 1,7% 21,3% 30,08 
South Yorkshire   32,11 
Wales + 0,1% 21,7% 38,21 
West Wales   42,49 
UK - 1,9% 17,4% 27,77 
Source: ONS; accessed October, 2009 
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As the table indicates, Wales was the only region where the number of people employed in 
manufacturing increased in the period before the start of the 2000 – 2006 expenditures cycle and 
the region with the second highest employment in manufacturing as a proportion of the total. Wales 
and  WW were also the areas in the UK where manufacturing firms tended to be largest. This legacy 
reflected the presence of large companies that could have been (as in SY and CYL) a lever for the 
regional development strategy and innovation plan. We will see, however, that the 2000 – 2006 
Welsh OB 1 programme seemed to deliberately distance itself from this possibility and immediately 
to focus on local SMEs. This was, at least, the opinion of most of our interviewees including 
Professor Dylan Jones65 who has been critical to most of the choices of the administration, but also in 
order to double check the plausibility of such assessment of some of the key people in the programme 
management of cohesion policies programmes like Victoria Chambers66 that we met in Cardiff. 
 
These features are a reflection of an historic pattern. Wales was one of the pioneers of the industrial 
revolution and hosted some of the champions of the steel and coal industry mainly located around the 
harbour of Cardiff. The entire system entered into decline after the first World War, this continuing 
also throughout the Second. In the post-war period, the UK government’s policy was to encourage 
engineering and manufacturing firms to relocate to the industrial belts that once thrived in South and 
North Wales. Companies like Ford and 3M became the flagships of massive American investments 
partially aided by the Marshall programme which had an important role in the reconstruction of the 
UK economy (Cooke, 1998). During this period (1945 – 1975) the strategy of foreign investment 
attraction was rather simple, with branches of US manufacturing multinationals recruiting semi- 
skilled workers in Wales and limited use of local suppliers. 
 
The establishment in 1976 of the WDA as one of the very first regional development agencies in 
Europe created a benchmark, and provided inspiration to those later founded elsewhere in the UK and 
in many other European regions. According to Professor Cooke67 (but see also Morgan, 1997) who 
was interviewed by us, the agency signalled a significant change as a body capable of expressing and 
implementing a regionally tailored strategy, for the first time.  
                                                 
65 Interview with Professor Dylan Jones – Evans, Deputy Director, Centre for Advanced Studies, Cardiff School of City 
and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, Cardiff 19th June 2008 
66 Interview with Virginia Chambers, Director Technology & Innovation, Welsh Assembly Government, Cardiff,  9th 
October 2009 
 
67 Professor Phil Cooke, Director, Centre for Advanced Studies, Cardiff School of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff 
University, Cardiff, 14th May 2008 
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It is worthwhile to notice that, notwithstanding the lack of a proper economic or corporate plan until 
the early 1990s, the results were impressive (by contrast with the useless proliferation of strategic 
documents seen in Wales in 2000 – 2006 and described in Chapter Four). As Cooke (1995) notices, 
from 1983 to 1993 Wales attracted a share of the total UK’ s inbound FDI between 15 and 20 per 
cent, while possessing just 5 per cent of the UK’s population. 
 
The table below shows Wales’ performance on FDI on the basis of two performance indicators: 
number of projects/ firms attracted and employment generated. 
 
Table 3.3 – Regional performance index of foreign investment 
 
Region Average 1982-92   Region Average 1982-92 
 Project index   New Jobs Index 
     
Wales 3,85  Wales 3,71
North 2,03  Scotland 2,68
Scotland 1,77  North 2,33
West Midlans 1,65  West Midlands 1,48
North West 1,10  North West 0,72
Yorks/Humber 0,71  East Midlands 0,69
East Midlands 0,65  South West 0,66
South West 0,42  Yorks/Humber 0,56
South East 0,41   South East 0,30
Source: Hill and Munday (1994)68 
 
On this basis it is clear that Wales used to represent a success story, and one that was largely linked 
to the WDA that accordingly became a benchmark for many European regions and states. 
 
Furthermore, FDI to Wales also used to be rather diversified.  After a first wave of FDI inflows, these 
investments came not only from the USA (Sharp, ITT and others were amongst the largest) but also 
from European countries (especially Germany, with Bosch being one of the most sizeable examples), 
and Japan (Sony). The South Korean LG was the last big deal (intended to deliver the greatest 
employment impact) that the WDA unsuccessfully attempted before being absorbed by the Welsh 
Assembly.   
                                                 
68 The performance index is calculated from Investment in Britain Bureau and is calculated as ratio between regional 
share of FDI/ new jobs on national totals and regional share of total UK employment 
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FDI attracted by the WDA were, mostly, so called “green field investments” with high impact on 
employment and high technology contents. Examples of this include the 200,000 engines produced 
per year for Toyota at the Bridgend factory and exported back to Japan, and the 325,000 engines 
produced for Jaguar at the same location. More broadly, the boom of the ICT industry, which more 
than doubled between 1980 and 1990, underlines the nature of this FDI-driven expansion phase of the 
Welsh economy.  The focus on innovation of FDI was also recognized by the EC, and the WDA was 
awarded the prestigious first European pilot Regional Technology Plan by DG Regio in 1994. 
 
Until 2000, thus, Wales was, in a sense, thus the forerunner of the regional industrial strategies in 
UK.  Immediately after 2000, whereas the WDA was absorbed by the administration, the RDA 
Yorkshire Forward was launched. Results since then have reversed, with Yorkshire improving its 
regional competitiveness and Wales witnessing deterioration. 
 
The evolution of the manufacturing base and FDI was, in fact, also mirrored by the change in R&D 
expenditures as shown in Graph 3.6. Both Yorkshire and Wales lag behind the UK by a little more 
than half (relative to GDP) of the national averages. However, the propensity of Wales to invest in 
innovation increased more than 40% in the four years preceding the start of the programming period 
observed. As a consequence, Wales appeared to overtake Yorkshire and to substantially reduce the 
distance from the UK average. In the meantime the propensity to invest in research decreased slightly 
both for the UK and Yorkshire. 
 
Graph 3.6 – R&D expenditures over GDP, Per cent 
 
Source: Eurostat; accessed October, 2009 
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Macro trends, as far as R&D, are, after all, very similar. Both regions were spending on R&D much 
less than the national average and spending a similar amount of money relative to the size of the 
economy. Another commonality is that in both the share of R&D expenditures coming from higher 
education institutions is much higher than the national averages (as for table 3.4). 
 
Table 3.4 – R&D expenditures and breakdown by sources, in  billion GBP and percentages, 1999 
 
 UK Yorkshire Wales 
Total R&D 
expenditures 
17.277 636 348 
% business  66,6 47,8 41,4 
% government 12,4 7,5 18,7 
% HEI 21,0 44,7 39,9 
 
Source: Office of National Statitsics; accessed October, 2009 
 
The overall result - multiplying the gap on total R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the 
one on the percentage of expenditures coming from the business - is, thus, that business in SY and 
WW spend roughly one third of what UK companies on average invest in research, notwithstanding 
the higher percentage of employment and added value of the two regions coming from the 
manufacturing sector (which is still supposed to invest more than other sectors in research).  
Moreover, in both regions higher education is much more important to the overall research base than 
in UK, making a consideration of the role that university are playing crucial for this thesis.  
 
If we, then now get a closer look to higher edication institutions, the quantitative evidence indicates 
that SY’s universities play a role within their wider region that is central, whereas in Wales the 
research base tends to be concentrated in the area that is not targeted by the OB 1 programme: thirty 
per cent of Yorkshire professors are in SY, which accounts for 25% of the population, whereas only 
46% of Welsh academics are in WW, with 63% of the Welsh population.  
 
WW’ universities in addition tend to dilute the research base amongst six different institutions which 
are not well connected in terms of transportation and of which a number seem to focus rather on 
agriculture and liberal arts than on technologies. SY universities are only two, they are both in the 
same city and one appears to be the best in the entire region. 
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Graph 3.7 compares the two areas’ most important universities. SY can more easily leverage on 
world class institutions which also appear to display a high concentration on research, to have a high 
international exposure and, at the same time, to be closely connected to the geographical area that is 
to be developed. This difference is a rather important because universities are, certainly, amongst the 
possible leaders that may take the lead of innovation strategy.  
 
 
Graph 3.7 – University Performances, Measured as percentage of  staff being rated 5 or 5* at the RAE (2001), 
percentage of students who are postgraduate (2006), percentage of students who are foreigners (2006) 
 
 
Source: RAE conducted by HEFCE, SFC. HEFCW and DEL, Higher Education Statistics Agency. 
 
The table is constructed by considering: the number of staff scoring the highest (5 or 5+) in the RAE, 
the share of students that are focusing on research (proxied by the number of postgraduates), and the 
percentage of students who are foreign (which is a signal of the international recognition of the 
university). SY performs consistently better on all indicators and especially on quality of staff. 
 
One of SY’s best assets appears to be the University of Sheffield, which can also leverage on 
tradition and on five Nobel prizes, coming from the departments - Medicine and Chemistry – where 
87 
18 19 
70 
21 
81 
25 
20 
18 
26 25 
28 
14 
18 
11 
16 
11 
18 
Cardiff Aberystwyth Swansea Leeds Sheffield Hallam Sheffield
staff quality PHD foreigners
East 
Wales
West
Wales
West
Wales
West 
Yorkshire
South
Yorkshire
South
Yorkshire
 120
the university concentrates much of its efforts. It is also to be noticed that Chemistry – as one of the 
leading departments of the school but also one of the best at international level – is linked to the 
industrial specialization of SY in metals. We will see later in Chapter Four that Sheffield University 
was not only the largest recipient of OB 1 funds meant to foster innovation but also one of the four 
leaders – through partnership with multinationals companies – of the innovation  strategy. 
 
Moreover, the University of Sheffield’s ratio between professors and students, a benchmark for the 
quality of teaching, is almost twice as high (3,8 professors for 100 students) as the UK percentage 
(1,9), whereas the corresponding numbers for the whole Yorkshire, Wales and WW are all below the 
national average. 
 
The only world class institution in Wales, Cardiff University, is outside the relevant area and this has 
created (as described in Chapter 4), a tension between the need to leverage on its skill base and the 
resistance of progam managers to involve institution outside the beneficiary area. In fact, Cardiff is 
also home to some of the most influential experts on regional development (Morgan, Cooke, Evans, 
Jones, Bristow, Healy). Yet, they all lamented, when interviewed during the field work for this study, 
that they have had very few interactions with relevant decision makers within the Welsh Assembly.  
 
The overall picture that emerges from the comparison is of two regions that had similar gaps in 
relation to the quantity of research investments at the beginning of the period. The remarkable 
difference is that whereas SY has an advantage in the quantity and quality of its university base, WW 
higher education institutions appear marginal in their region. This difference in credibility and 
potential leadership may anticipate – as we were reminded by Adrian Healy during the fieldwork69 - a 
problem for a public investment effort that is to be channelled mostly through universities.  
 
3.4.2 Castilla y Leon, Murcia and two different paths towards convergence  
 
Whereas the UK case allowed the comparison of two regions that diverged because of an institutional 
change that took place at the very beginning of the structural funds programming period that we are 
investigating, the two Spanish regions were characterized – during the same period - by the same 
level of autonomy towards central government.  
                                                 
69 Interview with Adrian Healy, Director ECOTEC Research and Consulting Ltd, 19th June 2008 
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The two cases we are going to study are CYL and Murcia. As mentioned in chapter two, they 
represent a rather polarized pair of regions because with similar, and low, R&D spend at the 
beginning of the programming period and similar composition of these investments between business 
and the public sector, they achieved in the period observed very different results in terms of 
mobilizing private investments around their publicly funded innovation strategy. This outcome is 
crucial because in both regions the research assets appear to display a significant problem of scale.  
 
These observations concerning the pre existing conditions, as in the UK cases, point to more 
similarities than differences in terms of development and R&D expenditure. However, two prior 
conditions appear to differ significantly. First, the absence of alternatives, as perceived by CYL 
programme managers and policy makers, to a path towards growth based on productivity gains and 
innovation, whereas the easier approach to economic growth through cheap labour was available to 
Murcia. Second, the presence in Castilla of research and business leaders that are used to competing 
at the international level, whereas both  academic and company structures appear to have a more 
local scope in Murcia. 
 
We will now observe the main demographic, geographic and economic characteristics that our two 
regions displayed at the beginning of the programming period, as well as the historic legacy that 
seems to be an important differentiator between the two regions that we are considering. We will also 
observe the propensity for investment in innovation that each region presented in 1999 and the 
quantity and quality of their research assets. The section is concluded by describing the main features 
of the OB1 programmes and of the innovation strategies. 
 
The advantage of having no alternative but to invest in  innovation 
 
At the beginning of the programming period 2000 – 2006 the two regions seemed to be coming 
closer as regards GDP per person.  Graph 38 notes that in the years before the last programming 
period, the growth of CYL had been smaller than of Murcia. In fact, as shown in the 1995 – 1999 
period, CYL was diverging, albeit slightly, from the EU average (from 61,6 to 60,8% of the EU 15 in 
terms of GDP per habitant), whereas Spain and Murcia were catching up. As a result the difference 
between CYL and Murcia was – at the beginning of the period that we will consider - relatively 
small: the GDP per inhabitant was 13,300 euro in CYL and 12,000 in Murcia.  
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Graph 3.8 – GDP per habitant, EU 15 = 100 
 
Source: Eurostat; accessed October, 2009 
 
The two regions were also very similar in terms of economic structure. The breakdown of the 
economy in terms of distribution of added value amongst different NACE (the statistical definition of 
sectors that the Eurostat employs) is such that the difference between the various sectors is never 
higher than two percentage points and, in any case, always very close to the national average (see 
annexes). The same applies to the distribution of employment and to other parameters like the density 
of firms (ratio between number and population). 
 
However, other important differences emerge in some of the basic features of geography and 
demography that, in turn, seemed to create a different degree of urgency on the plane of the economic 
policy and political priority.  CYL is the largest region in Spain (and the third largest in Europe), but 
also one of the least densely populated. Murcia is almost nine times smaller and has less than half of 
the population, and, as a consequence, four times more inhabitants per square kilometre (Eurostat). 
More interestingly, however, is the evolution of the size of the population and of its age structure as 
shown in Table 3.5.  
 
 
Table 3.5 – Main evolution in demographics, population, age brackets, Spanish regions, 1990 - 2007 
 
 Population 
% population between 20 
– 30 growth rates 
  1990 1999 2007 1990 1999 2007 
1999 – 
1990 
2007 
- 
2000
Galicia 2.744.800     2.689.042 2.723.915  14,5% 15,5% 14,2% -0,2% 0,2%
Principado de 
Asturias 1.101.087     1.067.081 1.058.059  14,6% 15,1% 13,4% -0,3%
-
0,1%
64,1
61,59
53,08
66,64
60,83
55,27
spain CYL murcia
1995 1999
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Cantabria  527.538        529.568  563.611  15,5% 15,9% 14,3% 0,0% 0,9%
Pais Vasco 2.114.894     2.069.723 2.124.235  16,7% 16,5% 13,1% -0,2% 0,4%
Comunidad Foral de 
Navarra 519.106        542.559  596.236  16,1% 16,3% 13,5% 0,5% 1,2%
La Rioja 262.941        265.274  306.254  15,2% 15,4% 14,3% 0,1% 1,9%
Aragón 1.192.383     1.195.496  1.275.904 15,0% 15,1% 13,4% 0,0% 0,9%
Comunidad de Madrid 4.931.541     5.128.470  6.052.583 16,7% 17,6% 14,9% 0,4% 2,2%
Castilla y León 2.561.818     2.475.112  2.486.166 15,7% 14,8% 13,4% -0,4% 0,1%
Castilla-la Mancha 1.659.033     1.719.480  1.929.947 16,1% 15,1% 14,5% 0,4% 1,6%
Extremadura 1.066.274     1.058.687  1.074.419 16,5% 15,1% 14,3% -0,1% 0,2%
Cataluña 6.054.382     6.182.921  7.085.308 15,7% 16,6% 14,3% 0,2% 1,9%
Comunidad 
Valenciana 3.839.122     3.966.639  4.759.263 16,1% 16,5% 15,1% 0,4% 2,5%
Illes Balears  705.700        798.961  1.014.405 15,9% 17,0% 15,0% 1,4% 3,0%
Andalucia  6.896.678     7.202.974  7.917.397 17,1% 17,1% 15,7% 0,5% 1,3%
Región de Murcia  1.038.380     1.132.821  1.370.802 16,9% 17,8% 16,2% 1,0% 2,6%
Canarias (ES)  1.487.057     1.643.006  1.997.010 18,5% 18,4% 15,6% 1,1% 2,5%
Spain 38.826.297   39.802.827 44.474.631 16,2% 16,5% 14,7% 0,3% 1,5%
Source: Eurostat; accessed October, 2009 
 
Murcia, in fact, displayed the strongest population growth in the nine years that preceded the start of 
the last programming period70. On the contrary, CYL was the region with the fastest shrinking 
population. The growth of Murcia is explained by the high inflow of immigrants arriving mostly from 
North Africa. CYL seems to be rather insulated from such migration patterns. 
 
The differences in the regions are also large in terms of demographic age structure. The people of 
Murcia were – in 1999 - the youngest in Spain. This phenomenon was also attributed to immigration, 
and to the fact that immigrants tend to be young relative to the regional averages. CYL’s population 
was, instead, the oldest and continues to age.   This difference is rather relevant to our research: 
Murcia can afford to increase its GDP, thanks to population growth and to the lever of cheaper labour 
force to be engaged in sectors like housing and tourism. CYL has few alternatives to improving 
productivity through innovation and focused investments in R&D. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70 If one excludes the islands of Canarias that cannot be considered as homogeneous as the continental regions 
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The difference in terms of leadership potential 
 
For both our selected regions, to achieve growth through innovation must have appeared – at the 
beginning of the 2000 – 2006 period - to present difficulties typical for less developed regions.  As 
far as R&D expenditures are concerned, the evolution of the two regions appeared almost identical in 
the period immediately before the last programming period. In both regions expenditure on R&D was 
0,47% of GDP in 1995 and became 0,62 in 1999 before the start of the OB 1 Programmes. Both were 
also accelerating, in the relevant period, the investments in innovation at a higher rate than for both 
Spain overall and the OB 1 Regions as a group. In both regions, in addition, the percentage of R&D 
investment coming from business was lower than the national average and very similar (42% for 
CYL and 43% for Murcia).  
 
Moreover, if we consider the question of generating, attracting and retaining the segment of the 
workforce with most potential (young with highest education achievements), geography seemed to 
pose a problem for both regions – a factor lamented by some of the university professors interviewed 
during this research in CYL and by the head of the Seneca Foundation in Murcia (Chapter Five). The 
“brain drain” was perceived in both places as a very significant competitive disadvantage (but cf. 
Skeldon, 1997 and 2008, on how the disadvantage has been transformed into an opportunity in some 
instances). Both regions are too close to the capital city to prevent the most talented individuals from 
going there in search for jobs, and too far away to have their firms and organisations benefit from any 
spillover from innovation that the capital is capable of generating. And, in addition, both regions 
seem to suffer from the agglomeration effects that the new economic geography theory forecasts 
without benefiting from the benefits that at a later stage should lead to a new equilibrium between 
centre and periphery (see Krugman and Venables, 1995, as in Chapter 1).  
 
Differences, however, existed between the two: in CYL, but not in Murcia, there were actors with 
enough international exposure and credibility potentially to express leadership within novel 
innovation strategies. CYL hosts the Spanish production sites of large automotive multinationals like 
Renault, Nissan, Iveco, Michelin, of local automotive suppliers (Antolin)  but also some large home 
groups within the agro food industry (Ebro, Lenche). The largest Murcian firm, Reguladora de 
Compras del Mediterraneo, which is a distributor of pharmaceutical products, would, instead, rank 
only ninth in CYL classification  (Centro Regional de Estadistica de Murcia, 2008 and CYL 
Economica, 2008).  
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The total turnover of the top fifteen firms is equivalent to 38% of the regional GDP in Murcia as 
opposed to 85% in CYL. Moreover, Graph 3.9 shows that the large companies in CYL appear to be 
more concentrated, with automakers in Castilla comprising more than two thirds of the total. The 
most important industry in Murcia, Agro food, by contrast represents less than half.  
 
Graph 3.9 – Distribution of turnover of largest fifteen firms by industry, %, 2006 
 
 
Source: Axesor, Castilla Y Leon Economica 
 
It is thus clear that – as we were confirmed by Carmen Rebollo, head of the CYL’s regional 
development agency71 - large companies play a more important role in CYL and that they appear to 
be more concentrated in a certain sector. However, important differences also emerge when one 
considers the history, which brings us to the question of the research assets of the two regions. CYL 
has been at the heart of Spanish history72, whereas Murcia has played a peripheral role.  
 
CYL is, in fact, the only region in Europe that hosts two of its ten oldest universities: Salamanca, 
founded in 1218, and Valladolid, founded in 1241. The situation is different in Murcia: its largest 
                                                 
71 Interview with Carmen Verdejo Rebollo, Jefe del Departamento de Innovación, ADE Inversiones y Servicios (Agencia 
de Inversiones y Servicios de Castilla y León), Valladolid, 22th April 2009 
 
72 It is the union of the kingdom of Castilla and of Leon with the Tratado de las tercerias in 1230  that is seen by 
historians as the real beginning of the history of Spain as one of the first Nation States of Europe. It is in Leon that in 
1188 the first parliament (les cortes) was established with representatives of the people to join the nobles and the clergy 
into decision making. It was also Valladolid which was named  the capital of the largest kingdom of Europe until the 
early seventeenth century. Other cities – Avila, Burgos, Salamanca, Segovia, Palencia – have also witnessed some of the 
most important moments of the history of Spain and in a sense Castilla Y Leon, even more than Madrid or Toledo, is at 
the heart of the history of the country. 
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University was founded in 1912 and the other two less than ten years ago.  This difference of 
tradition – together with the different weight of large companies within similar regional economic 
structures -  implies a potential differences in terms of the two regions producing and sustaining the 
leaderships that, as we will see, is important to success of innovation strategies as both the 
independent evaluator of Murcia73 and of CYL74 confirmed during the interviews. 
However the above does not, as we anticipated previously, also entails a difference in size between 
the two university systems.  
Table 3.6 – Weight on total for spain of CYL and Murcia universities, Percentage, 2000  
 
  Population professors 1 students 
CYL 6,22% 6,90% 6,57%
Murcia 2,85% 2,92% 2,53%
 
1 Here by professors we adopt the definition of the “investigadores” that  are the most senior figures in the university 
system in Spain: according to the terminology of the Ministry of Education their number is the sum of Catedraticos de 
Universidad, Titulares de Universidad and the Catedraticos de Escuela Universitarias,. The number of teaching staff is 
higher because the above categories do not include the Titulares de Escuela Universitarias, the Asociados and staff with 
Temporary contracts (visiting, ect..) 
Source: INE 
If we compare the number of students and academic staff with the population, as per Table 3.6, CYL 
and Murcia appear to host a number of professors and students per capita which is similar. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
An analysis of different levels of efficiency of different programmes using public investments in 
R&D as a tool for regional development, finds in the UK  and in Spain two of the most interesting 
national contexts.  
 
This is for different reasons: both countries appear to be relatively late comers to the club of countries 
that share enthusiasm for investing in R&D, and both of them seem to have recently discovered that 
innovation can be lever for convergence: as a consequence both contries have in recent years 
                                                 
73 Interview with Aurelio Jiménez Romero, Independent Evaluator Murcia OB 1 Programme 2000 – 2006 , Business 
Development Director, Red2Red Consultores S.L., Madrid 14th April 2008 
74 Interview with Olga Ogando Canabal, Evaluator of CYL 2000 – 2006 OB 1 programme, Departamento de Economía 
Aplicada, acultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Valladolid, Valladolid, 3rd May 2007 
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accelerated the accumulation of R&D assets more than other European countries. Moreover, both UK 
and Spain tell about an evolution of the relationship between the centre and the periphery that has 
been far by linear with a constant tension between further devolutions and temptations of 
recentralization. 
 
Also in UK and Spanish regions the statistical association between investments in R&D and 
economic growth is not straightforward and this rises the importance to understand which are the 
success factors.   
  
In this chapter we described significant similarities between the UK and Spain and between the two 
pairs of regions – SY and WW, CYL and Murcia – that will be our case studies: in terms of pre 
existing conditions – level of income per habitant, propensity to spend in R&D, human capital – they 
appear remarkably similar. 
 
The analysis also highlighted, however, some differences that are less about the macro picture of 
economic and social data and more about the micro features of the reputation of the universities 
hosted in the beneficiary regions and the size and involvement of the hosted firms in the regional 
environment. We will see in the next chapter that these difference may be associated to the 
emergence of leaderships that may explain the differences in results with regard to efficiency of 
public investment in research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT 
AGENCIES AND OF PARTNERSHIP BASED 
ORGANISATIONS IN THE UK  
 
 
The UK case provides an interesting test for the validity of our theory. We will, in fact, confront two 
regions that were similarly endowed at the beginning of the period and that yet displayed very 
different results at the end of it.  
As per the thesis that we want to prove the differences appear to be explained by two main factors: on 
one hand the development of effective regional innovation strategies appear to be associated to 
decision making processes that are independent enough from political pressures and, yet, are 
evaluated on outcomes being produced; on the other it looks vital the existence and even the 
strengthening of partnerships amongst firms, universities, governments and public opinions that 
allow to gather the information that the drafting of regional strategies require and that make easier to 
implement those strategies. 
 
In fact, if Wales was one of the benchmark in terms of productivity growth and Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) attraction and Yorkshire appeared to lag behind before 2000, the opposite 
happened in the first part of the current decade (as elaborated by Armstrong et al, 2001). The turning 
point took place in 2000 – at the beginning of the period that we are investigating - when a regional 
development agency (RDA) was created in Yorkshire, at the same time that in Wales the newly born 
regional government abolished the RDA that had led the development strategies in the nineties (as in 
Morgan, 1997a).  
More specifically, the two Objective 1 portions – West Wales (WW) and South Yorkshire (SY) - of 
the two regions drafted and implemented very different innovation strategies that seem to explain part 
of the difference in terms of economic performance: starting from the wording of the programming 
documents up to the specific choices in terms of resources allocation, the SY’s strategy is more 
focused on specific areas and industries, whereas WW’s one is characterized by a more even 
distribution of available resources amongst economic actors and local communities. 
The field work revealed that these differences appear to be largely due to a different degree of 
indepence of the programme manager to resist the pressure from local lobbies and to its capability to 
incorporate outside expert knowledge into the strategy (Cooke et al, 2003 and 2005). 
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The case gives also the opportunity to explore what may appear to be a paradox. The worse 
performace coincides with the devolution that happened in Wales and not in Yorkshire at the 
beginning of the period we are observing. 
This looks contrary to common wisdom because devolution just like decentralization, federalism and 
similar trends, is normally expected to be associated to better performances due to higher 
accountability of the policy makers (as, for instance, in Oates, 1972). Welsh policy makers adopted a 
rather risk adverse approach to regional development by dismantling the development agency – at the 
time that Yorkshire and other regions decided to delegate to such institutions the implementation of 
development programmes – and redistributing funds amongs local communities and small firms 
when it came to decide where to allocate the available funds. The opposite happened in Yorkshire 
where development strategies were governed by technical bodies that were only accountable on 
results.  
Stronger decision maker also appear to be associated in Yorkshire to stronger partnerships amongst 
business, universities, associations and government (Armstrong et al, 2001). In Wales the just born 
national government appears to be simply not ready to get engaged in promoting relationships with 
firms or universities (Jones – Evans, 2002). 
The final result is, then, that the Yorkshire’s regional innovation strategy is both more focused and 
more effectively delivered than the one in Wales. The explanation of the paradox lies, in fact, not in a 
negative effect that devolution in se may have on regions, but in the typology of devolution that took 
place in Wales (unlike the one that happened, for instance, in Scotland) and the rather thin level of 
public support that the creation of the new state managed to win (Cooke and Clifton, 2005). 
 
The chapter is structured, for the phases of the innovation value chain that we presented in section 2.1 
and that are reflected in the articulation of the analysis we conducted,  into the five following 
sections.  
In the first, we will present the main features of the Objective 1 programmes and more specifically 
the measures designed for increasing the research and innovation capabilities of the Region. In the 
second, we will show the results of our two cases in terms of capability of the regions to use public 
money to increase the propensity of private firms to also invest in R&D, productivity growth and 
impact on employment,  In the third, we will verify how these differences in performance are 
associated to more or less concentrated choices as far as resource allocation. In the fourth part we 
will, then, investigate the processes by which programmes are drafted and realized and how the 
institutional context impacts performance. In the fifth we will describe the mechanisms by which 
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partnerships amongst different actors that are relevant to innovation, are constructed and leveraged 
upon in the two regions. The chapter is concluded by summing up its main findings. 
 
4.1 THE DIFFERENCES IN THE LAY OUT OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES 
 
The structural funds awarded to WW and SY in 2000, represented roughly half of the structural funds 
allocated to Objective 1 Regions in the UK, and the two regions benefit respectively from the largest 
and the third largest allocations amongst the six objective 1 UK regions. 
Structural funds represent, as mentioned in chapter two when we reasoned about explanations of 
differences in economic performances other than the one that we are investigating, a big portion of 
development policies in regions like South Yorkshire or West Wales and they be big enough if 
compared with the economies’ size to be able to account for a large part of the results in terms of 
economic growth.  
The following chart calculates the weight of the Objective 1 programme and of the measures 
dedicated to R&D respectively on the two region’s GDP and R&D expenditures. 
Table 4.1 – Comparison between Objective 1 and main economic data of beneficiary areas, 2000 – 2006, (in mil euro and 
percent) 
 
 (1) 
Objective 
1 funds 
(total) (7 
years) 
(2)  
GDP 
(2001 
figure) 
(3)  
% (1) / 
(2) 1 
(4)  
OB 1 
measures 
on R&D 
(5) R&D 
expenditures 
region 
(2000) 2 
(6)  
% (4) / 
(5) 2 
(7) R&D 
public 
expenditures 
(2000)  2 
(8) 
% (4)/ 
(7)2 
South 
Yorkshire 
3,089 22,732 13,6% 100 108 92,3% 52 194% 
West 
Wales 
4,040 28,637 14,1% 234 224 104,6% 104 225% 
Source: Programming documents 
1 The percentage are of the seven years programme on the yearly figure of GDP and R&D. This gives the maximum 
potential impact given that the expenditures do not have to be uniformly distributed in time.  
2 The data at NUTS 2 level (South Yorkshire and West Wales) are not collected systematically at national level where the 
larger definition of regional government office (and thus Wales within which we have West Wales and Yorkshire & 
Humber within which you have South Yorkshire) is used. In order to estimate the West Wales and South Yorkshire R&D 
expenditures, we have assumed that the percentage of regional R&D spent at sub regional level can be proxied by  
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a) the weight of R&D expenses of the four districts of SY as opposed to the Y&H figure (provided by South 
Yorkshire Economic Assessment) and by b) the weight of West Wales employment in high technology sectors on the 
Wales employment in those sectors (as for the consultation on convergence programmes). The split between the public 
versus private funds have been assumed to be equal to the one that is given for the larger regions. 
 
 
As said EU funds amount to almost 2% of the GDP per year. Moreover, the amount that OB1 can 
spend in R&D is almost equal to the entire  regional R&D expenditure in one year and twice as much 
as the state and the universities spend in a year beyond what is spent via structural funds 
programmes.  
As Nigel Graddon, Technology and Innovation branch of  the Welsh European Funds Office 
(WEFO)75 acknowledged structural funds were seen as almost the only lever to give substance to the 
priority that the newly elected government in Cardiff gave to research and innovation. Similar 
considerations were true for SY.  
 
It is, therefore, likely that the way structural funds programmes are drafted and concretely 
implemented does have a significant impact not only on the indicators of knowledge society but also, 
although more loosely, on the overall economic performance. 
The comparison between the two regions also say that the weight of the programme is similar both 
when it is confronted with the economy size and the expenditures in R&D. It is, however, remarkable 
that at the beginning of the programme, as we mentioned in chapter three, Wales had surpassed 
Yorkshire as far as percentage of GDP spent on R&D, although as we will see this will not translate 
itself into a superior economic performance. 
Notwithstanding the similarities in terms of funds available to development policies and innoovation 
strategies, the difference between the two programmes start from the wording that they use and the 
objectives that they identify or, more precisely, the clarity with which they declare their choices and 
targets. 
 
The overall difference between the two programmes 
 
The SY Objective 1 Programme is constructed with an approach that is rather clear from the outset: 
as in the words of the programme that were confirmed to us by the Director of the Objective 1 
                                                 
75 Interview with Nigel Graddon, Technology and Innovation branch, Cardiff, 6th September 2006 
 
 132
Directorate Kevin Bennett at the beginning of the field work76, “the money is seen as an investment 
which buys impacts”; to achieve them, “the money is concentrated by geography and sector” and “the 
management of the money and its allocation will use” criteria that include “incentives and sanctions”. 
Generally speaking, however, the programme seems to establish, since its inception, some evidence 
based clear choices and guidelines. We will shortly see that this focalization of the strategy is 
maintained in the description of the innovation related measures. 
 
As far as West Wales, Paul Casey, Head of Research at the Managing Authority of the Programme 
clarifies77 since the start that “the structural funds were seen central to the regional development 
strategy of Wales and West Wales”. This centrality was even “more true when it comes to R&D78” – 
as Sue Price - who more specifically follows the innovation strategy - said to us (we will, in fact, see 
in Spain that failure can be due to not enough priority given to innovation whereas this was not 
apparently the case as far as West Wales).  
The objectives of the 2000 – 2006 Welsh Objective 1 Programme were, in fact, rather ambitious. 
According to the programme’s evaluators (Bristow and Blewitt, 2001) the targets were: a) to raise per 
capita GDP in the region from 73 per cent to 78 per cent of the UK average; and, therefore, to 
abandon the status of less developed region by the end of the programming period, and b) to have a 
significant impact on employment with a reduction of the number of those who are economically 
inactive by 35,000 and the creation of 43,500 net additional jobs79 which is not a trivial objective for 
a region with a stock of unemployment which has been around 60,000 people throughout the last 
decade.  
 
The programmes themselves are then articulated in a way which is broadly the same80 in our two 
cases. The regulations of the EC have, in fact, imposed in both regions six priorities (plus the so 
called technical assistance that is for buying services supporting the implementation of the projects) 
                                                 
76  Interview with Kevin Bennett, Director, Objective 1 Programme Directorate, London, 7th September 2006 
 
77  Interview with Paul Casey, Head of research, Managing Authority, West Wales, Objective 1 Programme Directorate, 
Cardiff, 6th September 2006 
 
78 Interview with Sue Price, Head for Programme Management Division, WEFO, Merthyr Tydfil, 16th April 2007 
79  Net jobs are the jobs that have been created once we subtract the ones that would have been created anyway (the so 
called “deadweight” effect) and the ones that will be eliminated at firms that have not enjoyed the support (the so called 
“displacement”).  
80 There are, in fact, some editorial differences: the innovation priority is the first in the financial table of the South 
Yorkshire’s OPs and in the second of the West Wales’s ones; the funds to SMEs are in the second in the former and the 
first in the latter; the community support is the third in WW and the fourth in SY; and conversely the training is the fourth 
in WW and the third in SY. 
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and in both regions the investments portfolio is structured so that funds do belong to six broad 
objectives81: 
1. strengthen companies (in most cases SMEs); 
2. foster innovation (including R&D and the investments that we associated in this thesis to the 
rather broad concept of knowledge based economy);  
3. promote economic and urban regeneration of weak local communities which is focused on 
some small neighbourhoods in SY, whereas it is spread on the entire territory in WW;  
4. improve employability through professional training; 
5. improve quality of life in rural areas in WW, whereas this priority is replaced by a priority on 
strengthening clusters in SY; 
6. generate economic growth by developing “infrastructure” which includes transportation – 
roads, airports, railways, but also energy and environment. 
The comparison of the two programmes is summarized by the graph below which shows the 
distribution of the funds.  
 
Graph 4.1 – Distribution of funds amongst priorities, Percent, 2000 – 2006 Objective 1, South Yorkshire left and West 
Wales right; 100% = 3.089 Mil Euro SY; 4.040 Mil Euro WW 
 
Source: Programming documents 
 
1  The support to SME is in South Yorkshire under Priority 2 
2 The funds for innovation (including R&D and ICT) are in South Yorkshire under Priority 1 
 3 The Communities support is in South Yorkshire under priority 4 
4 The training is in South Yorkshire under priority 3 
                                                 
81 The priorities are all mostly financed by the ERDF, except for  the fourth which is financed through the European 
Social Fund (ESF) and the fifth which gets funds through the EGGF. 
TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE 1%
SME  11%
INNOVATION  19%
COMMUNITIES 
SUPPORT  9%
TRAINING 31%
CLUSTERS 22%
INFRASTRUCTURE 
7%
TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE 1%
SME  26%
INNOVATION  16%
COMMUNITIES 
SUPPORT  6%
TRAINING 23%
RURAL AREAS 15%
INFRASTRUCTURE 
13%
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Notwithstanding similarities in the programmes’ structure, there are still four main differences, as far 
as funds allocation: 
1. whereas WW is supporting the regeneration of a number of communities (with priority 3) and 
systematically all rural areas (with priority 5), SY is targeting few areas that are – regardless 
if they are rural or urban – particularly deprived on one hand (priority 4), and on the other 
hand, has a measure that specifically tries to concentrate resources in areas with high potential 
(priority 5); 
2. if we sum up the priorities that are most closely associated to “competitiveness” (the first 
two), we discover that WW spent a significant amount on them, almost half of its resources  
(42%), and significantly more than SY (30%); the effort for SMEs seems much larger in WW: 
the first priority is the one with the highest budget (26% of the total) in WW, whereas it is 
only the fourth (with 11%) in SY. This becomes more evident, if we more specifically, 
observe the priority meant to finance innovation 
3. WW also spent more in the measure which is technically dedicated to R&D: 234 million euro, 
which is 5.8% of the total programme, against 100 million euro in SY which is 3.2% of the 
total;  
4. however, SY seems to prefer to invest more into “innovation” that is not R&D (473 million 
euro which is 15% of the total versus 401 which is 10% of the total). 
 
In other words, West Wales seems more keen to distribute evenly funds amongst different geographic 
areas (with funds like the one in priority 3 and 5) and more on SMEs and strictly defined R&D. SY is 
more keen on innovation, whereas this will have to be meant as commercially exploitable research. 
This difference in approach to the design of programmes was confrmed during the field work by Sue 
Price82; Head of Programme Management, in Wales that confirmed that the Welsh OB programme 
managers need to consider the wishes of local communities when it comes to distribute funds. On the 
other hand, Costas Georgiu83, Research and evaluation manager at the SY’s OB 1 programme 
directorate, recognized that SY’S decision was from the start to concentrate R&D assets in the same 
location. 
 
                                                 
82 Interview with Sue Price, Head for Programme Management Division, WEFO, Merthyr Tydfil, 16th April 2007 
 
83 Interview with Costas Georgiu, Research and Evaluation Manader, SY Objectibe 1 Directorate, Sheffield, 10th 
November 2006 
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An other difference that the numbers and even more the wording of the programming documents 
appear to indicate is that unlike SY’s one, WW programme is skewed towards small and medium 
companies. In 2000 this preference for SMEs as opposed to large companies represented a radical 
shift - as Virginia Chambers, Director Technology & Innovation of the Welsh Assembly Government 
recognized84 - from the strategy pursued in West Wales until the end of nineties. Although, as Dr. 
Chamber explained, “this change is at least partly due to the awareness that an FDI driven regional 
development was not possible any longer and that a new balance had to be found between having 
innovative local smaller firms and leveraging on multinationals”. 
SY’s programme managers, on the contrary, show a higher propensity to concentrate funds in areas 
with a higher potential (priority 5) or, on the contrary, with specific problems (priority 4); it spends 
more on measures that are about generating business related innovation and that provide support to 
SMEs not under the form of financial aid. 
Such differences in the overall approach to programming strategies are reflected into the approach to 
the drafting of the programmes’ measures dedicated to R&D and innovation85.  
 
The differences in research related programmes’ measures 
 
Both in the case of SY and WW we are considering interventions whose impact – in the short and 
even more in the long term – is expected to be higher than the one associated to the other policy 
fields in the OB1 programmes.  
In SY one euro of investment in innovation is forecasted to have a return ranging between 4 and 7 
euro of additional sales, whereas such forecast is around 2 euro for the entire OB1 programme. In 
WW against the above mentioned creation of 43,500 net jobs for the programme as a whole, the 
policy field dealing with innovation is expected to produce 14,000 new jobs and to safeguard another 
10,400 positions. Moreover, WW also promises to concentrate this impact in high added value areas 
and, thus, half of the identified additional jobs are supposed to be in high tech industry where 2,000 
additional firms are envisaged to be created.  
 
                                                 
84  Interview with Virginia Chambers, director Technology & Innovation, Welsh Assembly Government, Cardiff, 9th 
October 2008 
 
85 We will refer mostly to measure 1.1 in SY and 2.3 in WW that are related to R&D projects and infrastructures in a way 
that is closer to R&D definitions. We will also occasionally refer to the measures 1.4  in SY and 2.4 in WW that are more 
about enhancing high level human capital. 
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Differences, however, emerge if we compare the narrative and the wording that the two programming 
documents use. SY appears to be more pragmatic and clear in terms of decisions amongst different 
possible strategic choices. This is, in fact, true to start with the  
diagnosis of the gap in innovation versus more advanced regions, which is conducted differently in 
the two regions. 
In WW, the strategy start from a generic acknowledgment of the “low level of investment in research 
and innovation” as one “the region’s main weakness”.  
In SY, the starting point is “the structural evidence of under-representation in new and growth sectors 
and under investment in business R&D with consequent low levels of business product and process 
innovation”. Therefore, the gap is more clearly identified not in a generic low percentage of GDP 
spent in R&D (such a way to measure the innovativeness of a region may be the consequence, as we 
mentioned in section 2, of the rather generic metrics that the European Commission documents on the 
“Lisbon strategy” propose) but in the low number of firms which are present in new and growth 
sectors in the region and in the low propensity of private investors to spend in R&D. Within such an 
approach, public investments become a lever to increase both the number of innovative firms and the 
commitments of all firms to invest in innovation. 
 
This difference is consistent with the reading of the innovation strategies overall objectives. Whereas 
in WW the aim is to generically create an environment which supports innovation, R&D, and 
improve Wales’ competitiveness in a global market place”, SY wants “to achieve a substantial 
increase in business investment in R&D and in new technologies”. Thus, in SY’s case, there is a clear 
mention of having business (private) investments in R&D and not just total amount of expenditures 
on research as targets.  
Finally, whereas WW’s strategy proposes a rather broad target to “develop the long term R&D 
capacity in the region”, SY’s strategy is meant to “build and commercially exploit the research and 
technological development and innovation capacity of SY”. 
 
The measure dedicated to R&D is, then, named “exploiting a business centred research capacity” in 
SY, whereas it is more generically about “supporting for the development of innovation and R&D” in 
WW.  Once again, the former seems to be more clearly dedicated to the start of the development of 
the technology park that, as we will see, is one of the likely cause of the differences in performance. 
 
It also has to be said that in SY the measure mentions that – even if the priority will go to local 
universities and innovation centres – “in certain circumstances businesses may need to tap into 
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expertise only available on an international basis” and that “support will be given to establish a 
limited number of high profile, world class centres of technological excellence which would draw on 
and link up with the major centres in other parts of the world”. 
 
IN SY strategy there is then an explicit  opening to international actors that may include firms or 
universities: not only they are mentioned as possible recipient of the funds, they are also encouraged 
to provide strategic advice. This is – according to our methodological hypothesis, a rather important 
recognition.  
It must also be said that these choices of concentrating on internationally recognized and connected 
excellence represents a departure from the ortodoxy that the European Commission promotes of 
regional innovation strategies as a connector of localactors. This circumstance underlines that SY’s 
programme does represent a programming exercise originally conceived and tailored to the region’s 
needs, whereas this does not happen in WW where most of the programme echoes European 
Commission’s jargon and guidelines. 
 
More broadly, there are also differences between SY and WW as far as other families of 
interventions which are meant to more directly boost competitiveness of firms.  
In WW the measures of “financial support for SMEs” aim to “increase the birth rate of SME”, 
“develop competitive SMEs”, and “develop sites and premises”. No mention can be found of any 
follow up of leveraging on the FDI (foreign direct investments) strategy that was so distinctive of 
Wales in the period before the one we are investigating. 
In SY, instead, the goals are slightly but significantly different and thus the programme managers 
seem to be willing to “invest in targeted SMEs, develop growth sector start ups, attract growth sector 
firms” and “exploit new market opportunities”. Once again, there is an explicit choice of attracting 
firms from outside the regions that is different from the priorities that the OB1 programmes seem to 
normally display.  
 
Lastly,  as far as the measures meant to foster ICT: WW uses 65 mil euro for ICT infrastructure and 
166 mil euros for developing innovation and the knowledge-based economy”, whereas SY is once 
again more focused and more clearly “maximizing the potential presented by e-business”. The first 
choice is mostly about enhancing public administration, the second hints to the promotion of the 
channels that may improve WW firms’ sales. 
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The wording of the SY’s programming strategy seems, therefore, to imply an  approach which is 
rather focussed on and engaged with innovations closer to the end part of the value chain. WW., on 
the other hand, does not commit itself to any specific choices. This  results in a number of 
consequences that we will shortly discuss.  
 
 
4.2 THE DIVERSITY IN RESULTS 
 
“Unless somebody wants to deny the reality of the numbers, the 2000 – 2006 objective 1 programme 
did simply fail to achieve the objectives that the very Welsh Assmbly Government established for it 
at the beginning of the period”: the overall assessment of WW programme’s results provided by the 
independent evaluator86 Gillian Bristow87 at Cardiff University was rather clear. She, however, also 
recognized that “the experience of managing an important regional development programme without 
the assistance from London may have been an important learning opportunity for the newly 
established government”. 
 
The comparison between the two regions and more specifically between the two sub regions is, 
firstly, given by the overall success of the structural funds policies which coincide with the capability 
of a region to “converge”, and therefore, to overcome – by the end of the programming period - the 
75% of EU average GDP per capita. From this point of view the two regions diverge significantly in 
terms of results.  
 
After the 2000 – 2006 programmin period that we are considering, WW is still - notwithstanding the 
four billion euro of structural funds spent on development – a  convergence88 region (and, in fact, it 
has been awarded 1.4 Billion euros for the new programming period) and, thus, it has failed to 
achieve the very final aim of the structural funds programme89.   
                                                 
86 The independent evaluator is an institutionally recognized actor that is part of the structural funds programme and that 
the regions must nominate in order to carry out an independent assesement of the results of the programme in order to 
identify problems and possible improvements of the programmes. 
87 Interview with Dr Gillian Bristow, Reader in Economic Geography, Cardiff School of City and Regional Planning, 
Cardiff University (and project manager of the Mid Term evaluation of West Wales and the Valleys Objective 1 
Programme 2000 – 2006, conducted by Old Bell), Cardif, 14th May and 19th June 2008. 
 
88 Under developed regions receiving the maximum possible aid from EC were called “objective 1” regions in the 2000 – 
2006 period and “convergence” in the 2007 – 2013 period. 
89 Few authors do, in fact, notice that the system is somehow paradoxical, with regions that perform worse being – de 
facto – rewarded for not having achieved the initial objective of the programmes.  
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SY has, in fact, achieved the objective, will not be an Objetive 1 Region anymore, and will be in the 
2007 – 2013 period a phasing in region90. As a consequence, in fact, the new programming period SY 
is financed within the “regional competitiveness” programme for the whole Yorkshire91.  
Overall the assessment of SY performance was provided by Professor Harvey Armstrong92 at 
Sheffield University who is one of the leading expert in Europe on regional development “the 
programme managers had the merits to differentiate the stakeholders to involve for each typology of 
investments’ and as a consequence they were successful both in maximizing the mobilization of civil 
society for the measures meant to increase equity as well as in involving the right experts where the 
priority was efficiency (like in the case of innovation seeking interventions).   
The graph 4.2 describes how the differences between the two regions have materialized in recent 
years. 
 
Graph 4.2 – ratio between ragional and UE 15 average GDP per inhabitat (per cent) 
 
Source: Eurostat; accessed October, 2009 
                                                 
90 In the structural funds regulations the former Objective 1 Regions can be either “phasing in” or “phasing out” regions: 
the former have achieved the objective of reaching 75% of the average GDP per capita of the EU 15 to which structural 
funds applied in year 200o when the New Member States were not yet part of the EU since they joined in 2004; the latter 
are regions that have moved beyond the 75% GDP per capita of EU 27 but not of EU 15 and thus they are considered to 
have converged for a statistical effect. 
91 Within this programme, one of the five priorities (the priority four Economic Infrastructure for a Competitive Economy 
) has been ring-fenced to SY. Therefore, overall Yorkshire was awarded 960 mil euros (583 mil euros from ERDF and 
380 mil euros from ESF) of which 445 mil euros (271 mil euros from ERDF and 175 mil euros from ESF) goes to SY, 
whereas the programme is to be managed centrally by Yorkshire Forward and not any longer from Sheffield. 
92 Interview with Professor Harvey Armstrong, Professor of Economic Geography at  Sheffield University, Sheffield, 18th 
June 2008 
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The graph shows the evolution of the ratio between GDP per capita of the two regions and the 
average GDP per capita in EU 15 as the main indicator of convergence. WW and SY started from 
very similar levels of income per habitant in the mid 1990s with almost 40 points of disadvantage 
versus European averages. The gap was rapidly reduced in the second half of the 1990s. However, a 
gap between the two started to materialize in 1998 and became wider while SY continued to 
converge and WW seemed to find a barrier to further convergence within the very 75% of the EU 15 
average . 
 
It is also interesting to see how the GDP growth rates, in the two regions, are a result of productivity 
versus employment increase. The table 4.2 shows the situation and compare it to the rest of UK 
regions. 
 
Graph 4.3 – Contribution  of productivity and employment date growth rates to GDp growth trates (1999 – 2005) 
 
Source: Eurostat; accessed October, 2009 
 
The data shows situations which are rather extreme for our two sub regions: SY is the fastest growing 
UK region and by far the one with the highest growth in employment rate.  WW is one where 
economic growth has been the slowest and, more specifically, Wales has been the region with 
slowest increase of productivity.   
These trends apply at a lesser extent to the two regions – Yorkshire and Wales – and, in particular, as 
far as productivity growth in Yorkshire, it is twice as high as in Wales.  
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The data on productivity are paralleled by other evidence which may be influenced by factors others 
than investments in R&D and that yet we expect to be impacted also by the capability of firms to 
innovate. 
Before  2000 Wales’s region (and WW)  was, as we mentioned in chapter three, the region diplaying 
the largest number of FDI attracted, hosting the largest manufacturing firms and the only one whose  
manufacturing sector had not witnessed a decrease in number of people employed. By the end of the 
programme the situation appeared rather different. The table below summarizes the evolution as far 
as the size of manufacturing firms. 
 
Table 4.2 – Average size of the firm 
 
Region 2000 2005 % change 
West Wales and The 
Valleys 42,49 23,50 -44,7%
North East (ENGLAND) 41,51 25,78 -37,9%
Wales 38,21 25,03 -34,5%
Scotland 34,16 23,10 -32,4%
Northern Ireland 33,84 19,71 -41,7%
West Midlands (ENGLAND) 32,27 19,64 -39,2%
South Yorkshire 32,11 22,11 -31,1%
North West (ENGLAND) 30,71 21,30 -30,6%
Yorkshire and The Humber 30,08 21,35 -29,0%
East Midlands (ENGLAND) 29,38 20,95 -28,7%
United Kingdom 27,77 18,45 -33,6%
South West (ENGLAND) 26,70 17,31 -35,2%
Eastern 23,30 15,82 -32,1%
South East 23,13 14,47 -37,5%
London 17,36 11,35 -34,6%
 
Source: Office of National Statistics; accessed May 2010 
 
 
Whereas, WW was the area with the largest manufacturing firms at the beginning of the expenditures 
period that we are considering, the situation was very different only five years later and the reduction 
(-44,7%) of the size has been by far the deepest. The outcome does, in fact, appear even more 
worringsome if one considers that it is more the effect of the disinvestment of bigger firms than of the 
replacement of larger with smaller enterprises. The data on FDI attraction and the qualitative analysis 
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on the investors’ assessment on the quality of Wales’ environment as a possible location of new 
industrial sites point – as mentioned to us by Ed Sheriff, Economist for the Economic Research 
Advisory Panel93 - to “a sharp worsening of the region in the consideration of investors, whereas 
many mention the friendliness of the region towards innovation as a disadvantage”. 
 
These outcomes are, as we mentioned in chapter 3, in apparent contradiction with the behaviour of 
Wales and Yorkshire as far as the accumulation of research assets. If we, in fact, consider the 
percentage of GDP invested in R&D, in the 1998 -2003  period, it went up of 0,3% percentage points 
in Wales (from 0,83% to 1,13%) which is an increase almost double that of  the one registered for 
Yorkshire (0,17%  from 0,86% to 1,03%)94. This may, therefore, point to a much different efficiency 
between the two programmes as far as the way they spend R&D dedicated money.  
Such a gap appears to be confirmed by the different capability of structural funds funded investments 
to attract further investments from private investors in the two regions: as we argued in chapter two, 
this can be considered a proxy of the quality of investments done, or of at least of their financial 
sustainability. 
The graph 4.4 compares the two sub regions in terms of the capability of OB1 investments on R&D 
to yield co finance from private firms.  
 
Graph 4.4 – Leverage of EU funds, Thousand of euro, Average EU contribution per project and average project 
investment, 2000 – 2006 Objective 1, South Yorkshire and West Wales (measure 1.1 for SY and 2.3 for WW) 
 
Source: WEFI Database and SY OB 1 Directorate95 
 
                                                 
93 Ed Sheriff, Economist for the Economic Research Advisory Panel, Cardiff, 6th September 2006 
94 Data for the two sub regions are not systematically collected but OB1 programme complements numbers support the 
hypothesis that growth rates for regions and subregions have been similar.  
95 The results should be further elaborated because part of the funds are awarded to the Yorkshire Forward and to the 
Welsh Assembly Government and then passed to the real recipients. 
1777 1915
7966
4274
south yorkshire west wales
EU contribution Project cost
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The SY programme is capable of mobilizing twice as much money per euro spent by the EC than 
WW. This is  a signal of better selection of projects as well as better involvement of private investors 
in the main choices of the implementation process. We will shortly see that this pattern is associated 
– as per pur forecast in chapter two – to very different patterns in resources allocation strategies. 
 
 
 
4.3 THE DIFFERENCE IN TERMS OF CONCENTRATION 
OF RESOURCES 
 
We will now assess the presence of the two characteristics of a portfolio of successful innovation  
investments according to the innovation value chain we presented in chapter 2: the level of 
concentration and capability to mobilize private investments on interventions that have been triggered 
by the public administration. We will, first of all, consider the issue of the concentration that many on 
the fieldwork commented to be high in SY96 and diluted in WW97: their opinions are confirmed by 
the numbers 
 
Two dimensions that are important when one considers the resource allocation are the distribution of 
funds amongst beneficiaries and amongst areas. We will first consider the former and then the latter. 
 
The comparison between the two programmes in terms of distribution amongst beneficiaries is 
summarized by the following chart. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 Interview with Bea Jefferson, Programme Manager, Yorkshire Futures, Leeds, 19th June 2009 
 
 
97 Interview with Richard Rossington, Head of Science, Innovation & Enterprise Policy, Welsh Assembly Government, 
Cardiff, 19th June 2008 
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Graph 4.5 – Distribution of funds amongst beneficiaries, Percent, 2000 – 2006 Objective 1, South Yorkshire left and West 
Wales right; measure 1.1 and 1.4 for SY and 2.3 and 2.4 for WW; 100% = 100 Mil Euro SY ; 234 Mil Euro WW 
 
 
Source: WEFI Database and SY OB 1 Directorate (October 2008) 
 
If we consider that the funds awarded to Yorkshire Forward and to the Welsh Assembly Government 
(WAG) where passed to smaller recipients, and that the chart explicitly mentions the four final largest 
beneficiaries, two elements clearly emerge. 
 
Firstly, in SY the allocation of resources tends to be more concentrated with the four largest 
recipients of funds being awarded 60% of the money.  The allocation of the funds appears to be 
rather concentrated also in WW but to a lesser extent, with the four biggest recipients receiving 44% 
of the total.  
These findings are confirmed by the other programmes’ data on the number of the assisted companies 
that, again, say that SY’s programmes managers are more focused than WW’s ones: in WW the 
number was six times higher (64 against 10) which is also a consequence of the above mentioned 
choice to concentrate on SMEs in WW versus larger companies in SY.  
More importantly, the chart says that the four biggest recipients are very different in the two cases. In 
WW they are all universities, including the Cardiff University, which is outside the aided area. In SY, 
although the biggest share of funding goes to Sheffield University which  receives one third of the 
structural funds contribution, there are also three other private organisations.  
 
They are  all very peculiar, no profit bodies (as we will see shortly in section 4.2.2) whereas CTI and 
TWI are Research and Technology Organisations   - as for the definition of the british government - 
that are, in fact, joint ventures of metal industry related private multinational companies whose 
expertises could, then, be engaged into the implementation of the programme,  and NAMTEC is a  
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public administrations led charity that provided to the programme managers the possibility to 
outreach the schools and the local communities. 
On the contrary in WW the independent evaluator98, which found that “only two percent of a sample 
of beneficiaries of firms benefiting from incentives (within priority 1 measures 1, 2 and 3 and within 
priority 2 measure 2 and 3) declared to have had R&D support or advice”. And it is the same 
evaluator that concluded that “priority 2 interventions may have been less focussed on high 
technology than might have been anticipated”.  
Once again this difference in focus is the consequence of different choices that one can find in the 
programming documents: in WW, for instance, the priority was from the start the preservation of 
existing firms (jobs safeguarded were expected to be more than new jobs), whereas in SY there was, 
as mentioned, a bias towards the creation of new firms (new jobs were supposed to be twice as many 
as the safeguarded ones). 
These data appear to not only say that SY’s programme was more concentrated in terms of resource 
allocation, but also that it was able to engage with more diverse, more qualified, specialized and 
internationally minded constituencies. 
Whereas, the distinction between support of innovation and generic support of firms has further 
weakened in WW throughout the implementation of the development programmes, as the above 
mentioned independent evaluator appeared to find out. 
We also tried to run a test of geographic concentration in the two programmes, and more specifically 
we tried to understand how strong the deviation is between the geographic distribution of the funds 
and the distribution that we would have had if we had allocated them just on the basis of the 
population. This is likely to be a sign of the ability of programme managers to make choices that are 
capable of contradicting a neutral distribution that may be in function of the distribution of 
population only. 
 
In order to calculate the geographical concentration we compared the difference between population 
and structural funds intervention intensity99for each local community (four in SY and 15 in WW). We 
then calculated the average of the absolute values of these differences where a higher than average 
difference signals a distribution that is more dissimilar to one that would simply mirror the 
population, and thus concentration of money on some communities versus others. 
 
                                                 
98 Old Bell 3 Economic Development and European Services, Mid Term Evaluation Update for the West Wales and the 
Valleys Objective 1 Programme 2000 - 2006 
99 This parameter was calculated using an indicator of job creation that in both programme was proportional to the money 
spent. 
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Graph 4.6 – Concentration index; Difference between population and job creation within local communities; Percent, 
2000 – 2006 Objective 1, South Yorkshire (priority 1) and West Wales (priority 2) 
 
Source: WEFI Database and SY OB 1 Directorate (October 2008) 
 
The results of the table show a concentration that is four times higher in SY as opposed to WW. It is 
also to be noticed that whereas in SY there seems to be a concentration of funds on its most urban 
and research equipped community (Sheffiled receives a share of funds which is 5 per cent points 
higher than its share of the population), the same cannot be said for WW (where Swansea gets a share 
of funds which is almost identical to its share of population). 
 
In conclusion, resource allocation seems to reflect clearer choices in SY than in WW. In SY the 
intention seems to have been to reward an excellent university and coalition that is multinational 
minded, or specialized businesses and research centres. In WW the programme seems to be 
dominated by universities (and public administration) with little involvement of firms and the money 
appears to be distributed according to size of local communities. 
 
In the next two sections we will try to understand which specific institutional, administrative and 
social features produced these resource allocation patterns following the hypotheses envisaged by the 
innovation value chain which we described in chapter two. We will, thus, investigate the quality of 
decision making processes and the way the relationship between politics and administration impacts 
on it. Then in the section after the next, we will study how the implementation of the innovation 
strategies involves relevant partners and which is the role  of innovation brokers and innovation hubs 
in developing and maintaining partnerships. 
4,67
5,30
‐0,07
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4.4 THE IMPACT OF DECISION MAKING PATTERNS 
 
We will now explore the main decision making processes as well as the mechanisms by which 
programmes get implemented in the two regions.  
 
We expect –as per our thesis - that better results tend to be associated to the concentration of R&D  
funds on specific industries and geographical areas that may present the critical mass that is 
indispensable for achieving a certain level of efficiency and that, in turn, such concentration is 
associated to higher capability to make choices.. Our hypothesis is that an increased focus will 
depend on clearer decision making processes in the strategy design and project selection, and that this 
will, in turn, be associated to an institutional context where politics has the responsibility of the main 
strategic choices , but where implementation is independent from political pressure (Dunleavy et al., 
2006).  
 
We will, now, consider the different ways by which strategies and project selection occur in the two 
regions, and the mechanisms by which the projects are implemented.  
 
4.4.1. The impact of devolution in Wales 
 
 
The real difference between SY and WW has, almost entirely, been due to the way Wales 
implemented devolution, whereas Welsh case appears to contradict some of the accounts of the 
effects of decentralization that we can find in, for instance, Oates, 1972, and Tanzi, 2008. In fact, as 
mentioned in chapter three the change in the process by which regional development is managed and 
the design of the organisation lay out of the 2000 – 2006 OB1 programme, coincided with the 
transfer of power to the newly elected Parliament being completed in July 1999. 
 
This change has – in the case of Wales – produced two main effects: a) the creation of a large 
administrative body – the WAG - which has absorbed many technocratic bodies including the WDA 
and that according to the evidence of the field work changed the entire organisation culture of the 
bodies responsible for managing innovation programmes; and b) the empowerment of local 
communities that have found in the WAG a politically charged body with which to negotiate which is 
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something that was much less possible when the administration in charge was a technocracy whose 
principal was the national government. 
 
This was confirmed to us by the very people in charge of innovation strategies. For instance, the 
Finance Wales’ Director Steve Smith100 did confirm that the replacement of the regional innovation 
strategy did, in fact, imply the substitution of the agency with a “zero risk environment” with 
negative impact on the capabilities to pursue innovation that “requires that you account for failures”. 
On the other hand, Adrian Healy101, one of the main expert of Cardiff University on regional 
development policy, similarly recognized that local communities felt that “the new political ground 
had empowered them to ask redistribution of funds, much more than when they had to deal with 
WDA that was perceived as an representative of Whitehall”. 
It must, however, be said that this effect of devolution was far from obvious, where authors (Cooke 
and Clifton, for instance, 2005) reported that similar devolution patterns had opposite effects on the 
organisation of regional development policy in Scotland and Ireland102. As far as Wales, one, in fact, 
can not fully understand the type of devolution that was conducted if she does not consider the true 
political reasons for such decision. Morgan (1997b), for instance, saw the abolition of the otherwise 
successful Welsh Development Agency as “the culmination of a politically grounded, long lasting 
attempt to get rid of an organisation widely perceived to be the agent of a Conservative government 
in a Labourist region”.  
 
                                                 
100  Interview with Steve Smith, Director, Development Funding, West Wales, Cardiff, 20th June 2009 
101 Interview with Adrian Healy, Director ECOTEC Research and Consulting Ltd. Expert of Regional Innovation 
Strategies, Cardiff School of City and Regional Planning, 19th June 2008 
 
102 Cooke defines, in fact, the Wales approach to govern development as precautionary and the one that emerged in 
Scotland as visionary102. Whereas a different approach is, then, the one that was followed by the third devolved region 
Northern Ireland.  
 
The terms here refer to the higher propensity of Scotland to have produced innovation strategies based on projects of a 
significant scale and the tendency of Wales to give priority to what we called (in chapter one) equity when it comes to the 
distribution of funds. 
 
The difference between the two cases appears in that in Scotland there has been more of a sense of a vision of what the 
devolution was about and what kind of Scotland was supposed to emerge from the process (which are,  reflected by the 
larger turn out and bigger differences between the “yes” and “no” to the devolution referendum). These differences in 
institutional and political conditions have – amongst other things - led Scotland to delegate some of the economic 
governance to the  Scottish enterprise which has enjoyed autonomy and has deployed an ambitious plan both in terms of 
targets and capability to establish specific priorities. Whereas, as mentioned, Wales has decided for the gradual absorption 
of one of the first and most distinctive RDAs - the Wales Development Agency - into the WAG.  
 
The trend was different in Northern Ireland, where notwithstanding political problems, the Industrial Research and 
Technology Unit (IRTU) is considered a benchmark with its attempt to integrate private venture capitalists into the public 
resources allocation and project selection processes (Cooke, Roper and Wylie, 2003). 
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In any case, the combination of the two effects – change in the organisation of the programme 
management, change in the the role of local communities - did result into a shift towards public 
administration of the responsibility of carrying out tasks that require added value skills and some 
propensity to risk taking. Such a shift weakened - according to a number of authors including, for 
instance, Jones-Evans, 1998 - the efficiency by which these activities are performed. Moreover, the 
replacement of a quasi private agency with a public administration/ political body has meant that the 
entire process of resources allocation tends to be less capable to resist political pressures and this may 
mean that the portfolio of projects tends to get more diluted.  
 
SY did not experience the same discontinuity. Institutionally, it has always been a sub region within a 
region whose government body is not elected and is, in fact, appointed by the national government. 
The OB 1 programme is managed by a programme directorate and programme monitoring committee 
that has been capable of engaging private and non profit partners. The role of the RDA has – unlike 
the one in WW - gradually increased along with the number of the employees and the agency itself 
has increasingly been able to operate as a coalition of government and business partners. 
  
We will now firstly explore the formal mechanisms by which the OB1 strategies are developed; we 
will then see how the expansion (in SY) and reduction (in WW) of the role of the regional 
development agencies makes a difference. 
 
4.4.2 Two different implementation processes within the same structural funds 
regulation framework 
 
The SY programme management is characterized – even in the institutionalized decision making 
procedures – by a strong pragmatism and thus accountability to results – within the so called 
Programme Directorate that we will describe shortly – and a partnership that seems to be oriented 
towards leveraging on skills and financial or technological capabilities that may be helpful in the 
implementation of the programmes and projects.  
 
In fact, the main contributors to the development of the strategy and of its implementation are:  
 
1. the Government Office for Yorkshire and the Humber that were responsible for drafting and 
negotiating the original programme (using a local Drafting Team); the Government Office 
outpost is part of the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG).   
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2. the SY specific Objective 1 dedicated institutional infrastructure articulated into: a 
Programme Monitoring Committee and a programme Directorate (both appoint a number of 
groups that specialize themselves for typology of investments or specific issues); 
3. a number of “sponsors” are then responsible – together with the programme directorate – to 
select the beneficiaries that are the ones that implement projects; amongst them the most 
important is Yorkshire Forward, the RDA that is responsible not only to manage a portion of 
the funds, but also to design (and implement) the innovation and development strategies for 
the wider Yorkshire against which the consistency of the whole OB 1 programme and, in 
particular, of the measures dedicated to innovation must be assessed. 
 
The chart below describes the reporting lines between the Directorate and the organisations  - local 
authorities and other lead organisations: Business Link, the RDA, LSC and Job Centre Plus, local 
authorities, to which some of the decisions and of the activity of selection of the projects are 
delegated. 
 
Chart 4.1 - Programme Management (South Yorkshire, objective 1, 2000 – 2006) 
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The Programme Directorate and the RDA – Yorkshire Forward – have been de facto, the leaders. 
The Directorate is the ultimate decision maker and it is a temporary, project based organisation (the 
programme directorate) referring to a regional office part of the English public administration. It 
reports to the Monitoring Committee, to the Regional Office, to the Government and, ultimately, to 
the EC. Half of the employees are civil servants (they come from the local communities) and all are 
employed on a programme base and their contracts finish when the programme comes to an end103.  
 
The temporary nature of the programme managers job is considered to have both positive and 
negative consequences: on one hand this is a powerful incentive to the staff to achieve the 
programme objectives because this can improve their employability within the public sector for 
further assignments of similar nature; but on the other, the  risk is that the institutional capabilities 
that are established may be wasted after the conclusion of the implementation process.  
 
As one of our interviewee, Costas Georgiou104, Research and Evaluation Manager of the Objective 1 
Programme Directorate, warned when the programming period was still running in 2006, this latter 
possibility had already materialized for some employees that had been recruited by Cornwall and the 
remaining UK convergence regions105.  
The comments from most of the people we met is that, however, the net effect of the flexibility and 
per project organisation of the OB1 Programme was that “ the programme was steered – as one of the 
expert of regional development, Professor Armstrong106 , acknowledged - towards realistic 
objectives”. Moreover, “through a good project selection its effectiveness was increased by 
minimizing the waste that programmes like this normally produce”. This is especially true, according 
to some, for the investments in R&D whose return risk is sub optimized when distributed to small 
and medium firms.   
 
WW structural fuds programmes’ strategy definition and implementation processes have been within 
the political responsibilities of the Welsh Assembly Government that nominated the Welsh European 
Funding Office (WEFO) responsible of managing Objective 1 and other Structural Funds 
programmes.  
                                                 
103 Similar arguments hold for the Regional Development Agency and other bodies like the Business Link 
104 Interview with Costas Georgiou, South Yorkshire Objective 1 Directorate, Shefield, 10th November 2006 
105 Mr. Georgiou himself, however, was  recruited by other Yorkshire’s regional institutions meant to foster development 
and his human capital was not lost. 
106 Interview with Professor Harvey Armstrong, Professor of Economic Geography at  Sheffield University, Sheffield,  
18th June 2008. 
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The WEFO was set up on 1 April 2000 as an Executive Agency of the National Assembly for Wales, 
incorporating the staff and functions of the Welsh European Programme Executive Ltd. and certain 
divisions of the National Assembly for Wales. In July 2003 WEFO became part of the Economic 
Development and Transport Department of the WAG. In April 2006, following the above mentioned 
incorporation of the WDA and the Wales Tourist Board (WTB) into the WAG, a wider Enterprise, 
Innovation and Networks Department was established. More recently (May 2007) the Department has 
been renamed the Department for Economy and Transport (DE&T) and WEFO remains the 
designated Managing Authority and Paying Authority within the WAG under its own Chief 
Executive. 
The difference with SY is evident. In Wales we have a public administration, staff are civil servants 
and permanently employed, incentives are small, and objectives tend not to be OB1 programme 
specific. The WAG is accountable to its electorate, which obviously makes its opinions on the basis 
of a number of policies of which structural funds are only one (although important).  
In SY staff are not civil servants. Civil servants are to be reallocated on the basis of a number of 
factors (including programme’s results) to other functions at the end of the programme. 
Accountability lies with the central government that can use the programme directorates (and 
regional development agencies) of other regions as benchmarks.  
 
The WEFO has the leadership of the process, the power of controlling, steering, and revising the OB1 
programme which was formally with the Programme Monitoring Committee. The PMC is chaired by 
a Member of the National Assembly for Wales (who is nominated by the Economic Development 
Minister), and has other members, six from each of the public, voluntary/community and 
private/trade unions sectors (as well as 8 specialist statutory advisors and 4 EC advisors).  
 
The Programme Monitoring Committee has, then, both in SY and WW, the overall responsibility of 
ensuring that the Programme is delivered according to plan and takes strategic decisions about the 
allocation of resources. Even in this case, the differences are clear.  
In SY the participants to the committee are fewer and they represent specific industries (mostly 
metal), research domains, and NGOS that are relevant for the programme objective to reach it’s 
potential targets.  
In WW the partnership structure is diversified and fragmented and this is important in terms of the 
selection and implementation of projects, and the subsequent consequences of the dilution of the 
project’s portfolio. As we will elaborate in the section on the approach to partnerships, the 
programme’s governing body exposes the programme itself to  political pressures of the various local 
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communities. The focus becomes mostly on political bargain and less on possible solutions to 
specific problems. The resources also tend to be allocated in a less concentrated way (as we 
demonstrated) and the chances to create competitive advantages in terms of innovation of firms and 
research centres become smaller. 
 
4.4.3 Two opposite evolution patterns for the regional development agencies 
 
In most structural funds programmes – and this also applies to Spain as we will see in the next 
chapter -  the design of the strategy is centred around the programme directorates. The 
implementation process is, however, mostly delegated or supported by development agencies 
working alongside the administration.  
 
The evolution patterns followed by regional development agencies are, as we anticipated, one of the 
main differences between the two programmes we are analysing. Whereas Yorkshire Forward (YF) 
were founded at the beginning of the programme and, since then, has continued to expand its scope, 
in WW the WDA, which used to be considered one of the European benchmarks of a regional 
development body, has been gradually absorbed into the Welsh Administration during the 
programming period itself. 
 
Yorkshire Forward was created in 2000. It is not a governmental organisation, and its employees are 
not, technically speaking, civil servants. Out of 300 employees, 200 are retained on a long term basis 
and the remainder are project managers. Their appointments last as per the duration of the project. 
This project based tenures do, then, represent a common feature of the entire structural funds and 
development programmes implementation processes in Yorkshire. 
 
Most of the employees have a similar background: their core experience is in the public sector, 
frequently dealing with private entities107. The organisation is meant to be based - as confirmed by 
Alex Mc Whirter, working in Business support unit at Yorkshire Forward108 -  on identification of 
objectives (general and articulated by business units), continuous monitoring of the results, and 
incentives. The departments of the Agency are, in fact, identified on a management-by-objectives 
                                                 
107 It is directed by Terry Hodgkinson, as Chair, and Tom Riordan, as Chief Executive. They both have backgrounds in 
between the public and private sectors.  Mr Hodgkinson’ s main other experience is in the regeneration of industrial sites 
and areas (he is currently the chair on Magna Holding Ltd, a property development and investment company), and Mr 
Riordan’s is on the environment (he represented UK in UN negotiations on climate change and endangered species).  
 
108   Interview with Alex Mc Whirter, Business support, Yorkshire Forward, Leeds, 20th March 2007 
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approach and correspond mostly  to business lines to which specific products/ clients/ targets can be 
attached109. 
The organisational chart is not immune of problems and as Gill Browning110, Strategy Manager at 
Yorkshire Forward clarified “it is to be better defined in terms of clearer separations of vertical/ 
clients or product related areas and horizontal/ services functions”. Yet the organisation appears to 
allow for the identification of objectives and of individual and group responsibilities for their 
achievement that matter in terms of remuneration and career paths.  
 
One of the main tasks of the YF is the development of the overall economic development strategy111 
as well as the innovation strategy for Yorkshire and The Humber. The Objective 1 and the future 
Competitiveness Programme are supposed to be consistent with the plans for the entire region.  
 
In the case of OB1, however, the peculiarity is that the programming documents of Objective 1 for 
the 2000 – 2006 expenditure cycle were drafted before the RDA was created.  The influence of the 
agency has therefore been exercised on the review of the programme Single programming Document 
in 2004 and it has contributed more significantly to the drafting of the  programming for the  2007-
2013 period. 
 
The organisational features of the YF confirm most of the considerations we made about the 
programme directorate. It is a technocratic structure which has the advantage of  being responsible 
for objectives to the government, and has also been drafted in a way so that it maximizes the dialogue 
between government and business. The fact that the responsibilities of the agency are clear (and not 
confused with the roles of many other policies) and the temporary nature of the assignments of most 
staff seem, moreover, to have created a corporate culture where as Gordon Todd112, Innovation 
                                                 
109 More specifically the Agency has five main organisation units: a) business directorate which deals with enterprise 
development, science, technology & innovation, cluster development (and also marketing & communications for the 
agency) etc.; b) environment directorate that follows rural and urban renaissance, tourism, property & development; c) 
economic inclusion function that is responsible for transport, learning & skills, communities and human resources; d) 
strategy directorate which is in charge of economic policy, investment planning & strategy, Yorkshire futures (the body 
that develops statistics and studies on the Region’s performance); and e) finance directorate that is in charge of evaluating 
performance, knowledge & IT. 
 
110 Interview with Gill Browning, Strategy Manager, Yorkshire Forward, Leeds , 20th March 2007 
 
111 The strategy developed by Yorkshire Forward is a three year process and goes through two draft exercises. Formally 
the document is for a ten year period but, in fact, it is reviewed in a major way every three years with a longer term view 
on the subsequent seven years. 
112 Interview with Dr. Gordon Todd, Innovation Manager, Yorkshire Forward, Leeds, 16th May 2008 
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Manager at YF declared “the agency is used to being scrutinized and appears to be more open to 
engaging in public debates”. 
 
As far as Wales, instead, the incorporation of the WDA in the WAG has signposted the history of the 
regional development strategies (Cooke and Clifton, 2005, Morgan, 1997). 
 
At the time of the incorporation, one of the problems of the WDA was said to be the lack of public 
accountability (Morgan, 1997) seen as a price to be paid for high autonomy in decision making. 
Public accountability, however, did not seem to have been increased by the end of the experience of 
the WDA and its partial replacement with organisation like Finance Wales (FW) (Cooke and Clifton, 
2005).  
FW is, in fact, the most relevant of the agencies still engaged into regional development still outside 
the public administration. FW is described as the financial vehicle to realize the creation of new 
innovative companies and spin offs as a key driver of the Welsh Innovation Strategy. FW was 
established in 2000 with the objective to  provide commercial funding (debt and equity) to small and 
medium-sized businesses (SMEs) throughout Wales, enabling them to realise their potential for 
innovation and growth at critical stages of their life cycle. 
 
Even FW, however, has a degree of autonomy which is not comparable to other development 
agencies. It is, in fact, a subsidiary company of the WAG, although it operates on a commercially 
independent basis. Its decisions are still influenced by policy makers and the public administration at 
the board level, “where it is the board’s  investment committee that approves the most important 
deals” as Steven Smith113 confirmed to us. In fact, although the law says that the seven board 
members must be independent representatives of business and research communities, they are 
nominated by the Welsh Government (and employees of the company and its directors can only be 
observers).  
 
The political nature of the projects selection process seems to have as a consequence the 
fragmentation of the investments (as it was observed as far as the measures of the OB1 programmes 
dedicated to innovation and that we described in the section 3 ): the company’ s initial capital of 130 
million GBP (provided by the Welsh Assembly for 15 million, the structural funds for 50 million - 
70% from Objective 1 and 30% from Objective 2 - and by Barclays for the remaining 65 million) has 
been distributed to  1,700 investments into Welsh SMEs which accounts for less than 100,000 GBP 
                                                 
113 Interview with Steven Smith, Director, Development Funding Finance Wales, Cardiff, 20th June 2009 
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of support per firm. This result seems even more sub optimal if one considers that, in theory, FW 
should have as its core business, the provision of capital for “early stage”, “expansion”; MBOs, MBIs 
and employee buy outs that typically require much more significant funding per firm. 
 
In short, the two regions experienced opposite patterns in terms of evolution of the regional 
development agencies. In Yorkshire, the RDA was created at the beginning of the programming 
period and became progressively more important by giving  the management of the development and 
innovation programmes the added value of a dedicated, independent infrastructure. In Wales, the 
RDA was progressively dismantled and absorbed within the public administration where the 
decisions became more risk adverse and more exposed to the political pressure of different 
constituencies. 
 
The next section will significantly develop these results. The independent body of SY also seems to 
have been better capable of engaging stakeholders whose skills, strengths, and technology is essential 
for the success of the programme, into the process. Whereas the elected assembly of Wales seems to 
have, instead, consumed a lot of energy in the development of merely formal participation channels. 
 
 
4.5 THE ROLE OF  PARTNERSHIPS 
 
The second main hypothesis to be tested is an explanation of how differently focused and differently 
efficient portfolios of innovation projects, which depend on different degrees of involvement of 
partners that may be relevant to the capability of programme manager, are able to identify the areas 
where to invest and to mobilize additional investments on research 
 
We expect that better outcomes are associated to partnerships amongst research, government, 
business, and civil society since those programmes have the advantage of incorporating local 
knowledge of problems and opportunities, and that the decisions may be more effectively 
implemented because they are shared,  and that the visibility of the projects and the expectations that 
they raise are higher.  
We, however, expected these partnerships also to be collectively accountable to results and, as a 
consequence, focused on project or programme related concrete activities or choices, whereas they 
sometimes risk to be purely formal or to represent a cost in terms of time and quality of choices 
(Wilson, 2004).  
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In the framework of the innovation value chain that we introduced in chapter two, the hypothesis of 
the importance of high quality partnerships is completed by the idea that specific actors (innovation 
brokers and innovation actors) and mechanisms are necessary for these partnerships to develop.  
We will now explore the formal mechanisms by which partnerships are developed and engaged in 
WW as well as the approach that SY has developed. 
 
4.5.1 The weight of local communities in West Wales  
 
The procedures through which local stakeholders are involved in the implementation of the 
programmes in WW are rather complex and the overall impression is that an attempt is made to 
formalize  each detail of how participants are selected and how they get involved into decisions. 
 
As Sue Price114 who was in charge of the R&D portion of the OB 1 Programme noticed during the 
interview “the main partners with whom Welsh programmes need to be negotiated are the local 
partnerships consisting of representatives of the public administrations as well as private and 
voluntary sectors”. The local partnerships represent the fifteen local communities. They were 
established in 1999 and were given operational responsibility for implementing some aspects of the 
programme, notably in respect to supporting project development. The aim used to be the promotion 
of partnerships working throughout the region to secure high quality and integrated regeneration and 
economic development programmes115. 
 
For the specific role of assessing projects, it must be said that for certain measures the programming 
documents maintain that “indicative allocations to local partnerships have been established”. In this 
case the role of the partnerships becomes much more important and thematic groups maintain a 
strategic overview. 
 
In addition to local partnerships, the implementation of the Objective 1 Programme was also 
supported by regional partnerships. It took slightly longer than local partnerships to set up, with the 
first in place in January 2000 and the last one established in August 2001. In some cases, most 
notably the Agri-food Partnership, the regional partnerships emerged out of existing all-Wales 
                                                 
114 Interview with Sue Price, Head of Branch for Programme Management Division Business support, Tourism, ICT, 
R&D, Energy, Transport and Environment, Welsh European Funding Office, Merthyr Tydfil, 16th April 2007 
115 The key roles of the local partnerships were established such as to: a) “Develop and review a local strategy or action 
plan to target Objective 1 resources to local areas of need and opportunity; b) Monitor progress in implementing the 
strategy and identify gaps in provision; c) Assist applicants in developing projects which will deliver the objectives of the 
strategy; d) Promote the programme locally”( Notes from WEFO’s  statute) 
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partnerships and were thus relatively quick to develop. Others, such as the infrastructure partnership, 
were entirely new entities and thus took longer to become established.  
 
Unlike local partnerships, regional ones are differentiated according to the theme of their 
specialization116.  
 
Each of the  partnerships was required to develop a strategy for its area (Local Action Plan - LAP in 
the case for the local ones), and for its sector (Regional Action Plans - RAP in the case for the 
regional ones). The two sets of strategies were to be submitted simultaneously117.  The reasons for 
such a provision was to ensure parity of esteem, whereas in fact, one may argue that most importantly 
the strategies were to be coordinated with each other.  
 
Local and regional partnerships, thus, created a framework that since the outset seems characterized 
by a multiplication of partnerships and, as a consequence, of strategic documents with fifteen local 
and ten regional strategies to be drafted. And the situation was further complicated by the subsequent 
creation - advised by a consultant called to “streamline” the process118 - of four further strategy 
partnerships119. 
                                                 
116 The objectives of the regional partnerships are on paper “to: a) Develop a regional strategy for the use of Objective 1 
monies to add value to national policy within their area of expertise; b) Assist, where appropriate, with project 
development; c) Assess and recommend projects to the strategy partnerships (see below); d) Identify gaps in provision; e) 
Liaise with local partnerships on project assessment and development”. 
 
117 The first time by September 27th 2000 
118 The presence of this organisational problem was, in fact, immediately recognized by the very Welsh Government in 
November 2000 and a Task and Finish Group was established with the objective to overhaul the just established structure 
for delivering the Objective 1 programme. The Group was composed of a core group of seven individuals, all of whom 
were individually selected by the National Assembly, to develop with immediate effect a revised model for 
implementation. More specifically, the remit of the group was to: 
“Bring together the local and regional action plans and look at their fit within the strategy of the SPD; allow the delivery 
of Objective 1 to go ahead on time and bring back confidence into the process; secure absolute clarity and a strategic 
approach to the process 
Brought together for the first time as a group on November 20th 2000, the deadline  for producing a strategy was 
December 12th 2000. The report produced focused on three areas of the Programme’s delivery.   
 
The main area of weakness identified was the fragmentation between local and regional partnerships. This was tackled in 
two ways. Firstly, the recommendation was made for a cutback in the number of RAPs (see above).Parallel to this, the 
different partnership groupings were ‘encouraged’ to reflect ‘cross fertilisation’ through their membership. WEFO 
officials were required to attend the RAP and LAP meetings in an advisory capacity, thereby helping to ensure 
consistency of the process across the board. 
119 However, the real paradox was that – vis a vis a problem of multiplication of structures - the Task and Finish Group 
recommended the establishment of further four strategy  partnerships. Constituted on a 50:50 local/regional basis (and 
also gender-balanced), the expectation was that ‘their existence would make competition between local and regional 
partnerships redundant’. The Task and Finish Group report was approved by the Programme Monitoring Committee on 
December 15th 2000 and in January 2001 these recommendations were implemented and one more layer of partnership 
was realized. The four strategy partnerships were: 
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In addition to an already complex architecture, and in response to the Commission’s 
‘encouragements’ for all three sectors to be represented in Structural Fund partnerships, Wales has 
sought to encourage equal representation from the public sector, the social partners,  the voluntary, 
and community sectors in the composition of certain key partnerships – the so-called ‘three-thirds 
principle’. This principle was initially agreed upon in 1999 by the Economic Development 
Committee (EDC) of the Assembly. It was agreed that each of the three sectors should be represented 
in equal number within each of the partnerships. In addition, it was also established that there should 
have been a gender balance in each of the partnerships which meant, in practice, that at least 40 per 
cent of members should be women. This target for the gender balance of partnerships was a 
requirement for all aspects of the partnership. In summary, the map consists of almost thirty groups 
each constructed to balance the  gender and representation of various stakeholders. 
Overall, the interaction of managing authority, monitoring committee and partnerships create an 
implementation process as summarized by chart 4.2. 
Chart 4.2 – Development of Strategy (West Wales objective 1) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Business Assets Strategy Partnership (BASP): considers projects submitted under Priorities 1, 2 and 6, with the exception 
of stand-alone ESF projects submitted under Priority 1, Measure 4 (apart from projects relating to entrepreneurship) and 
Priority 2, Measure 4; Community Assets Strategy Partnership (CASP): considers projects submitted under Priority 3; 
Rural Assets Strategy Partnership (RASP): considers projects submitted under Priority 5, Human Assets Strategy 
Partnership (HRASP): considers projects submitted under Priority 4 and stand-alone ESF projects submitted under 
Priority 1, Measure 4 (with the exception of entrepreneurship) and Priority 2, Measure 4. 
 
According to WEFO the strategy partnerships were charged with the aim: “to develop and review of strategic frameworks 
for the use of Objective 1 funds; to carry out a qualitative assessment of individual projects already proposed by one of 
the regional or local partnerships, and making final recommendations to WEFO on the selection of projects; to monitor  
the impact of the Programme against these strategic frameworks and the identification of gaps in delivery; to facilitate the 
effective communication amongst all partnerships”. 
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The above chart describes the role and the interaction of the various actors involved into the 
definition of the strategy. It is even graphically evident that the process is a rather participative one. 
However, the decision making process as far as selection of projects is even more interesting. 
Chart 4.3 – Project selection (West Wales objective 1) 
 
Source: WEFO 
 
It appears that  WW partnerships  have a significant power with strategy partnerships “advising” and 
local and regional partnerships even having the final word (“endorsing”) on projects. Overall it 
appears that the governance of the programmes is  steered by the public administration and goes 
through an intense negotiation with local partnerships. The result is, however, a system which looks 
rather fragmented, more based on institutional relationships than oriented to completing projects. 
This resulted, as we will see later in this chapter, into a dilution of the funds targeted to R&D and 
most likely in a diversion of these funds to financing  projects with  low contents of research or, even 
more broadly, innovation.  
 
The even more important feature of the mechanisms by which in WW partnerships have been 
developed is that they have been almost entirely delegated to procedures written in programming 
documents. No real provision was made in order to promote the emergence of an actor – one of the  
innovation brokers or of the innovation hubs – that are, in our theory, indispensable to making 
partnerships capable to deliver results. In fact, it was the very WDA that in the 1990s (Morgan, 1997)  
tried to play this role in fostering partnerships of different actors within the same value chain and, 
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thus, even this approach to partnerships seems to be a legacy of the institutional modifications that 
we have described before. 
 
However,iIt should be, recognized that as Richard Rossington120, Head of Science, Innovation & 
Enterprise Policy of Welsh Assembly Government recognized “the partnerships layout that we have 
described is, also, the result of a change in the economic structure of WW that was more rapid than 
the similar evolution elsewhere in Britain”.  
If one looks, in fact, to the evolution of employment in manufacturing industries finds a situation as 
the one pictured by graph 4.7.   
 
 
Graph  4.7 – UK regions Manufacturing employment, yearly growth rates, percentage of total, 1991 – 2001 
Source: ONS 
 
It is interesting to notice that Wales went from being the only region where the number of people 
employed in manufacturing was not shrinking, to being the one, in the  1998 -2001 period, where the 
decrease was the largeest one.  
 
This hints towards a rapid process of deindustrialization of a regional economy that seems to heavily 
depend on manufacturing. It happened within a much larger process of restructuring that saw the 
                                                 
120 Interview with Richard Rossington, Head of Science, Innovation & Enterprise Policy, Welsh Assembly Government, 
Cardiff, 19th June 2008 
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entire UK  loose in six years (between 1994 and 2002) half a million of the 4.8 million manufacturing 
jobs that it had in 1994 – with the trend in WW even stronger. This loss was more than compensated 
by the gains in services and especially in public administration where in the same period UK gained 
1.2 million jobs (an increase of around 15%). Such an increase in public services was even more 
pronounced in Wales where the public sector grew by one third in the same years.  
 
It is, therefore, likely that these trends facilitated a modification in institutional and organisation  
settings which started since the devolution (Cooke and Clifton, 2005).  
 
Attraction of FDI of large multinationals was replaced by a different strategy focused on SMEs. But 
it is also true that – viceversa – the reduction in number of large firms had an impact in terms of 
possible leadership in industrial policy. Moreover, as described before, the expansion of the public 
administration may have consequently had  the same fate of the WDA , in that it went from being an 
independent body to being absorbed into the WAG and the people in charge of igniting and 
sustaining economic development became civil servants. 
 
We will shortly see that the SY approach was rather different. The choice here has been not to create 
complex mechanisms of partnership generation but rather to encourage and strengthen partnerships 
that already existed. This reduced the lead time necessary to create them, but also empowered 
coalitions that were not artificial, drafted around specific programme requirements, or motivated by 
specific projects and their expected outcomes. 
 
4.5.2 The partnership based organisations in South Yorkshire and the advanced 
manufacturing park 
 
As far as partnerships, the SY strategy is significantly different from the one we found in WW. In 
fact, as we will see shortly, the case of SY does, in fact, introduce a way by which partnerships are 
developed that is different from the one that is envisaged by our “innovation value chain” (in chapter 
two) as well as by the mechanisms that the EC appears to promote. 
SY partnerships are, in fact, embodied into special not for profit organisations whose members come 
from diversified backgrounds – research, firms, civil society, government – and whose interactions is 
seen by this author and others as crucial in order to generate sustainable innovation. The difference of 
this approach is that not only that these partnerships are already existing and thus the programmes do 
not incur in the lead time necessary to create them, but also that they are not artificial, drafted around 
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specific programme requirements. In fact, the various stakeholders are motivated by specific projects 
and their expected outcomes. 
  
Alongside these industry specialized partnerships, the Programme Directorate of SY OB1 
Programme is also developing partnerships with local communities. The local communities involved  
however do not cover the entire territory but only the very poor areas and are mostly involved in 
community regeneration projects and not in R&D activities. The project appraisal is, unlike WW, 
made independently by the Programme Directorate. Moreover, the picture of the partnerships is 
completed by the OB1 Programme Monitoring Committee that features less participants than the one 
in WW and  has less intrusive functions. 
 
However, as pointed out,  the real mechanism to generate partnerships and leverage on them is 
through pre-existing bodies that are, in fact, partnerships themselves. 
 
The way SY has approached the development of partnerships has been rather peculiar in terms of 
pragmatism. The main actors of the strategy have been organisations that are themselves no profit 
and partnerships amongst firms and universities, whose core activity is R&D in a way that is rather 
particular. Barry Jackson, Head of Finance and Management Services of Castings Technology 
International (CTI) explained, in fact, to us that some of the knowledge that these organisations 
produce becomes, at least partially, a “common good” of the partner organisations121. This method of 
pooling technical know-how and experiences, provides a reduction of the costs of the R&D and 
competitive advantages to companies are engaged into different industries, although they all demand 
metal for different uses.  
 
The strategy that SY has envisaged, is one of saving the traditional focus of the region’s  metal 
industry and, in fact, gradually specializing in the research segment of it. The OB 1 programme has, 
in part, reflected and, in part, facilitated the emergence of such a strategy and we, therefore, observed 
a quite interesting case of an innovation strategy extremely specialized on the core competences of a 
region and of high added value for the regional economy. 
More specifically, one of the main choices of the OB1 Programme has been to fund the creation of an 
innovation hub (one of those that we described in chapter two and that we will find in different forms 
                                                 
121 Interview with Barry Jackson, Head of Finance and Management Services, Castings Technology International (CTI), 
Rotherham, 15th May 2008 
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in CYL in chapter five) where these networked organisations could meet and leverage on each 
other’s contacts and strengths. The hub is the Advanced Manufacturing Park (AMP) based in 
Rotherham.  
 
The location is a joint venture between UK Coal and the RDA, Yorkshire Forward, which was 
launched in September 2000, becoming fully operating four years later. The actual site of the park 
was built upon a 100-acre brown field site, a piece of “previously developed land” which was once 
seen as unacceptable for future use and that was transformed into a location whose environment 
friendliness is one of the most publicized features of the initiative.  The location is also easily 
accessible to a highly used motorway on the Rotherham-Sheffield border. 
 
Structural funds were crucial to the start up and success of the park’s activities as well as the 
attraction of organisation outside the region and to the development of the ones already operating 
there. Some of the field work to develop this thesis, in fact, took place in the park and its 
surroundings in conjunction with the management of all three organisations – the above mentioned 
CTI, The Welding Institute (TWI), The Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre w/ Boeing 
(AMRC) - that are hosted at the AMP – plus the National Metal Technology Centre (NAMTEC ) - 
that is just outside it – were extensively interviewed122. It is also to be noticed that these four 
organisations were – as we mentioned in the section on resource allocation– the most important 
private actors involved in the implementation of the OB1 programme’s measures on R&D. 
 
Unlike technology parks in Spain (and in particular the Parque Tecnológico de Boecillo in Valladolid 
that we will describe in chapter five), the AMP infrastructure has a very narrow mandate which is 
basically limited to managing the logistics. As a consequence firms based at the AMP hold a very 
loose affiliation with the Yorkshire Forward: simple inquiries can be made and are followed up as far 
as possible funding goes. Yet, links and partnerships between firms at the park are strongly  
independently from any specific top down efforts. 
 
In fact, the difference with the more developed parks that we observed in Spain, is that the 
organisations that are hosted by the AMP are very few (only three as opposed to almost one hundred 
in  the park in Valladolid) but much bigger and unlikely to accept or to need any guidance from a 
                                                 
122 See annex five for further details of the interviewed organisations. 
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public administration (like the one that would manage a normal technology park). The RDA and the 
OB 1 programme directorate, thus, rightly decided to have an approach to the partners that has been 
very hands off. Yet, as we were told by Yorkshire Forward, not only partnerships and relationships 
amongst the hosted organisations were created, but these bodies also spontaneously adjusted their 
positioning so that overlaps were reduced, the potential for collaborations was maximized and the 
potential for competition was minimized. 
 
The following map shows, then, a differentiation of the four research based organisations around 
which the innovation strategy for SY was drafted. 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4.8 – Strategic positioning of research based partnership in SY 
 
 
A rather simple but yet clear innovation system seems to emerge. It is not generic but focused on a 
specific research/ industry domain – metal – which is, at the same time, embedded into the tradition 
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of the region, but also narrow enough to let SY’s firms and institutions achieve a position of 
international competitive advantage. The four organisations do play different roles with minimum 
overlaps. 
 
TWI is the biggest and most skewed towards the business side of the business versus university 
spectrum in terms of composition of its members; it is also the most specialized and, in fact, the one 
that is – de facto – a very high end supplier of innovative manufacturing processes that use 
sophisticated joining materials technologies; the meeting with Mark Roughsedge, the technical 
business developer123, was a rather significant one and acknowledgement of one of the most 
remarkable success of the OB1 programme strategy: in fact, TWI with more than 3,000 partners, 
headquarters in Cambridge, UK and offices in the USA, South Asia, Middle East is at the leading 
edge of metal technology; according to Mr. Roughsedge, the negotiation with the directorate 
responsible for the OB1 programme (facilitated by the already existing relationship between TWI and 
CTI) was crucial to the decision to staff 100 of the 600 employees in SY. At the same time, from the 
point of view of Kevin Bennett, director of the OB 1 Programme, it was important to have attracted 
TWI because its involvement could provide to its SY’s partners the experience and exposure to 
international markets that was seen as indispensable for the regional innovation strategy to succeed.  
 
CTI is positioned slightly more than TWI towards research and has heavily invested into an 
experimental technology (vacuum manufacturing casting process) that can increase productivity and 
sales of its members (by providing a lightweight and high quality castings). An interesting feature 
that we found was that TWI and CTI developed a partial vertical integration with TWI accessing to 
some of the results of the experimentations carried out at CTI, and CTI materials being proposed to 
some of the TWI’s clients. 
 
AMRC, also called “the factory of the future”, is a University of Sheffield initiative; it is broadly 
working to innovative materials (thus a broader scope of TWI and CTI) with, however, a specific 
focus on aerospace industry and thus partnering with Boeing, Messier – Dowty and Goodrich. 
Although technically speaking AMRC is part of the University of Sheffield campus, Professor John 
Baragwanath, AMRC’s Project Director124, pointed out the independence of the organisation and its 
                                                 
123 Interview with Mark Roughsedge, Technical Business Developer, The Welding Institute (TWI), Rotherham, 16th May 
2008 
 
124 Interview with Professor John Baragwanath , Project Director, Advanced manufacturing research centre (AMRC) 
with Boeing 
The Factory of the Future, Rotherham, 15th May 2008 
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business orientation. The frequency by which visits of students to the site are taking place, anticipates 
another feature of SY’s programme: the consideration of civil society being an important component 
of the innovation strategy.  
 
This feature is - even more clearly – displayed by NAMTEC which is gradually specializing in 
consulting, training and seminars although still with a focus on metals. One of the services NAMTEC 
is providing is the Special Metals Forum – and, more specifically titanium – a group of NAMTEC 
members have established a Titanium Information Group.  
 
As Dr. Richard Cinderey, responsible for Knowledge Transfer at NAMTEC125, explained “the 
objective is the promotion of the image of metal industry in order to sustain a flow of entry-level 
graduates and high-level professionals into the traditional sector”. NAMTEC concern on the supply 
of new work force appears to be an interesting reversal for an industry and a region that appeared to 
suffer of all the problems that are typical of mature industries. 
 
 
The picture emerged from the research reveals a  specialization in the four organisations in terms of 
developing relationships with the actors – government, civil society, outside universities and firms - 
whose involvement, according to the theory we presented in chapter two, is relevant to a successful 
innovation  strategy (given that the even more basic link between local universities and businesses is 
ensured by the very nature of the organisations that we have observed in SY):  
 
1. The relationship with the Government is not only through the implementation phase of the 
development and innovation strategies (and, thus, for instance the development of the 
Advanced Manufacturing Park), but also in the strategy development phase where NAMTEC 
is partner of YF and functions as a sort of consultation forum (focused on metal industry); 
 
2. The outreach towards civil society is, concretely, demonstrated to be essential in the SY case; 
the objective – as discussed during the interviews at NAMTEC and at AMRC – is mostly to 
ensure that a sufficient inflow of graduates  can support the strategy to heavily specialize the 
region on across the industry research on metals; the seminar and communication campaign  
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
125 Interview with Dr. Richard Cinderey, Programme Manager - Knowledge Transfer, The National Metals Technology 
Centre (NAMTEC), Sheffield, 16th May 2008 
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of NAMTEC and the visits to the “factory of the future” are two of the most important tools 
through which the aim gets achieved; 
 
3. The relationships with the rest of the world and more specifically foreign firms and 
multinationals (less with foreign universities) is, probably, the biggest point of strength with 
TWI being itself an out-of-the-region organisation (the headquarter is in Cambridge) that has 
been attracted to SY by the OB 1 programme directorate; CTI being in a phase of constant 
expansion of its foreign memberships; and the AMRC partnering with some of the largest 
multinationals in the aerospace industry. 
 
It is, therefore, clear that such a system – which also has the advantage of not having been imposed – 
creates a win - win situation where each of the four organisations has played a role, has enjoyed 
considerable support from structural funds and is creating high tech jobs for the entire region (in 
Rotherham alone, according to the programme document “over a fifth of businesses and 43% of jobs 
supported” belonged to AMM at the end of the programming period 126).  
 
The difference between SY and WW is, therefore, rather clear. In WW we have a framework by 
which the generation of new partnerships is somehow pushed through formal mechanisms. In SY, 
instead, the policy maker appears to have deliberately chosen to make the centrepiece of its 
implementation strategy, the already existing partnerships to whom funds and a place is provided 
(without the further technical assistance that according to EC text books should be necessary for 
partners to get together). Not less inetresting it is through the interactions of these actors and not a 
decision taken from the above, that SY programme management found in one niche of the value 
chain of the steel industry a smart specialization capable to be sustained (as all intervieweed 
underlined) also beyond the time frame of the public support.  
4.5.3 The limits of an SME centred strategy and the technium 
 
The difference between SY and WW is even more clear if we consider the much debated (and often 
criticized, see for instance in Cooke and Clifton, 2005) experience of the Technium in WW in 
contrast with the AMP in Rotherham. 
The technium is a network of micro technology parks dedicated to small innovative firms and that 
was born as a partnership between Swansea University and the WDA (immediately before the 
                                                 
126 Objective 1 Programme Directorate, Research & Evaluation (June 2006). Businesses and Jobs Supported by the 
Objective 1 Programme: December 2005, p. 49. 
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absorption of the agency in WAG). The initiative was launched – like the Advanced Manufacturing 
Park in SY – in 2000 but is still yet to produce any significant results (in fact, the occupancy of the 
spaces that have been created is still less than one third) as shown by the  following table 
summarizing per site the main parameters: typologies, ownerships, date of opening (if any), number 
of available spaces and occupancies as for the end of the programming period we are considering127. 
 
Table 4.3 – Swansea-based Technium characteristics 
 
     
Technium Day of Opening (projected) M² Spaces Occupancy (at Jenuary 2006)
T-1 April 2001 2000 14 12
T-2 May 2004 3639 13 10
T-Digital July 2004 1200 12 12
T-Dig.@Sony July 2004 800 8 2
T-Sust.Techs November 2005 3397 32 2
T-Perf. Engin (April 2006) 2200 15  
T-Pembs (September 2006) 814 14  
T-Life 
Sciences (?) 1600 12  
Total       15 650 121 37
 
Source: Innovation Office, Swansea University 
The most striking feature of the technium initiative is, however, the dispersion of these sites: an 
account made on the basis of WAG’s data show that techniums have proliferated to the point of 
becoming twelve. This anomaly was acknowledged by the same representatives of Welsh 
government that we met: Virginia Chambers, Director Technology & Innovation of the Welsh 
Assembly Government 128 did, in fact, admit that “possibly they were too many” and even her 
justification of West Wales being not easy to travel does not account for the fact that seven of the ten 
techniums are located in the same city (Swansea). The number of research site is a further evidence 
                                                 
127 One of the issues that has been debated is the assessment of the costs of the investments and of its maintenance is 
rather different, ranging from 260 million GBP to 52 million GBP (for the eight Swansea based Techniums). Different 
figures brings, of course, to very divergent assessments when it comes to understanding the return on investments of the 
incubators.  
 
128  Virginia Chambers, Irector Technology & Innovation, Welsh Assembly Government, Cardiff, 9th October 2008 
 
 170
of the dilution of choices that similarly, as we will shortly see, the proliferation of so called 
“technology centres” produced  in Murcia. 
The differences between WW and SY results and strategies are evident if we consider both the 
quality of the partnerships and the ways they have been generated. The Advanced Manufacturing 
Park proposes a more modest goal to attract organisations that already exist in the same place, which 
possess technical and R&D skills in a specific industry/ research domain and represent partnerships 
between research and firms. These organisations can also bring the added value to involve  
government and outreach to civil society and are able to leverage on stable relationships with 
worldwide leaders. The Techniums put forward a much more costly objective to generate innovation 
and to facilitate the emergence of a rather large number of small innovative firms where no specific 
industry or research choice seems to have been made.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
UK is one of the country where the endogenous growth driven idea to use public investments in 
research as a tool for regional development has been more widely debated and the discussion has 
often considered as paradigmatic cases the very two regions – Wales and Yorkshire – that this work 
focused on (Armstrong, 2001, Bristow, 2001, Cooke, 2005, Jones – Evans, 2008, Morgan, 1997).  
Since the end of the nineties, R&D expenditures had been considered by the British government 
(H.M. Treasury, 2001, CBI, 1996) as an increasingly important strategic tool for finding novel ways 
to facilitate economic development of regions that are lagging behind and that tend to be 
characterized by a history of dependence on industries that are mature and have undergone  heavy 
restructuring of production processes and labour force (Konstadakpoulos, 2000, Howells, 1997). 
 
More specifically, Wales and Yorkshire experienced opposite growth paths throughout the decade 
that preceded the launch of the Objective 1 programme in year 2000.  
The Wales economy was distinct from all other UK regions in that the largest percentage of its 
workforce hailed from the manufacturing sector. Moreover Wales was  the only region where the 
number of manufacturing jobs had not declined in the nineties. The real driver behind the growth of 
the Welsh economy, however, was a much higher ability to attract FDI when compared to any other 
UK region. Moreover, FDI was greatly increasing the propensity for the Welsh economy to invest in 
innovation and as a result the percentage of GDP spent on R&D had significantly increased. The 
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driving force behind such an expansion was undoubtedly the WDA, which was one of the first UK 
regional development agencies and one of the most benchmarked at the European level (Cooke, 
2005).  
Yorkshire and SY were, in the meantime, experiencing difficulties in maintaining their 
manufacturing base and per capita income levels. Many of the regions’ firms were struggling through 
the metal industry’s restructuring and the region’s R&D investment was gradually tapering off during 
this period (Armstrong, 2001). 
 
In fact, by the end of the nineties Wales had completed a catch up with regions like Yorkshire that, in 
the meantime, had witnessed stagnation in most of the indicators measuring innovation and 
prosperity: the picture of the two regions taken before the beginning of the start of the programmes 
whose results we are investigating, turned out to be very similar in terms of GDP per capita, 
productivity, propensity to invest in R&D and universities, presence of multinationals and openness 
of regional economy, economic structure.  
 
The OB 1 programmes implementation period 2000 – 2006 that we are considering in this thesis, 
coincided with a radical reversal of these trends. 
 
Since 2000, SY was, by far, the most rapidly growing regional economy in the UK, whereas Wales 
showed the worst performance as measured by change in indicators like the employment rates. SY’s  
GDP per capita continued to converge towards European averages and was no longer classified as a 
“less developed region” by the end of the 2000 – 2006 programming period; WW instead hit a sort of 
ceiling in its convergence process and the gap with European average has stayed the same for the first 
half of the last decade. 
  
Structural funds programmes represented a large share of investments for development in both 
regions and, although the money made available to the two regions and the amount allocated to the 
R&D specific measures were similar, they appeared to have had a significant impact on the reversal 
of fortunes of the two regional economies. More specifically, the regional innovation strategies and 
the different effectiveness of structural funds investments in R&D played an important role in a way 
that is consistent with our hypothesis (and some of the literature as in Boldrin and Canova, 2001, or 
Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman, 2002): the better region was the one that decided to concentrate 
resources and to develop a strategy meant to use public money to mobilize further private 
investments. Moreover the choice was not in terms of a broader sector but of a selection - within the 
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value chain of an industry – of the niche that SY firms and research centres could occupy and upon 
which develop a competitive advantage (and, thus, a smart specialization as more recently the search 
of niches by the regions has been theorized by, amongst others, McCann and Argiles, 2011 and 
OECD, 2010).  
 
Behind these outcomes, there were two rather differently drafted regional innovation strategies: 
choices are clearer in the better performing region where public investments favoured efficiency 
rather than internal equity (by “efficiency” and “equity” we refer to recent definition suggested by 
Barca, 2009, and the European commission, EC, 2009) with precedence given to the concentration of 
research assets in certain hubs, involvement of larger firms, attraction of champions of innovation 
from outside the region. It was, however, not less important the creation of mechanisms which 
allowed the spill over – through suppliers and local universities – of innovation to the rest of the 
economy.  
This approach appears to be more adequate when it comes to dealing with investments in innovation 
that, by definition, have for objective the creation of a competitive advantage that can be sustained in 
global markets (as related by the most recent literature on cohesion policies acknowledges, Barca, 
2009). More focus coincides with more attractiveness to private investors: R&D projects in SY have 
mobilized approximately twice as much private investments as their homologues in WW.  
However, more generally there are two main factors – organization and partnerships as envisaged by 
this thesis - that explain the differences in performances and choices (as the table 4.5 summarizes).  
 
Table 4.4 – Main differences between West Wales and South Yorkshire along the innovation value 
chain 
 
Factors West Wales South Yorkshire 
Concentration of 
innovative projects’ 
portfolio and leverage 
on private funds 
Redistribution of funds 
amongst local communities on 
the basis of their size 
Low leverage 
Focus on the high end of the metal 
industry as region’s specialization  
High leverage  
Organisation settings Devolution and absorption of 
the regional development 
agency (as leader of 
development strategies) at the 
beginning of the period 
Creation of the programme directorate 
and of the regional development agency 
(as leader of development strategies) at 
the beginning of the period 
Independence of program manager in 
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the implementation and result based 
relationship with the public 
administration 
Partnerships Partnerships centred on local 
communities and dedicated to 
the programme 
Partnerships pre existing the programme 
and capable of engaging with civil 
society (students) and in long range 
(international) collaborations 
Performance Weak in the period after 
having been the best 
performing UK region as far as 
FDI and manufacturing 
Fastest growth in productivity in the 
period 
 
 
First, the case points to a sharp difference in organisation of the processes through which innovation 
programs are designed and implemented.  In Yorkshire, at the beginning of the programming period, 
the responsibility of designing and implementing the innovation and development strategies was 
delegated to a body outside the public administration: a Regional Development Agency – Yorkshire 
Forward - that is jointly governed by government and business. More specifically, the SY’ s OB1 
programme was managed by a “directorate” that was accountable to the central government in 
London for the programme’s outcomes and was supported – especially for the innovation portion of 
the programme – by Yorkshire Forward. 
 
At the very same time, in WW, the opposite happened with the WDA’s absorption into the public 
administration. As previously stated, the Agency had been the leading force behind a decade long 
phase of industrial development and foreign investment attraction in Wales. This decision appears to 
be due to the wish of the newly established WAG to exercise control on an important lever of 
economic value creation (as Cooke et al, 2000, and before him, Jones – Evans, 1998 and Morgan, 
1997, pointed out and few managers dealing with Finance Wales confirmed in the filed work). As a 
consequence of putting an elected body, the regional assembly  at the centre stage not only of strategy 
design but also of strategy implementation, the political pressures coming from local communities 
increased and a push towards a mere redistribution of resources occurred reducing the focus of the 
programmes.  
The new organisational arrangement, thus, produced a reduction of motivation and accountability. 
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This change coincided with Welsh devolution and yet as Cooke, 2005, noticed, this outcome can not 
be seen as an unavoidable consequence of devolution. It was, in fact, crucial the particular way 
devolution happened – with very moderate public support and weak majorities in the regional 
government – in Wales as opposed to, for instance, Scotland where a stronger policy maker could 
afford a more results oriented strategy.  
 
Another important factor appears to be the difference in terms of the nature of the alliances of 
business, government and research actors that were involved into the implementation of the regional 
innovation strategy.  
The difference was not about the number of partnerships – whereas Wales witnessed a proliferation 
of them – but in their quality and ability to retrieve information on local economy and global 
prespective before making decisions. 
In WW partnerships were constructed ad hoc for the programme as a response to a requirement 
coming from the EC and they were designed to be mechanisms of interactions amongst institutions of 
different levels that need to negotiate where to allocate funds.  
Partnerships were developed through mechanisms that were supposed to guarantee representativeness 
to multiple stakeholders.  
The unexpected outcome was a much slower decision making processes, very little capability of 
partnerships to add value to innovation projects in terms of expertise and a diluition of the resources. 
 
In SY, partnerships were facilitated by the fact that there were organisations that existed before the 
introduction of the programmes and could leverage on a broad basis of firms around research. The 
four main organisations around which the innovation strategy was constructed, composed an informal 
system  that was able – with minimal overlaps and competition – to reach internationally recognized 
competitive advantages in research, to engage regional government on a daily basis, and to outreach 
public opinion.  
Not less interesting even the strategic choice of a smart specialization appears to happen through the 
interactions of the key business and research partners with no imposition from the management of the 
regional development policy. 
In this context, the innovation  hub – Advanced Manufacturing Park - that the government provides 
in order to host main actors of the innovation strategy, is a very hands off contribution of the public 
administration that limits itself to creating a place for skilled organisations to collaborate with each 
other.  
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This is different from what we observed in Spain where less mature industries still call for a presence 
of the region in terms of stimulating networks amongst firms and universities.   
 
**** 
 
An implementation process that is not micromanaged by the public administration and policy makers, 
as well as accountability for results and the quality of  partnerships appear to be, thus, key to 
explaining the performance of the regional innovation policies.  
 
It is no less interesting, however, that the two factors – quality of the organisation through which 
strategies are realized and quality of partnerships – reinforce each other: in the better performing 
region actors that possess the dual knowledge of both research along with the business acumen to 
recognize its potential, appeared to have strengthened the trust and relationship between programme 
managers and the central government thereby according an even greater independence to the 
programme manager. By contrast, in the less efficient region, programme managers appear to be 
made weaker by the obligation to negotiate redistribution of funds with different institutions. 
Consequently, programme managers are more reluctant to engage expert outside partners in the 
implementation of innovation policies. This has resulted in partnerships themselves having become 
less adapt at incorporating information on competitive advantages of the region into the 
implementation processes. 
 
The two cases that we compared are, however, distinguished by a different institutional arrengement. 
In the next chapter we will compare two regions that have the same levels of autonomy from the 
centre. Accountability of programme managers as well as clarity in the allocation of responsibilities 
and presence of places where partnerships develop will, however, also in the next case prove to be 
decisive. This appears to say that the institutions, per se, do not create the difference in performance; 
the organisation and the capability to promote integration amongst different stakeholders do. 
 
  
 176
CHAPTER FIVE - THE ROLE OF DIFFERENT 
ORGANISATION LAYOUTS AND OF THE INNOVATION 
BROKERS IN SPAIN 
 
 
The Spanish case provides a confirmation of the thesis: it does, in fact, appear to be capable to 
explain differences in performance even in a context that is different from the UK one both in terms 
of the economic structure of the two regions and their institutional settings.  
Whereas the two UK regions are heavily focused on mature, research intensive industries, in Spain 
we will investigate two areas where manufacturing is relatively small as opposed to farming, food 
industry and services. If in the UK case, one main difference between the two regions was devolution 
(taking place in Wales at the beginning of the programming period that we are studying, whereas 
Yorkshire continued to be governed by a not elected central government office), in Spain the regions 
that we are observing live of the same institutional settings. And if in UK one consequence of the 
devolution was that in one of the region the management of the innovation strategies was delegated to 
a body outside the public administration and in the other it stayed within the region, in both Spanish 
cases the responsibility stayed with the regional government, 
This, therefore, hints that pre existing institution settings may not be able per se to explain why 
regions may diverge significantly in their development patterns (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 2004). The 
organisation layout of the program management and its capability to resist pressures from local 
lobbies to merely act as a redistributor of resources; the existence of parternships capable to engage 
business, firms, administrations and civil society in the design and draft of the strategies: the 
hypothesis to be tested is that these are the strongest differentiators between the better and the worse 
performing region in the Spanish as well as the UK cases.  
 
The chapter is structured in five different parts that similarly to the  UK correspond to the phases of 
the innovation value chain that we described in chapter two. In the first, we have an overview of the 
regional development policies and of the regional innovation strategies in the two regions.  
In the second, we will consider the economic performance of each region, as well as their 
accumulation of research assets during the recent programming period. In Spain, in fact, we will 
consider the growth of private firms’ R&D assets as a particularly important proxy of success both 
for the reasons that we explained in chapter two (an acceleration of private investors’ investments can 
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be considered per se an indicator of effectiveness of public investments - as in Hall et al, 1999) and 
because the very low level of R&D investments gives a strong priority in Spain to the need to create 
some minimum mass of assests (as for the expectation of the new economic geographers – as in 
Rodriguez-Pose, 2001, and Puga, 2002). Such critical mass appears to be necessary to escape to the 
innovation paradox (Landabaso et al, 2002) that regions with very low research endowments face.  
In the third, we will discuss how  the regions differ in terms of concentration of resources allocations. 
In the fourth, we will consider the differences in the decision making processes that may explain the 
performance disparities and different choices. In the fifth we will observe how innovation hubs can 
make a difference by providing in CYL the platform for developing and maintaining the partnerships 
that can explain part of the differences in performances of the two regional innovation systems.  The 
chapter is concluded by summing up its main findings. 
 
 
5.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE OB 1 PROGRAMME AND 
THE PROBLEM OF SCALE IN THE REGIONAL R&D 
STRATEGIES  
 
In the 2000 – 2006 period CYL and Murcia were both awarded Objective 1 status. This resulted in 
funds which summed up to slightly more than 5 bil euro for Castilla and almost 2 bil euro for Murcia. 
We calculated how important the structural funds are within the structural funds strategy. The 
following chart presents the results of the same analysis we showed in table 4.1 for SY and WW. 
 
Table 5.1 – Importance of structural funds to regional development and innovation strategy, million euro 
 (1) 
Objective 
1 funds 
(total) (7 
years) 
(2)  
GDP 
(2001 
figure) 
(3)  
% (1) / 
(2) 1 
(4)  
OB 1 
measures 
on R&D 
(5) R&D 
expenditures 
region 
(2000) 2 
(6)  
% (4) / 
(5) 2 
(7) R&D 
public 
expenditures 
(2000)  2 
(8) 
% 
(4)/ 
(7)2 
Castilla 
y Leon 
5,033 33,435 15,1% 134 202 66,1% 116 115% 
Murcia 1,918 13,630 14,1% 66 85 78,0% 38 172% 
1 The percentage are of the seven years programme on the yearly figure of GDP and R&D. This gives the maximum 
potential impact given that the expenditures does not have to be uniformly distributed in time. 
Source: Programme complements, Regional Research and Innovation Strategies, Eurostat 
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Similarly to SY and WW the Objective 1 funds are about 2% of the GDP per year (in the seven year 
period). The amount that OB1 can spend in R&D is about two thirds of the entire regional R&D 
expenditure per year and significantly more than the sum that the state and the universities spend in a 
year on research. Therefore as said in the methodological part and at the beginning of the chapter on 
UK, it can be safely assumed that the effect of other public investments are rather small and it is, 
therefore, arguable that the way structural funds programmes are drafted and concretely implemented 
can make a difference in terms of evolution of macro-economic indicators.  
This, also, creates an expectation of structural funds being able to make a difference in terms of 
development as this was confirmed to us during the fieldwork by stakeholders like the president of 
the firms association in CYL129 and the head of the regional development agency in Murcia130. 
Altough the structural funds are similar in size relative to economy’s size, there are, nevertheless, 
differences both between these two cases and the UK ones and between the two Spanish regions 
themselves when we consider the structure of the programmes.  
The following table gives an overall picture of the distribution of funds to different priorities131.  
Graph 5.1 – Distribution of funds amongst priorities, Percent, 2000 – 2006 Objective 1, Castilla Y Leon left and Murcia 
right; 100% = 5.033 Mil Euro CYL; 1.918 Mil Euro Murcia 
 
 
Source: Programming complements of CYL and Murcia, 2004 
                                                 
129   Interview with Valentín Fernández-Soto Vélez, General Director, Consejo Regional de Cámaras Oficiales de 
Comercio e Industria de Castilla y León, Valladolid, 3rd May 2007 
 
130  Interview with Juan A. Aroca, Head of the Innovation Department, Instituto de Fomento de la Region de Murcia, 
Murcia, 14th September 2006  
 
131 It includes also the funds earmarked to instruments called global subsidy. Global subsidy are measures of the 
programmes whose implementation is allocated to an intermediary in the place of the programme managing authority (the 
regional administration). The intermediary are the regional development agencies and, thus, in CYL it is the ADE and in 
Murcia the INFO. 
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CYL and Murcia’s  programmes are different in terms of priorities. Overall, CYL has decided to 
invest heavily on transportation (including the high speed train infrastructure) whereas Murcia has 
selected the environment and, more specifically, the water resources (given the scarcity of it in the 
region) as its main  priority. 
 
The percentages dedicated to priorities concerning competitiveness and innovation can be proxied by 
the sum of the first two priorities and, as mentioned, they are – in percentage of the entire 
programmes - much smaller than the ones that we have seen in UK. If we sum the two priorities, we 
get slightly more than 10% in CYL and 14% in Murcia against the much higher percentages we saw 
in UK - 30% in SY and 42% in WW. Moreover, the measures dedicated in CYL to innovation are 
relatively small and they take slightly more than 3% in Murcia and slightly less in CYL, whereas in 
SY they absorb 19% of the programme and in WW the 16%. These differences reflect a rather broad 
concern on the capability of Objective 1 regions to get more funds that they could possibly spend. In 
fact, in the words of Jose Luis Kaiser Moreiras, Subdirector General de Programación Territorial y 
Evaluación de Programas Comunitarios of the Ministry of the Economy in Madrid “the problem with 
R&D expenditures is that some regions – OB1 regional economies that are still based on traditional 
industries – simply do not have enough firms to demand innovation”. 
 
More specifically the allocation of the funds of the R&D priorities amongst measures CYL and 
Murcia is summarized by graph 5.2. 
Graph 5.2 – Distribution of innovation priority funds amongst measures, Percent, 2000 – 2006, Objective 1, Castilla Y 
Leon left and Murcia right; 100% = 134 Mil Euro CYL; 66 Mil Euro Murcia 
 
 
Source: Programming complements of CYL and Murcia, 2004 
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It appears that – as it was confirmed to us by Maria Jose Bernal Torres132 of the Unit that is 
responsible for OB1 programme at the regional administration – “Murcia is investing a lot in 
information society meant as interventions on ICT applied to public administrations”. CYL, instead, 
is giving priority – as for the indication we got from Francisca de la Fuente Lopez133 that supported 
the drafting of the OB1 programme in CYL – “to human capital, training of researchers and PHDS”. 
The funds that are specifically dedicated to projects that are strictly about R&D are less than 50% 
(thus about 56 mil euro in CYL and 28 mil euro in Murcia) of the total funds allocated to the priority. 
It is evident that, as we mentioned in the introduction, the innovation strategies had to face, in both 
regions, a problem of scale much larger than their colleagues in SY or WW: a problem in terms of 
size  in both  the pre existing research base of the region and the available budget  to counter this 
situation. 
 
The programme structures, however, appear similar, unlike Britain where differences emerged even 
when we compared the mere articulation and wording of the programme. The field work helped us to 
unveil differences in resources allocation patterns that were, in fact, created by the later stage of the 
implementation of the strategy and the concrete choices made in terms of resources allocation. 
 
 
5.2 THE RESULTS: TWO DIFFERENT PATHS TOWARDS 
CONVERGENCE 
 
The two regions share similarities: they both lag behind Spanish and EU averages in terms of income 
per habitant and propensity to invest into R&D. They, in fact, were both assigned an Objective 1 
Status within the 2000 – 2006 programming period and more importantly, they were both influenced 
by the fact that as Daniel Miguel San José – the deputy rector at the University of Valladolid 134 - said 
“they are geographically, economically and culturally peripheries of the country and  suffering a 
substantial brain drain towards Madrid”. More importantly, the share of GDP spent on R&D and the 
                                                 
132 Interview with Maria Jose Bernal Torres, Relation with Servicio de Fondos Europeos, Direccion General de 
Presupuestos y Fondos Comunitarios, Consejeria de Hacienda, Instituto de fomento Región de Murcia, Murcia, 14th 
September 2006 
 
133 Interview with Francisca de la Fuente Lopez, Servicio de Fondos Europeos, Direccion General de Presupuestos y 
Fondos Comunitarios, Consejeria de Hacienda, Junta de Castilla Y Leon, Valladolid, 14th September 2006 
 
134 Interview with Daniel Miguel San José, Vicerrector de Desarrollo e Innovación, Universidad de Valladolid, 
Valladolid, 15th September 2006 
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percentage of R&D expenditures that come from business was practically the same (0,62% as far as 
the first parameter and 42,1% for CYL and 41,9% for Murcia as far as the second). 
 
The differences appear to be a) the possibility for Murcia to grow by leveraging on cheap labour and 
population growth due to immigration, whereas CYL has no alternative but to seek productivity led 
economic growth and b) the presence in CYL of potential leaders (the rectors and academic faculty of 
the most prestigious universities, the management of the multinationals) that any innovation 
strategies may need (see our chapter two and section 2.2.4) and that Murcia is missing. 
 
Against this background two different paths towards economic growth emerge.  
In CYL it was – as for the words of Gregorio Munoz Abado, leader of the innovation strategy at the 
Consejería de Economía y Empleo of Castilla y León that supported the author in the field work135 - 
clear “since the beginning of the last programming period that convergence had to go through an 
increase in productivity and a higher political priority on innovation”.  
In Murcia – according to Rafael Martinez, Director of Innovacion of the Instituto de fomento Región 
de Murcia ( INFO) that was the main reference point of four visits to the region – “less pressure was  
felt due to the possibility to expand its economic base through industries that had a reduced added 
value (especially housing) and cheap labour”. 
 
The results follow consistently with a change of gear for CYL that did not materialize in Murcia. We 
will now consider macroeconomic evidence relative to R&D and innovation and the results of the 
programme themselves. 
 
Firstly, it must be acknowledged that in the next phase CYL will be “phasing in” because it  has 
overcome the threshold of 75% of the average GDP per capita of the fifteen EU regions. Murcia will 
be, instead,  “phasing out” which is the status that applies to the regions whose GDP per capita 
happens to be  still lower than the 75% average GDP per capita of the EU 15 countries and yet higher 
than the 75% of the same measure for the EU 27, and thus  they are said to not qualify any more as a 
“convergence” region for the so called “statistical effect”. In this very strict sense, CYL, therefore, 
achieved its basic development target, whereas Murcia has yet to do so. 
 
                                                 
135 In annex three and five more details of the field work are available. In annex four the interview guides for each 
category of interviewee can be consulted. 
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The graph 5.3 compares the performance of the two regions versus the EU average on GDP per 
capita (the income per habitant is the most important performance indicator of the structural funds 
programmes) for the period during and before the start of the last programming period. 
 
Graph 5.3 – GDP per habitant, EU 15 = 100 
 
 
Source: Eurostat; accessed May 2010 
 
It is interesting to notice that 1999 –  the first year of the 2000-2006 programming period – 
constitutes a turning point for CYL as mentioned in the section where we discussed the antecedent 
conditions of our two cases.  
 
In the four years before 1999 the gap between CYL and the  EU average has stayed largely the same 
and actually – unlike Murcia and the average for both Spain and Spanish OB1 Regions – it has 
slightly increased. The opposite scenario has happened from 1999 onward where there has been a 
convergence of CYL whose rate has consistently outpaced the peers.  
 
More broadly, the table 5.2 considers changes in basic macro economic data of the two regions 
within the group of eight136 Spanish Objective 1 Regions in the 2000 – 2005  period. 
 
 
 
                                                 
136 In fact also Ceuta, Melilla and the Canarias were considered objective 1 regions. However they are not considered – 
because of their size, geography and institutional characteristics – comparable to Castilla y Leon and Murcia.  
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Table 5.2 – Main macroeconomic and population data, Changes in the 2000 – 2005 period, Per cent 
 
Region Gdptot population Gdppc productivity employment rate
Galicia 41,9% 1,0% 40,7% 27,1% 10,5%
Principado de Asturias 39,5% -0,4% 40,1% 21,1% 15,7%
Castilla y León 39,8% 0,2% 39,1% 20,9% 15,4%
Castilla-La Mancha 46,1% 7,4% 35,2% 17,7% 15,5%
Extremadura 43,7% 1,1% 42,1% 25,2% 13,5%
Comunidad Valenciana 44,6% 12,7% 27,6% 14,9% 11,7%
Andalucía 50,6% 5,9% 41,6% 16,3% 22,3%
Región de Murcia 54,4% 13,2% 35,7% 20,3% 13,3%
Average 45,1% 5,1% 37,8% 20,4% 14,7%
 
Source: Eurostat; accessed May 2010 
 
It looks like  the eight regions can easily be divided into two groups with rather different trends: one 
mostly from the North which are characterized firstly by a population size that has been roughly 
stable; and one mainly from the South where the population is increasing (mostly because of 
immigration). CYL belongs to the first together with Galicia, Asturias and Extremadura; and Murcia 
to the second with Castilla – La Mancha, Comunidad Valenciana and Andalucia.  
 
The differences then are reflected by the main economic indicators: total GDP grows more in the 
second group. Murcia tops the lot with 55% growth in the five year and CYL is at the semi last 
position with less than 40%.However, the situation is reversed if we consider GDP per capita and 
even more if we consider productivity, where the differences are particularly large and growth rates 
go from more than 27% in Galicia to less than 15% in the Comunidad Valenciana. More specifically, 
CYL displays a growth rate that is higher than the average for Spanish Objective 1 regions both on 
productivity and employment rate, whereas Murcia lags behind on both.  
 
The differences in the results between the two regions, however, are clearer if we look to another 
indicator that together with productivity is considered relevant when we attempt to evaluate the 
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effects of public investments into R&D: the change in total volumes of R&D investments and, even 
more interestingly, the change in the size of expenditures in R&D coming from enterprises. 
 
Graph 5.4 – R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP, Per cent, 1995 - 2005 
 
Source: Eurostat, INE; accessed May 2010 
 
As the graph shows the trends were rather similar up to 1999. It is the start of the new programming 
period that saw CYL  speed up and Murcia  slow down in the propensity to invest into innovation.  
 
However, it is, once again, interesting to see the evolution of the two regions within the group of 
similarly developed Spanish regions sharing the OB 1 status. The chart below visualizes the 
evolution of the total R&D expenditures in the nine regions as far as the first part (1999 – 2004) of 
the programming period (2000 – 2006) we are studying.  
The picture in recent years seems very different from the one we observed before in the 1995 – 2005 
period (paragraph 1). 
It is rather evident that the regions that start from a higher level of R&D investments are growing 
more than the others and that the final effect is that the differences amongst objective 1 regions end 
up being higher at the end of the period. 
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Graph 5.5 – Total R&D expenditures and percentage changes, 1999 – 2004, Million Euro and per cent 
 
 
Source: Eurostat; accessed May 2010 
 
The distance grows and as a simple proxy of the dispersion within this group, the difference in the 
size of R&D investments between the region that spent more (Andalucia) and the region that spent 
less (Extremadura) doubles in five years (from 436 mil euro in 1999 to 825 mil euro). More 
specifically, the four regions that have increased more and that, in fact, have more than doubled their 
R&D expenditures are the four regions that previously spent more at the beginning of the period: 
Galicia, Comunidad Valenciana, Andalucia and CYL137. The last one has gone from an overall 
spending of almost 200 milion euro to almost 400 milion euro in five years. On the contrary, Murcia 
has been the region that has grown less – 53,5% - after Extremadura. In fact, the correlation between 
the  initial level of investments in R&D and growth rates (+0,51%) is rather strong.   
 
                                                 
137 In fact, the percentage increase of R&D expenditures has been larger in Canarias than in Andalucia, but the island 
regions are not comparable to the other OB1 inland regions. 
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A similar trend is witnessed if we observe private investments as for graph 5.6. The distance between 
the highest and lowest levels of spending more than doubles from 131 mil to 295 mil.  It is even more 
interesting to see what happens to the ratio between private and public investments into R&D. 
 
 
Graph 5.6 – Percentage of private investments on total R&D investments, 1999 – 2004, Per cent 
  
Source: Eurostat; accessed May 2010 
 
 
The general trend, as depicted, is of an increase of the share of private to public investment.  
 
CYL is, however, the region where this increase has been fastest and the contribution of private 
investments to the overall increase of R&D investments has been the highest (71% of the increase in 
the period came from business). Murcia, on the contrary, has witnessed the second sharpest decrease 
in the ratio and has been the region where the percentage of the increase of R&D due to private 
investments has been the lowest (31%). As discussed in chapter two, lower capability of public 
investments to attract private funds on R&D projects is both a cause of lower efficiency of public 
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R&D public investments, but also a sign itself of a lower return on the public investments that have 
been made. 
The capability of OB1 programme in CYL to mobilize private investments was confirmed by the 
field work and the description that entrepreneur like Alfonso Calderón Vergandone138, Owner of 
Cenit Solar, one of the world leader in renewable energies provided about his experience of the 
partnership with the regional government. He, in fact, showed to us how structural funds played an 
essential role to his decision not to leave the region and to increase the fixed investments. 
The difference between the two regions is further demonstrated if we move from the view of the 
regional data to the results of the programme. 
 
Table 5.3 – Comparisons of capability to attract private investments, measure 2.52, 2000/ 2004 
  Murcia Castilla Y Leon 
Payments        4.379.879         34.708.286  
private investments       24.014.908       541.338.951 
private inv./ program payments 5,5 15,6 
Source: Intermediate evaluations 
 
Once again, the comparability is limited to one measure – which is however one of the largest and is 
focused on R&D projects – but the numbers show that the performance of CYL  is three times higher 
than that of Murcia. This result seems consistent with the higher capability of the programme 
managers in CYL to outreach, hence mobilize the region’s industrial and research community. 
 
Different performances of the two programmes and, more specifically, different capabilities to draft 
measures that meet demand from firms and universities are also shown by the absorption rates (speed 
by which the  programmed expenditures get realized). The table below compares by measure actual 
versus expected expenditures in CYL and Murcia.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
138 Interview with Alfonso Calderón Vergandone, Owner, Cenit Solar, Boecillo, 18th April 2008 
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Graph 5.7 – Absorption rates (effective expenditures over expected ones), CYL and Murcia OB 1 Programmes 2000 – 
2006, selected innovation measures, first half (2000-2004) programming period 
 
Source: Intermediate evaluations 
 
The real remarkable piece of information here is the success of CYL in quickly absorbing the 
expenditures on R&D with three out of four measures having been overspent versus the expectations 
for the first part of the expenditure cycle. Murcia is proceeding much more slowly. 
 
Absorption is, as we mentioned, a proxy for the demand that a certain region expresses in an 
investment programme and, thus, it is a sign of a higher consistency between the design of the 
interventions and the concrete characteristics of a certain region. Ultimately, it thus shows higher 
capability to incorporate local knowledge in the choices that are being made by the programme 
manager, whereas such capability is, as we have elaborated in chapter one, crucial to success (see 
Barca, 2009, for instance). 
We will shortly see in the next section that the interviews made clear that this higher consistency is 
due not to the initial, on paper design of the programmes, but to different, concrete choices made 
during the implementation phase of two rather similarly constructed programmes. 
In turn, higher demand means higher expectations and, thus, likely, better multiplication effects of the 
public investments when these expectations are met.  
Similar evidence is provided by the number of individuals that are reached in the two regions. The 
only measure where this indicator is available for both CYL and Murcia is the one on human capital. 
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CYL seems capable to reach – in proportion to the size of the programme – twice as many 
individuals (in fact, the unit cost is half in CYL as opposed to Murcia).The data of the intermediate 
evaluations for the first half of the programming period (2000 – 2004) report that in Murcia, for every 
1 mil euro spent, 200 individuals were reached, where in CYL they were 422.  
As far as jobs creation the indications are less clear: the unit cost for additional job appears higher in 
CYL than in Murcia (see annex ..), however this may be a consequence of investments being more 
focused on positions being more research based, capital intensive position in CYL than in Murcia.  
Overall CYL’s programme appears superior as far as involving business and convincing firms to 
invest more or even alongside the state, and as far as being more consistent with the demand of the 
region’s economy and research base. This, in turn, appears to have made the programme more visible 
and to have created – as the field work recorded – higher expectations.  
The macro and micro evidences appear, then, robust enough to conclude that Castilla did achieve a 
higher returm from its structural funds funded interventions on innovation. This is, however, as we 
saw in the first section of the chapter less due to the overall programme structure and design (which 
is similar in the two cases), and more related to the concrete choices that have been made in the draft 
of the bidding procedures and the project selection when it comes to actually selecting recipient 
firms, research centres and highly skilled individuals. 
This is associated, in our theory, to more credible investment choices and a higher concentration of 
resources in industry, areas, research domain, and niches where the region may have some pre 
existing scale and competitive advantage. 
 
 
5.3 THE DIFFERENCE IN CONCENTRATION OF 
RESOURCES 
 
Our theory is that – industry and the geographic concentration of resources is associated to higher 
efficiency of R&D investments and similar conclusions are reached by country specific literature 
(like in Serrano, 2004) on R&D.  
The resources allocation appear to confirm this expectation. We, therefore, firstly compared the 
distribution of R&D investments with the existing economic structure. We expect that higher 
deviations between the two indicate that stronger preferences have been expressed, whereas in an 
inertial scenario the two breakdowns should be similar with funds allocated according to the different 
size of the industry regardless of their concrete potential for innovation. This potential is, in fact, 
supposed to be different, with manufacturing being traditionally the sector that spends more on R&D. 
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The results show that both regions express an allocation of funds that does not mirror the current 
economic structure. However, CYL choices express a higher concentration, whereas the focus of 
Murcia has recently been diminished. The overall sector allocation – in Murcia and CYL - of R&D 
dedicated public investments is shown in table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.4 – Breakdown of GDP and R&D public investments in the economic sectors by region, as compared to 1999 
breakdown by sectors. 
 Agriculture Commercial Industry Services Construction Other Total 
Murcia        
GDP 2006 4.7% 12.8% 14.3% 33.3% 4.2% 30.7% 100% 
R&D 2006 28.6% 3.4% 49.6% 13.6% 4.8% - 100% 
Castilla y 
Leon 
       
GDP 2006 4.9% 10.9% 16.2% 31.3% 4.3% 32.3% 100% 
R&D 2006 9.7% 3.4% 64.9% 21.9% 0.2% - 100% 
 
Source: Eurostat, and regional databases on R&D expenditures; accessed May 2010 
 
The categories139 considered by the databases are too broad to pick up specific sectors, but the macro 
categories already show that CYL has chosen to concentrate more than 60% of the funds in 
manufacturing where there are, in fact, the most R&D intensive firms and industries although it 
represents about 16% of the economy.  
The choice seems also to stabilize in time with minor changes in the share of different sectors in the 
innovation pie. This mirrors the presence of multinational companies in CYL, which represent – as 
we referred in chapter three on the economic structure of the two regions - a significant share of the 
regional economy that is concentrated in few specific industries – automotive, agro foods, 
pharmaceuticals. 
In Murcia the choices are less clear cut: there is a bias towards agriculture (and more specifically agri 
foods and equipments for agriculture). More recently, there has been a large shift of funds dedicated 
to “services” (up to 43% of total) that reflects the importance given to the “information society” 
                                                 
139 The forms in which the regions of Murcia and CYL separately categorize investments and grants vary along with the 
NACE codes each region classifies its different projects with. However, the two regions make use of four general 
categories in which to allocate their R&D investments: Agriculture, Commerce, Construction, and Industry. CyL’s 
database categorizes the investments and grants as “approved proposals” and “approved subsidies” in comparison to 
Murcia’s “investment” and “grant approved”, respectively. We consider subsidies and grants as measures of public 
investments (to which private co finance may be added).  
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measure and to ICT investments especially in automation of procedures of public administrations and 
in the so called “e government”. The dispersion of the funds is –after all and as we will elaborate – 
the result of a strategy that “was never integrated” as Rafael Martinez Fernandez140, the Director for 
Innovation of the Murcia regional development agency (INFO) acknowledged to us.  
The allocation of funds per geographical areas confirm the pattern of clearer choices being made by 
the programme managers in CYL. The concentration of the funds distribution is higher than the 
concentration of the population with urban, knowledge incentive provinces receiving a  
disproportionately higher share of the funds. The same does not apply to Murcia where dilution takes 
place.  
 
The table that follows proposes a measurement of concentration using two indicators: the comparison 
between the standard deviation in the population distribution amongst provinces and the standard 
deviation in the distribution of R&D funds amongst them; and the average difference between the 
shares of the population and of the grants received by the different provinces. 
 
Graph 5.8 – Distribution by city (municipality) of R&D grants, Percentage, 2006  
Source: INFO Database; accessed June 2010 
 
The first two values say that the population tends to be more concentrated in Murcia than in CYL, 
and yet the funds tend to be distributed in a more concentrated way in the latter  region. The average 
                                                 
140 Interview with Rafael Martinez Fernandez, Director of Innovacion, Instituto de fomento Región de Murcia, Murcia, 
14th September 2006 
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absolute value of the difference between the share of the population and the funds is higher the more 
dissimilar the distribution of funds and population and, again, say that resources allocation patterns 
reflect stronger choices in CYL than in Murcia141. 
 
The differences in terms of preferences is further clarified if we consider the weight that the two 
regions have given to the most urbanized areas. In CYL Valladolid, which hosts the largest 
university, has received almost half of the innovation grants although the capital accounts for one 
fifth of the population. In Murcia the situation is reversed where one third of the capital has been 
distributed to a city where almost half of the population lives. The same applies to Carategena, the 
host city of the second university of the region and thus, although Cartagena and Murcia have more 
than 70% of the population and the entire university base, they get less than half of the funds. 
 
Graph 5.9 – Distribution by province of R&D grants, Percentage, 2000 - 2004 
 
Source: Mid Term evaluation OB1 Programme CYL 
 
The pattern is confirmed if we observe the smallest local community: the most rural area of Murcia – 
Archena - receives almost twice as much of the share of the R&D funds as opposed to its share of the 
                                                 
141 The analysis does, in fact, discount some limits of a) consistency: in Murcia we are considering a sample of the 
municipalities, in CYL the provinces that cover the entire region; and of b) completeness: in Murcia we only have the 
numbers for 2006, in CYL some of the projects have not been assigned to a specific area. 
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region’s population, whereas the smallest locl community of CYL gets a share of funds which is 
smaller than its share of population. 
CYL choices, in fact, appear even more tailored to each of the province’s characteristics if we 
consider the specific measures of priority 2. Valladolid, in fact, seems to specialize itself in R&D 
infrastructure projects where it gets almost 90% of the funds (within measure 2.53). Salamanca, 
instead, gets the largest share of money to be spent in tertiary education. 
The highest geographical concentration is an “explicit strategic choice of CYL regional government” 
as the independent evaluator of the OB1 programme, Olga Ogando Canabal142 from the University of 
Valladolid, told us. 
 
Concentration of choices is, however, also reflected in the selection of the main actors with whom to 
implement the innovation strategies. This applies to the technology centres that are being financed  in 
each region. 
In CYL, , the beneficiary technology centres are much fewer and their actions seem more 
streamlined. In CYL, in fact, there are six technology centres, whereas in Murcia, which is less than 
half of the size of CYL, there are ten (which is a really large number considering that in the entire 
country their number is 64). Moreover in CYL there is a further concentration amongst them due to 
CIDAUT (Transport and Energy Research and Development Foundation) which  specializes in 
mechanics and has approximately the same revenues (17 mil euro  in 2007) and the same number of 
employees (365) of the other five put together.  
 
The field work143 unveiled the results that are associated to these two different approaches.  
Since there are fewer technology centres in CYL , it also means that they are better supported. They 
are all housed in their own premises144. This may better explain the results in CYL, because four out 
of six of the centres in CYL get half or more of their revenues from the market (the less solid of the 
parks seem to be ones that are trying to focus on ICT and biotechnology, which are innovation areas 
that are not close to the core of the economy of CYL). However, one of the main factor for success 
has been that in CYL the technology centres were born around a number of research and business 
initiatives that, , like in UK,  pre existed the structural funds aids and that, therefore, “will go ahead 
                                                 
142 Interview with Olga Ogando Canabal, Departamento de Economía Aplicada, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y 
Empresariales, Universidad de Valladolid (Evaluator of the IOP) , , Valladolid 3rd May, 2007 
143 See annexes three, four and five 
144 Whereas, on the contrary, two of the smallest – shipping and  energy – have, very recently, established their premises 
in the technology park 
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even when the OB1 programme will finish” as in the words of CIDAUT’s Director Juan Carlos 
Estévez145. 
 
In Murcia, instead, the initial objective to achieve profitability in a 5-years period, has now been 
“abandoned” – as we were told by Rafael Martinez Fernandez146 - Director of Innovation of the 
Regional Development Agency (INFO) of Murcia - told us “and although the funding system of the 
centres has changed147, they  still continue to depend on public money. 
 
The justification that a privatised centre will not invest in ameliorating its technological expertise and 
in long term projects that we collected in some of the interviews in Murcia, seems to be contradicted 
by the typology of investments successfully carried out by CYL’s technology centres. But again, the 
concentration of thin resources on competitive advantageous sectors  may have been crucial. In short, 
although we are still discussing a (cohesion) policy that has amongst its objectives the redistribution 
of resources, we are still witnessing different strategies within the same group of OB 1 regions. 
Whereas in Murcia there is also a redistribution internal to the region, in CYL there has, instead, been 
a strong preference in terms of concentrating resources in industry and areas where there was already 
a pre-existing research base. 
 
The interesting finding is that whereas dilution was associated in the UK comparisons to higher 
political pressure of local communities on the newly established regional government, in the Spanish 
cases it is the presence in CYL of a strong political priority on R&D that has made possible more 
rational choices. 
 
 
 
                                                 
145 Interview with Juan Carlos Estévez, Director, CIDAUT, Transport and Energy research and Development Foundation, 
Boecillo, 22nd April 2009 
 
146 Interview with Rafael Martinez Fernandez, Director of Innovacion, Instituto de fomento Región de Murcia, Murcia, 
14th September 2006 
 
147 In the past, there were direct funds from INFO and regional ministries. Now each centre has a plan, and the funding is 
provided on a project-based system in which the centre applies for grants, scholarships and research projects, coming both 
from INFO, Fundacion Seneca, regional and national ministries. Moreover, the centres are also funded through “by-pass” 
methods based on programmes which fund SMEs to acquire technological advice and assistance. 
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5.4 THE ROLE OF THE ORGANISATION OF DECISION 
MAKING  
 
The differences between the two regions as far as the government of the R&D and innovation system 
seem to be both in terms of institutional settings and of organisational layouts.  
In brief, we will see that the two regions differed mostly in terms of strategy execution as it is 
recognized by external institutional observers. CYL managed to be identified by the EC a benchmark 
in the use of R&D regional led strategies. In fact, the European Trend Chart on Innovation148, cited 
CYL as the “region most committed to R&D … by reinforcing regional guidelines around traditional 
sectors such as farming products, wood and furniture, mechanics, textile, natural stone, automotive 
components and promoting new emerging sectors such as biotechnology and aeronautics industry.” 
Murcia is, instead, believed to present some structural problems in approaching innovation: this was, 
after all, confirmed by the same Spanish Ministry of Economy and, more specifically, by Mr. 
Moreiras’s team that we mentioned before as the head of the department that follows the structural 
funds funded programmes meant to foster innovation149.  
 
What did produce this divergence in approach between two regions, that at the beginning of the 
period were characterized by similar problems in terms of insufficient scale of research assets, and by 
expenditures on R&D – both total and private – and that were almost identical when measured  
relatively to the size of their economy? The difference appears to be mostly about a specific political 
decision that CYL has taken, as well as the presence of leadership in the better performing region of 
the political, business and research that could support such a strategy. 
 
We will now investigate the independent variables that according to our theory, should  account for  
the differences in the results. In the process we will describe the decision making and implementation 
processes, as well as the approach to partnerships whose high quality is supposed – per our 
hypothesis – to be a pre-condition to a successful programme. 
 
Firstly, it is worthwhile to mention that – unlike the UK case - the regional governments of CYL and 
Murcia share similar institutional frameworks, and they are progressively acquiring new 
competences. More specifically, they have both achieved the power to manage education and 
                                                 
148 European Trend Chart on Innovation: Annual Innovation Policy Trends and Appraisal Report 2004-2005. 
149 Personal interviews with the team of the Ministry of Economy in Madrid which is responsible for structural funds 
expenditures. See annexes for names and dates. 
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universities. This last feature impacts the decision making processes in research. As a consequence, 
the OB 1 programmes are managed by regional governments.  
 
The similarity of institutional settings, however, does not prevent the two regions from taking two 
rather different routes towards the design and the implementation of OB 1 programmes and of the 
innovation strategies. The main difference between CYL and Murcia is in terms of a different degree 
of fragmentation in the decision making process and of a different priority that the regional 
government attaches to innovation strategies.  
 
Murcia’s main actors of strategy design 
 
As far as Murcia, the recent law (2007) and reorganisation (October 2008) of the regional 
government acknowledges that the problem for the entire period we have observed (2000 – 2006) 
has, mostly, been one of lack of coordination when it comes to both the design and deployment of the 
strategy. In fact, these recent moves reunified at least two of the three parts of the strategy – 
“research” and “innovation” – by creating a new ministry called Consejeria de Universidades, 
Empresa y Investigation from which both the targeted measures of the firms and the ones targeted by 
the universities depend. The decision has, basically, been to forgo the difficult search of a balance 
between the power of the Ministry for Education and the Ministry for Industry that has escaped – as 
we will shortly see two different reorganisations – and to, instead, merge the two. 
 
The new approach seems to also point out that the Region has realized that successful innovation 
strategies are even more important than other policies that are within the portfolio of the ministries. 
Even in this new situation, however, the third part of innovative policies – the so called “Information 
Society” which is mostly about the introduction of ICT in the public administration – remains outside 
the innovation framework and, in fact, is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy. 
Anyhow, the effort of coordination has been recognized as indispensable and we were told during the 
field work by the new director general of the Consejeria de Universidades, Empresa y Investigation - 
Eduardo Osuna Carrillo150 who was called from the University of Murcia with the very purpose of 
delivering the reorganisation that, in fact, “the regional government of Murcia recognized the 
absolute importance to gradually achieve the highest possible coordination of all institutional actors 
involved in the deployment of the research and innovation strategy”. 
                                                 
150 Interview with Edoardo Osuna Carrello, Director General de Universidades y Politica Cientifica, Region de Murcia, 
Murcia, 18th May 2009 (see annex three) 
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In Murcia the governance of innovation has gone, in fact, through a number of transformations that 
were not always designed as a coherent plan meant to achieve some pre-conceived model. The 
innovation strategy of 2003 – 2006 was designed by the Ministry for Industry  - Consejeria de 
Economia, Industria e Innovacion; the 2007 – 2010 strategy was written by the ministry in charge of 
education, universities and culture - Consejeria de Educacion y Cultura.  
 
In both cases the governance was the result of reorganisations introduced by specific laws few years 
before the period to which the strategy was dedicated. This means that the first organisational layout 
operated approximately since the start of the 2000 – 2006 period and that the second has governed 
the choices and their implementation in the second half of it. 
 
The common trait between the first and the second period has been the lack of integration between 
innovation strategies for firms and universities. However, the two governance regimes were also very 
different.  
The first model was led by an approach centred on firms, led by the Ministry of economic 
development and, operationally, by the RDA – Instituto de Fomento (INFO). Moreover, in the 2003 – 
2006 plan, there was a specific body supposed to coordinate activities: the Council of Science and 
Technology - Consejo de Ciencia Y Tecnologia – which was aimed to combine the four ministries - 
education and culture, industry and environment but also healthcare and agriculture and water, in the 
same institution. In addition, the President of the Region was supposed to be also the head of this 
council. 
 
 
The strategy for 2007 – 2010 was, on the contrary, the product of the Ministry of education, 
universities and culture, whereas the real author of the document was the Foundacion Seneca, which 
is an agency that  similar to the INFO, is supposed to advise the Ministry on all major choices.  
The shift from one minister to the other carried out - amongst other consequences - a drastic change 
in the focus of the strategy that has altered the priority from supporting firms and a broader concept 
of innovation, to one concentrated on aiding universities and more codified research.  
More importantly, however, the plan became even less coordinated in the 2007 – 2010 period as 
opposed to the previous one because – as we were said by Aurelio Jiménez Romero151, Independent 
                                                 
151 Interview with Aurelio Jiménez Romero, Independent Evaluator Murcia OB 1 Programme 2000 – 2006, Business 
Development Director, Red2Red Consultores S.L., Murcia, 14th April 2008 
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Evaluator of the Murcia’s  OB 1 Programme 2000 – 2006, “the above mentioned council meant to 
supervise overall strategy was replaced by a Commission – Comision Interdepartmental de Ciencia, 
Tecnologia e Innovacion – that was ranked at a lower, more administrative level”.   
 
The falilure of any attempt to integrate explains – as we said before mentioning the interview - the 
most recent move that appears to be very bold: instead of making the two main ministries – industry 
and education - agree, the new law merges them into a larger ministry with a fully fledged 
institutional integration. 
 
The causes of the fragmentation of the decision making are – according to few programme managers 
like Antonio Jose Mula Gomez152, head of the department resposnible for universities and research at 
the regional Administration that we interviewed – “mostly explained by the absence of a real history 
of research activities in Murcia, and lack of leadership: after all two of the Universities have been 
founded after 1996 and no lrge companies was engaged into the draft or the implementation of the 
strategy”. Sub optimal lay-out of the decision making appeared to explain most of the problems of 
the innovation strategies in Murcia:  
 
1. the very late start up of both the technology and the science park, which was delayed by 
conflicts between the two ministries, as well as conflicts amongst different local communities 
contending the location;  
2. the proliferation of the research centres with a further dilution of the research base;  
3. more generally, an approach of universities, on one, side, and firms, on the other, that only 
established a relationship when there was a specific demand from firms, or of some specific 
know how to be supplied by universities (and intermediated by their of oficina de 
transferencia de los resultados de la investigacion - OTRI); 
4. the absence of clear choices in terms of industries and/ or scientific domains to which 
available funds should be allocated as we mentioned in the previous section 4. 
 
This lack of integration is also reflected in the approaches, organisational culture, and lastly, results 
of the two bodies that were – in different periods of time – in charge of the innovation strategy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
152 Interview with Antonio Jose Mula Gomez, Jefe de Servicio de Universidades, Direccion General de Universidades, 
Consejeria de Universidades Empresa e Investigacion, Region de Murcia, Murcia, 18th May 2009 
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Murcia main actors of strategy implementation 
 
The 2003 – 2006 innovation strategy was centred around – like in our two UK Regions, Wales and 
Yorkshire - the Regional Innovation Agency INFO -  Instituto de Fomento de la Region de Murcia.  
INFO’s mission is the “development of SMEs in Murcia by means of economic promotion, 
investment, raising, elimination of obstacles, and the establishment of an environment favouring 
competitiveness”153. As such INFO is supplying a complete “package” of services that range from 
networking to consulting154.  
 
INFO - whose total revenues (including grants from the regional government) have been 38.8 M€ 
(46.5% for R&D) in 2007 and which has  around 100 employees – is, therefore, similar in functions 
and services to Yorkshire Forward and to the Agencia de Desarrollo Econonomico (ADE) of CYL. 
However, the difference is that, unlike YF in Yorkshire and ADE in Castilla Y leon, INFO is  totally 
public and, thus, all of its employees are all civil servants. 
More over as we already mentioned INFO works in partial competition with the Seneca Foundation, 
whereas in CYL the RDA concentrates all of the most important functions of the innovation strategy. 
This will result – according to what Rafael Martinez, Director of Innovation at INFO referred to this 
author - in “a decreased incentive for employees to reach targets and also unclear levers for 
responsibility of the final results”155. 
 
Fundación Séneca is the institution that shares the responsibility of implementing innovation 
programmes with INFO and it, in fact, had the ultimate responsibility to draft and follow up on the 
2007 – 2010 strategy. It is - with approximately ten employees - a much smaller organisation. Séneca 
was founded by the Government of the Autonomous Region of Murcia, “for the promotion of 
scientific research and technological development and know-how in the region.”156 The organisation 
is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and Culture, and acts much like INFO (with the 
Ministry of Industry and Environment), as an operating arm of the regional government’s 
department.  
                                                 
153 Qué es el INFO. Instituto de Fomento Región de Murcia (INFO)  
http://www.ifrm-murcia.es/contenido/info/queesing.html 
154 In particular, INFO is managing at the moment the following innovation programmes:  
R&D support to SMEs (covering 60% of expenses, including equipment); Technology transfer support (covering 50%, 
consulting costs); Implementation of innovation (40%, personnel); R&D Unit development (40%, equipment, personnel); 
ICT development (40%, implementation of ICT); Technology-based companies (40%, investments). 
Moreover, INFO supports programmes for the access to financial instruments (financial management, financial 
guarantees), internationalisation, support to family businesses. 
155 Personal interview with INFO (see annexes) 
156 Presentación. Fundación Seneca. http://www.f-seneca.org/seneca/html/inicio.htm  
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According to its mission, the organisation supports: the appropriate environments that would help 
promote scientific and technological advancements in the region, proper collaborative efforts 
between universities and research centres and the private sector, innovation and competitiveness and 
scientific dissemination and diffusion.157   
However, Seneca officers come mostly from University and substantially Séneca’s main concerns are 
– in the words of its Managing Director, Juan Antonio Sanchez Martinez - to improve the position of 
the researchers as for its declared mission:“the education of researchers after the attainment of a 
degree, and the attempt of attracting and incorporating the doctorate level in the firm.”158  
 
The field work has, in fact, confirmed that Seneca’s organisational culture tends to be very focused 
on university, and rather far from industry. This choice was made explicit to us during interviews.  
Our hypothesis is that this attitude is both the consequence and the cause of the lack of integration 
between business and research which is  reflected into the organisation of governance that we have 
just mentioned.  
 
One of the main concerns of the agency is the relevant brain drain that the region suffers. In the 
interviews with the director of Seneca, it also appears that the regional funds  apparently aim to 
further the education of those at the doctorate level, whereas the national funds are intended – again 
in Mr. Martinez’s view - “to collect the results of these investments and prevent the money spent in 
education from being dispersed otherwise.”159 The foundation is also engaged with “educating its 
population, and also in assuring that its most talented academics are kept in the region”. The entire 
approach is oriented towards fostering research as a mostly cultural dimension. 
Seneca handles approximately 70% of public investments in basic research. One important factor 
regarding the dispersal of these public investments comes with the classification of the type of 
research done: basic or applied. In order to receive financial support, the application of basic research 
activities must fit into the mould set out in the agency’s definition, which envisages – in the view 
expressed by Mr. Martinez that “applied research is defined on the necessities of the firm, while basic 
research comes from the researcher’s initiative. Basic research is entirely financed by public funding, 
while applied research is co-financed with firms.”160  
                                                 
157 Presentación. Fundación Seneca. http://www.f-seneca.org/seneca/html/inicio.htm 
158 Interview with Juan Antonio Sanchez Martinez, Fundación Séneca. Murcia, 28 May 2007. 
159 Interview with Juan Antonio Sanchez Martinez, Fundación Séneca. , Murcia 28 May 2007 
160 Interview with Juan Antonio Sanchez Martinez, Fundación Séneca. Murcia 28 May 2007 
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Interviews at Seneca displayed some problems in dealing with European funds. Aside from what is 
seen as a quantitatively small support from Structural Funds, Seneca corporate culture appears to be 
not consistent with the nature of the projects that structural funds tend to finance. Since the 
Commission requests that predetermined specifications are written explaining the way in which funds 
will be used, those at the agency see themselves as being often excluded from these sources. 
According to those at the foundation, it is difficult to set out predetermined projects for the next 
programming period since “this is not the way science works.”161 The scientific and technological 
priorities change continuously, as experienced within the most recent programming period. 
However, as a partial contradiction one interesting note was the level of influence placed on 
researchers by the regional ministry. As a result, this influence often plays a role – as Mr. Martinez 
suggested - in “structuring the money in directions that reflect the ministry’s priorities.”162 
The focus of Seneca on researchers and, more specifically, the creation and maintenance of 
researchers’ jobs is reflected in some of the results we showed before: less clear cut choices in terms 
of industry and research domain, less capability to mobilize private investments 
 
The Murcia’s innovation system is completed by a complex web of institutions163. However Mr. 
Rafael Martinez of INFO revealed that the operations closed by these financial vehicles were fewer 
than budgeted, where the innovative nature of the financed projects was not always clear 164. 
 
Castilla Y Leon main actors of strategy design 
 
The design and the implementation of the R&D strategy in CYL is – vis a vis Murcia - characterized 
by a strong priority placed on research in the last programming period.  
As mentioned the public investments in R&D were similar to the ones we found in Murcia (as for the 
evidence in chapter 3) at the beginning of the programming period in 2000. However, by the end of 
the period the regional administration increased its propensity to invest in research even beyond the 
                                                 
161 Interview with Juan Antonio Sanchez Martinez, Fundación Séneca. Murcia, 28 May 2007 
162 Interview with Juan Antonio Sanchez Martinez, Fundación Séneca, Murcia, 28 May 2007 
163 They include: the entrepreneurship centres and incubators of Murcia (CEEIM) and Cartagena (CEEIC); the technology 
Park of Fuente Alamo (with MTorres) of which INFO owns 30% of the capital which is still largely unoccupied; the 
science Park of Murcia (with local public Universities) which was still to be opened at the end of the programming period 
we are studying; the technological centres that, as we anticipated, appear to be not clearly focused in terms of sectors to 
follow. Moreover, INFO has established a number of bodies which are intended to financially support innovative SMEs 
and more specifically: a)  Invermur whose objective is to provide seed capital and risk capital; b) Undemur which is a 
mutual guarantee society for SMEs; c) Murcia Emprende which is supposed to operate as a public-private venture capital 
company with the participation of INFO and three local banks (Cajamurcia, Caja Ahorro del Mediterraneo and Cajamar).  
 
164 Interview with Rafael Martinez Fernandez, INFO, Murcia, 19th May 2009. 
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structural funds pot. By 2005 CYL used to spend a percentage of its own total that was the highest 
amongst Spanish regions as shown by table 5.6.  
Table 5.5 – Percentage of regional administration budget spent on R&D, 2005 
 
REGION % 
Castilla y Leòn 2,30%
Madrid 1,67%
Paìs Vasco 1,37%
Navarra 1,10%
Andalucìa 1,00%
Galicia 0,80%
C. Valenciana 0,77%
Aragòn 0,70%
Murcia 0,70%
Asturias 0,60%
Catalana 0,50%
Castilla-La Mancha 0,40%
Rioja 0,37%
Extremadura 0,30%
Islas Baleares 0,20%
Islas Canarias 0,10%
Cantabria 0,03%
 
Source: Castilla y Leon, Regional Innovation Strategy, 2007 - 2010 
 
Such a rise in R&D within the portfolio of the region can also be seen a consequence of better results 
coming form the management of the OB1 programme that in turn appear to be associated with better 
management. However it works also the other way around with a strong priority and a strong political 
leadership being driver of more focus and better results. 
 
As far as the 2000 – 2006 programming period, the formal line of decision making of the R&D 
strategy in CYL is rather simple:  
 
1. The commission for coordination of Science and Technologies Policies - Commission de 
Coordination de Ciencia Y Tecnologia  - is responsible for coordinating all investments in 
science and technology and is, also, responsible for designing the strategy,  defining its 
structure in programmes and measures,  allocating the funds amongst different objectives,  
evaluating the results, and adjusting the allocation of funds accordingly. The president of the 
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Commission is the president of the region which is an indicator of how high of a priority  
R&D is in the portfolio of the Region’s policies. Almost all other ministries (and the director 
general) sit on the commission.  
The coordination is, however, made more effective by the fact that the president of the Region 
delegates most of decisions to the secretary of the Commission, Mr. Juan Casado Canales165 
and his assistant Mr. Gregorio Munoz Abado who was also the main source of the field work 
in CYL that this research developed. These two individuals have been considered the leaders 
of the regional innovation strategies since their inception in 1997. This reinforces a strong 
leadership on most important strategic choices.  
The coordination is intended to become even more pervasive vis a vis the innovation and 
economic community of the region when the council for science and technology (consejo 
assessor de cienca y tecnologia) is established. The council is still not working and is 
supposed to be representative of all social and political partners of the region. 
 
2. Underneath the junta there is the real implementation core of the R&D policies: ADE – 
which still stands for  Agencia de Desarrollo Econonomico (RDA) although the name has 
been recently changed to Agencia de Inversiones Y Servicios - and the various bodies that are 
owned by ADE (ADE Financiacion, IBERAVAL, ADE Capital Sodical, ADEUROPA, 
Gesturcal).  
 
3. ADE and its subsidiaries, in turn, coordinate – in various fashions – with five different 
typologies of organisations that complete the picture: three technology parks; six technology 
centres; four science parks; eight laboratories and investigation centres; three business 
innovation centres. 
 
On a more informal plane – as Professor Olga Ogando Canabal, team leader of the work group of the 
University of Valladolid that conducted the independent evaluation of the Operational Programme, 
said 166 - “the presence of a few national level leaders of each of the worlds – regional administration, 
                                                 
165 Mr Canales has been since 2001, Secretary of the Science and Technology Co-ordination Commission; since 2007, 
Commissioner for Science and Technology, and Director General of Universities and Research; from 2003 to 2007,  
Director General of Industry and Technological Innovation; and from 1996-2007, Head, Innovation Division of the 
Regional Development Agency ADE. Moreover he has been in charge of the elaboration and implementation of all 
regional innovation strategies for Castilla Y Leon: the Regional Technology Plan 1997-2000, and the two regional 
R&D&I Strategies (2002-06 and 2007-13). 
 
166 Interview with Professor Olga Ogando Canabal, Departamento de Economía Aplicada, Facultad de Ciencias 
Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Valladolid, Murcia, 3rd May 2007 
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university, business – whose interactions are necessary for innovative projects to happen, simplified 
the decision making process” and created an informal dialogue amongst these leaders who are 
oriented to solve problems and find opportunities. 
 
Castilla Y Leon main actors of strategy implementation 
 
As Dr. Carmen Verdejo Rebollo, Head of the Innovation Department of ADE Inversiones y Servicios 
(Agencia de Desarrollo Economiquo Inversiones y Servicios de Castilla y León) told us the agency is 
the “principal promoter of development in the economic activity and the system of productivity in 
CYL.”167 One of its main activities is the distribution of regional funds to firms. All money received 
by the region passes through the agency before being dispersed to individual enterprises.  The agency 
holds offices in each of the sub-districts in the region of CYL, assuring that its overall objective is 
implemented in all areas of its jurisdiction.  
 
These objectives include168 a number or rather general purposes that appear characterized by a more 
strategic approach than the ones we mentioned as far as INFO that seem to provide services on 
demand.  
In fact, the RDA works much like a full-service strategic consulting firm. It not only acts as an outlet 
for the region’s businesses to obtain funding, but it also works to promote and sustain 
competitiveness for all firms.  
Since its establishment in 1989, the agency has been involved with the objectives set out in the 
regional strategy169 produced by the Junta de Castilla y León. Although its programmes may be 
facilitated independently, it has a close working relationship with the regional government. 
Consequently, this collaboration has established various institutions and centres helping with the 
goals set forth in each regional strategy.  
ADE is a public body, functionally dependent on the Consejeria de Economia y Empleo and consists 
of different organisations: 
                                                 
167 Interview with Carmen Verdejo Rebollo Jefe del Departamento de Innovación and Maria Lopez, ADE Inversiones y 
Servicios (Agencia de Inversiones y Servicios de Castilla y León), Valladolid, 22nd April 2009 
 
168 Objectives of the ADE include - as per the description at http://www.ade.jcyl.es: “a) fortifying the weaving of 
business, by means of an increase in the creation of businesses and the promotion of an entrepreneurial spirit; b) 
favouring an increase in the size of businesses, by means of professionalization and consolidation, and by the innovation 
in its processes and products and inter-business cooperation; c) designing sector politics with spatial attention to the 
production sectors with a significant presence and high repercussion for productivity”.  
 
169 The most recent being the Regional Scientific Research, Technological Development & Innovation Strategy of Castilla 
y León 2007-2013 (2007). Junta de Castilla y León. 
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(1) The main one is ADE itself that changed, as mentioned, its name to Agencia de Inversiones Y 
Servicios: the new name implies a role which seems more focused on the implementation than 
in the design of the strategy; in fact, as opposed to Seneca or INFO in Murcia, but also 
Yorkshire Forward in SY which are the informal owners of the regional strategy on 
innovation, ADE is not involved into the strategy drafting exercise; the ADE is a public body 
although its roughly 200 employees have a contract that is substantially similar to the contract 
of civil servants (high security, low variability of salaries, ..); amongst other functions ADE 
has the rather pivotal role of developing and maintaining the technology parks and half of its 
workforce are engaged in this task; in fact the firm is going to increasingly integrate within its 
functions Gesturcal which is the owner of the industrial parks;  
(2) ADE Financiacion, SA is the owner of Iberava that is in charge of distributing various 
products insuring from defaults the banks providing loans to innovative firms (and thus 
making loans more accessible and cheaper) and Sodical that is supposed to provide risk 
capital  especially to spin offs; ADE Financiacion staffs 20 employees; 
(3) ADEUROPA has 40 employees, it is in charge of supporting firms and universities seeking  
grants for supporting R&D projects and of internationalizing them mainly by promoting 
exports and attraction of investments. 
 
The difference between the two regions is, therefore,  a clearer distribution of responsibilities and 
also stronger leadership of the RDA as the main implementer of the regional innovation strategy. 
This is reflected by the very distribution of OB 1 funds amongst bodies responsible for the 
implementation, summarized by table 5.7. 
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Table 5.6 – Distribution of R&D measures by beneficiary (i.e. body responsible for implementation), OB 1 Programmes 
2000 - 2006 
CASTILLA Y LEON MURCIA 
Beneficiary Measures Managed 
amount 
(mil euro) 
% of 
total 
Beneficiary Measures Managed 
amount 
(mil euro) 
% of 
total 
ADE (regional 
development 
agency) 
2.11, 
2.52, 
2.53 
88,4 66,2% INFO 
(regional 
development 
agency) 
2.52, 
2.54, 
2.55 
18 27,3% 
Ministry of 
family (with 
education and 
healthcare) 
2.7 41,7 31,2% Ministry of 
agriculture 
2.12, 2.2, 
2.3 
19,8 30% 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
2.2 3,4 2,5% Ministry of 
Economy 
2.73 28,1 42,6% 
1 Together with Ministry of Education 
2 Together with Ministry of Labour 
3 Together with Ministry of Industry 
Source: Programming documents 
 
It is evident that in CYL there is a higher concentration of resources on the RDA. Meanwhile in 
Murcia, INFO  manages less than 30% of the funds and the largest beneficiary happens to be the 
Ministry of Economy which is outside the arrangement between the Ministry of Industry and 
Ministry of Education for the governance of the innovation strategy that we have observed in this 
section. 
 
Like in the UK, the less efficient region appears to make a larger use of the public administration as a 
decision maker. This may be the consequence of an environment that may be more or less focused on 
the creation of opportunities on the basis of evidence: when this attitude does not emerge, the public 
administration fills the vacuum with its formal impartiality. 
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5.5 THE ROLE OF PARTNERSHIPS 
 
The specific literature on Spain’s regional development seems to buy the argument of the need of 
regional innovation systems and, thus, of partnerships and agents promoting such alliances for 
innovation (see for instance, Torrejón, 2008).  
These arguments appear similar to those that we introduced in chapter 2 when we described the 
“chain” by which a regional system produces innovation.   
 
The approach to the selection of the implementers of the strategy and to the role of partnerships in 
our two regions will be described by referring to the institutions that act as hub of the interactions 
amongst the various actors of the innovation strategy and, more specifically, to a) the technology 
parks that had an important role in matching business and research in Spain, b) the offices that 
Spanish universities developed in order to market their research product and, then, c) a number of 
companies that we interviewed and that helped to qualify the approaches to partnerships in the two 
regions.  
The Spanish case provides, thus, the possibility to focus on the effectiveness of the place, of the 
mechanism by which ideas, technologies, and business models meet each other and leverage on each 
other which is also the core of the argument of the mainstream endogenous growth theory in Arrow 
(1962) and Romer (1986) whose theoretical premises are the starting point of this research.   
 
5.5.1 The technology park in Castilla y Leon 
 
The technology parks are seen as the most effective tool to promote, maintain, and leverage upon 
partnerships amongst universities, firms, and administrations. The country – since the 1980s – has 
developed a number of technology parks with the help of respective regional governments, 
universities, private businesses, and development agencies. 
The importance of the parks is remarked by a study of the Association of the Scientific and 
Technology Park (APTE – Association de Parques Cientificos Y Tecnologicos de Espana): the parks 
employ an increasing share of the total employment in R&D sectors (5% in 2001 – 6% in 2005) and 
the productivity meant as the ratio between total turnover and number of people employed seems to 
be more than 50% higher (134,000 euro versus 83,000) than the general one for Spain. The study 
shows that such  productivity is also higher than that of the UK (107,000 euro), Finnish (116 000 
euro) or American (122 000 euro) economies. 
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Spain, since the 1980s, was one of the first countries to understand how important Information 
Communication Technologies (ICT), in particular, and research, in general, is to economic 
development that may be not only based on a competitive advantage of cost and sustainable in the 
long run. One of the characteristics of Spain’s strategy was the focus on technology parks. These 
infrastructures were thought, since the beginning, to operate both as a place for firms and research 
centres to meet and to share resources, and also to provide them a number of services. 
Within this scenario, CYL has literally pioneered some of these concepts and has, therefore, been 
imitated. CYL’ s  technology parks are, therefore: 
 
1. Boecillo Technology Park (Parque Tecnologico de Boecillo); this is, by and large, one of the 
main actors of the research strategy in CYL; it was founded in 1992 and since then has 
accumulated specific know how and as a result has constantly increased the number of people 
employed, the number of firms and the turnover; 
2. the park of Leon completed in 2004: and 
3. the park of Burgos still in development. 
 
The Boecillo Technology Park  was one of the very first technology parks constructed in Spain and 
Europe. In fact, it gained mentions in various reports of the EC including the report to the European 
Spring Council 2008 where the committee of the regions mentioned CYL as a best practice for 
having promoted a technology centred cluster. 
 
The decision to build a park dedicated to technology while focusing on the sectors most important to 
the region – specifically, transport and agriculture – began in 1988. The technology park was 
authorised by the Junta de CYL, in 1990, and was inaugurated in 1992. The park, as a whole, was 
designated as a Sociedad Anónima which is similar to the structure of a private limited company in 
the United Kingdom. The technology park is a true collaborative effort by private business (El Banco 
de Santander), regional planning (El Ayuntamiento de Valladolid), government (Junta de Castilly y 
León) and higher education (La Universidad de Valladolid). This effort gains its competitive 
advantage through the high-level research done by the university system and the effective, results-
based nature of the business sector. 
 
The administrative staff at the Technology Park, unlike the case of the Advanced Manufacturing Park 
in SY, seems to be involved in adding value to the firms that are hosted into the park. The chart 5.1 
maps the possible services that a technology park can provide and the organisational choices that the 
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Park of Valladolid has been progressively made170. The map was reconstructed on the basis of the 
interviews with Mr. Jose Antonio Menendez, Director and José Pérez Marín, Head of the Innovation 
and network departments of the Technology Park. 
 
Chart 5.1 – Technology parks value chain – In bold the services provided by the Parque Tecnológico de Boecillo 
 
Source: Personal interviews 
The field work showed that: 
• the “hosting” of the firms tends to be full and goes well beyond the provision of floor service 
and basic infrastructure; more broadly, the scope of ICT (ICT) services is wide and the 
updating of the structure is frequent; logistics to and from the park are also conceived as both 
personalized (if needed) and shared (if cost arguments prevail) arrangement; 
• the “services” tend to be provided directly by the staff of the park and they are relatively 
simple; the staff is engaged in organizing trainings, workshops and the tutoring of firms in 
their spin off phase (business plan development of new candidates to be hosted by the park) as 
well as expansion or consolidation (mostly through the acquisition of grants from the region 
or the EC, within or outside the structural funds programmes); 
• through hosting and not hosting services a significant degree of “cooperation” is  developed; 
in fact, this has become a deliberate strategy and has overcome the stage when collaboration 
is basically meant to acquire higher bargaining power (discount on volumes, larger market 
                                                 
170 Interview with Jose Antonio Menendez, Director and José Pérez Marín, Head of the Innovation and Network 
(Departamento de Innovación y Redes) of the Boecillo Technology Park, Boecillo,  16th – 18th April 2008. 
Technology parks value chain
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Cooperation
(competition)
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Outsourced
Direct
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• Tutoring firms critical phases
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share in some niches, ..) and is producing integration of value chains that are the most 
important feature of the ecosystem that a park is nurturing.  
 
The nature and the results of the technology park were explained to us by the technology park staff, 
but also by some of the firms that are being hosted. We extensively interviewed the management of 
three firms - Ingeniería y Sistemas de Ensayos no Destructivos (ISEND), Proxima Systems, Cenit 
Solar, Proyectos e Instalaciones Energéticas - that are each representative of one of three different 
typologies of relationships with the park’s business system (roughly one for each stage of 
development of the technology park value chain that we have just shown in the map) and of an 
evolution in the nature of innovative firms that is interestingly dependent on the partnerships that 
they manage to develop within the park:  
 
1. ISEND – a high technological start up company - was the youngest of the three firms that we 
visited and as a consequence the less integrated into the park’s systems; even in the case of 
ISEND, however, the park was – according to the owner José Manuel Bernárdez171 - not only 
the logistic support, but also the guidance if not the possibility to outsource to the park’s staff 
some crucial activities like looking for government funding – which is a rather obvious 
activity to delegate to the park’s staff given their close link to the regional administration – 
and, more remarkable, “the scouting of prospective clients”  - which can be part of the 
relationship assets of the park; this support – although not as sophisticated as the one enjoyed 
by other firms that we visited – is crucial for allowing the entrepreneurs – normally highly 
skilled engineers – to focus on the development of technology which is obviously the core for 
start up firms;   
2. Proxima Systems is, instead, at a different stage of the park’s value chain; the owner Emiliano 
Muñoz172 was – unlike the founder of ISEND – not interested in public money because it is 
“too complicated to be managed” – and, instead, very keen on “pulling resources” and even 
more in “developing joint technologies” as they did by combining their remote control 
devices and the know how of other firms on how to build eco compatible and energy efficient 
houses; 
3. Cenit Solar (the oldest and largest of the firms hosted in the innovation hub of Valladolid) has 
been recognized a leadership of the park; it is Cenit Solar that - according to the interviews 
                                                 
171 Interview with José Manuel Bernárdez, Owner, iSEND, Boecillo, 17th April 2008 
 
172 Interview with Emiliano Muñoz, Owner, PROXIMA SYSTEMS, Boecillo, 17th April 2008 
 
 211
we were released by other entrepreneurs and by the park managers, as well as by its founder 
Alfonso Calderón Vergandone173 – that is leading most of the joint new markets/ new 
technologies development that involve various firms based in the Boecillo.  
 
All three cases (described extensively into the annex five) point to another even more profound 
impact of the technology park: by having firms and research centres working side by side, the firms 
themselves are changing their nature. The transfer of technology and knowledge does not have, 
anymore, suppliers and demanders but becomes a day-by-day circulation that spills out of formal 
agreements. This has created an ever changing ecosystem where firms and researchers share common 
marketing strategies, product development, funds raising ,and obviously research project. 
It is in this environment that – in a way which is similar to the one we reconstructed for the SY’ s 
technology park in Rotherham – the CYL programme (and innovation firms by and large) found in 
technologies applied to energy saving and energy generation their smart specialization. 
 
Similar considerations apply to other technology hubs like the Technology Institute for Agriculture 
(Instituto Tecnológico Agrario de Castilla y León - ITACyL174). The centre has, in time, increasingly 
become the leader of a number of researches that actively involve firms positioned at different stages 
of the agri food value chain. Moreover, ITACYL is, also, like Cenit Solar, leader in the development 
of relationships with European and South American organisations that give to CYL firms an 
international exposure seen as crucial to develop competitive advantages. Like within the technology 
park, business and research, firms and research centres become much more integrated and knowledge 
gets jointly developed and shared.  
 
5.5.2 The market place of know how in Murcia  
 
Partnerships are considered, in Murcia,  as in CYL,  crucial for innovation. According to the great 
majority of the actors we met in the field work, small firms have two main options: cooperate with a 
technological centre or collaborate with other firms. However, interviewees made clear that 
cooperative arrangements are difficult to achieve and that cooperation between companies is 
particularly complex.  
This is, also, true for mature industries like the agro food. As Angel Martinez Sanmartin, Director of 
Technology Transfer of the Centro tecnologico Nacional de la Conserva Y Alimentacion - a 
                                                 
173 Interview with Alfonso Calderón Vergandone, Owner, CENIT SOLAR, Boecillo, 18th April 2008 
 
174 Interview with Cristina León,  Head of the Technology Transfer Area, and others, ITACyL, Burgos,  16th April 2008 
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technology centre that in theory operates on a national scale, altough it is based in Murcia – explained 
to us “in a region like Murica, vertical cooperation is considered easier (in terms of creation and 
management) than horizontal cooperation: local firms prefer to cooperate with suppliers and clients, 
instead of competitors”. Moreover, the cooperating agreements are achieved with the intermediation 
of a public institution, like Universities, INFO or other technological centres which try to promote the 
creation of consortiums between companies. How is the regional system faring against such a need 
for partnerships? 
 
As far as technology parks, Murcia is positioned – if compared with CYL - in the opposite side of the 
spectrum. If CYL has been one of the pioneers of the concept, Murcia has been one of the laggards as 
far as developing places where to aggregate innovative firms. The absence of these networkers has 
been consistent with an approach to innovation where firms and universities do not interact like in 
CYL, and rather they exchange specific know hows demanded by firms and provided by universities. 
It is a pragmatic vision of the role that innovation can play in a region that does not seem to be able to 
afford an innovation based regional strategy aiming to create or sustain region’s competitive 
advantages. Even with regard to the agriculture and agrifood industry the difference with CYL is 
clear: whereas in CYL as Cristina León175 of the Institute in charge of research in agriculture 
described what she called “an innovation strategy in the agrindustry”, in Murcia “universities are 
waiting for a specific question raising from industry before acting” as Luis Almela Ruiz176, Director 
of the Departmement of chemistry applied to agriculture of the University of Murcia, told us. 
 
In fact, as far as the entire period we are observing – 2000 – 2006 – Murcia operated without  
technology parks or science parks, notwithstanding the allocation of more than 16 million euro within 
measures 2.52 and 2.55 of the Objective 1 programme that were explicitly dedicated to develop these 
kinds of infrastructures. 
Moreover, the park that is being developed seems to already display some important pitfalls as 
opposed to the basic requirements that a structure of this kind should have in order to respond to the 
expectations of promoting innovation.  
The technology park of Fuente Alamo, in the area of Cartagena, is an initiative by a local large 
company, Manuel Torres (wind energy and industrial equipment), two local banks (CAM and Caja 
                                                 
175 Interview with Cristina León, Head of the Technology Transfer Area, ITACyL, Burgos, 17th April 2008 
 
176 Interview with Luis Almela Ruiz, Director, Departmento de Quimica Agricola, Geologia Y Edafologia, Universidad 
De Murcia, , Murcia, 15th April 2008 
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Murcia), two business associations (Camara de Cartagena and Coem) and INFO. In particular, INFO 
has a participation of 43% into the project, Manuel Torres 11% Caja Murcia 22, CAM 22 .The 
remaining 2% is split between the two  business associations. The board of the park is composed by 
two people coming from each of the four major shareholders, one from each of the smaller 
associations, plus the rector of the University of Murcia, and the rector of University Politecnica de 
Cartagena.  
This shareholders’ structure has rendered the technology park a private initiative. This is a rather 
peculiar condition because almost all other technology parks are public (and, in fact, one may argue 
that they provide a “public good” that the market on its own may not provide). The most practical 
consequence is that while on one hand, the park can operate more easily, and construct and sell 
“parcels”, on the other, it cannot apply for public funds being allocated in a not competitive way.  
The technology park partially opened in 2005 and by 2006 the first five firms (amongst them the 
founder and co-owner of the park Manuel Torres, the Israelian BEL that is working on desalinization 
technologies, the pharmaceutical firm Villapharma) occupied their parcels. The technology park has 
now around 20 companies already settled, including high-tech multinational companies, like Siemens 
(which moved its corporate European R&D centre for biomedical research), Indra (the Spanish 
largest ICT company) and Bionet (engineering services). Moreover, two technological centres - the 
one for shipping industry and the one for energy and environment - are being established in the park 
together with the contact points (OTRI) of the two public universities. 
The further development of the technology park includes the intention to complete the portfolio of 
added-value services for the companies that will be hosted. However, until now only three people 
(director, and engineer for the physical development and a deputy director) work at the park with 
general management duties. The only service provided to companies is the logistics (the building, the 
electricity and heating, the gardening and more importantly the security) by an external body (the 
entidad de consercìvaciòn). Moreover, Joaquin Juan Aguera, the director of the park has 
acknowledged, that “it is not clear enough how they are different from a industrial park (“industrial 
polygon”) which is basically a real estate development initiative to host firms177”. 
It is, however, evident that for a long time, although things are now finally moving, Murcia – unlike 
CYL – has not been able to leverage on a concentration of innovative and high tech firms like the one 
that has gathered around the main technology park in Valladolid. 
The delay in the process of developing the technology park seems due to two main reasons: a) a 
priority given to this initiative that was much smaller than the one that we described in CYL; b) a 
                                                 
177 Interview with Joaquin Juan Aguera, Director, Technology Park de Murcia in Fuente Alamo, Murcia,18th may 2009 
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lengthy negotiation to find a compromise between conflicting interests. As Mr. Aguera explained to 
us “the clash of interests has been mostly on the plane of different municipalities” interested to host 
the park in order to minimize the distance from the park (that, in fact, at the end has been constructed 
in a rather remote location half way from Murcia and Cartagena), and to get the taxes that hosted 
firms are supposed to pay (whereas now it is paradoxically happening that the initial plant is 
expanding and going to enter into a municipality different from the one where it was supposed to be 
established). 
In the absence of adding value brokers, Murcia’s strategy has been the promotion of a business-
university market place that is used quite extensively – along with the creation of parks and other 
intermediaries - in the Spanish move toward modernisation.  
The model was created by the General Secretariat for the R&D National Plan in 1988 and  proposed 
the use of the University Knowledge Transfer Offices (KTOs) within the Spanish system for 
innovation. This program spurred the creation of oficina de transferencia de los resultados de la 
investigacion (offices for the transfer of research results - OTRIs) with the intention of strengthening 
the relationship between the worlds of science and business.”178 
The establishment of this body has led to a number of results. In 2005 alone, 9.916 R&D contracts 
were signed for a commercial value of 339 million €. This resulted in 336 national patent 
applications, 117 international patent applications, 116 license contracts and 88 new technology-
based firms.179   
Each research institution has created a transfer unit with the support of national dedicated 
programmes. The OTRIs, which employ research, administrative and commercial staff, are now 
carrying several activities180.  
 
The Centre for Technology Transfer assists with the procurements of contacts and contracts for 
projects and research activities. Prior to its establishment, each department within the university was 
responsible for contacting firms and obtaining the appropriate information for suitable research 
agreements. The OTRIs manage the collaborative research projects during the entire life cycle, and 
manage all the bureaucratic and accounting aspects, including relations with other administrative 
                                                 
178 RedOTRI Annual Report 2006 (2007). Red OTRI Universidades – CRUE. 
179 Ibid, p. 5. 
180 In particular the OTRIs are involved in: communication of the research activities of the Universities/research centres 
to local companies and stakeholders (one-to-one meetings through commercial staff and events); internal support for 
patenting; internal support for spin-off development (business plan, legislation, bureaucracy); internal and external 
support for regional and national funded schemes/grants applications; negotiation with external industrial/research 
partners and setting up of contracts; accounting and project management; management of patents and research results. 
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departments of the institution (for instance the public competitions for scholarships related to funded 
projects and other legal issues). As a consequence, for research projects the OTRI represents the only 
administrative interface both for researchers and for external partners. Moreover, software 
information systems for accounting and monitoring have been implemented to facilitate the 
management of funded projects. For all these reasons, the activities of local OTRIs have been 
recognised as one of the main changes in the local academic and research organisations in the last 
decade. The OTRIs are perceived as pro-active units, and thanks to their commercial unit and public 
relation activities manage to find an industrial partner in around 50% of research projects carried 
(with an increasing share year by year), overcoming the outcome of the usual networking activities 
carried by research groups to start projects. The ultimate objective of the OTRI is to put the 
researchers in the position to not waste resources on administrative duties and, therefore, to maximize 
their focus on their investigations. 
 
OTRI seems, in fact, more common in Murcia than in CYL. The reason for that is, according to our 
theory in chapter two, not entirely surprising. The broker of innovation between academia or business 
is more common in regions with a lower level of development of their innovation strategy; in a more 
advanced context there should gradually be a move towards a situation where universities (or 
individual researchers) and firms end up converging into innovative firms that integrate innovation 
and research together with the processes by which new products and processes get developed and 
streamlined. 
 
However, the general limit that, as Juan Francisco Pacheco Martín, Project manager of the OTRI at 
the University of Murcia told us, is that  OTRIs do not really have the capability to do marketing and 
“their staff does not have the time or the capability to visit firms and proactively identify their need of 
innovation along their value chain 181”. 
 
The other important feature of the relationship between universities and companies is signalled by the 
value of the projects that are being carried out by the universities as a result of demand from 
companies. As mentioned, in 2007 the University of Murcia managed around 500 projects for 9 Mil 
euro and  the University of Cartagena 250 for 1.9 Mil euro which sums up to an average value per 
project of less than 20,000 euro for the former and less than 10,000 for the latter. Most of the 
industrial applied projects are funded directly from business companies, which consider the academic 
                                                 
181 Interview with Juan Francisco Pacheco Martín, Project manager, Oficina de Transferencia de Resultados de 
Investigation, Universidad De Murcia, Murcia,  14th April 2008 
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groups mainly as engineering service providers. As a consequence, these projects, which are focused 
on finding technical solutions more than developing a long term research activities, are featured by 
very short duration, very limited funding and value added. Long term projects are mostly funded 
through public schemes and have an overall greater amount and greater value for the companies 
involved. 
 
The firms that we interviewed themselves confirmed the typology of relationship that universities and 
firms have developed (the field work described extensively into the annexes). They are both 
characterized by innovation that seems connected with Murcia’s traditions – Duralmond182 literally 
invented a process and a product (almond made wall coverings and ceilings)  and Hydraconta183 is 
specialized in finding technological solutions to irrigation as one of the greatest problems of Murcia – 
and they both established relationships with the local universities to better their products.  
In both cases the relationship between research and entrepreneur is of a kind where the firms asks for 
a specialized, precise quality improvement and no real partnership is being developed. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The comparison between Murcia and CYL provides a complement to the research in the UK, because 
unlike the UK here we are confronted with regions whose economy was traditionally centred around 
agriculture (whereas both Wales and Yorkshire face a massive problem of industrial restructuring) 
and they both have a similar institutional setting and level of autonomy from the government 
(whereas the devolution and the creation of the new regional government made Wales divergent from 
Yorkshire that at the same time - at the beginning of the programming period that we are 
investigating- delegated most of regional development functions to a newly established regional 
development agency). Moreover unlike UK the ultimate decision maker is in both regions the public 
administration. Yet notwithstanding these differences in Spain like in UK it is the gap in terms of 
capability of the programme manager to conceive a high quality innovation strategy and to engage 
innovators the differentiator that is capable to explain the differences in performances.  
 
The case allows to consider one of the European country that has witnessed both one the highest 
increase of the expenditures in R&D and of the priority that innovation plays in the political agenda 
                                                 
182 Interview with Pedro P. Carrillo González, Duralmond, , Lorqui, 14th April 2008 
 
183 Interview with Alfonso Corbalán Carreño, Hidroconta, , Santa Catalina, 14th April 2008 
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and in the regional development strategy. Consequently, the results of regional innovation strategies 
in Spain have been widely investigated (amongst others De La Fuente, 2002, Pilar, 2002, Rodriguez-
Pose, 2001, Puga, 2002) although these analyses have been focused more on a country wide 
assessment of the performance, rather than on a region specific identification of the reasons for 
differences in the outcomes (Landabaso et al, 2002).   
 
More specifically, our two regions provide a comparison between two situations that were very 
similar as far as pre existing conditions and endowment of public investments to be spent on R&D, 
and that yet achieved very different results in terms of multiplication of public effort into more 
durable private expectations and investments.  
 
At the beginning of the 2000 – 2006 period, CYL and Murcia had the same absolute value of R&D 
expenditures on GDP and were both exceeding the national growth rates on the same indicator by the 
same margin. The percentage of these investments coming from business was the same (40%) and 
both were lower than the national average.  
The percentage of funds available to research in both OB 1 programmes was similar and in both 
cases much smaller than the average that we observed in the UK cases. The two regional innovation 
strategies were believed to be constrained in both regions by the expenditures in research failing to 
reach the minimum critical mass necessary to compete (Rodriguez-Pose, 2001, Cuadraro, 1999) in a 
country that displayed - at the end of the nineties - a very polarized distribution of R&D investments 
(Coronado et al, 2008, Rodriguez-Pose, 2001) towards few industrialized areas (Madrid, Cataluna, 
Basque countries). 
  
However, notwithstanding these similarities the results between the two regions differed in a 
remarkable way between the beginning and the end of the 2000 – 2006 period.  
In fact, while both had allocated similar amounts of funding on R&D, the funds were dispensed of 
more quickly in CYL attracting more private investments than in any other Spanish region and 
significantly increasing the share of R&D expenses coming from business (to 58%).  
The opposite happened for Murcia where the percentage of expenditures on R&D coming from 
business actually dropped to 36%. As a result, whereas at the beginning of the programming period 
the expenditure in R&D per habitant was roughly the same, in only 5 years it became twice as high in 
CYL when compared with the Murcia.  
Moreover, CYL achieved the final goal of the OB 1 Programme which was to rise above, in terms of 
GDP per capita, the 75% of the EU average. Murcia did not reach the same result and failed to leave 
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the status of “less developed region”. If CYL exceeded the national and OB 1 average both in terms 
of growth rates of GDP per person and productivity, Murcia lag behind along both indicators. 
 
The Objective 1 programmes that we analyzed, can explain these opposing trends. The resources that 
they made available were significant when framed as a percentage of the regional GDP and, more 
specifically, funds dedicated to R&D represented a large percentage of public investments in 
research: therefore, as elaborated in chapter 2, we can safely assume that the explanatory power of 
factors other than structural funds, can be expected to be low. 
 
CYL concentrated more resources in the manufacturing sector than Murcia; likewise in CYL, the 
concentration was also geographically focused,  especially when we consider the allocation of funds 
meant to finance R&D infrastructure – on metropolitan areas like Valladolid. In Murcia, the opposite 
happened with the only two cities with a university getting a share of the money that was lower than 
their percentage of the population and, therefore, the structural funds spent in R&D tended to be used 
as a redistributive tool and get skewed towards to rural locations.  
The argument of agglomeration of R&D (Krugman, 1999) appears to find an interesting regional 
interpretation with one region accumulating few assets on city universities and the other diluting 
further the available funds and transforming investments in R&D into expenditures for incremental 
up grading of small firms in mature sectors (connected with agriculture). 
 
One is the consequence of more focus is that CYL OB 1 financed projects received three times the 
quantity of co-financing from business investors than the projects in Murcia.  
More broadly, the innovation measures appeared to have been designed in such a way that they met 
the demand from universities and firms more rapidly than in Murcia and that the funds were spent 
much faster. 
 
Beyond these results, the field work unveiled that decision making patterns and differences in the 
layout in the relationships between firms and universities (as for the table 5.8) were crucial - as 
envisaged by the thesis that this work is testing -  to determine differences in performance (in a way 
which develops the accounts of regional innovation strategies in Spain provided amongst others by 
Landabaso, 2007, and De la Fuente, 2002).  
 
 
 
 219
Table 5.7 – Main differences between Murcia and Castilla Y Leon along the innovation value chain  
 
Factors Murcia Castilla Y Leon 
Concentration of 
innovative projects’ 
portfolio and leverage 
on private funds 
Redistribution of funds towards 
rural areas 
Low leverage 
Concentration on university cities 
High leverage 
Organisation settings Separation of implementation 
processes between strategy for 
universities and strategy for firms 
Integration and strong political 
sponsorship  
Political accountability 
Partnerships Deliberate separation between 
demand (firms) and supply 
(universities) of innovation 
(where innovation is meant as 
incremental improvement) 
No leadership 
Strong priority on technology park 
where firms and universities partner 
and innovate together  
Presence of pre existing leaders 
(universities and multinationals) 
Performance Spanish OB1 region where the 
percentage of R&D expenditures 
financed by private firms has 
decreased the most 
Spanish OB1 region where the 
percentage of R&D expenditures 
financed by private firms has 
increased the most  
 
 
The decision making programmes in CYL are more streamlined with political and management  
leadership that appears to be clear both on a formal and informal plane, and  a higher integration 
between strategies that support universities and those that promote business innovation.  
More importantly, CYL has developed technology and science parks that act as hubs between firms 
and universities which have succeeded in developing strong relationships. 
It is interesting to see how both firms and research centres change progressively in their approach to 
research and as a result they become more similar (and this is a confirmation of behaviours that 
Wilson, 2004, and Blake, 2009, have noticed in innovation systems outside Europe). The park 
becomes an ecosystem whose leadership is not formally governed anymore by a public 
administration in a top down mode, but with the largest and more innovative organisation hosted by 
the park becoming the partnership leader. 
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In Murcia, for the entire programming period the issue of leadership between the Ministry of Industry 
and the one of Research was never solved. This was acknowledged by the same regional 
administration with the recent creation of a brand new ministry that may overcome the institutional 
impasse. 
In the meantime, a rather pragmatic model of an innovation market with clear distinction and 
separation between those who demand technological knowhow (mostly small firms) and those who 
supply it (mostly universities through their Office of technologies transfer) seems to have prevailed. 
The attempt to create more proactive technology centres has, instead, witnessed a multiplication of 
beneficiaries (ten against six in CYL and against 64 in the entire country) that have never achieved 
financial and economic independence from the regional administration. More importantly, no 
innovation hubs were finalized until very recently and, notwithstanding much discussion, the 
technology park is only partially utilized while the science park is still under construction. 
 
**** 
 
These variations in results, decision making and strategy implementation models do, in fact, point to 
two other higher level differences that – as it was confirmed by policy makers and programme 
managers  - differentiated the two regions at the start of the programming period in 1999.  
 
Firstly, the realization in the better performing region that higher productivity, and thus an 
investment in innovation, was the only way to accelerate GDP growth, whereas Murcia, instead, 
appeared to have the option to grow through immigration and cheap labour in more traditional 
industries. Secondly, the existence in the winning case of a potential source of leadership: a group of 
multinationals with international exposure; universities with great traditions; and a policy maker and 
a team of senior civil servants that clearly hold the ownership of the strategy and could focus the 
entire innovation strategy on solving the problem of scale without significant political bargaining. 
 
Moreover, like in UK, the two factors – capabilities of programme managers and partnerships - are 
correlated: it was the lack of places where academic pursuits and business could intermingle that 
prompted  Murcia not to integrate the two strategies for universities and firms and, consequently, to 
reduce the leadership of the regional administration. On the contrary, it was a stronger political 
leadership that made it possible in CYL to pioneer the concept of technology parks. 
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If the UK case highlighted the effects of having the decision making processes on innovation 
strategies brought back to the public administration as opposed to delegating it outside to a 
development agency, the Spanish case  concentrated on the difference that can be generated by two 
different organisational models that are both inside the public administration. The result is, however, 
similar: clarity of governance mechanisms and objectives, leaders and the presence of places 
dedicated to creating innovation through the development of partnerships, are crucial to improving 
the efficiency of R&D expenditures. 
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CHAPTER SIX - CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS OF FURTHER 
INVESTIGATIONS 
 
 
One of the more distinctive features of endogenous growth theory is the belief that differences 
between regions do not go away spontaneously and that these disparities are permanent because of a 
difference in terms of knowledge and research assets that are not easily transferrable from one region 
to another (as in Arrow, 1974, Kaldor, 1972, Lucas, 2001, and Romer, 1986, amongst others).  
The consequence for development policies is that lagging countries or regions must concentrate their 
efforts on filling this distance in terms of innovation.  
The influence of the theory on policy makers around the world has been large. Governments of some 
of the fastest growing economies in the world – including Singapore, South Korea, and more recently 
India, Brazil, China – have explicitly declared that innovation and research are their key priorities to 
achieve sustainable growth. In the meantime, the United States and Japan continue to consider the 
country’s propensity to produce technological breakthroughs as their greatest competitive advantage.  
The success of the endogenous growth theory has also been particularly high with EU policy makers 
who have, in recent years, made public investments in innovation the undisputed priority in the 
toolkit for  producing or stabilizing economic growth and for reducing regional inequalities. 
Endogenous growth theory is, thus, also the inspiring principle of the EU Lisbon Strategy (EC, 2005, 
2000) and of the most recent re-design of the EU’s cohesion policies (in the European Commission’s 
progress reports on economic and social cohesion, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2009).  
This priority has been confirmed recently (in the so called Europe 2020 strategy) and the recent crisis 
appears to have made it even more urgent to preserve social cohesion and to spend scarse public 
resources by targeting typologies of investments whose return can be higher. 
As a consequence of such a choice, 85 billion Euro of structural funds are being spent on innovation, 
with 50 billion in R&D and 81% of this in the poorer European Regions. The public investments 
allocated to R&D and to R&D investments in less developed regions become even bigger if we 
consider the co-financing of member states, regions, private firms (which double the contribution 
coming from the EC) and the framework programs that are outside cohesion policies but still finance 
investments in research. Moreover, the rise of public investments in the structural funds programs for 
the 2007 – 2013 programming period has, in fact, continued a trend that started in the 2000 – 2006 
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cycle, where the structural funds spending had produced a widespread catch-up process of less 
developed regions that have grown much more than the advanced regions in terms of investments in 
research.  
However, although there is substantial literature that deals with the importance of increasing the 
expenditures on innovation (EC, 2009, 2008, 2006a, 2003, OECD, 2010,2009, 2003, 2001, 1999 just 
to mention few), there is much less investigation into the factors that impact on the actual return on 
these categories of investments.  
This lack is particularly significant when it comes to the quality of decision making because statistics 
appear to contradict the optimism of the EU and other national and supernational agencies with 
regards to R&D investments. The statistical association of higher economic growth with higher 
absolute levels of R&D expenditures, as well as faster growth rates of R&D assets, is weak.  
Equally important is the evidence that notwithstanding the growth of public investments in R&D, the 
percentage of European GDP spent in research has not significantly grown, is per se a signal that, in 
fact, private investments were not stimulated by the public push which, then, failed to achieve one of 
its main targets. 
The correlation between R&D investments and economic growth becomes, in fact, even smaller 
when we observe the sub group of European regions that are defined as less developed.  
However, it also must be said that R&D was indeed central to the strategy of the few less developed 
regions that did succeed (like Castilla Y Leon and South Yorkshire, two of our cases) to largely 
outperform other areas.  
In general, it can be safely said that according to statistics, R&D investments appear capable of 
impacting upon economic growth more than other typologies of expenditures (see our section 1.3 but 
also Rodriguez- Pose and Fratesi, 1997) and yet the outcomes are very differentiated.  
What explains the difference in performance?  
Little has been attempted in terms of systematic identifications of performance of regional innovation 
strategies and of the reasons underlying these differences.  
Relative exceptions are authors like Wang, 2007, Rodriguez-Pose, 2001, Crescenzi, 2005 that have 
tried to define and measure pre existing conditions – human capital, specialization, accessibility to 
main markets – that may account for differences in efficiency levels, although the conclusions are 
still far from certain.  
This thesis chooses a different approach and start from the demonstration that even initial regional 
endowments – in terms of education achievements, propensity to spend on R&D, institutions, 
accessibility to markets - do not fully explain differences in performance: the cases that we have 
investigated demonstrate that similarly endowed regions showed very different outcomes and more 
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importantly that regions that started from poor endowments appear to have been able to break away 
from paths of under development by putting innovation at the centre of their development agenda.  
The field work tried to identify the reasons that may explain differences in performances and what 
the manager of a regional innovation strategy should then do in order to increase the likelihood of the 
success of the policy she is managing. 
 
This thesis is therefore meant to provide a contribution to better understanding the conditions under 
which public investments in research can be an effective tool for regional development. More 
specifically we have investigated the role of different organizations in the programme management 
and of different approaches to developing, maintaining partnerships amongst business, research, 
government and civil society and involving them within the implementation process. 
As such the thesis constitutes an evolution of the idea that less developed regions seem, in fact, to 
face an “innovation paradox” that is described in the literature on regional development and 
economic growth (amongst others see Landabaso, 2002, Miedlfart-Knarvik and Overman, 2002, 
Boldrin and Canova, 2001): it is indispensable to invest in their research base if the EU wants them to 
grow; and yet these regions appear to have significant problems when it comes to manage innovation 
strategies. 
They, in fact, face two problems that make it difficult for them to effectively spend in research. The 
first problem is the public administrations’ processes and, even more, specifically their culture which 
tends (not only in less developed areas) to conflict with the identification and promotion of 
innovation (for instance, Potts, 2009, Pellegrin, 2008, Milio, 2007). The second problem is an issue 
of scale according to which research investments tend to agglomerate where they already exist 
beyond some minimum critical mass (again Kaldor, 1972 and Krugman, 1999). 
 
Putting the problem differently, it seems that public administrations are incapable of retrieving the 
knowledge which is necessary to understand where to concentrate investments and specialize, and 
how to overcome a certain threshold of scale which is indispensable to be competitive in a global 
market. 
This is because according to some (Barca, 2009, for instance) public administrations are neither able 
to communicate with innovators that tend to be – especially in the less developed regions – small, nor 
to have a view on what is state of the art at global level in a certain research or industrial domain.  
In this context the design of the strategy risks being an imitation of what other regions have done 
whereas a creative approach to strategy design and priority selection appears indispensable to identify 
the possible “smart specialization”.  
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Moreover, the absence of what we called “administrative leadership” may determine either that 
implementation is captured by the strongest local interest or, alternatively, that resources are 
distributed to all possible categories of recipients proportionally to their size with no real choice: in 
both cases results will be sub optimal. 
 
Solutions to the paradox are not easily found: even the proposal to recentralize the management of 
regional policies does not seem to be the solution (Begg, 2010): the analyses of the policies’ 
performances in UK (Cooke and Clifton, 2005) and Spain (Serrano, 2004, Konstadakopulos, 2000) 
demonstrate that top-down managed and nationally conceived regional strategies will also fail to 
gather the local knowledge that is necessary to identify the niches where less innovative regions may 
find their advantages.  
Therefore, the question of understanding under which conditions regionally managed innovation 
strategies succeed is still to be addressed. Our hypothesis was that the higher capability of R&D 
programmes to generate economic growth depends on a number of factors that can be positioned 
along the phases of a chain -  the “innovation value chain” - through which a regional system can 
produce innovation. More specifically the productivity of R&D programmes is supposed to be a 
function of: a) the ability to concentrate resources on the industries (and academic domains and 
areas) where the region has better chances of developing a competitive advantage or to use a more 
recent and effective wording its “smart specialization” (McCann and Argiles, 2011);  b) clear 
decision making and implementation mechanisms at a programme level and independence of 
decision makers in the project selection from politics; c) coalitions amongst business, research, 
government and non profit actors that can propose, contribute or execute innovative projects and 
provide the leadership that can develop and maintain these alliances. 
 
The research considers the 2000 – 2006 R&D programmes financed by structural funds and the 
regional innovation strategies, in two regions in the UK – WW and SY,  and Spain – Murcia and 
CYL as cases of a wider phaenomena. The choice of the structural funds and of the period is due to 
the need to compare similar instruments but also to the fact that by selecting this programming cycle 
we are able to observe impacts that are supposed to require few years before unfolding (whereas the 
expenditures of the programme lasted until 2008 after the nominal conclusion of the period).  
The cases were selected considering that each couple was characterized by similar conditions at the 
beginning of the programming period, similar endowments of structural funds and yet the results 
have been very different in terms of productivity of R&D investments. 
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The research has – by and large – confirmed the thesis and raised some further questions that are 
worth investigating.  
Its conclusions are discussed in the next sections following the articulation of the innovation value 
chain that we just described.  
They can partially be scaled up to European regional innovation strategies not financed by structural 
funds and to programme managers of regional or national innovation strategies outside Europe.  
However  they of course have the potential to more immediately feed the debate on the EC budget 
review and on how the EC should use structural funds in the coming years. The last three sections of 
this concluding chapter will spell out the recommendations for the European policy maker, the areas 
of further investigation that this research calls for and the wider conclusions suggested by the 
research. 
 
 
6.1 THE IDENTIFICATION OF SUCCESS FACTORS 
THROUGH THE FIELD WORK 
 
We will start by summarizing the characteristics of the selected regions as far as the characteristics of 
the decision making processes that we analyzed, the main features of the partnership strategy that has 
been persued and the overall institutional characteristics that may have an effect on the other two. 
The overview gives the opportunity to add a cross country comparison to the analyses that we 
described in the “conclusions” sections of chapter four and five. 
The field work, in fact,  considered six features that constitute a further operationalization of the 
independent variables of hypothesis (the innovation value chain) that we introduced in chapter two:  
1. the degree of devolution of power and, therefore, autonomy of the region that according to 
various authors can make a difference ((Hooghe, 1996, Marks, 1996, Rodriguez-Pose and 
Gill, 2004);  
2. the balance of power between the public administration and the technocratic body (normally it 
is a regional development agency or a financial institution meant to finance SMEs) to which 
the design and the implementation of the strategy can be delegated; such relationship in the 
opinion of some (Morgan, 1997, Cooke et al, 2005) is one of the differentiators that is more 
able to discriminate between success and failure;  
3. the existence of a main technology park able to be the hub of innovation driven firms and 
research centres (as claimed amongst others by Yu and Jackson, 2011);  
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4. the capability to leverage on already existing partnerships that are not constructed ad hoc for 
the realization of the structural funds programmes and that thus tend to be focused on specific 
problems and objectives (that according to, for instance, and Batory and Cartwright, 2011, are 
crucial);  
5. the capability of the decision maker to resist pressures from local lobbies (as in David, Hall 
and Toole, 1999);  
6. the existence of accountability either at an administrative or political level so that the 
achievement of the overall programmes objectives matter for the decision maker (Mairate, 
1999). 
The results can be summarized – as for the table below - by tracking down which of the above 
features correspond to which of the cases we investigated. 
 
Table 6.1 – Main characteristics of the selected regions as far as organisation, partnerships and 
overall governance  
 
 Overall institutional 
characteristics 
Partnership strategy Programme management lay 
out 
 Devolution  RDA 
based 
(verus 
PA 
based) 
Existence 
of 
technology 
parks 
Pre existent 
partnerships
Involvement 
of local 
communities 
in project 
selection 
Accountability
South 
Yorkshire 
 X X X  X 
West 
Wales 
X    X  
Castilla 
Y Leon 
  X X  X 
Murcia     X  
 
The table appear to say that institutional characteristics are not necessarily the ones that make the 
difference.  
Although South Yorkshire has been advantaged by the decision of creating a technocratic body (the 
regional development agency and the programme directorate) operating outside the public 
administration, the case of Castilla Y Leon appears to say that decision making processes driven by 
public administration are not necessarily doomed to failure. And even if devolution seems to have 
had the unexpected outcome of exposing the innovation strategy to the pressure of local communities 
that then diluited it, in Spain the same degree of autonomy did not prevent the performances of the 
two regions from diverging much. 
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As for the hypothesis that we tested the programme management and the quality of the partnership 
appear to be able to explain a great deal of the difference in performances. However, the study 
allowed us to better clarify the specific features that can make an innovation strategy more 
successful: 
 
1. As far as partnership is concerned, the existence of “places” where innovators from different 
industries as well from different research domains meet appears to be consistently one of the 
characteristic that susseful innovation strategy meet (as for some of the intuitions in Arrow, 
1962, and Romer, 1986); in South Yorkshire (the ATM technology park) and in Castilla Y 
Leon (the BOECILLO one) the hub of innovators is essential for partnerships to be born and 
developed; 
2. An other feature that is present where the investments in R&D appear to be more productive, 
is the possibility to leverage on partnerships that pre exist the programme (like in SY where, 
in fact, partnership based organisations are the pillars of the strategy and in CYL where 
business relationships have only been furthered by the structural funds programmes) and are 
likely to last after its conclusion; the existence of these kind of relationshis make it more 
likely that partnerships are organized around specific purposes and problems (as wished by – 
amongst others – Leydesdorff, 2000, and Pellegrin, 2008); 
3. Leadership (that for instance, Wilson, 2004, sees as a pre condition to the development of 
underdeveloped) is essential and more specifically it is essential that the programme manager 
resists the pressures from local communities (or from local business interests); although local 
communities must be involved in the implementation of the strategy, it is equally important 
that all partners are involved only as long as they are able to contribute – with the information 
that they possess – to the problem solving exercise that above mentioned strategy pose to all 
participants (as this research and other authors – including Armstrong et al, 2001 – found); 
4. Accountability is also necessary and the concept can be interpreted (Head, 2011) both as a 
administrative accountability (whereas there is a responsibility of the programme manager on 
certain targets towards politics like in SY) and a political one (where, like in CYL, is the 
policy maker that has accepted the challenge to be assessed on the basis of the results of the 
innovation strategy). 
 
We will in the next pages detail more the outcomes of the field work that point to unveiling the 
overall conclusions that we just anticipated. 
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6.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING CHOICES AND THE 
IDEA OF SMART SPECIALIZATION  
 
One of the main challenge to doing innovation in a less developed region is (as programme managers 
in Castilla Y Leon demonstrated to be aware of) about the difficulty to reach the minimum mass (as 
warned by Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman, 2002) that can allow the achievement of a competitive 
advantage which is sustainable once the public aid is finished. This question implies a real innovation 
paradox (Oughton and Landabaso, 2002): public investments innovation is one of few policies to 
escape an underdevelopment and yet to invest public money in R&D can imply a severe loss of 
overall efficiency of public investments, as opposed to alternatively spend money in regions where 
research assets are larger (Rodriguez-Pose, 2001, Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman, 2002, Sapir, 
2003). 
  
The hypothesis that we put forward in the second chapter of this work, regarding the features of 
successful portfolio of publicly funded innovation projects is confirmed. More efficient programmes 
display two main qualifications: high capabilities to attract private funds and highly focused resource 
allocation patterns (where these features are consistent with the argument of agglomeration that we 
find in the researches carried by amongst others Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman, 2002, Krugman 
and Venables, 1995 or even Kaldor, 1972) . The thesis has also clarified the strenght of the 
relationship between these two factors. 
However, even more interesting was the way our selected regions decided where to focus an 
anticipation of the idea of smart specialization (JRC, European Commission, 2009) concretely 
deployed before the most recent theorization of the concept.  
In CYL a number of different technology providers grouped themselves around the unifying idea to 
provide solutions for saving energy and replace fossil one with renewables produced locally. Yet the 
space for investing in a totally different sector (highly specialized agrifood industry was not denied) 
so that variety (as for Cooke’s argument, 2007) was not lost. 
In SY the organisations that we interviewed concentrated their effort in researching and testing new 
joining materials for the steel industry: this was, in fact, a choice not of an industry but of a niche 
within that industry’s value chain (as in Porter, 2000).  
It was also interesting to notice that the selection of the possible competitive advantages was neither 
imposed in a top down fashion from the region or some consultant, nor deliberated bottom up 
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through lengthy democratic procedures. As we will elaborate shortly, partnerships amongs firms and 
research centres animating technology parks were crucial.  
This method was found to be essential to avoid some of the problems that concentration may still 
yield (as for the note written by Mark Harrison – JRC report, 2009 – on the unpleasant consequences 
of concentration imposed from above). 
 
The data of the OB1 programs first says that both pairs – the one in UK and the one in Spain - are 
characterized by a large difference between the more and less performing regions in terms of 
capability to attract private investments. For each euro of structural funds spent on R&D, the private 
money that is being used in co-financing the projects was three times higher in SY and CYL, 
respectively, than in WW and Murcia.  
This is consistent with the macro data, where the share of R&D expenditures coming from firms 
rather than government and higher education, has increased more in CYL than in any other Spanish 
region, whereas it has dropped in Murcia.  
 
Different abilities to attract private investments is strongly associated with concentration: the 
allocation of resources is four times more geographically concentrated in SY than in WW. In fact, the 
distribution of money in WW mirrors almost exactly the distribution of the population. The same 
applies to the Spanish case. 
More geographic concentration is, in fact, the consequence of more focused choices in terms of 
beneficiaries and industries.  
As said, the choice in SY has been one of not only choosing the traditional metal industry as the 
target, but also of focusing on the high end phase of the business system of this industry where 
special manufacturing of components and prototypes are produced.  
This decision is explicitly mentioned in the programming document that deliberately prefers high 
growth firms (with a bias towards steel making) and declares the intention to attract firms from 
outside. And as a consequence four specific organisations – each of them being an association of 
business, research centres and civil organisations – were selected as the champions of the innovation 
strategy. 
 
A similar choice does not emerge from the reading of WW OB1 programme which appears to be a 
rather generic transposition of EC guidelines.  
In fact, this is possibly a wider problem of the last generations of cohesion programmes: the need for 
regional programmes to be consistent with the EC’s guidelines which are imposed in a top down 
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fashion, appears to have produced some conformism that may have been detrimental to the 
emergence of distinctive choices in terms of priorities. Region specific strategies are, instead, 
indispensable given that resources are scarce and that the regions express different needs and 
potentialities (see Begg, 2002, on the hypothesis to apply a different “open” method of coordination 
to structural funds in the place of the adoption of guidelines and Scharpf, 2002).  
 
As a result, the picture of the recipients of funds is much more fragmented in WW than in SY. 
Moreover, firms benefit from only a small share of the money; they are all small and dispersed into a 
network of nine micro technology parks located in a number of rural, remote locations.  
 
In Spain the programmes are more similar because of stronger dependence of the regions both from 
the centre and the EC guidelines.  
Unlike UK, the differences in terms of concentration versus dilution of choices emerge in the stage of 
the selection of projects and recipients and the final result is the same as in UK in terms of strong 
differences in terms of concentration. 
An example is provided by the number of the “technology centres”. There are six in CYL and are all 
agglomerated in the same technology park; in Murcia, which is less than half the population and nine 
times smaller, there are ten similar centres which are more geographically dispersed. 
The two regions express, in fact, two different approaches: CYL’s strategy is focused on the 
identification of competitive advantages upon which to concentrate resources, whereas Murcia 
appears to adopt a redistributive approach. 
CYL concentrates the R&D resources in terms of industry (manufacturing where there is the bulk of 
R&D expenses) and geographical areas (the urban and university agglomeration of Valladolid). 
Murcia appears to use structural funds to correct imbalances in R&D assets across territories, where 
rural areas get a larger share relative to their population than the two cities – Murcia and Cartagena – 
where the universities are located.  
 
Although a different concentration of choices in terms of sector - industry or academic domain - 
appear enough to make a difference (as for our initial theory), the work also found that none of the 
regional innovation  strategies that we considered showed neither a systematic analysis of the value 
chain through which a competitive advantage in that sector was built nor a comparison against other 
clusters with which the region may compete.  
Therefore, although we may have in SY an indication of investing in high-end, research intensive 
activity within the metal industry and in CYL a suggestion to concentrate on industries that link ICT 
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and renewable energies, more specific choices were left to the main actors through which the strategy 
got implemented. 
 
 
6.3 THE PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT AS KEY FACTOR 
 
As for our initial hypothesis, the quality of the innovative projects appear to be associated to two 
conditions. Firslty, the capability to keep programme managers accountable for the results and to 
provide them clear enough levers of decision making in order to implement strategies (as in De la 
Fuente with regard to the Spanish context, 2002, and Bristol and Blewitt with regard to the British 
one, 2008). Secondly,  a layout that facilitates the independence of the technical decision maker from 
the public administration (as theorized by Morgan, 1997, discussing the case for the continuation of 
the WDA).   
 
However, the empirical work sees two main differences emerging as determinants of different 
abilities to express more or less focused strategies. 
  
In the UK case the real difference was at the level of autonomy of the main implementation body vis 
a vis local communities. This was the disadvantage of WW where  devolution had two rather 
unexpected effects. 
First, the RDA that had been, until 2000, one of the European benchmarks for the attraction of 
foreign investors and the realization of development programmes was absorbed into the regional 
assembly. This diluted the presence of performance based mechanisms and made a number of 
experienced professionals  to leave (in some cases to join other RDA including the Yorkshire 
Forward). 
Second, the presence of a regional electorally charged body exposed the entire process to the 
negotiation of the allocation of resources between the regional assembly and the local communities. 
The result was a distribution of money that closely mirrored the distribution of electorates.  
In SY, the selection of projects were delegated by the cental government to an RDA (created just at 
the time WW  dismantled its own agency: as a result independence was higher, the performance 
based mechanisms were more important, and the political bargain with local communities was 
smaller. 
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The integration of different levers to promote innovation is recognized as complementary to 
autonomy. The field work demonstrated that the fragmentation of the policies prevents 
empowerement of the programme management and, thus, it is a precondition to autonomy. The  level 
of integration amongst different innovation strategies was instead the most remarkable difference 
between Murcia and CYL. 
In Murcia such an integration did not exist in the 2000 – 2006 period where the R&D programmes, 
were separated between two different political (the industry and the research ministries) and 
organisation units (where a third meant to promote ICT triggered changes into public administrations 
was delegated to the economy ministry) mainly operating as a piece meal “seller” of opportunities to 
small medium firms and universities.  
In CYL the opposite appears to be true: a strong leadership from the President of the regional 
administration and the experiences of a rather small team of programmes managers could guarantee 
several important targets: an integration amongst regional innovation strategies aimed to reach 
different clients; clearer lines of responsibilities; a stronger - mostly informal - capability to promote 
partnerships amongst universities and business; and a higher capability to resist to the pressures from 
local lobbies to use innovation strategy as a redistributive policy.  
 
The field work also showed that in better performing regions higher level of empowerement of the 
programme management goes hand in hand and is reinforced by higher accountability. It is the case 
of SY programme that displayed fewer, more relevant and understandable indicators than the one in 
WW, suggesting for more accountability and transparency in SY. In Spain, accountability was 
ensured in a different manner: to similarly drafted programmes and monitoring systems, 
corresponded different political priorities with the CYL government explicitly asking to its electorate 
to be assessed on economic performance measurements and sharing these objectives with the 
administration. 
 
The institutional aspects - which according to some (Hooghe, 1996, Marks, 1996, Rodrigeuz - Pose, 
2004) can be the determinant of innovation programmes’ success - appear here less decisive if one 
cross reads the cases. Although the delegation to a regional development agency appears to be a key 
differentiator in UK and devolution seems the change that triggered a sharp decline in regional 
development policies’ performance in Wales, Spain allowed the comparison of two differently 
performing regions where public administration had a similar role and the degree of autonomy from 
the centre was formally the same.  
 234
The comparison says that you can still have successful regional innovation strategies where the 
programme manager is a regional public administration: in this case it is crucial that there is a 
political leadership capable to design the strategy and share the expected outcomes whereas 
partnerships are used in making decisions on specific projects.    
Institutions do, in fact, matter – as the UK case shows. However as found by others (Cooke and 
Clifton, 2005 as far as the opposite impact on Scotland and Wales of devolutions that were formally 
equivalent and yet concretely implemented in very different ways) the range of possible outcomes 
tends to be large and may depend on other less evident factors (like the differences in opinion 
making’s support for that particular institutional arrangement).  
 
However, on a more general level, the research conducted in UK and Spain, showed that all observed 
strategies share some common limits: none of the public administrations that we observed had 
developed neither the skills capable to have an internationally minded approach to regional 
innovation strategies,  nor the attitude towards risk that is necessary to encourage innovation (and to 
accept that some of them may fail). Moreover, none of them developed the knowledge management 
systems that would be essential (Davenport, 1998) to organize the knowledge generated by the 
execution of the experimentations that innovative projects imply.  
 
 
6.4 THE EVOLUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLE 
 
The thesis that we propose is completed by the idea that the technical – administrative and 
managerial – pre-conditions to a successful resource allocation pattern needs to be paralleled by the 
existence of partnerships that can make each phase of the implementation process more relevant to 
the needs and potentialities of the local economy and research community. The existence of these 
partnerships appears, even intuitively, fundamental – together with the concentration of choices – to 
respond to the problem of incorporating local information in the strategy (as for  the classical 
arguments of Sen, 1997, that have been more recently echoed by Barca, 2009) and getting other 
investors to also fund innovation in order to reach a critical mass of R&D assets which is necessary 
for achieving high enough levels of efficiency (Rodrigeuz-Pose, 2008, Midelfart-Knarvik and 
Overman, 2002, Krugman and Venables, 1995). 
 
The research demonstrates that the development of these typology of partnerships are not necessarily 
to be referred back to the existence of social factors like human (as in Rodriguez-Pose and 
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Crescenzi, 2006) or social (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993) capital. In fact, the observed 
regions appeared to be similarly endowed in terms of social factors. Effective coalitions, then, can be 
created but in order for this to happen it is necessary that priority is given to specific typologies of 
innovators and that specialized actors are dedicated to the development of those coalitions (Arrow, 
1962, Romer, 1986). 
 
The concept of partnerships is – in the context of this thesis – an evolution of the one we find in most 
of literature (amongst others Porter, 2000 and Leydersdorff, 2000, where a “triple helix” should link 
administrations, enterprises and research). The thesis has, in fact, suggested that the concept of 
partnerships must be developed considering three different factors. 
  
Firstly, the research confirmed that in order to be relevant, partnerships need to be oriented to solve 
common problems and not to be driven by negotiation on how to divide initial, available resources.  
 
A problem solving oriented partnership is distinguished both by a) instances when one of the partners 
dominates the others; and b) cases where partners can veto each other and decisions are taken in such 
a way that funds are distributed evenly amongst different interest groups and efficiency is lost in the 
dilution of resources (similar arguments can be found in Bauer, 2002, and Olsson, 2003, with regard 
to the application of the partnership principle applied to structural funds and, more in general, 
development programs). 
 
Secondly, the thesis reinforces the idea that it is necessary to add as a fourth element of the 
partnerships - alongside governments, firms and universities - non profit organisations which aim  
to promote the propensity to innovation within certain segments of the population (Putnam, 1993, 
Wilson, 2004, but also Craig, 2004, on the effects that partnerships with government can have on the 
autonomy and independence of voluntary sector organisations). NAMTEC in  SY is an example of an 
organisation whose mission is to make students and families more interested in metal industry and 
the opportunities that it may represent in terms of finding a job and developing valuable skills. The 
SY’s case also says  that the involvement of civil society works when there is a) a specific segment to 
be involved (students in our case, as we just reminded) and b) a specific objective to be achieved (in 
SY, it was to increase the attractiveness of the metal industry to new potential, highly qualified 
employees whose supply is vital for the survival of the industry). 
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Thirdly, the research confirmed that for cohesion policies applied to R&D programmes it is necessary 
to escape the trap of too much localism in the approach to project selections and beneficiaries; the 
relevance of relationships that goes beyond the region and that links the innovation system to other 
contexts across regions and countries (as Niosi and Zhegu, 2005, Ernst, 2005, found for other areas 
outside Europe). An example of this comes from the partnership based organisations operating in SY. 
These organisations’ mission is, in fact, knowledge-sharing and prototype development amongst a 
large number of UK and foreign firms and universities. Strong partnerships in SY , therefore, also 
intended to create the opportunity to engage in long range collaborations with research centres and 
firms located in other countries. This proved to be a powerful factor in pushing the Region’s 
investments into leading edge research and applications (such a finding is confirmed by other studies 
that found similarly evidence of the importance of internationally connected clusters in other 
European regions). 
 
Finally, the thesis also attempted to not only evaluate the presence and importance of this web of 
relations, but also to assess the possibility to develop these coalitions through an explicit strategy 
and, thus, through rules, as well as specific innovation aggregators and innovation intermediaries. 
 
We believe that the field work says that this is possible but also provides four main qualifiers of 
such feasibility. 
 
First of all, both WW’ and Murcia’s experiences underline the limits of mechanisms that are 
supposed to live for the duration of a development program and that are imposed from the public 
administration without considering the effective representativeness and added value of various 
partners.  
In WW, a formalistic application of the EC’s partnership principle produced such a large number of 
consultative bodies that – de facto – became detrimental to decision making. Strategic decisions were 
made by the regional assembly and project selection was delegated to the single local community 
within a budget distributed geographically to each of them. 
The situation is similar, although at a different level of the implementation process, in Murcia. 
Formal partnerships between universities and Ministry of Education, on one hand, and firms and 
Ministry of Industry, on the other, have resulted in the  separation of the innovation strategy in two 
strands – an innovation strategy for business and one for research. Formally the two components 
joined the same monitoring committee and “commission for innovation”; in reality there is an ex ante 
separation of the resources with no real effort to conceive an integrated strategy.  
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In fact, both SY and CYL point to a second finding: the importance of identifying and leveraging 
upon already existing alliances, working collaborations that preceded the programming period. The 
fact that they existed even before the development programme, makes it more likely that they are 
based upon the ability of the partners to provide value to  each other and  allows them to live even 
beyond the end of the programme. 
A strong example of such an approach is SY: partnership developments are facilitated by the fact that 
even before the establishment of the innovation strategy there were sector (in the case of our region 
metal) specific non-profit organisations (such as CTI, TWI, the factory of the future) that involved 
different stakeholders on the basis of the realizations to be carried out. Within these partnership 
models, universities and firms converge towards similar models both oriented towards the production 
of economic value through innovation. 
As a consequence, in SY the OB1 programme designs a much smaller and agile participation 
framework where few actors – capable of engaging with businesses, universities, governments, and 
civil society, both inside and outside the region – are involved on the basis of their concrete 
capability to generate projects and to test their feasibility. 
 
In Wales the approach to partnerships was the opposite: the asset of relationships with multinationals 
that WDA had developed was terminated together with the development agency. The idea to develop 
brand new mechanisms for encouraging business and universities to  engage in dialogue was, as said 
before, formalistic and did not yield any concrete results.  
 
Situations similar to SY happened in CYL where the programme could leverage on a technology park 
and on a consolidated web of relationships amongst businesses and universities hosted by the park 
that pre-existed the program. The Parque Tecnologico de Boecillo was, in fact, one of the first to be  
established in Spain in 1992 and two more parks were completed in CYL during the last 
programming period whereas a science park was recently started up. 
Technology parks have, in fact,  become in Spain, more than in other countries, the place where 
partnerships happen every day in the mode and with the scope that partners were willing to pursue 
(OECD, 2001) and CYL has been a pioneer and a benchmark in the practice. 
In Murcia, on the other hand, no innovation hubs were finalized until very recently and, 
notwithstanding much talk, the technology park is only partially utilized, while the science park is 
still under construction. The model that prevailed was that of a proper market with a clear distinction 
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and separation between who demands innovation and who supplies it. The consequence is that 
expenditures on R&D that tend to be small, incremental and rarely about proper product innovation.  
 
Third, the investigation of the technology parks (Advanced Manufacturing Park in SY and the 
Boecillo in Valladolid), pointed to a further finding that clarifies further our initial thesis on 
partnerships. 
Given that it is crucial to leverage on partnerships and leaderships that already exist, the intervention 
on the region needs to not be invasive. 
It is interesting to notice that successful technology parks (as the most frequent innovation promoter) 
appear to be characterized by a hands-off attitude which encourages firms to take the lead on the 
processes that are supposed to integrate the actors of these ecosystems.  
In the UK park, after the start up  the region did not leave any office and the firms took care of 
themselves. In Spain, it was Cenit Solar – a firm specializing in across the board technologies for the 
environment – that promoted and maintained not only partnerships but also a corporate culture that is, 
by now, shared by most of the firms in the park. 
 
Finally, strong partnerships also require leaders that are informally or formally the developers and 
maintainers of the coalition of interests around innovative projects.  
In SY there is a strong research base concentrated in some niches and, more specifically, on a 
university – Sheffield – that is recognized as excellent at international level in some departments 
(Engineering, Chemistry) and that is also home of some internationally recognized regional 
development experts that have been interacting with the programme managers.  
In WW universities tend to be smaller and not of the same level as the ones hosted in the East part of 
Wales; the firms’ size has dramatically dropped and with it the possibility to leverage on industrial 
champions whose knowledge and relationships could be used. 
 
The same differentiator that we just referred to for the UK, emerged in the Spanish case as well. 
Notwithstanding a similar propensity to spend in innovation and an initial level of economic 
development, CYL could leverage on a much more consolidated university base with two of the 
oldest universities of Europe located in the region.  
Universities together with some industrial champions – multinationals in the car making and 
Agrifood industry – provided natural leadership for the innovation strategies and for the development 
of project based partnerships. In Murcia the situation was more similar to Wales with no large 
university or innovation oriented firm capable of leading research strategies. 
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Leadership appears to be, in a sense, the ultimate reason to understand why some regions (relatively 
few in Europe, as we saw in the introduction) do succeed escaping a situation of stable 
underdevelopment, whereas this may contradict even the idea that there are path dependancies 
(David, for instance) that makes this difficult to happen. 
  
It is, thus, possible to develop partnerships through explicit strategy and publicly financed actors like 
the technology park. However this strategy needs to recognize and rely on leaders and collaborations 
that are able to stand on their feet and to even survive to the end of the programming period and of 
the aids. 
 
6.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR INNOVATION POLICIES 
 
Although,  as we will elaborate in the next section, some questions are left open by the research that 
we have conducted, a number of policy implications emerge from the study. They can be of more 
immediate interest for programme managers in charge of regional innovation strategies financed by 
structural funds, but can also be useful for designing and implementing programmes that aim to 
promote innovation outside the domain of the cohesion policies. These implications are structured 
according the main phases of the innovation value chain that we have been using as our 
methodological framework (section 2): the ability of the programmes to mobilize private investors 
alongside public ones as a pre-requisite for success; the need for each region to concentrate public 
investments in few areas and, thus, to understand where to focus its efforts in order to smartly 
specialize and achieve a competitive advantage ; the quality of the programme management as crucial 
to performance; the existence of partnerships based on sharing problems and objectives of 
development; and, ultimately, as a factor uncovered by the research itself, the need for leaders who  
are essential to initiate and protect the change that innovation necessarily produces within the 
business, research communities as well as within government and society by and large. 
 
Firstly, then, the mobilization of private investors can be seen not only as a condition to but also as a 
signal of success. It is a condition which can be expected to be associated with success as our cases 
demonstrate and this is for the rather obvious reason that a private investor risking its own money can 
be believed to be the best assessor of an increase in the expected return to investments produced by 
the additional expenditures in research undertaken by the state.  
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In fact, the association appears so strong that - as the comparisons in UK and Spain show - the 
amount of private money being attracted or mobilized by or because of the public investments, is per 
se a strong signal of success of an innovation strategy.  
This indicator may well become the most important to evaluate the performance of regional 
innovation strategies, whereas it looks otherwise difficult to detect early success of innovation 
strategies given that the outcomes of a public investment in R&D may take years before yielding its 
return.  
One further implication for the future of the importance of mobilizing private investors would be to 
involve specialized financial operators (venture capitalists, merchant banks) that may be willing to 
select the projects to be financed and to share the risk and the funds to be provided to the firms and 
universities to be aided. Return of the investments should, then, be split between the financial 
operator and the state, compensating the private investor of the country risk implied by the 
investment into a less developed region. 
 
Secondly, concentration of the investments in research is necessary and, thus, we expect that certain   
industry or academic domain and, thus, some geographical areas will be overrepresented in the 
portfolio of projects that are going to be successful. The expectation of the new economic geography 
is confirmed: to achieve a competitive advantage in the global market of innovation, a minimum 
quantity of R&D assets is necessary. The consequence is that programme managers should avoid  
using R&D as a redistributive tool so that investments get distributed to all stakeholders and areas 
internal to a region in proportional amounts (the mistake of using R&D funds in a redistributive 
manner was the one that WWand Murcia did). Preferences should go to the industry where 
competitive advantages can be achieved more quickly. At the same time, mechanisms that ensure that 
the rest of the economy interacts with the cluster of innovation that has been created should be 
developed.  
Moreover, in order for each area to have the possibility to achieve a significant scale in a certain 
niche, a new, wider definition of innovation appears to be needed. Innovation is still about creating 
new products or processes whose novelty can be judged against a global (or quasi global) prospective 
and which have the potential to increase social or economic value and thus, we cannot confound 
innovation with incremental improvements or with realignments to standards of quality that structural 
funds have frequently financed . However, in order for each region to be an innovator, we need to 
recognize that the domain in which innovation can be applied is much larger than the mainstream 
industrial production, and include services (like tourism in Spain), more mature sectors (like 
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agriculture in Murcia) and relatively small niche as well (like the high-end of metal industry where 
SY is finding its competitive advantage). 
Therefore, diversity amongst regional innovation strategies and amongst different mechanisms of 
implementing them should be encouraged. An excess of consistency between European, national and 
regional guidelines may have the side effect (especially in regions - like WW and Murcia- with less 
experience with managing development policies and lower administrative capabilities) of 
encouraging imitation. Differences in choices are a necessary consequence of what we just said in 
terms of specialization in order for everybody to afford to be an innovator (as for the smart 
specialization concept as in McCann and Argiles, 2011 and OECD, 2010). Differences in 
implementation mechanisms (for instance, procurement procedures) are, instead, necessary to 
concretely experiment novel ways to solve the problem that public administrations and especially less 
developed region’s administrations may, in general, have with innovation strategies. 
 
The third condition to success is, as for our thesis is concerned, that there must be a clear decision 
making process and accountability for results. Various implications emerge from the research.  
To start with, although different innovation strategies co-exist in all regions that we observed, it is 
essential for them to be integrated. The research, however, also shows that integration is to be tested 
not at the level of a general, abstract political intentions, but at the project  level where the concrete, 
day by day collaboration between universities, firms, government around specific objectives and 
problems gives substance to coordination of different actors’ activities. 
A further capability that appears necessary to programme managers for success is a mix of local 
knowledge and international prospective. This implies two challenges. 
The first is about obtaining information on which are the niches in which the region can manage to be 
state-of-the-art, will require the  involvement of the potential local innovators not adequately 
represented by mainstream entrepreneur associations and sometimes not even fully aware of their 
potential.  
The second is that having acquired local knowledge, the region will have to be  complemented with a 
vision of the characteristics of markets, competitors and possible partners in the international arena.  
Examples of these capabilities - dialogue between public administration and innovators and, more 
importantly, amongst innovators - are what the technology parks have been providing for a decade in 
CYL and SY. However, although CYL and SY did manage to partially solve the problem, our field 
work still demonstrated that public administrations do still have a structural problem with managing 
some of the activities involved in the design and implementation of an innovation strategy.  
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There were two reasons for this.  Firstly, the selection of the right sectors and within these the right 
firms requires a global vision of innovative processes happening within industries : as our research 
confirmed, these capabilities  are beyond the skills and the professional development path of public 
administrators. Secondly,  conceiving and  realizing innovation strategies requires a risk taking 
attitude that is simply not aligned to a public administration’s corporate culture and to its legal 
framework.  
Both the successful cases we investigated say that development agencies (Yorkshire Forward in 
Yorkshire and ADE in CYL) seem to be an effective solution provided they are held accountable on 
overall results (measured, for instance, on the volume of private investments being mobilized) which 
does not always happen (as in the case of Murcia’s Seneca and INFO).  
 
The fourth condition to success that we tested is the importance of partnerships amongst all actors 
relevant to innovation that are developed on shared objectives and problems to be solved. 
In order to do that, it appears that programme managers should leverage on the existing partnerships 
as much as possible (Wales demonstrated that to construct partnerships that are dedicated to the 
program and, thus, are supposed to be dismantled when the program finishes is risky). Coalitions 
must also be constructed on the basis of skills and must have the specific objective of producing 
certain innovation in business, society or academia.  
The formalistic application of the partnership principle imposed by the structural funds (and often by 
the European Commission) may have had the effect of promoting coalitions where all stakeholders 
are represented and this is counterproductive for innovation. Innovation is about change and, thus, 
about a challenge for incumbents: involving everybody makes the implementation processrun the risk 
of being captured or influenced by those who may have interests that conflict with such a change. 
 
There is finally a last message that emerges from the research as partially unexpected: leadership is 
necessary for innovation strategies to succeed (as both the Spanish and the UK cases demonstrate 
clearly) in order to have an effective programme management, encourage the development of 
partnerships able to get involved in the implementation of innovation strategies and to concentrate 
resources on certain possible typologies of beneficiaries. 
Leadership is likely to be something that cannot be constructed and yet its development can be 
consolidated either through a) scouting within industry, government, research or civil society of 
leaders that are not yet visible or b)  attraction from outside (even from abroad) of leading edge 
organizations that may provide skills, technologies, or advice to the region. 
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In any event the research appears to say that leadership is associated (as happened ten years ago in 
CYL and SY) to the priority that politics, business and society give to innovation as a driver of 
development and to the change that innovation unavoidably brings about. 
 
 
6.6 LIMITS OF THE RESEARCH AND FURTHER NEEDS 
FOR INVESTIGATION  
 
The research provides some answers in terms of the conditions given which public investments in 
R&D are an efficient policy for regional economic development. Concentration of the investments 
portfolio, quality of programme management and problem solving based partnerships appear crucial.  
Each of the findings show, however, limits in terms of its applicability to contexts wider than the one 
of EU cohesion policies and thus to each of them we can attach further possible research to be 
developed. 
 
Regarding the issue of the level of focus that the portfolio of innovation projects should express, 
although our work supports the idea that choices in terms of quantitative allocation of resources 
amongst sectors, areas and academic domains are needed, we did not explicitly investigate the 
question of the quality of such choices. 
In fact, between similarly concentrated portfolios of R&D projects, resource allocation can still differ 
in terms of effectiveness and performances because of  different capabilities to identify, within a 
certain industrial sector and along its value chain, the areas whose potential is higher.  
In fact, very rarely regional innovation strategies and, even less, structural funds programmes attempt 
to identify priorities on the basis of a diagnosis of competitive positioning of regional industries and 
identification of gaps along the value chain of firms and cluster of firms (as in Porter and Stern, 
2003). The analysis of operating programmes in UK and Spain said that diagnosis of a certain region 
is normally made by using macro economic data (for instance, comparing the percentage of the GDP 
that a certain region is spending in research with national or other regions’ averages) and, at the most, 
confronting industries in terms of growth rate and dimension (like the Murcia innovation strategy 
(2007) attempted to do). Competitive analysis of the selected industries appears to be beyond the 
expectation of EC and structural funds practices. 
Such a feature may have been encouraged by imitations amongst programme managers across 
Europe. The extension of the research outside cohesion policies may instead provide examples of 
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finer identifications of possible competitive advantages (and smart specializations as in McCann and 
Argiles, 2011). 
  
Interesting areas of investigation appear to exist also regarding the organisational features that appear 
to be associated to successful programmes. Enough evidence appears to support the idea that 
autonomy of the programme manager from politics and integration of innovation strategies are a 
precondition for drafting more effective strategies. However, there are situations that may alter this 
conclusion and that, however, do not apply to any of the regions that we examined. 
In the case where public aids become significantly attractive to private interests, the partial 
privatization of the implementation process may produce risks that may even be higher than the ones 
that exist where project selection and control happen within a public administration where legal and 
regulatory constraints may limit abuses. In the regions that we observed, the relatively small amount 
of money spent on R&D in the 2000 – 2006 programming period has minimised this danger and we, 
thus, could not assess situations where this risk had to be handled. The name of the game was more 
about convincing, with scarce funds, private investors to increase the priority that they give to 
research, rather than to protect public funds from appropriation by private firms.  
 
As far as integration of strategies goes, it would also be interesting to notice that unification of 
strategies and of their institutional owners can, in theory, produce the negative effect of a reduction in 
the differentiation in the approach towards firms as opposed to the one meant to reach universities. 
The two targets of beneficiaries require, in theory, different strategies to be outreached.  
However, structural funds programme managers do not – in almost all of the cases – design and 
deploy any communication strategy meant to explicitly involve specific public. Therefore, the 
potential problem that integration may produce cannot be appreciated within the cohesion policies 
implementation framework. 
 
The work done on partnerships backs up the idea that the measurement of the effectiveness of these 
alliances must go beyond the existence of formal mechanisms for different stakeholders to come 
together and consider the quality of the interactions amongst them.   
In fact, the work also suggests that the best strategy is not to impose new mechanisms of partnership 
development, but rather to leverage on alliances that already exist which may be more reliable in 
terms of the capability of partners to adopt a problem solving oriented approach in their relationships.  
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In this context, the limit of the research we conducted is that the differences between the two regions 
in each of the two national couple was in terms of pre-existing leaderships that are strong in the better 
performing region and weak or nonexistent in the worse performing one.  
We, therefore, could not evaluate  an explicit strategy aiming to counter the lack of such a leadership 
which could be tackled by either scouting smaller innovators in the region or “importing” leaders 
from other regions. 
None of our observed region systematically tried to do so. This is partially due to a framework and, 
more importantly, a practice where medium firms and other mainstream actors are the players that 
more frequently partner with public administrations. 
  
Moreover, with regards to the  importance of the long range relationships as a factor that can make a 
regional innovation strategy more competitive, we also need to acknowledge that very few  
innovation strategies are really international in scope; neither in the identification of the priorities, 
nor in the role that international partnerships can play. 
The insistence on the development of innovation strategies meant to foster relationships between 
local business and local universities, may have produced a vision (very clear if one reads the 
operational programme of Murcia, but present also in the other three regions) by which innovation 
systems may be seen as closed regional system. 
We, thus, cannot still compare existing innovation strategies with strategies that are conceived with a 
fully international approach, whereas if we extend the observation beyond Europe we may find – in 
the USA for instance – such examples. 
 
These open questions may correspond to the further development of our work, by testing the 
hypothesis that we tested and revisited outside the structural funds and European domain. 
 
 
6.7 CONCLUSIONS: ACTORS, HISTORY AND CHANGE  
 
Our hypothesis is confirmed: R&D programmes appear to be more productive when they are more 
capable of mobilizing private investments and when they are more focused on decision making in 
terms of choices of industries and academic domains to invest in. Moreover, it is true that these 
characteristics are associated to more streamlined and integrated decision making processes and to 
independence of the project selection phase from local lobbies. Additionally, it is fundamental to 
develop partnerships capable of engaging in a problem solving exercise all the actors whose 
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contribution (and information) is necessary for innovation strategies to be designed and for 
innovation to happen.  
There are, however, some further conclusions to which the test of the hypothesis leads. 
The George Bernard Shaw’s quotation mentioned at the beginning of this work refers  to the very 
nature of any innovation, of any (public or private) investment in knowledge (and of any research 
including the one that I am about to conclude): acquiring new knowledge necessarily calls for change 
in the way we produce (social or economic) wealth; it also means to “loose” something, to demolish 
(as in Schumpeter) something that existed before and that is made obsolete by innovation itself.  
The impression that this work leaves to the author is that often the problem with many regional 
innovation strategies and, more in general, with the approach of the EU to innovation, is that they do 
not allow for real choices to be made in terms of resource allocation, clarity of decision making 
processes, or of partners to be involved. Such choices are naturally associated to changes, even to the 
disruptive change without which the ability of innovation to improve prosperity of societies is 
drastically reduced. Real change, however, is supposed to happen at all levels: industry structure, 
demand as well as organization settings, layout of the relationships of government with business, 
universities, civil society. However,  the logic of cohesion policies appear to be somewhat contrary to 
disruptive changes and, in fact, the regions that we observed as being successful, seem to have 
achieved results because of the very reason that they deviated from that logic. 
More generally, the thesis supports an argument that - although consistent with common sense – 
appears not to have been acknowledged either by policy makers, much of the media or by a  portion 
of the academic debate.  
Outcomes of innovation policies (and by and large of any development ones) depends not only on the 
pre-existing conditions or quantities of resources which are normally determined by policy makers, 
but also on the allocational, organizational and relational choices concretely made by programme 
managers during the implementation processes.  
Finally, there is an even wider conclusion that this thesis brings about. The study of similarly 
endowed regions that achieved very different results but used similar amounts of public investments, 
seems to suggest that very different economic (and possibly even social) development patterns may 
spur out of similar pre existing situations, similar institutional arrangements and out of similarly 
organized and endowed policies. 
The idea of path dependencies (David, 1985, Gerard and Taymaz, 1998, but also Giannitis – JRC, 
2009 - on the possibility to more easily break when radical technical changes happen) where 
evolution is locked in by some inherited factors (human capital, institutions, research base) appears to 
be contradicted by another less embedded variable called leadership. Both our two explanations – 
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organization of programmes’ implementation and their quality of partnerships - for better 
performance, refer ultimately to decisions that are taken by individuals (or rather groups of 
individuals) that can make the difference and invert consolidated patterns. Underdevelopment is not a 
permanent condition. Policies that are carefully designed, capable of mobilizing public opinions and 
innovators and that are well implemented can make a region  break out from a low growth pattern. 
Moreover the research also seems to say that a precondition to leadership is a sense of urgency and of 
inevitability of change. This was the case of Castilla Y Leon that at the beginning of last decade 
could not count – unlike Murcia - on immigration and cheap labour to accelerate economic growth 
and understood that innovation was the only way to create development; and the case of South 
Yorkshire that did not have– like Wales – a history of successful attraction of foreign direct 
investments and decided together with the central government that scarce resources had to be 
allocated on the few competitive advantages that the universities and firms of the region could still 
count on.  
History, institutions and policies frameworks, thus, matter, and yet the destiny of regions and 
communities is not pre-ordained but can be changed by both leadership and an awareness of the need 
for change.  
This is in one sentence, the message that the author takes away from this work. It will be worthwhile 
continuing to study the applications of these factors to wider contexts given the intellectual interest 
that such questions raise and their importance for the possibilities of economic development of less 
advanced regions in an environment which is more and more confronted by the challenge – 
dramatized by the current financial crisis – of doing more with increasingly scarce resources. 
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ANNEX 2 – LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
 
 
ADMRC Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre 
 
CF Cohesion Fund 
 
CTI Castings Technology International 
 
CYL Castilla Y Leon 
 
EC European Commission 
 
EIB European Investment Bank 
 
ESF European Social Fund 
 
ERDF European Regional Development Fund 
 
EU European Union 
 
FDI Foreign Direct Investments 
 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
 
ICT Information Communication Technologies  
 
INE Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (National Statistics Institute) 
 
ONS Office National Statistics 
 
NAMTEC National Metal Technology Centre 
 
R&D Research and development 
 
RDA Regional Devolpment Agency 
 
SME Small Medium Enterprises 
 
SY South Yorkshire 
 
TWI The Welding Institute 
 
WAG Welsh Assembly Government 
 
WDA Welsh Development Agency 
 
WEFO Welsh European Funding Office 
 
WW West Wales 
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ANNEX 3 – FIELD WORK – NAMES AND DATES OF 
INTERVIEWS 
All interviews correspond to notes. Most of them were taped although some of the interviewees 
preferred not to be taped. 
 
West Wales 
 
6th September 2006 
Cardiff  
Damien O’Brien; Managing Authority Objective 1 
Sue Price, Head of Branch for Programme Management Division 
Business support, Tourism, ICT, R&D, Energy, Transport and Environment, Welsh European 
Funding Office 
Ed Sheriff, Economist for the Economic Research Advisory Panel 
Nigel Graddon, Technology and Innovation branch 
Paul Casey, Head of Research, Monitoring & Evaluation, Welsh European Funding Office 
 
16th April 2007 
Merthyr Tydfil  
Sue Price, Head of Branch for Programme Management Division 
Business support, Tourism, ICT, R&D, Energy, Transport and Environment, Welsh European 
Funding Office 
Paul Casey, Head of Research, Monitoring & Evaluation, Welsh European Funding Office 
 
14th May 2008 
Professor Phil Cooke 
Director, Centre for Advanced Studies 
Cardiff School of City and Regional Planning 
Cardiff University 
 
Dr Gillian Bristow 
Reader in Economic Geography 
Cardiff School of City and Regional Planning 
Cardiff University 
 
19th June 2008 
Richard Rossington 
Head of Science, Innovation & Enterprise Policy 
Welsh Assembly Government 
 
Professor Dylan Jones - Evans 
Deputy Director, Centre for Advanced Studies 
Cardiff School of City and Regional Planning 
Cardiff University 
 
Dr Gillian Bristow 
Reader in Economic Geography 
Cardiff School of City and Regional Planning 
Cardiff University 
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Adrian Healy 
Director ECOTEC Research and Consulting Ltd 
Expert of Regional Innovation Strategies 
Cardiff School of City and Regional Planning 
 
20th June 2009 
Steven Smith 
Director, Development Funding 
Finance Wales 
 
9th October 2009 
Virginia Chambers 
Director Technology & Innovation 
Welsh Assembly Government 
 
Adrian Healy 
Director ECOTEC Research and Consulting Ltd 
Expert of Regional Innovation Strategies 
Cardiff School of City and Regional Planning 
 
 
 
South Yorkshire 
 
7th September 2006 
Kevin Bennett 
Director 
Objective 1 Programme Directorate 
South Yorkshire 
 
10th November 2006 
Costas Georgiou 
Research and Evaluation Manager 
Objective 1 Programme Directorate  
 
20th March 2007 
Costas Georgiou 
Research and Evaluation Manager 
Objective 1 Programme Directorate  
 
Wendy Dodson, 
Project Manager 
South Yorkshire Business Link  
 
Gill Browning,  
Strategy Manager, 
Yorkshire Forward 
 
Alex Mc Whirter,  
Business support 
Yorkshire Forward 
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15th May 2008 
 
Barry Jackson 
Head of Finance and Management Services 
Castings Technology International (CTI) 
 
Professor John Baragwanath  
Project Director 
Advanced manufacturing research centre (AMRC) with Boeing 
The Factory of the Future 
 
Mark Roughsedge  
Technical Business Developer 
The Welding Institute (TWI) 
 
Dr. Richard Cinderey 
Programme Manager - Knowledge Transfer 
The National Metals Technology Centre (NAMTEC) 
 
16th May 2008 
Dr. Gordon Todd,  
Innovation Manager 
Yorkshire Forward 
 
Costas Georgiou 
Research and Evaluation Manager 
Objective 1 Programme Directorate  
 
18th June 2008 
Professor Harvey Armstrong 
Professor of Economic Geography at  
Sheffield University 
 
Bethan Sheridan-Jones 
Economic Reseracher, Chief Economist Unit 
Yorkshire Forward  
 
Costas Georgiou 
Research and Evaluation Manager 
Objective 1 Programme Directorate  
 
19th June 2009 
Bethan Sheridan-Jones 
Economic Researcher, Chief Economist Unit 
Yorkshire Forward  
 
Sue Richardson 
Evaluation Manager 
Yorkshire Forward 
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Bea Jefferson, Programme Manager 
Yorkshire Futures 
 
Castilla Y Leon 
 
15th September 2006 
Gregorio Munoz Abado 
Jefe de Servicio de Innovación Tecnológica 
Dirección General de Industria e Innovación Tecnológica 
Consejería de Economía y Empleo  
Junta de Castilla y León 
 
3rd May 2007 
Gregorio Munoz Abado 
Jefe de Servicio de Innovación Tecnológica 
Dirección General de Industria e Innovación Tecnológica 
Consejería de Economía y Empleo  
Junta de Castilla y León 
 
Francisca de la Fuente Lopez 
Servicio de Fondos Europeos 
Direccion General de Presupuestos y Fondos Comunitarios 
Consejeria de Hacienda 
Junta de Castilla Y Leon 
 
Daniel Miguel San José 
Vicerrector de Desarrollo e Innovación 
Universidad de Valladolid 
  
Valentín Fernández-Soto Vélez 
Director General 
Consejo Regional de Cámaras Oficiales de Comercio e Industria de Castilla y León 
  
Evaluator of the IOP, from the University. 
Olga Ogando Canabal 
Departamento de Economía Aplicada 
Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales 
Universidad de Valladolid 
 
 
16th, 17th and 18th April 2008 
 
Gregorio Munoz Abado 
Jefe de Servicio de Innovación Tecnológica 
Dirección General de Industria e Innovación Tecnológica 
Consejería de Economía y Empleo  
Junta de Castilla y León 
 
Javier Álvarez-Benedí 
Coordinador Área de Transferencia 
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Instituto Tecnológico de Castilla y León 
Junta de Castilla y León 
 
Daniel Miguel San José 
Vice-rector for Development and Innovation  
Director General  
Parque Científico de la Universidad de Valladolid 
 
Juan Girbes  
Professor 
Nutrition and Food Research 
Universidad de Valladolid 
 
Pedro Carasa  
Professor 
Historia Contemporanea 
Universidad de Valladolid 
 
Cesáreo Hernández Iglesias 
Professor 
Departamento de Economía y Organización de Empresas 
Universidad de Valladolid 
 
Jiménez Lopez 
Professor 
Experimental Physics Research 
Universidad de Valladolid 
 
Carlos Balbás  
Professor 
Theoretical Physics - Nanophysics 
Universidad de Valladolid 
 
José Manuel Bernárdez 
Owner 
iSEND 
 
Emiliano Muñoz 
Owner 
PROXIMA SYSTEMS 
 
Alfonso Calderón Vergandone 
Owner 
CENIT SOLAR 
 
Francisco Ciudad Bautista 
Departamento de Producción Vegetal y Agronomía 
Instituto Tecnológico Agrario de Castilla y León (ITACyL) 
 
Marta Hernández Pérez,  
Researcher, Molecular Biology Lab. 
ITACyL  
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Cristina León,  
Head of the Technology Transfer Area.  
ITACyL  
 
Pérez Marín  
Deppartemento de Producción Vegetal y Agronomía  
ITACyL  
 
David Rodríguez Lázaro,  
Researcher, Food Technology. 
ITACyL  
 
Luis Rodríguez Ruiz,  
Deputy Director for Agri-food Research and Technology. 
ITACyL  
 
Gabriel Villamayor, Head of the Agricultural Research Area. 
ITACyL  
 
Mª José Pérez Marín  
Jefe del Departamento de Innovación y Redes  
Parques Tecnológicos de Castilla y León 
 
Jose Antonio Menendez 
Director 
Parques Tecnolgicos de Castilla Y Leon 
 
Francisco Barredo 
Promotion of business projects 
Centors Europeos de Empresas e Innovacion de Castilla Y Leon 
 
Juan Carlos Estévez 
Director 
CIDAUT, Transport and Energy research and Development Foundation 
 
 
22nd April 2009 
 
Gregorio Munoz Abado 
Jefe de Servicio de Innovación Tecnológica 
Dirección General de Industria e Innovación Tecnológica 
Consejería de Economía y Empleo  
Junta de Castilla y León 
 
Carmen Verdejo Rebollo 
Jefe del Departamento de Innovación 
ADE Inversiones y Servicios (Agencia de Inversiones y Servicios de Castilla y León) 
  
Maria Lopez 
ADE Inversiones y Servicios (Agencia de Inversiones y Servicios de Castilla y León) 
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Juan Casado Canales 
Comisionado para la Ciencia y la Tecnología, y Director General de Universidades e Investigación 
Commissioner for Science and Technology, and Director General of Universities and Research 
Consejeria de Education  
Junta de Castilla Y Leon 
 
Juan Carlos Estévez 
Director 
CIDAUT, Transport and Energy research and Development Foundation 
 
 
Murcia 
 
14th September 2006 
Rafael Martinez Fernandez 
Director of Innovacion  
Instituto de fomento Región de Murcia 
 
Juan A. Aroca 
Jefe Departmento Innovacion 
Instituto de Fomento de la 
Region de Murcia  
 
Maria Jose Bernal Torres 
Relation with Servicio de Fondos Europeos 
Direccion General de Presupuestos y Fondos Comunitarios 
Consejeria de Hacienda 
Instituto de fomento Región de Murcia 
 
4th May 2007 
Rafael Martinez Fernandez 
Director of Innovacion  
Instituto de fomento Región de Murcia 
 
Juan Antonio Sanchez Martinez 
Director Tecnico 
Fundacion Seneca 
Agencia Regional de Cienca Y Tecnologia 
Region de Murcia 
 
 
14th, 15th April 2008 
 
Aurelio Jiménez Romero 
Independent Evaluator Murcia OB 1 Programme 2000 – 2006  
Business Development Director 
Red2Red Consultores S.L. 
 
Rafael Martinez, INFO 
Director of Innovacion  
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Instituto de fomento Región de Murcia 
 
Luis Almela Ruiz 
Director 
Departmento de Quimica Agricola, Geologia Y Edafologia 
Universidad De Murcia 
 
Sancho Banon Arias 
Food technology teacher 
Departamento de Tecnología de Alimentos, Nutrición y Bromatología 
Universidad De Murcia 
 
Juan Francisco Pacheco Martín 
Project manager 
Oficina de Transferencia de Resultados de Investigation 
Universidad De Murcia 
 
Pedro P. Carrillo González 
Duralmond 
 
Alfonso Corbalán Carreño  
Hidroconta 
 
Pedro Fernández Segura 
Hidroconta 
 
 
18th - 19th May 2009 
 
Joaquin Juan Aguera 
Director 
Technology Park de Murcia in Fuente Alamo 
 
Edoardo Osuna Carrello 
Director General de Universidades y Politica Cientifica 
Consejeria de Universidades Empresa e Investigacion 
Region de Murcia 
 
Julio Pedayuè Ruiz 
Unidad de Gestion del Plan 
Direccion General de Investigacion y Politica Cientifica 
Consejeria de Universidades Empresa e Investigacion 
Region de Murcia 
 
Esteban Salced Arias 
Asesor Facultativo 
Consejeria de Industria Y Medio Ambiente 
Region de Murcia 
 
Antonio Jose Mula Gomez 
Jefe de Servicio de Universidades 
 283
Direccion General de Universidades 
Consejeria de Universidades Empresa e Investigacion 
Region de Murcia  
 
Manuel Tarraga  
Area de Promocion del Espacio Europeo de Investigacion 
Direccion General de Investigation Y Politica Cientifica 
Consejeria de Educacion Ciencia e Investigacion 
Region de Murcia 
 
Angel Martinez Sanmartin 
Director Technology Transfer OTRI 
Centro tecnologico Nacional de la Conserva Y Alimentacion 
 
Rafael Martinez, INFO 
Director of Innovacion  
Instituto de fomento Región de Murcia 
 
Ricardo Pedraz González 
Independent Evaluator Murcia OB 1 Programme 2000 – 2006  
Director del Área de Consultoría Estratégica  
Red2Red Consultores S.L. 
 
Rocco Luigi Bubbico 
PhD Candidate in Planning  
School of Environment and Development  
University of Manchester 
 
 
Central government – Madrid 
 
21st April 2008 
 
Jose Luis Kaiser Moreiras 
Subdirector General de Programación Territorial y Evaluación de Programas Comunitarios 
Secretaría General de Presupuestos y Gastos 
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda 
 
Sergio Lopez 
Subdirector General de Programación Territorial y Evaluación de Programas Comunitarios 
Secretaría General de Presupuestos y Gastos 
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda 
 
Anatolio Alonso Pardo 
Dirección General para el Desarrollo de la. Sociedad de la Información 
Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología 
 
Miguel Angel Tejedor Garcia 
Jefe de Servicio de Seguimento de Fondos Comunitarios 
Ministerio de Trabajo Y Asuntos Sociales  
 
 284
European Commission – Bruxelles 
 
27th May 2010 
Mikel Landabaso, 
DG Regio, European Commission  
 
17th November 2009 
Mikel Landabaso, 
DG Regio, European Commission 
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ANNEX 4 – INTERVIEW GUIDES 
 
Research questions for firms 
 
The research questions for firms are structured in three sections. The first is about the firm and its 
market. The second is meant to measure the degree of innovation (if any) of the investment. The third 
has got the objective to evaluate the effects. The three parts may be compiled by different persons in 
the firm according to their capability to answer. 
 
The firm and the industry 
 
1. In which industry do you operate? 
 
2. Which are the main trends of your industry 
a. Competition on price 
b. Competition on quality of products 
c. Competition of product development 
d. Geographical expansion of markets 
e. Relocation of firms 
 
 
3. How would you define your firm? 
a. Private SME individual or family owned 
b. Private Large family owned 
c. Private large non family owned 
d. Owned by the state 
e. Multinational 
f. others 
 
4. Which are your firms’ competitive advantages? 
a. Costs 
b. Individual skills 
c. Brand  
d. Marketing 
 
5. Which are your firms’ areas to strengthen? 
a. Costs 
b. Individual skills 
c. Brand  
d. Marketing 
 
The experience with structural funds  
 
6. Are you aware that the operational programme xyx supports firms in your region through the 
measures abc? 
 
7. Have you applied for being supported (if the answer to this question is no skip to question ? 
 
8. What kind of support did you apply for? 
a. Grant 
b. Loan 
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c. Equity 
d. Indirect Support 
 
9. How much funds did you apply? 
 
10. Did you receive the aid? 
 
11. What kind of support did you receive? 
a. Grant 
b. Loan 
c. Equity 
d. Indirect Support 
 
12. How much funds did you get for and which is the share of the investments that you co 
financed? 
 
The effects 
 
13. Up to what extent did the investment supported by the operational programme xyz, measure 
abc imply a change into your product portfolio? 
a. It did not imply any change 
b. The change was only analysed; implementation did not start 
c. The change was marginal 
d. The change was significant 
 
14. What kind of production change was financed? 
a. Reduction of defects 
b. Marginal change 
c. Brand new product 
d. Information Communication Technologies add up 
 
15. Did the investment supported by the operational programme xyz, measure abc imply a change 
into the process? 
 
16. Up to what extent did the investment supported by the operational programme xyz, measure 
abc imply a change into your process? 
a. It did not imply any change 
b. The change was only analysed; implementation did not start 
c. The change was marginal 
d. The change was significant 
 
17. What kind of process change was financed? 
a. Manufacturing/ Floor  
b. Procurement 
c. Distribution/ sales 
d. Marketing 
e. Training/ skills 
f. Overall re organisation 
 
18. What is the value of the investments supported by the operational programme xyz measure 
abc? 
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a. Reduction of manufacturing costs 
b. Reduction of procurement costs 
c. Improvement of price/ margin on product 
d. Improvement of sales/ market share 
e. Improvement of skills 
f. Improvement of organisation 
g. Improvement of financial situation 
 
The outlook for the future 
 
19. In the last year has your willingness to invest in the firm ? 
a. Increased 
b. Stayed the same 
c. Decreased  
 
20. Did in the last year the possibility for you to consider relocation of your production activities 
increased or decreased? 
 
The answers will be treated confidentially and no relevance will have the identity of the single 
interviewee given that all data will be aggregated.  
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Research questions for Universities 
 
The research questions is structured in three sections. The first is about the University and its main 
features. The second is meant to measure the kind of investment (if any) has been realized. The third 
has got the objective to evaluate the effects. The three parts may be compiled by different persons in 
the university/ department according to their capability to answer. 
 
The university 
 
1. Which are the programmes being delivered? 
2. Which are the main research centres? 
3. Which is the size of the faculty and the student body? 
4. Which are the programmes that attract more students? 
5. Which are the programmes that are considered the most successful in term of producing 
research? 
 
The experience with structural funds  
 
6. How much do you know about the structural funds and its innovation related measures? 
7. How clear are the choices that the portfolio of innovation projects indicate and how are they 
relevant/ binding for your strategic choices? 
8. How much were you involved into the drafting of the strategies’ diagnostic and identification 
of strengths and weaknesses?  
9. Do you have any role in the definition of the processes by which funds within measures are 
allocated to specific projects/ beneficiaries)?  
10. Are you involved into the selection of projects? 
11. Were you involved into the development of monitoring systems? 
12. Were you involved into the marketing/ communication of the strategies? 
13. Were you involved into the identification of the objectives/ targets of the strategies? 
14. How strongly is considered the link between local companies and local universities?  
15. How much was favoured an approach by which businesses and universities alike are 
encouraged to find partners from outside?  
 
 
16. Have you applied for being supported (if the answer to this question is no skip to end)? 
 
17. What kind of support did you apply for? 
a. Technological infrastructure  
b. Costs of time of researchers 
c. Equity for spin offs 
d. Travel costs for developing network 
 
18. How much funds did you apply? 
 
19. Did you apply in a consortium? Were you the leader? How large was your share in the 
consortium? 
 
20. How many of your applications were successful? And how much funds did you get? 
 
21. What kind of support did you receive? 
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a. Technological infrastructure  
b. Costs of time of researchers 
c. Equity for spin offs 
d. Travel costs for developing network 
 
The effects 
 
22. What kind of effect did the structural funds funded investments have on the university? 
a. Improvement of the base of researchers 
b. Acquisition of an infrastructure  
c. Completion of an innovation process and acquisition of patent 
d. Creation of a spin off 
e. Increase of knowledge about how to acquire and manage projects 
f. Development and consolidation of network with other universities 
 
23. If the impact was in terms of university’s researchers asset base, did it happen through  
a. opportunities of research for current researchers 
b. attraction of researchers from other universities 
c. economic means to maintain current researchers 
 
24. If the improvement was in terms of availability of a technological infrastructure can you 
describe the infrastructure and how do you evaluate the effective use of the infrastructure? 
25. If the improvement was in terms of acquiring patents can you describe the contents of the 
patent and the kind of economic benefit that may accrue from its use? 
26. If the improvement was in terms of establishing a spin off can you describe the business 
proposition of the spin off and the kind of economic and research benefit that may accrue 
from it? 
 
 
The answers will be treated confidentially and no relevance will have the identity of the single 
interviewee given that all data will be aggregated.  
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Research questions for NGOS and opinion makers 
 
 
The questionnaire is structured in two sections. The first is about the segment of public opinions 
being represented by the interviewee. The second is meant to evaluate the relationship between civil 
society and innovation, and more in particular the opinion on the effects of structural funds funded 
investment in innovation.  
 
The association and the individual 
 
1. Which segment of the public opinion can more easily be associated to the interviewee? 
  
2. Which is the relationship between that segment and the interviewee? She or he is about 
 
a. interpreting its opinion 
b.  forming its opinion 
c. representing its needs 
 
 
3. Are there other bodies associable to that segment? 
4. How well associations represent that segment? 
 
The experience with structural funds  
 
5. How much do you know about the structural funds and its innovation related measures? 
6. How clear are the choices that the portfolio of innovation projects indicate and how are they 
relevant/ binding for your strategic choices? 
7. How much were you involved into the drafting of the strategies’ diagnostic and identification 
of strengths and weaknesses?  
8. Do you have any role in the definition of the processes by which funds within measures are 
allocated to specific projects/ beneficiaries)?  
9. Are you involved into the selection of projects? 
10. Were you involved into the development of monitoring systems? 
11. Were you involved into the marketing/ communication of the strategies? 
12. Were you involved into the identification of the objectives/ targets of the strategies? 
13. How would you define the attitude of citizens towards science, innovation, competitiveness 
(judgement to be distinguished by concept and segment of citizens)?  
14. What can be done in order to make the public opinions a force driving change? Were you 
involved into communication activities promoting the innovation strategy? 
15. Which are the priorities of citizens (segmented by demographic characteristics) as far as 
innovation goes? 
16. How representative are mainstream representative bodies (business associations for instance) 
and government? 
 
The answers will be treated confidentially and no relevance will have the identity of the single 
interviewee given that all data will be aggregated.  
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Research questions for Government and Public Administrations 
 
 
The questionnaire is structured in three sections. The first is about the type of public administration 
being interviewed. The second is meant to evaluate from the Pas point of view the types of the 
investments where the PA got involved. The third has got the objective to evaluate the effects and the 
outlook for the future. 
 
The institution 
 
1. Which institutional mission of your institution? 
 
2. Which is its status (public administration, agency, ..) 
 
The experience with structural funds  
 
3. How much do you know about the structural funds and its innovation related measures? 
4. How clear are the choices that the portfolio of innovation projects indicate and how are they 
relevant/ binding for your strategic choices? 
5. How much were you involved into the drafting of the strategies’ diagnostic and identification 
of strengths and weaknesses?  
6. Do you have any role in the definition of the processes by which funds within measures are 
allocated to specific projects/ beneficiaries)?  
7. Are you involved into the selection of projects? 
8. Were you involved into the development of monitoring systems? 
9. Were you involved into the marketing/ communication of the strategies? 
10. Were you involved into the identification of the objectives/ targets of the strategies? 
 
11. Which was the role of the central government versus the region in terms of selecting 
priorities?  
12. Which is the role of local administrations? 
 
13. Which were and are the main priorities of the e government strategies, which is specifically 
the role of the structural funds funded information society measures and how is e government 
supporting the innovation propensity of the region’s industry? 
 
14. Which is the relationship between the overall region’s strategy on R&D and the measures 
meant to fund R&D within structural funds? 
 
The results and the outlook for the future 
 
15. Which is your evaluation of the results of the structural funds investments in R&D? 
16. In which area would you believe that the results is having the bigger impact? 
a. economically valuable results 
b. improvement of skill base; 
c. knowledge on how to select and govern innovation programmes. 
 
 
17. Up to what extent did the structural funds switch investments decisions (so made investors 
that would not have undertaken the investment to do so)? 
a. Large extent 
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b. Enough 
c. Little 
d. Not at all 
e. Don’t know 
 
18. Up to what extent did the structural funds discourage to invest companies that di not benefit 
from the funds? 
a. Large extent 
b. Enough 
c. Little 
d. Not at all 
e. Don’t know 
 
19. Which are the main areas of improvement and which are the evolutions in the next structural 
funds programming period (2007 -2013) as opposed to the current one? Does the priority on 
competitiveness/ innovation change as opposed to the importance of investment in internal 
convergence/ support of marginal areas and segments of the population? 
 
The answers will be treated confidentially and no relevance will have the identity of the single 
interviewee given that all data will be aggregated.  
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Research questions for Technology Park 
 
 
The interview may be focused on the below issues. Interviews are normally followed up through 
remote interactions. In this case breakdown of activities and output numbers by site would be useful. 
 
 
1) Which sort of organisation model do your technology park has got?  How many sites do you have 
and if they are specialized what kind of specialization do they have? What kind of central office 
do you have (if any) and what kind of autonomy does each site enjoy? How many people work at 
central and local offices? Which is their status (civil servant or private contracts) and do they 
have any variable pay linked to results? How are results monitored and evaluated?  
 
 
2) Which phase of firms value chain do you support?  
a) Hosting and logistic support; 
b) funds raising; 
c) administration and fiscal services; 
d) sharing contact with suppliers and logistic; 
e) support on recruiting and training; 
f) internal floor and administrative processes; 
g) research; 
h) marketing and branding. 
 
3) Through which products are the above supports provided 
a) Direct service from your facilities; 
b) Matching with external partners or suppliers  
c) Direct financial support (with more or less intervention into the actual choice/ control of 
products/ suppliers/ partners); 
d) Internal networking 
 
4) What kind of marketing do you develop  
a) In the regions towards innovators and SMEs 
b) In the country towards SMEs and larger companies; 
c) Outside the country towards large companies 
 
 
5) What kind of other funds do you seek and through which processes from 
a) Public funders (EU, ..) 
b) Private and banks 
 
6) What kind of results do you monitor/ want to monitor and do you actually know? 
 
7) Which kind of (results – driven) institutional incentives are envisaged? 
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ANNEX 5 – FIELD WORK REPORTS 
 
South Yorkshire – Description of meetings and  organisations profiles 
 
Castings Technology International (CTI) is classified as a research and technology organisation 
(RTO) focusing in the fields of: casting design, materials development and selection, specifications, 
manufacturing technologies, quality control and testing and performance. 
The firm’s workforce consists of 114 employees based in three offices: Sheffield (40), Birmingham 
(14) and Rotherham (60).  Turnover, for the last year (2007), equalled £8.9m and the company seems 
to be growing steadily, as can be seen from the construction of a new building next to the current site. 
Five percent of turnover comes from the annual membership-based subscription services offered by 
the firm, while ten percent comes from grants. The remainder, and majority, is generated from the 
revenues earned from projects and consultancy service. 
Members of CTI are both small, specialized and large, multinational firms within the metal industry 
and research centres from UK as well as from Australia, Italy, France, Germany, USA, Japan, China, 
India, Brazil. It is, in fact, a rather peculiar arrangement because it realizes the sharing of knowledge 
amongst firms that are in competition and it embodies the concept of a partnership that spans at a 
global level.  
Membership is categorised in two levels: Full Membership who pay a maximum of £15000 or £2500 
per site and Associate Membership who users  pay from £1000 to £2500. Members receive technical 
advice and analysis on production and manufacturing and can make full use of facilities and services. 
The business model is most interesting because the firm reinvest any profits in the organisation 
development. This structure gives the members of the firm the ability to manage its growth and 
success. Each member has a vested interest since it pays a subscription fee and receives services from 
CTI, thus making cooperation an important factor. In addition, the board of directors is made up of 
elected volunteers that have an interest in the competitiveness and productivity of the South 
Yorkshire region. 
Services is, mostly, knowledge produced by research project that is shared or transferred to all or part 
of the members. Research product is, therefore, meant to be a sort of “common good” that members 
produce in a quasi open source method. 
CTI moved its headquarters to the Advanced Manufacturing Park in South Yorkshire in September 
2006. The very project of moving headquarter of CTI to the AMP was partly financed with OB1 
funds provided by the Yorkshire Forward and that – according to interviewees - would not have 
happened without the financing and the dialogue that took place between the programme directorate/ 
YF and the company that was looking for a new location. In addition, the organisation was awarded 
addition EU Structural Funds that were invested into new technologies, which would prove useful for 
its future operations and ultimately to its members. One of the technologies produced was the 
vacuum manufactured casting process. This technology yields a product with much higher alloy 
integrity and decreased weight. The practice has essentially increased productivity and sales by 
giving CTI the advantage of producing high-quality, lightweight castings. 
Overall, according to the Objective 1 Programme Directorate, three grants were awarded to CTI, 
totalling £4.111.515. The first grant totalled £346.214 and provided support for the development in 
the field of titanium casting expertise for the advanced manufacturing sector. £1.443.331 was then 
awarded for a second project, in order to produce technologies for the manufacturing of aluminium 
and titanium castings, which meet accredited air-worthiness quality. Lastly, £2.321.970 was allotted 
in order to help the advanced manufacturing programme developed by the organisation. In addition, 
the Yorkshire Forward RDA provided a great deal of funding for the construction of the CTI head 
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office on the AMP. However, the remaining funds necessary were privately financed by the 
organisation itself. The buildings are now owned by the company. 
Since moving to the Advanced Manufacturing Park, CTI has also seen a rise in international 
partnerships. Approximately thirty percent of its annual membership-based services are provided to 
firms in some of the largest global economies, such as India, China and Australia. Although the 
castings industry continues to shrink in the UK, the firm has continued to grow. Turnover continues 
to rise steadily each year and it has seen its membership grow in over forty countries. This is, also, an 
interesting feature of the approach to innovation in SY and it responds fairly well to one of our 
expectations of well functioning partnerships, as well as programmes capable to generate sustainable 
innovation: knowledge production is not considered as something to be kept within the region and 
exchanges of even quasi proprietary know hows are considered essential to make the process of 
producing and spreading innovation sustainable in time.  
Another partnership based organisation is The Welding Institute (TWI) which specialises in the 
field of R&D in materials joining technology. The firm offers a wide range of services to its 
membership, including: contract work, consultancy, expert advice, technology transfer and research 
and development. 
Established as in 1946, the company has now grown into one of the premier specialists of joining 
technologies for engineering materials. TWI not only focuses on the manufacturing aspect of joining 
technology, but also provides a long list of services and products, including: training and 
examinations, technology transfer, event hosting, case studies and publications, information services 
and computer software.  
Companies prefer to outsource services to TWI because they do not often have the high skilled 
expertise required within their own organisations. Thus, these firms can reap the benefits of the 
technology and knowledge fashioned at TWI, while keeping costs lower since it was not necessary to 
hire additional welding specialists. In addition, TWI members receive the Intellectual Property rights 
for all technologies developed. As for CTI, services is shared knowledge, with the difference of the 
TWI’ s products being more market oriented and the ones of CTI more focused on research. 
TWI’ s main office was established, and is still located, in Cambridge, England. However, the 
organisation has expanded its scope by establishing offices across the United Kingdom, the 
Americas, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Memberships now totals approximately 3500 
members, all of which pay a subscription fee for the services provided by the company. As a result, 
this steady growth in membership has led to increases in income and staff. This global presence has 
broadened relations with firms located outside the United Kingdom. Like for CTI, by establishing 
headquarters in other countries it has become possible for TWI to easily access a market that was 
once seen as unfeasible, due to language barriers and differences in general infrastructure. 
Staff is numbered at over six hundred individuals and continues to grow each year. In 2006, income 
went from £33.7m to £36.2m, an increase of 8%. Additionally, TWI has forecasted that a 10% 
compound growth for the 2007-09 business plan. 
The organisation received funding for a number of various projects throughout the years. The 
opening of the Rotherham office and a portion of the equipment housed at the facility were made 
possible with the arrival of EU funding. 
The first phase of funding was used in order to develop “advanced laser technologies for 
manufacturing applications” and totalled £975.800. The next funding request was used for the 
development and use of friction stir welding, which “offers radical changes in fabrication practice” 
and the possibility of “innovation opportunities and new markets.” The amount for this second phase 
equalled £1.000.000. Lastly, TWI received funding – £2.837.897 – in order to help establish its 
technology centre in South Yorkshire. 
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As an already well-established organisation before its arrival at the AMP, TWI was able to fund a 
significant portion of the construction costs through private sourcing. Yorkshire Forward funds, much 
like the EU Structural Funds, were used to help purchase the necessary equipment. 
It was also made apparent that there is a steady flow of cooperation between the educational and 
industrial sectors on the Advanced Manufacturing Park. This was best described during our interview 
at TWI Ltd. According to Mark Roughsedge, Technical Business Developer at the firm, this 
cooperation is seen as a “network of competence.” Collaboration is guaranteed because the businesses 
located on the park have established the necessary rapport in sustaining a high-level of sustained 
research and innovation. 
The Advanced Manufacturing Research Centre w/ Boeing (AMRC) is another example of 
partnership based organisation and unlike the first two is born out of an initiative of the university 
world and more specifically the University of Sheffield. It focuses on the development of solutions 
for materials-forming, metal-working and castings. The objective of the organisation is the 
improvement of the advanced manufacturing supply chain across the UK, and in particular, the 
Yorkshire and Humber area. The AMRC also hosts partnerships that include some of the principal 
leaders in the aerospace supply chain, including: Boeing, Messier-Dowty and Goodrich. This 
international partnership provides the firm with a unique insight on the services needed for the entire 
market. 
As mentioned the facility was produced through a partnership between the private sector, government 
and international academic institutions. This joint venture is quite interesting mainly because it calls 
upon the key interests of sectors that usually do not work together. The AMRC w/Boeing has a 
unique competitive advantage since its activity lies at a crossroads between academia, manufacturing 
and industry. This often leads to purpose-driven technologies that are based upon high-level research 
advancements often possible only in the academic field.  
Accordingly, AMRC w/ Boeing has seen a period of rapid growth since its inception at the Advanced 
Manufacturing Park. During its first year, in 2004, twelve individuals were employed at the facility. 
Currently, there are approximately seventy employers working on a number of projects. It is 
forecasted that employee growth will steadily rise though, with numbers reaching 150 workers within 
the next eighteen months. 
The research centre now has forty-one partners, which make up its main clientele base. Membership 
is divided between two categories: Tier 1 and Tier 2. The fixed cost of membership for all Tier 1 
partners is £200.000 per annum, while Tier 2 partners pay £30.000. Although the organisation 
focuses its main efforts on services for its partnership, research and development projects are also 
carried out for other organisations that do not pay annual membership fees. 
Funding was allotted to the University of Sheffield, since the AMRC is considered an off-campus 
department. The first phase of funding – which developed the facility that first housed the 
organisation – totalled £2.713.126. The building was considered an instrument that could “promote, 
secure and strengthen strategic Research and Technological Development projects with S. Yorkshire 
SME’s and major international companies.” The second phase totalled £3.000.000 and supported the 
construction of The Factory of the Future that opened in January 2008. As an off-site department, 
located at the AMP rather than on the main campus, the centre is “given fairly free reign” in terms of 
the activities performed, according to AMRC’s Project Director John Baragwanath. However, the 
centre is still responsible to the university and has several board members from the institution. 
AMRC is, therefore, not only a research centre but a campus and a place where demonstrations and 
lectures for a wider public takes place. As such it is an important link towards civil society. 
 
The mobilization of civil society is a specific mission of National Metal Technology Centre 
(NAMTEC). The organisation is a “non-profit, Research and Technology organisation” focusing on 
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the UK’s Advanced Engineering and Metals (AEM) sector. The organisation is fairly small as 
compared to the others visited during the fieldwork. Total staff equals thirty individuals, but annual 
turnover for the past year was £3 million. 
In terms of government relations, NAMTEC is considered a strategic partner with Yorkshire 
Forward. Recently, the organisation has been preparing a three-year Business Development Proposal 
with the agency. As strategic partner, NAMTEC supports the metals industry in the Yorkshire sub-
region on behalf of the RDA. Responsibilities will include: support programmes, marketing 
information, computer analysis, technical support, and communications events. In addition, 
NAMTEC supports Yorkshire Forward with the development of the regional strategy. The 
relationship will help both groups. NAMTEC will be provided with a great deal of representation, 
while Yorkshire Forward will receive information relating to the metals industry in the region. 
The organisation operates within three areas: research & development, desk-based research and case 
studies, and educational resources in the form of training. Although the organisation does not have its 
own research facilities, it does broker partnerships; thus, making the possibility of projects to be 
established. Through these partnerships, the development of best practices and new technologies are 
possible since NAMTEC is provided the use of off-site facilities. 
In a broad sense, NAMTEC works much like a technical consultation service. Two membership-
based services are available to prospective and current partners: the Titanium Information Group 
(TIG) and Special Metals Forum. TIG is a subscription service, which provides a technical and 
commercials service. Technically, members are given answers to any inquiries regarding titanium. 
Commercial opportunities are motivated by the collection of contacts interested in the purchase of 
titanium, which is then compiled and circulated to the membership. Lastly, promotion and 
representation is provided to members since NAMTEC attends a number of tradeshows throughout 
the year.  
Eighty percent of funding for NAMTEC comes from the public sector and the organisation is also a 
participant of the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) for research & technological development. 
NAMTEC received funding from OB1 in two phases: the first totalled £1.610.299, while the latter 
amounted to £349.737. The first phase was used for “Infrastructure Project Measure 1” and helped 
establish NAMTEC. The organisation – according to the South Yorkshire Objective 1 Programme 
Directorate – would be used “to assist in stimulating innovation and research and development 
through network and knowledge sharing.” 
As aforementioned, the public sector provides a substantial share of funding for the organisation. The 
organisation receives funding on the regional government level, by Yorkshire Forward, and the 
national level by the Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (formerly the 
Department for Trade and Industry). Twenty percent of funding comes from private sector contracts. 
The interview at NAMTEC was insightful with regard to the industrial situation of the region.   It was 
explained that the metals manufacturing industry may be successful, but the original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) of certain high-level goods (automobiles, aircraft or oil and gas platforms) are 
simply not present. The supply chain of the metals industry passes through the region, but the final 
components are made elsewhere. This is considered a vast weakness.  
This weakness, however, leads to an explanation of the strong relationship that organisations in the 
district – especially those visited during the fieldwork – have with external firms. The partnerships 
mentioned by each firm included well-known, international companies. 
The development of the university - industry relationship seems to be in its initiation phase though. 
Improvements will most likely continue with the establishment of businesses such as NAMTEC, 
which helps to promote the metals industry and train graduates and professionals. This plan could 
provide the necessary level of sustained flow of entry-level graduates and high-level professionals 
 298
into the traditional sector; thus, helping to improve the business outlook of the entire area. Moreover, 
changing the image of the industry by proving the importance of research and development is an 
important factor to attract graduates. 
 
West Wales – Description of meetings and  organisations profiles 
 
Finance Wales is the most relevant of the agencies still engaged into regional development still 
outside the public administration. Finance Wales is the financial vehicle to realize the creation of new 
innovative companies and spin offs as a key driver of the Welsh Innovation Strategy. Finance Wales 
was established in 2000 with the objective to  provide commercial funding (debt and equity) to small 
and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) throughout Wales, enabling them to realise their potential for 
innovation and growth at critical stages of their life cycle. 
 
The company’ s initial capital of 130 million GBP (provided by the Welsh Assembly for 15 million, 
the structural funds for 50 million - 70% from Objective 1 and 30% from Objective 2 - and by 
Barclays for the remaining 65 million) has been invested in 1,700 investments into Welsh SMEs 
which accounts for less than 100,000 GBP of support per firm.  
FW has got as its core business the provision of capital for “early stage”, “expansion”; MBOs, MBIs 
and employee buy outs that typically require much more significant funding per firm. 
 
The Technium is a network of micro technology parks dedicated to small inovative firms and born as 
a partnership between Swansea University and the Welsh Development Agency (immediately before 
the absorption of the agency in Welsh Assembly Government).  
The initiative was launched– in 2000 and the occupancy of the spaces that have been created is still 
less than one third.. 
One of the issues that has been debated is the assessment of the costs of the investments and of its 
maintenance is rather different, ranging from 260 million GBP to 52 million GBP (for the eight 
Swansea based Techniums). Different figures brings, of course, to very divergent assessments when 
it comes to understanding the return on investments of the incubators.  
 
Castilla Y Leon – Description of meetings and  organisations profiles 
 
Ingeniería y Sistemas de Ensayos no Destructivos, (ISEND), is a fairly new organisation, founded in 
February 2007. The firm focuses on the “investigation, development, production, installation and 
maintenance of data processing, electronic systems and mechanics for the inspection, measure and 
industrial quality control in the sectors of transport, aerospace, iron and steel, petrochemical, energy 
and other industrial sectors184. 
 
The possibility to be tutored in funds raising,  but also to scout prospective clients with the park staff, 
but also in partnership with other firms was mentioned by José Manuel Bernárdez, owner and 
technical manager at ISEND185, as the main competitive advantage provided by the association to the 
technology park.  
                                                 
184 Bernárdez, José Manuel. Personal Interview (16 April 2008) and InfoJobs.net. http://www.infojobs.net/isend 
 
185 Ingeniería y Sistemas de Ensayos no Destructivos, (ISEND), is a fairly new organisation, founded in February 2007. 
The firm focuses on the “investigation, development, production, installation and maintenance of data processing, 
electronic systems and mechanics for the inspection, measure and industrial quality control in the sectors of transport, 
aerospace, iron and steel, petrochemical, energy and other industrial sectors (InfoJobs.net. http://www.infojobs.net/isend ) 
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According to Mr. Bernàndez, ISEND has a “typical profile of a high technological start-up 
company,” with activities “strongly related with research & development” and it is one of the 
example of the effectiveness of the technology park based strategy. “The support coming from the 
regional government, and also coming from, the central government has been crucial for the firm to 
start operations 186”. 
 
The activity of the firm, for the first year of operation, was mainly focused on research & 
development. Rather than marketing an unfinished product, ISEND was able to focus all efforts on 
the process of innovation, ensuring that a quality good would reach potential clientele. These efforts 
were made possible through the help of structural funds. The arrival of public funding ensured that 
operations would continue and the organisation would not have financial troubles, even though its 
efforts were focused on innovation, not sales. 
 
The services attained from the technology park were seen as valuable to the firm. ISEND pays for the 
leasing of space, but receives a number of benefits from the park’s administration. The managers of 
the firm are often guided on how to go about the attainment of public funding. When deadlines for 
proposals for publicly funded projects are approaching, the firm’s managers are assisted with all 
aspects of the application process. 
 
It is, however, more interesting to understand that - according Mr Bernárdez – the park is supporting 
and, sometimes, even replacing the firm for selling possible projects to potential clients and 
government funding agencies.  
 
Not everybody does, however, believe to the convenience of looking for public funds. Proxima 
Systems187 was able to secure a public funding concerning a research & development project for a 
hydrogen producing power plant. Although public money was acquired, Emiliano Muñoz, owner of 
Proxima, stated that the process of “managing and getting the money [was] a real mess188.” The firm 
experienced a number of delays regarding the procurement of funds and it was questioned if the 
entire process was worthwhile. The problem was not, however, in the case of Proxima, associated 
with some pitfalls of the staff of the park, but with the adequacy of public funds procedures vis a vis 
the timing of R&D initiatives.  
 
More recently, the firm is often required to “pull resources” in order to develop new technologies for 
publicly funded projects. Although organisations at the park often compete with one another for 
                                                 
186 Bernárdez, José Manuel. Personal Interview. 16 April 2008. 
187 Proxima Systems was founded in 2004 and focuses on the industrial application of information technologies. They are 
mainly concerned with: monitoring and telecontrol of industrial and installation processes, automated information, 
industrial data processing, video security (closed-circuit cameras) and access control.  
The organisation’s main line of products gives managers the capability of monitoring and controlling the operations of a 
power plant (or a series of power plants) through the use of remote control access. Plant managers are able to receive 
messages and updates – on mobile phones or computers – concerning the current state of the facilities they supervise. 
With this hardware, these managers are given a number of capabilities, the most important being: oversight of problems 
experienced in the plant, shutting down the entire facility or its electricity and controlling important metres regarding 
overall operation and efficiency.  
For the most part, Proxima Systems services medium-sized industrial facilities and power plants (including photovoltaic 
power stations). Its partners include Cisco Systems, HP and Siemens Mobile. However, it is currently moving into the 
market of automated homes. Much of its hardware came about through a very specialised practice. It first took on certain 
projects for clients and saw that many other similar businesses experienced the same problems. Thus, by looking to 
answer one problem for one client, it established its main line of hardware: remote monitoring and control. 
 
188 Munoz, Emiliano. Personal Interview. 16 April 2008. 
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publicly funded R&D projects, they nonetheless continue to partner together. This can be seen with 
the partnership between Proxima Systems and Cenit Solar and Besel (both housed at the park) to get 
projects be funded. The cooperation between firms was seen as “harmonic,” since a high level of 
reciprocity, involving sales and project assistance, is attained between organisations. 
 
In any case, one of the possible future development of the portfolio of services provided by the park 
is a diversification of finance looked for, including private equity and venture capital. Innovative 
projects, in fact, require – according to the entrepreneurs that we met at the park – “much time and 
effort, and if the firm is not able to win public funding, it will nonetheless market the forthcoming 
product privately that can later be sold privately and on a more international market”. 
 
From the point of view of Mr. Muñoz, the single most important service provided by the park is, 
mostly, a knowledge management system  accessible “from so many places and formats in a way that 
is useful” for him and other employees at the firm.  
Managers at Proxima Systems seem to appreciate particularly the activities that according to our 
framework are supposed to support the development of corporate culture as well as the culture of the 
firms as part of the same system. Workshops and seminars are often organised for member firms, 
allowing managers to meet businesses with similar business and project interests. This often provides 
the easy outlet for gaining partners for publicly funded research and development projects in the 
region and looking for clients and suppliers. 
It is, however, interesting to notice the articulation of services being exchanged between the firm and 
the eco system of the park. Not only, in fact, the firm retrieve knowledge, it, also, offers services to 
other firms located in the park. Some of Proxima’s most prominent clients include: Apple Computers 
and Movistar, but also the Junta de Castilla y León, the above mentioned Cenit Solar,.  
 
Cenit Solar189 is, probably, the largest and up to some extent the most innovative firm hosted into the 
park. It is also a firm that was born and entirely developed within the park. Cenit’s owner confirmed 
to an even higher added value that the technology park provides: the integration of value chain and, 
thus, the further specialization of firms that can focus on their core competence. 
Cenit’s case is, however, a case where it is a firm and not the formal manager of the park, that has 
developed the leadership vis a vis the other firms. It is a leadership of approach to the market that 
other firms are acquiring. Cenit’s approach is very proactive and totally dedicated to quality.  
 
The firm, in fact, found its competitive advantage by providing free consulting to clients and 
potential customers. Energy audits are performed in order to realise the total amount of energy used, 
and then, alternative and more economical sources are then explored for the client. Much like some 
of the firms interviewed in the United Kingdom – in South Yorkshire – Cenit Solar also offers 
technical training and assistance. Classes and training sessions, at a number of various levels, are held 
for professionals when requested. For the most part, the organisation states that its main goal is to 
raise the competitiveness of its clients, in all areas. Solutions are based upon a holistic approach. The 
firm studies the nature of the environment, the building in which its product will be installed and the 
                                                 
189 Cenit Solar, Proyectos e Instalaciones Energéticas,  is dedicated to the design and installation of sustainable and 
renewable energy sources. However, its main product line is concerned with solar energy (both thermal and photovoltaic 
systems). Although the firm is quite young – founded in February 2004 – much of the staff has acquired a great deal of 
experience in the field of research & development for sustainable energy sources. Unlike many of the businesses found at 
technology parks, Cenit Solar does not limit its business activities only to the industrial sector. The design and installation 
of its products are done so that they offer solutions to all sectors – residential, commercial and industrial. 
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overall goals of its clientele. Thus, Cenit Solar assures that its solar systems will be environmentally 
safe, aesthetically appealing, and, most importantly, efficient for each client’s specific needs. 
 
This marketing and sales strategy has become the format that many of the firms in the park are 
following.  
This is true, however, also for R&D and product development: one of Cenit Solar’s main products, 
HelioStat, shows the competitive advantage experienced with being housed at the technology park at 
Boecillo. This product, which allows for the remote access of the solar energy system installed by the 
organisation, was furthered by the technologies developed by Proxima Systems. It is apparent that the 
close proximity of the two organisations made the partnership for the HelioStat project much simpler 
and efficient, in terms of cost and general logistics and planning. 
 
Murcia – Description of meetings and  organisations profiles 
 
The Universidad de Murcia Department of Chemistry did, in fact, contribute – thorugh its OTRI - 
to produce a lighter composite material to increase the almond product’s acoustic capability, 
durability and capacity to withstand fire at much higher temperatures, as well as stability toward 
ultraviolet radiation. The ability to develop this new material was made possible partly because of a 
300.000-euro financing by the Centro para el Desarollo Tecnológico Industrial (CDTi). In addition, 
the firm received a 90.000-euro subsidy from INFO in order to help develop the new material.  
 
Duralmond is specialized in producing wall coverings and ceilings. The firm’s most interesting 
feature is how exactly these materials are produced. Rather than using traditional components in 
forming their products, Duralmond has implemented a strategy that uses a conventional agricultural 
commodity in the region: almonds. The composite material – which produces the wall coverings and 
ceilings that can be displayed in residential or commercial buildings – is made from a mixture of 40-
45% crushed almond shells and resin. The shells are often considered a waste product in the 
agricultural sector. Nonetheless, the products provided by the company use this waste in order to 
produce a biodegradable, recyclable and aesthetic product. Additionally, the firm is able to provide 
products that mimic more traditional artisanal wood products at a much lower operating cost, since 
the composite mixture is manufactured rather than hand-crafted. 
Duralmond is one of the most innovative small firms in Murcia,  literally invented a process and a 
product – almond made wall coverings and ceilings -  and has established a relationship with the 
University  only for further product development.  
 
 
According to Duralmond’s owner and technical manager 190, in the future, the organisation plans to 
increase technological efficiency and improve the automation of the production process. The 
development of new machines has been mentioned, which will help improve the speed of production. 
Also, due to new legislation on improved fire protection, the firm plans to continue to increase the 
durability of its products to extreme heat. 
The relationship with the University is, in this case, seen as positive, although entirely on a technical, 
marginal improvement plane. 
                                                 
190 Pedro P. Carrillo Gonzales, Personal Interview (15th April 2008) 
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The story of HidroConta191 is not much different. The firm specialises in the field of hydration and 
irrigation; it offers services and manufactures products, such as: water meters, membrane valves, 
hydrants, backwash valves, pilots and accessories and mixing pumps.  
Through the use of funding, HidroConta has developed new technologies and averages two new 
innovative projects per year. The tasks assigned by HidroConta to the relevant department of the 
university of Murcia are, again, an example of a relationship which gets developed on mere technical 
basis. 
In addition, European Union funds assisted with the firm’s joint venture programme in Italy. The 
firm was able to establish a collaborative effort with an Italian firm, WaterTech, in order to increase 
its scope of services across Europe. Hydraconta’s owner and technical manager…192 remarked that 
non-financial assistance from INFO was also provided to the firm, in terms of establishing the joint 
venture safely and securely with as few problems as possible. Specifically, funds were used for legal 
counsel and travel expenses. 
  
  
                                                 
191 The main service offered by the firm is called HIDROCONTROL HC-2002-C. This telemanagement service provides 
monitoring, control and administration of the irrigation systems used by clients. If problems occur with a client’s water 
meters, HidroConta is able to adjust the measures all through the use of this programme. The utilization of an installed 
programmable receiving transmitter allows HidroConta to not only monitor the systems of all clients, but also regulate 
any problems without leaving the premises. 
 
192 Alfonso Corbalàn Carreno and Pedro FernAndez Segura, Personal Interview (15th April 2008) 
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ANNEX 6 – ADDITIONAL TABLES   
 
Table A.1 – Regression of GDP per capita growth rate on structural funds expenditures as a percentage of GDP. GDP 
per capita 1999 and percentage of population with a tertiary education diploma; EU Objective regions;2000 – 2006. 
Results 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      39 
                                                       F(  7,    28) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6726 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .01417 
Robust 
gdppccagr Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
rtdisftot~99 1,768469 0,9577659 1,85 0,075 -0,193426 3,730363
ter99  0,3722778 0,2535992 1,47 0,153 -0,1471966 0,8917522
gdppc99 -                      0,00000066   0,00000119  -0,56 0,583 -0,0000031   0,0000018  
at -0,0078647 0,0137768 -0,57 0,573 -0,0360852 0,0203557
de -0,0703887 0,0270917 -2,6 0,015 -0,1258835 -0,0148939
es 0,0111972 0,0074818 1,5 0,146 -0,0041286 0,026523
gr 0,0084628 0,0233772 0,36 0,72 -0,0394231 0,0563487
ir 0,0525174 0,012145 4,32 0 0,0276395 0,0773953
it 0,0450645 0,0452878 1 0,328 -0,0477033 0,1378323
pt 0,0345373 0,0363747 0,95 0,35 -0,039973 0,1090476
_cons -0,014125 0,065026 -0,22 0,83 -0,1473248 0,1190748
 
Gdppcaccagr: Gdp per capita compounded growth rate; rtdisftot: structural funds allocation in R&D measures; ter99: 
percentage of graduates on total population; gdppc99: Gdp per capita in 1999 
 
Table A.2 - GDP breakdown by sector, 2000, %, UK, Selected areas 
 
GDP BREAKDOWN 2000 
West 
Wales and 
The 
Valleys 
South 
Yorkshire U.K. Wales Yorkshire
Agricolture, hunting, foresty and fishing  2,0% 0,4% 1,0% 1,8% 1,3%
Construction 6,6% 7,5% 5,3% 6,2% 6,0%
trade; hotels and restaurants; transport and communication 21,1% 24,8% 22,8% 22,1% 23,5%
Financial intermediation; real estate 15,3% 17,6% 27,2% 21,0% 21,3%
Public administration and defence; education; health 
and social work 32,1% 26,7% 21,6% 30,6% 23,5%
Mining and quarrying 0,8% 0,6% 2,9% 0,6% 0,4%
Manufacturing 19,8% 21,5% 17,4% 15,1% 22,1%
Electricity, gas and water supply 2,4% 1,0% 1,8% 2,6% 1,9%
TOT 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
Source: Eurostat 
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Table A.3 - Objective 1, 2000 – 2006, Financial allocations (in mil euro), UK 
 
Programme Total costs EU 
contributions 
ERDF ESF EAGFF FIFG 
West Wales 4.023 1.934 1.163 615 133 23 
Mersey Side 3.631 1.389 931 453 6 0 
South 
Yorkshire 
3,088 1.221 834 365 23 0 
Northern 
Ireland 
1.493 929 537 285 78 29 
Cornwall & 
Scilly 
1.206 523 327 101 79 17 
Highlands & 
Islands 
864 320 190 62 38 29 
Total 14.306 6.317 3.981 1.881 357 98 
Source: Programming documents 
 
Table A.4 - Breakdown of employment, Year 2000, UK Regions 
 
  agriculture manufacturing Construction Wholesale Financial Public Services
United Kingdom 1,5% 17,9% 7,1% 26,5% 15,5% 31,2%
North East (ENGLAND) 0,8% 21,3% 6,6% 27,1% 10,5% 33,2%
North West (ENGLAND) 0,9% 20,4% 6,8% 27,5% 12,5% 31,7%
Yorkshire and The Humber 1,2% 21,3% 6,9% 26,8% 12,7% 30,9%
South Yorkshire 0,7% 21,6% 7,3% 26,7% 11,2% 32,5%
East Midlands (ENGLAND) 1,7% 24,0% 6,7% 26,9% 12,3% 28,3%
West Midlands (ENGLAND) 1,4% 24,4% 6,7% 25,8% 12,5% 28,9%
Eastern 1,8% 16,8% 7,9% 26,4% 17,6% 29,4%
London 0,2% 8,8% 5,6% 26,6% 25,9% 32,3%
South East 1,5% 15,1% 7,1% 27,1% 18,9% 30,1%
South West (ENGLAND) 2,1% 17,3% 7,5% 26,1% 15,0% 31,7%
Wales 2,7% 19,4% 7,7% 24,7% 10,4% 34,8%
West Wales and The 
Valleys 2,6% 19,9% 8,2% 24,3% 8,8% 36,0%
Scotland 2,4% 17,4% 7,8% 26,4% 12,5% 33,3%
Northern Ireland 4,9% 17,5% 10,2% 23,7% 8,0% 35,4%
Source: Office of national statistics 
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Table A.5 - Number of academic staff1  and distribution by RAE category – 2001, Yorkshire 
 
Institution Name 
Number of 
research 
staff 
Rating 
1 
Rating 
2 
Rating 
3b 
Rating 
3a 
Rating 
4 
Rating 
5 
Rating 
5* 
University of Hull  337 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 28,3% 37,0% 34,7% 0,0%
University of Lincoln  75 0,0% 13,3% 45,9% 40,8% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
University of Bradford  289 0,0% 0,0% 15,5% 2,3% 50,9% 27,5% 3,8%
University of Leeds  1.137 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 2,5% 27,8% 59,8% 9,9%
Leeds Metropolitan University  152 0,0% 4,1% 19,3% 70,7% 5,9% 0,0% 0,0%
Trinity & All Saints  10 21,1% 21,1% 15,8% 0,0% 42,1% 0,0% 0,0%
University of Huddersfield  127 0,0% 12,6% 34,2% 19,7% 7,9% 25,7% 0,0%
University of York  554 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 8,4% 8,2% 65,7% 17,7%
York St John College  33 19,3% 31,6% 38,6% 10,5% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
South Yorkshire         
Sheffield Hallam University  227 0,0% 0,0% 14,5% 37,8% 26,5% 21,2% 0,0%
University of Sheffield  956 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 3,2% 15,5% 62,5% 18,9%
Subtotal South Yorkshire 1.183        
Total Yorkshire 3.897        
UK 48.021 0,2% 2,4% 5,5% 12,5% 24,8% 35,9% 18,7%
1 By academic staff it is only considered the part of it that has been rated by RAE (category a and a*) and they are counted 
in Full Time Equivalent 
Source: RAE conducted by HEFCE, SFC. HEFCW and DEL, Higher Education Statistics Agency 
 
Table A.6 - Number of students and percentage of postgraduate and foreigners – 2006/ 2007, Yorkshire 
 
  Total all students Post graduate Foreign students 
University of Hull 22275 16,0% 13,3%
University of Lincoln 16705 8,2% 6,2%
University of Bradford 13600 33,0% 29,6%
University of Leeds 33315 26,4% 15,7%
Leeds Metropolitan University 39310 10,6% 6,6%
Trinity and All Saints(#12) 2690 15,2% 3,9%
University of Huddersfield 19740 18,1% 7,3%
University of York 13270 31,4% 21,6%
York St John University 6435 14,5% 3,1%
South Yorkshire    
Sheffield Hallam University 29700 25,2% 10,8%
The University of Sheffield 25700 28,1% 17,8%
Subtotal SY 55400     
Total Yorkshire 222740     
 UK 2478425 22,6% 14,2%
Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 306
Table A.7 - Regional Partnership, Objective 1 Programme, West Wales 
 
Objective Lead Body 
Human Resource Development HRD European Unit/ELWa - National Council 
Community Regeneration Welsh Council for Voluntary Action 
Agri-Food Welsh Development Agency 
Forestry, Countryside and Coastl 
Management The Forestry Commission 
Business Support Welsh Development Agency 
Entrepreneurship Welsh Development Agency 
Innovation and Research and Development  Welsh Development Agency 
Information Age Welsh Development Agency 
Tourism Wales Tourist Board 
Strategic Infrastructure Welsh Development Agency 
Source: Programming documents 
 
Table A.8 - Number of academic staff1  and distribution by RAE category – 2001, Wales 
 
Institution Name 
Number of 
research 
staff 
Rating 
1 
Rating 
2 
Rating 
3b 
Rating 
3a 
Rating 
4 
Rating 
5 
Rating 
5* 
Cardiff University  710,1 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 1,0% 11,9% 62,1% 25,1%
University of Wales College  240,6 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 84,3% 15,7% 0,0%
University of Wales Institute, 
Cardiff  58,0 0,0% 0,0% 23,6% 15,5% 60,9% 0,0% 0,0%
Royal Welsh College of Music 
and Drama 12,2 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
100,0
% 0,0%
University of Wales College, 
Newport  16,0 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 59,4% 0,0% 40,6% 0,0%
University of Glamorgan  161,5 0,0% 4,3% 50,2% 17,5% 28,0% 0,0% 0,0%
North East Wales Institute  28,9 0,0% 61,9% 0,0% 38,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
West Wales         
Swansea University 407,4 0,0% 0,0% 6,3% 33,4% 40,9% 16,0% 3,4%
Swansea Institute of Higher 
Education  16,8 17,9% 29,8% 52,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Trinity College  7,3 0,0% 58,6% 41,4% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
University of Wales, Lampeter  61,0 0,0% 0,0% 6,6% 21,6% 37,4% 34,4% 0,0%
Aberystwyth University 301,6 0,0% 1,1% 5,6% 31,4% 43,7% 4,8% 13,4%
Bangor University 268,1 0,0% 0,0% 2,6% 20,8% 44,9% 19,1% 12,6%
Sutotal WW 1.062,2               
Total Wales 2.289,4               
UK 
          
48.020,8  0,2% 2,4% 5,5% 12,5% 24,8% 35,9% 18,7%
1 By academic staff it is only considered the part of it that has been rated by RAE (category a and a*) and they are counted 
in Full Time Equivalent 
Source: RAE conducted by HEFCE, SFC. HEFCW and DEL 
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Table A.9 - Number of students and percentage of postgraduate and foreigners – 2006/ 2007, , Wales 
 
  Students % pg % foreigners 
Cardiff University 30930 25,3% 14,3%
University of Wales Institute, Cardiff 10910 29,0% 19,0%
Royal Welsh College of Music and Drama 660 22,0% 6,1%
University of Wales, Newport 9780 21,0% 4,4%
University of Glamorgan 25465 12,8% 12,8%
North-East Wales Institute  7400 7,3% 21,1%
West Wales    
Swansea University 15525 17,7% 11,3%
Swansea Institute of Higher Education 5800 20,9% 6,3%
Trinity College, Carmarthen 2480 13,9% 2,8%
 University of Wales, Lampeter 8925 20,6% 18,2%
Aberystwyth University 12245 20,4% 12,0%
Bangor University 14020 14,5% 7,3%
Subtotal West Wales 58995   
Total Wales 144140   
UK 2478425 22,6% 14,2%
 
Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency 
 
 
Table A.10 - Distribution of GDP by industry, 1999, Percentage, Spain, Regions 
Region 
Agriculture 
Mining 
and 
quarrying
Industry Construction 
Servic
es 
Wholesale 
and retail 
trade 
Financial 
intermediatio
n 
Public 
administrat
ion and 
defence 
Andalucia 4,2% 7,3% 11,9% 4,6% 36,0% 13,6% 9,3% 13,1%
Aragón 3,3% 14,0% 17,8% 3,8% 30,6% 11,9% 8,0% 10,6%
Canarias  1,4% 4,0% 8,2% 4,2% 41,1% 20,6% 8,7% 11,8%
Cantabria 2,7% 12,0% 16,6% 4,6% 32,0% 11,8% 9,7% 10,5%
Castilla y León 4,9% 11,9% 16,2% 4,3% 31,3% 10,9% 8,5% 11,9%
Castilla-la Mancha 7,6% 11,5% 16,5% 5,0% 29,8% 10,9% 7,0% 11,8%
Cataluсa 0,9% 14,4% 17,7% 3,4% 31,8% 13,5% 9,7% 8,5%
Comunidad de Madrid 0,1% 8,5% 12,0% 3,5% 38,0% 14,8% 12,8% 10,4%
Comunidad Foral de 
Navarra 2,3% 17,0% 20,9% 3,9% 28,0% 10,6% 7,0% 10,5%
Comunidad 
Valenciana 1,9% 12,3% 16,5% 4,2% 32,6% 13,7% 9,2% 9,7%
Extremadura 7,4% 5,9% 11,6% 5,8% 34,6% 11,5% 7,6% 15,6%
Galicia 3,9% 11,5% 16,4% 5,0% 31,6% 11,6% 8,4% 11,6%
Illes Balears 1,0% 4,3% 8,2% 3,9% 41,3% 23,0% 9,6% 8,6%
La Rioja 6,1% 15,7% 19,3% 3,7% 27,6% 10,3% 8,0% 9,3%
Pais Vasco 1,0% 15,9% 19,4% 3,4% 30,1% 11,6% 8,0% 10,5%
Principado de Asturias 1,6% 12,5% 17,7% 5,1% 31,5% 11,6% 9,2% 10,7%
Region de Murcia 4,7% 10,2% 14,3% 4,2% 33,3% 12,8% 8,8% 11,7%
Average 3,2% 11,1% 15,4% 4,3% 33,0% 13,2% 8,8% 11,0%
Source: Eurostat 
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Table A.11 - Composition of R&D expenditures, 2000, million euro, Spanish Regions 
 
  
Total 
Expenditures Firms Government 
Higher 
education Non-profit 
Spain 
    
5.718.988  54% 16% 30% 1% 
Andalucìa       542.156  33% 19% 48% 0% 
Aragòn       134.169  56% 16% 27% 1% 
Asturias       114.586  49% 13% 35% 2% 
Cantabria         35.942  25% 22% 45% 8% 
Castilla y Leòn       222.811  41% 8% 50% 0% 
Castilla-La Mancha       118.578  64% 9% 26% 0% 
Cataluna 
    
1.262.168  67% 1% 24% 1% 
Comunidad 
Valenciana       430.512  42% 9% 48% 0% 
Extremadura         56.537  26% 23% 50% 0% 
Galicia       209.457  3% 17% 50% 1% 
Madrid 
    
1.751.983  54% 27% 17% 1% 
Murcia       104.216  43% 16% 40% 0% 
Navarra         94.595  65% 2% 32% 0% 
Pais Vasco       459.617  78% 3% 18% 1% 
Rioja         27.377  61% 8% 31% 0% 
Source. INE 
 
 
Table A.12 - Ranking of the 15 largest companies in Castilla Y  Leon, 2006 
 
Ranking Company Sector Turnover (M€) 
1 Renault Espana Automobile 7274
2 Nissan Motor Ibèrica Automobile 3421,09
3 Iveco Espana Automobile 2702
4 Ebro Puliva Agro-food  2693,3
5 Michelin Espana Portugal Automobile 2601
6 Grupo Antolin Automobile 2189
7 Viajes Halcòn Tourism 1129,65
8 Grupo Lenche Pascual Agro-food  1057
9 Bridgestone Hispania  Automobile 990,75
10 Campofrìo Alimentaciòn (Grupo) Agro-food  968,46
11 Grupo Vaka Construction 717
12 Grupo El Arbol Distribution 711,1
13 Grupo Begar Construction 680
14 Europac Stationery 525,6
15 GlaxoSmithkline Pharmaceuticals 344,7
Source: Castilla y Leon Economica  
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Table A.13 - Distribution by province of R&D grants, Percentage, 2000 – 2004, Castilla Y Leon 
 
Province grants % of population % of grants difference 
Avila 369468,29 6,73% 1,32% -5,41% 
Burgos 4787511,17 14,68% 17,06% 2,37% 
leon  3368523,47 19,58% 12,00% -7,58% 
Palencia 247484,16 6,77% 0,88% -5,89% 
salamanca  3239200,17 13,70% 11,54% -2,16% 
Segovia 917168,17 6,42% 3,27% -3,15% 
soria  931555,64 3,68% 3,32% -0,36% 
Valladolid 12985883,87 20,71% 46,27% 25,55% 
Zamora 1219856,11 7,71% 4,35% -3,37% 
standard 
deviation    4.019.659  6,23% 14,32% 10,04% 
Source: Mid Term evaluation OB1 Programme CYL 
 
 
Table A.14 - Distribution by province of R&D grants, per mesure Percentage, 2000 – 2004, Castilla Y Leon 
 
  
% of 
population 
2.1 Tertiaty 
human 
capital 
2.52 R&D 
projects 
2.53 R&D 
equipments 
2.7 information 
society 
avila 6,73% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 3,93% 
burgos 14,68% 5,20% 22,66% 9,40% 16,32% 
leon  19,58% 22,01% 11,38% 3,09% 16,70% 
palencia 6,77% 0,00% 1,01% 0,00% 1,38% 
salamanca  13,70% 36,22% 6,08% 0,00% 21,79% 
segovia 6,42% 0,00% 2,20% 0,00% 7,01% 
soria  3,68% 0,00% 2,11% 0,00% 7,28% 
valladolid 20,71% 36,56% 52,62% 87,50% 15,04% 
zamora 7,71% 0,00% 1,95% 0,00% 10,55% 
total 100% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
 
Source: Mid Term evaluation OB1 Programme CYL 
 
 
Table A.15 - Ranking of the 15 largest companies in Murcia, 2006  
 
Ranking Company Sector Turnover (M€) 
1 Reguladora de Compras del Mediterraneo Pharmaceuticals (distribution) 1057 
2 El pozo alimentacion Agro-food  549 
3 Sabic (General Electric Plastics) Chemical – plastics 525 
4 Garcia Carrion Agro-food 445 
5 Mivisa Envases Metal packaging - Agro-food  431 
6 Polaris Desarrollo Tourism – Estates 274 
7 Viajes Soltur Tourism - tour operator 259 
8 Hero Espanasa Agro-food 225 
9 La Torre Resort Development Tourism – Estates 204 
10 Fuertes Promociones Commercial 163 
11 Zamora Distribuciones de bebidas Commercial (agro-food) 161 
12 Huertas Motor SL Commercial 152 
13 Diego Zamora Agro-food 150 
14 Himoinsa Electrical equipment 143 
15 AMC Grupo de Alimentacion Agro-food  134 
Source: Axesor  
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Table A.16 - Distribution by city (municipality) of R&D grants, Percentage, 2006, Murcia 
 
Municipalità grants % of population % of grants difference 
ALCANTARILLA      425.721  4,3% 16,7% 12,4% 
ARCHENA      115.750  1,9% 4,5% 2,7% 
CARAVACA        78.670  2,9% 3,1% 0,2% 
CARTAGENA      269.656  23,4% 10,6% -12,8% 
CIEZA        28.702  4,0% 1,1% -2,9% 
MOLINA DE SEGURA      361.085  6,2% 14,2% 7,9% 
MURCIA      953.174  47,3% 37,4% -9,9% 
SAN JAVIER        13.761  2,9% 0,5% -2,4% 
TORRE PACHECO      171.762  3,2% 6,7% 3,6% 
YECLA      129.762  3,9% 5,1% 1,2% 
standard 
deviation      280.983  14,53% 11,03% 7,55% 
Source: INFO Database 
 
 
 
 
